

# **Empowering and Engendering Governance Indicators**

Report of the UNDP-ICSSR Technical Workshop on  
Governance Indicators for Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive  
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## Glossary

CSDS	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
DIAL	Développement Institutions et Analyses de Long Terme
G1	First generation (indicator)
G2	Second generation (indicator)
G3	Third generation (indicator)
GIDD	Governance Indicators of the Doubly-Deprived
ICNRD	International Conference of New or Restored Democracies
IIM	Integrated Indicator Matrix
Lok Adalats	People's Courts (India)
Metagora	Measuring Democracy, Human Rights and Governance project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSCBP	National Statistical Co-ordination Board of the Philippines
NSDS	National Strategy for the Development of Statistics
NSO	National Statistical Office
OGC	UNDP Oslo Governance Centre
ONS	Office for National Statistics (UK)
PFC	Process Flow Chart
PPGS	Pro-poor gender-sensitive (indicator)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDSA	State of Democracy in South Asia programme (CSDS)
STATCAP	Loan programme of World Bank for Statistical Capacity Building
TFSCB	Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building (World Bank)
TI	Transparency International
UGI	Urban Governance Index (UN-HABITAT)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VIJ	Vera Institute of Justice

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## Executive summary

Recent work by the OGC and Eurostat found that existing governance indicators are used primarily by external stakeholders to compare and rank nation states. These measures are insufficiently pro-poor, gender-sensitive and subnationally disaggregated to assist policy-makers monitor and evaluate governance reforms at the country level.

The purposes of the workshop were (a) to develop a common framework for identifying national governance indicators in six countries to be included in UNDP's pilot project on Governance Indicators for Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Policy Reform; (b) to review and appraise existing methods and tools for measuring governance at national and subnational levels, and (c) to identify and discuss best practices and lessons to be learned from national efforts to use governance indicators for policy-making.

This report on the workshop proceedings is presented in four sections:

1. **Governance, Democratic Governance and Governance Reform** reviews briefly the debate among workshop participants as to how these key concepts should be understood in the context of the pilot project.
2. **Towards an Integrated Matrix of Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Governance Indicators** pulls together different methodological contributions to the workshop in a format which is operationally relevant to the pilot project.
3. **Issues Arising from Recent Innovations and Initiatives in Measuring Governance** appraises the country-specific material presented to the workshop.
4. **Implications for the Pilot Study** draws conclusions from the workshop for the design and implementation of the pilot project.

'Governance' encompasses UNDP's seven service lines. Workshop participants noted an additional governance dimension – that of corporate governance. It was suggested that indicators also be included for informal institutions of governance and the level of armed conflict which has a hidden gender dimension. 'Democratic governance' is a value-laden concept. The normative basis of the term as it will be used in the pilot study is provided by the 'rights-based approach to development' of the UN. It was also recognised that values vary within and between countries, so that the poor and non-poor may not share a common perception of what democratic governance is or should be. 'Governance reform' may be defined as a process of institutional change which aims for, and results in closer alignment of one or more service lines of governance with the values embodied in the UN's 'rights-based approach to development'.

Several different classifications of governance indicators were presented to the workshop, but these can be integrated into a single matrix for each of UNDP's seven service lines at the national level. Each integrated indicator matrix (IIM) combines distinctions between (a) different meanings of the terms 'pro-poor' and 'gender-sensitive'; (b) objective and subjective governance indicators; (c) different types of objective governance indicators; (d) different generations of governance indicators, and (e) core and satellite governance indicators. For purposes of illustration, outline IIMs are presented for Electoral Systems and Processes, and Justice and Human Rights.

Integrated indicator matrices serve several purposes in monitoring governance from a pro-poor gender-sensitive perspective. However, they need to be complemented by other instruments, such as process flow charts (PFC) which bridge the gap between each pre-defined service line and identifying a priority set of specific governance indicators. For purposes of illustration, a PFC is derived for the criminal justice system in Honduras. These charts illustrate the basic principle that the relevance of an indicator depends on the purpose(s) for which it will be used. An indicator which is appropriate in one context or for one purpose may be inappropriate in other contexts or for different purposes.

A variety of recent innovations and initiatives in measuring governance were presented to the workshop and several themes emerged from the discussion:

- The threats to the integrity of official statistics and how to overcome them.
- The advantages of collecting poverty data and governance data in the same instrument as compared with combining these data from different instruments.
- The need to avoid urban bias (or even capital city bias) creeping into governance indicators
- The value of achieving balance among different units of observation (households, firms, public officials) in studies of corruption, so as to cross-check results and generate informational synergies.
- The challenge of institutionalising new data initiatives within the national statistical system, so that they may be sustained.
- The inherent danger of any single indicator acting as a perverse incentive.

The richness of the debate at the workshop posed a big challenge to deriving practical implications for the design and implementation of the pilot study. Nevertheless, there was a consensus regarding the strategic questions which needed to be answered in order to take the project forward

- What should be the aims and outputs of the pilot study?
- What analytical framework or research design should be adopted for the study?
- What happens after the pilot is complete?

At least five objectives were suggested for the pilot study:

1. To identify a set of G1 and G2 PPGS governance indicators across UNDP's seven service lines.
2. To explore and promote innovatory ways of using governance indicators
3. To achieve some 'learning-by-doing' and build some capacity
4. To generate reliable information on the costs of producing and disseminating governance indicators

The central design issue concerns the choice of the six pilot countries and deciding how these countries should be used to attain the goals of the pilot. Selection criteria proposed by participants included:

- Willingness of the UNDP country office to participate in the study
- Willingness of pilot country government to undertake governance reforms and to use indicators for measuring them.

- Regional representation (at least one country from each UNDP programming region)
- Country size: the pilot study should include a mix of large and small countries
- Capacity of the statistical system: the pilot study should include countries with high and low capacity.
- Level of governance: the pilot study should include countries which represent different levels of democratic governance.

One proposal for the research design of the pilot would involve:

- Choosing at least one country from each region and including five regions (Asia, Africa, Arab States, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe). There is a strong case for choosing two countries either from Asia, which has the highest absolute incidence of deprivation, or from Africa, which has the highest relative incidence of deprivation. This leaves one country to be selected from each of the other four regions
- Assigning four UNDP service lines of governance to each country, of which one would be Policy Support and Dialogue on Democratic Governance, which cuts across all the others. This will allow broader and deeper coverage of six service lines than would be possible if each pilot country attempted to include them all. It would also permit comparisons to be made between three countries and three regions for any one of six service lines.
- In each pilot country, an attempt should be made to identify ‘quick wins’ whereby some PPGS-G1 governance indicators can be developed using existing administrative data sources.

Depending on the resources available for the pilot study, follow-up work could be developed in one of two directions:

1. Revised pro-poor and gender-sensitive governance indicators (most of which would be first generation) could be rolled out for a larger group of countries.
2. The results of the pilot could provide the basis for more refined work on governance indicators in the same six countries. This would allow the testing of G2 indicators which are likely to be superior to many G1 indicators.

The shorter the duration of the pilot study, the more limited the resources allocated to it and the higher the ratio of G2 to G1 governance indicators in pilot countries, the stronger is the case for choosing option 2. above.

## Introduction

The aim of this report is neither to reproduce material provided to the workshop as background papers or presentations, nor to offer a detailed and comprehensive account of all the discussions among participants. Rather, the value-added of the paper lies in two areas:

- i. It reports the main comments made on the presentations and flags issues which only came up in the discussions.
- ii. It attempts to develop the analyses presented and discussed at the workshop in ways which will be helpful to designing and implementing the pilot project.

The background to the workshop was a review by OGC and Eurostat of existing governance indicators and their data sources. This concluded that such indicators were used primarily by external stakeholders to compare and rank nation states, rather than as tools to assist individual countries undertake governance reforms. The construction of international league tables may provide some benefits at country level. In some, but by no means all cases, poor performers may improve their governance in response to peer pressure from the international community created by this process of ‘naming and shaming’.

Country rankings may also enhance the transparency and accountability of foreign aid allocations by some donors. Nevertheless, the current range of governance indicators is insufficiently pro-poor, gender-sensitive and subnationally disaggregated to assist policy-makers monitor and evaluate governance reforms at the country level. The methodological lessons to be learnt from the OGC/Eurostat review, together with an annotated bibliography of international data sources for governance indicators can be found in *Governance Indicators: a Users’ Guide* (UNDP/Eurostat, 2003).<sup>2</sup>

The purposes of the workshop were:

- To develop a common framework for identifying national governance indicators in six countries to be included in UNDP’s pilot project on *Governance Indicators for Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Policy Reform*.
- To review and appraise existing methods and tools for measuring governance at national and subnational levels.
- To identify and discuss best practices and lessons to be learned from national efforts to use governance indicators for policy-making.

The report is presented in four sections:

- **Section 1: Governance, Democratic Governance and Governance Reform** reviews briefly the debate among workshop participants as to how these key concepts should be understood in the context of the pilot project.
- **Section 2: Towards an Integrated Matrix of Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Governance Indicators** pulls together different methodological contributions to the workshop in a format which is operationally relevant to the pilot project.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs04/UserGuide.pdf>.

- **Section 3: Issues Arising from Recent Innovations and Initiatives in Measuring Governance** appraises the country-specific material from the International Conference of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) project, National Statistical Co-ordination Board of the Philippines (NSCBP), Développement Institutions et Analyses de Long Terme (DIAL), Metagora, Transparency International (TI), Vera Institute of Justice and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), which was presented and discussed at the workshop.
- **Section 4: Implications for the Pilot Study:** draws conclusions from the workshop for the design and implementation of the pilot project.

## **1. Governance, Democratic Governance and Governance Reform**

In a background paper (UNDP, 2005b), UNDP indicated that for the purposes of the pilot study, ‘democratic governance’ encompasses seven service lines:

- i. Policy support and dialogue on democratic governance
- ii. Parliamentary development
- iii. Electoral systems and processes
- iv. Justice and human rights
- v. E-governance and access to information
- vi. Decentralisation, local governance and urban/rural development
- vii. Public administration reform and anti-corruption

While participants agreed that different components of governance needed to be distinguished, concern was expressed that two sets of activities which might legitimately be included under governance were omitted from UNDP’s typology: corporate governance and informal institutions of governance.

### **1.1. Corporate governance**

The recent trend towards widespread privatisation of public sector assets in developing countries, together with an acknowledgment that private sector behaviour is a key determinant of the extent and nature of corruption in the public sector (UK Commission for Africa), suggests that corporate governance might usefully be included in the pilot study. This was suggested by participants in two discussion periods of the workshop. In response, UNDP representatives indicated that corporate governance is often included under the seventh service line: ‘Public administration reform and anti-corruption’

The inclusion of corporate governance will have implications for the selection of national counterpart institutions in the pilot study. While in some countries, such as the Philippines, an umbrella organisation (NSCB) exists which can integrate the monitoring of public sector performance with tracking private sector compliance with a Code of Corporate Governance, in other countries, no such organisation may exist.

### **1.2. Informal institutions of governance**

One question raised after the Vera Institute’s presentation concerned the appropriateness of their indicators to measuring the performance of informal institutions of justice. In the subsequent discussion, it became clear that two types of such institutions should be distinguished:

(i) Local level institutions which have emerged and evolved relatively independently of the central state: these include traditional forms of dispute resolution which persist in both rural and urban areas, e.g. to settle conflicts arising from access to local common property resources. The prevalence of such institutions can be measured through household surveys and participatory techniques. Key policy issues include:

- Whether such forms of dispute resolution are viewed by low income groups as substitutes for, or complements to formal legal processes.
- Whether the state can provide support to these institutions without subverting their nature and purpose.

- Whether the justice meted out is consistent with the UN's 'rights-based approach to development' (see §1.4(i) below)<sup>3</sup>.

(ii) Relatively low cost institutions created by central government to improve access to publicly provided goods and services: these include the People's Courts (Lok Adalats) in India, the aim of which is to reduce the transactions costs faced by low income groups in using the law. In this case, indicators based on administrative data which monitor the performance of formal judicial processes may be appropriate. It was suggested in discussion that such institutions may present a trade-off between access to the law and the quality of justice dispensed. This is an empirical question, the answer to which is likely to depend on the choice of counterfactual. In the absence of low cost/ low quality courts, would an appellant pursue her case in the high cost/high quality court, or drop legal proceedings altogether, thereby being denied all access to justice?

### 1.3. The level of armed conflict

This topic was raised neither in the presentations, nor in the discussion, and only one data source for armed conflict is given in *Governance Indicators: A Users' Guide*<sup>4</sup>. However, in many countries (particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa), including several with some functioning democratic institutions, there is a strong case for monitoring directly and separately changes in the level of armed conflict as a governance indicator. This is not only because the existence of such conflict constitutes evidence of (at least partial) state failure, but also because civil wars have a hidden gender dimension. Recent research suggests that up to 40% of the 300,000 children involved in armed conflicts world-wide are girls. In Uganda, it is estimated that 6,500 girls have been coerced into joining the rebel Lord's Resistance Army. In Sri Lanka, which possesses a range of democratic institutions, no less than 21,500 girls are involved in the endemic fighting between Tamils and Sinhalese (Save the Children, 2005).

### 1.4. Democratic governance

There is a wide consensus in the international development community that achieving democratic governance is a prerequisite for attaining equitable development. However, participants acknowledged that democratic governance is a value-laden concept which has (at least) two implications for the pilot study:

(i) Make explicit the normative basis of 'democratic governance': participants stressed the importance of revealing the value premises which underpin the pilot study. UNDP representatives explained that the UN's 'rights-based approach to development' provides the relevant framework. This framework gives primacy to individuals' freedom from arbitrary constraints and individuals' freedom to realise their full capabilities and functionings<sup>5</sup>. Thus, in an anecdote recounted to the workshop, one participant explained that although recent elections in Mozambique

<sup>3</sup> A study by UNDP of informal systems of dispute resolution among six groups of the disadvantaged in India suggests that outcomes are often not consistent with the UN's 'rights-based approach'.

<sup>4</sup> The Users Guide refers to the State Failure Problem Set compiled at the University of Maryland. Other sources which distinguish between different types and levels of armed conflict include the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and Small, 1984), Collier and Hoeffler (2001), and Gleditsch et al (2001).

<sup>5</sup> In her presentation on UN-HABITAT's Urban Governance Index (UGI), Narang listed five UN principles of good urban governance.

had been characterised as ‘free and fair’ by standard criteria, many women in rural areas had admitted to voting according to instructions given by local village headmen or other male authority figures. The implication was that these elections were evidence of less democratic governance than if the women concerned had made up their own minds as to how to vote.

(ii) Values vary within and between countries: since different social groups espouse different values, their definitions and perceptions of democratic governance will also vary. Consequently, the UN’s rights-based approach to development may not be universally shared among political actors<sup>6</sup>. Even when it is shared at an abstract level, large differences of opinion may arise when this framework is used to evaluate specific behaviours. Such differences were illustrated at the workshop on several occasions:

- One explanation for the discrepancy between the results of the expert panel and the results of the household survey in DIAL’s work on corruption in francophone Africa is that the experts and the survey respondents did not share the same definition of ‘corruption’.
- In presenting the work of Transparency International, Salas stressed the need for ‘clarity in what we want to measure. Corruption means different things for different nations and societies.’
- One comment on the Vera Institute’s presentation drew on the results of recent research in India which showed that perceptions of justice varied between people and social groups.

However, while intergroup differences in values clearly exist, attempts to legitimate certain types of behaviour by appealing to cultural specificity can often serve as a device to deflect criticism of dubious political practices.

### **1.5. Governance Reform**

Both the workshop and the pilot project focus on ‘governance indicators for pro-poor and gender-sensitive policy reform’. Governance reform may be defined as a process of institutional change which aims for, and results in closer alignment of one or more service lines of governance with the values embodied in the UN’s rights-based approach to development. This emphasis on monitoring the progress of policy reform provides a first criterion for the selection of pilot countries:

- Only countries with a clear, specific and time-bound commitment to undertaking governance reforms should be selected.
- Taken as a group, the six countries should represent a variety of reforms across all of UNDP’s seven service lines of governance.

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<sup>6</sup> One participant characterised existing discourses on governance as ‘..hegemonic and ethnocentric’. It was unclear whether this charge could be levelled at the UN’s ‘rights-based approach to development’.

## **2. Towards an Integrated Matrix of Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Governance Indicators**

During the course of the workshop, reference was made to several different classifications of governance indicators. The purpose of this section of the report is to integrate these classifications into a single matrix for each of UNDP's seven service lines at the national level. This should provide an operational tool for the pilot study. For reasons of space, only two such matrices are included here, but they cover service lines which received much attention at the workshop, namely Electoral Systems and Processes, and Justice and Human Rights.

### **2.1. Typology of governance indicators**

Tables 1 and 2 present a composite typology of governance indicators which distinguishes between

- Different meanings of the terms pro-poor and gender-sensitive.
- Objective and subjective governance indicators.
- Different types of objective governance indicators.
- Different generations of governance indicators.
- Core and satellite governance indicators.

The columns in each table distinguish five ways in which a governance indicator might be considered 'gender-sensitive', while the rows in each table distinguish five ways in which a governance indicator might be considered 'pro-poor'. The definitions of column- and row-headings are given in the papers by Corner and Scott. The final column and the last row identify governance indicators which are gender-blind and poverty-blind respectively. So, any indicator which is located neither in the final column nor in the last row of the matrix, is simultaneously gender-sensitive and pro-poor in some sense of these terms. This is the subset of governance indicators of the **doubly-deprived (GIDD)**.

### **2.2. Governance indicators of the doubly-deprived (GIDD).**

Recent research is generating new GIDD which have powerful policy implications. Ongoing work on India suggests that female state legislators in Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe seats (a potential GIDD) tend to favour capital investments, particularly on irrigation and primary education, as well as to increase maintenance expenditure on water supply. This group also favour 'women-friendly' laws such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, designed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. By contrast, general women state legislators (not a GIDD) do not have an impact on 'women-friendly' laws, they oppose redistributive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich public expenditure, invest in non-primary education and reduce social spending (Clots-Figueras, 2005).

### **2.3. Subjective and objective indicators**

For any given pair of definitions chosen for the terms gender-sensitive and pro-poor, indicators may be further subdivided into objective and subjective (based on respondent's perceptions). Objective indicators can be broken down into inputs, outputs and outcomes. Thus, by way of illustration, if a policy maker wishes to identify a set of governance indicators for Electoral Systems and Processes which are simultaneously sex-disaggregated and economic status-disaggregated, she turns to the first bordered cell in Table 1. This cell includes objective indicators, such as

expenditure targeted on increasing female voter registration in poor electoral districts (input), percentage of eligible females registered as voters in poor electoral districts (output), voting turn-out (%) among eligible females in poor electoral districts (outcome), and a subjective indicator, which is the percentage of females > 18 yrs in poor electoral districts considering the electoral process relevant to their lives.

Tables 1 and 2 also indicate to which generation each indicator belongs (shown as a figure in square brackets, e.g. [G2]) and allow core indicators to be distinguished from satellite indicators (through the use of cell shading). The indicators shown in the tables are purely illustrative, and are drawn from Corner (2005), Vera Institute (2005) and Scott (2004).

**TABLE 1: INTEGRATED INDICATOR MATRIX FOR GOVERNANCE SERVICE LINE 3 - ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES**

				GENDER-SENSITIVE					GENDER-BLIND
				Sex-disaggregated	Gender-specific	Implicitly gendered	Chosen by women(men)	Result of engendered statistical processes	
<b>PRO-POOR</b>	Economic-status disaggregated	Objective	Input	Expenditure targeted on increasing female voter registration in poor electoral districts [G2] % of eligible females registered as voters in poor electoral districts [G2] Voter turn-out (%) among registered females in poor districts [G2] % of females >18 yrs in poor electoral districts considering electoral process 'relevant' to their lives [G2]					
			Output						
		Subjective	Outcome						
	Specific to poor	Objective	Input						
			Output						
		Subjective	Outcome						
	Implicitly pro-poor	Objective	Input						
			Output						
		Subjective	Outcome						
	Chosen by poor	Objective	Input						Average time (minutes) required to vote in state/national elections (travel, queuing, voting)[G3]
		Output							
Subjective		Outcome				No of female legislators in state/national assemblies experiencing sexual harassment at work [G2]			
Result of poor-empowered statistical processes	Objective	Input						No of exclusively female focus groups in poor districts indicating that it was 'common' for women to vote as instructed by father, husband or other male figure [G2]	
		Output							
	Subjective	Outcome							
<b>POVERTY-BLIND</b>		Objective	Input	Expenditure on special programmes in civic and voter education targeted at women [G1] No of women covered by special programmes in civic and voter education [G1] Ratio of female to male voters in elections [G1]					
			Output						
			Outcome						
		Subjective							

TABLE 2: INTEGRATED INDICATOR MATRIX FOR GOVERNANCE SERVICE LINE 4 – JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS									
				GENDER-SENSITIVE					GENDER-BLIND
				Sex-disaggregated	Gender-specific	Implicitly gendered	Chosen by women (men)	Result of engendered statistical processes	
<b>PRO-POOR</b>	Economic-status disaggregated	Objective	Input	% of judges and magistrates who are female attending court in poorest 40% of districts in the country [G1]					Ratio of prosecution caseloads in courts serving rich communities to those in courts serving poor communities [G1] Clear-up rate of crimes in poorest 40% of districts in the country [G1]
			Output						
			Outcome						
	Specific to poor	Objective	Input						
			Output						
			Outcome						
Subjective	Input								
	Output								
	Outcome								
Implicitly pro-poor	Objective	Input							
		Output							
		Outcome							
Subjective	Input								
	Output								
	Outcome								
Chosen by poor	Objective	Input							
		Output							
		Outcome							
Subjective	Input					(Probability of assault on male prisoners) [G2]			
	Output								
	Outcome								
Result of poor-empowered statistical processes	Objective	Input							
		Output							
		Outcome							
Subjective	Input								
	Output								
	Outcome								
<b>POVERTY-BLIND</b>		Objective	Input						
			Output						
			Outcome						
Subjective	Input			No of VAW cases prosecuted in the courts [G1]					
	Output								
	Outcome								
Subjective	Input			Prevalence measure of domestic violence [G1]					
	Output								
	Outcome								

## 2.4. How should the integrated indicator matrices (IIMs) be used?

Tables 1 and 2 are tools which serve three purposes:

(i) By distinguishing between different meanings of the terms gender-sensitive and pro-poor, *IIMs offer a clearer understanding of, and therefore allow more control over the process of indicator selection.* The matrices themselves do not identify directly an appropriate set of governance indicators for a given country. This requires the use of additional instruments (see §2.5 below). Rather, the relationship between an IIM and a set of indicators is similar to that between a stack of class-marked library shelves and the books standing on them.

(ii) *IIMs provide a framework for monitoring the evolution of governance indicators over time.* In particular, a matrix can be used:

- To track indicators as they move from second (or third) generation (G2,G3) to first generation (G1) status.
- To show how pro-poor but gender-blind indicators are gradually replaced by pro-poor/gender-sensitive indicators.
- To identify data gaps, especially for outcome indicators, which are the main concern of stake-holders.
- To reveal how un(der)utilised sources of data might be used to support the creation of new, or more disaggregated indicators.

(iii) *IIMs present information in a way which invites policy analysis.* Again using the first bordered cell in Table 1 as an example, a policy-maker might ask two questions:

1. Is an increase in public expenditure aimed at raising female voter registration in poor electoral districts associated with a rise in the percentage of eligible females registered as voters in those districts? If the answer is 'No', then such expenditure should be reviewed.
2. Are changes in voting turn-out among females eligible to vote in poor electoral districts related either to changes in the percentage of adult females registered as voters in those districts, or to changes in the percentage of adult females in those districts who describe the electoral process as relevant to their lives? If changes in turn-out are only weakly related to changes in registration, then there may be a case for switching the focus of public policy from promoting registration to reducing the costs of voting, e.g. provision of more polling stations (particularly in rural areas) and/or ensuring secrecy of the ballot to guarantee voter anonymity<sup>7</sup>.

2.4.1. It is neither necessary nor desirable that indicators are defined for each cell of an IIM for a given UNDP service line. Such a procedure would result in over 200 governance indicators, which is clearly too many<sup>8</sup>. It would also preclude the tracking of clusters of inputs, outputs and outcomes associated with priority governance

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<sup>7</sup> Several participants cautioned against the use of voter turn-out as a governance indicator on the grounds that while voting is voluntary in some countries, it is compulsory in others. However, since there is evidence that compulsory voting reduces the differential in voter turn-out between high and low-income groups, there may be a case for considering compulsory voting as a pro-poor governance indicator (Rogers, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Defining one indicator per cell in each gender-sensitive column of seven IIMs would generate 210 indicators.

reforms. Monitoring such clusters should be a key activity of policy-makers<sup>9</sup>. One device for identifying such clusters, termed the process flow chart, is discussed in the next paragraph.

## **2.5. Upstream and downstream instruments**

The indicator matrices cannot stand alone as devices for selecting governance indicators. They need the support of at least two other instruments: one downstream and the other upstream of the IIM.

2.5.1. The *downstream instrument* is a table which shows for each IIM the data source for each indicator, the frequency with which these data are collected, the organisation(s) responsible for collecting the data and compiling the indicator, together with any related comments (Corner,2005: Tables 2 and 3.1).

2.5.2. An *upstream instrument* is likely to be required to bridge the gap between each of the broad and pre-defined service lines, such as Justice and Human Rights, and identifying a priority set of specific gender-sensitive and pro-poor governance indicators. Priorities can be assigned to governance processes by gender-specific focus groups and/or surveys of the poor<sup>10</sup>. Once this is done, flow charts can be generated by professionally-moderated group discussion of each priority governance process. An example of such a process flow chart (PFC) is given in Figure 1 which was used in Honduras to identify potential pro-poor performance indicators of the criminal justice system. Once a PFC has been identified, a search can be made to locate relevant data sources. The resulting indicators are similar to those based on episode statistics collected by medical authorities<sup>11</sup>.

## **2.6. Relevance of indicators**

Reference to flow charts illustrates the basic principle that the relevance or appropriateness of an indicator depends on the purpose(s) for which it will be used. A governance indicator intended for use by members of a small, low income, ethnically divided rural community, such as the percentage of voters from poor households who voted for a local government candidate from outside their own ethnic group, may be of limited relevance at national level. Such is likely to be the case where the country is ethnically homogeneous and is attempting to meet the information demands placed on its PRSP monitoring system by external stakeholders. As Corner indicates, a major reason for the weak development of pro-poor/gender-sensitive governance indicators is that neither governments, nor the organised poor, nor women's groups make much use of those indicators which already exist.

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<sup>9</sup> The Vera Institute also supports the use of a basket of indicators, each of which would measure the contribution of a single institution to some overall purpose (Vera Institute,2005:5). This may result in the selection of a different cluster of indicators to that generated by choosing a mix of input, output and outcome indicators.

<sup>10</sup> The use of participatory techniques and score cards among the poor in the World Bank's *Voices of the Poor* project provides one illustration of how this might be done (Narayan et al,2000a,2000b).


<sup>11</sup> Episode statistics are routine data collected on what happens to each patient during treatment. In the UK, the Freedom of Information Act was used to access episode statistics in order to calculate and publish the death rates of patients attended by every cardiac surgeon in the country (Guardian, 15/4/05).

## **2.7. Use of indicators to evaluate UNDP's impact**

Integrated indicator matrices and process flow charts are designed primarily to assist national governments and domestic stakeholders monitor progress in democratic governance reforms. However, UNDP may also wish to develop indicators for use in evaluating the impact of its own interventions on promoting democratic governance. Such an exercise is fraught with problems which go well beyond the choice of indicators. *The main challenge is to identify an appropriate counterfactual for comparison: namely, what would the nature of governance be in the absence of UNDP's interventions?* If UNDP's expenditures on promoting democratic governance were hypothetically to fall to zero in a given country over a specific period, how would the expenditures of its partners be affected? Would they remain unchanged, or rise to compensate (at least in part) for UNDP's reduced spending? Different assumptions as to partners' spending behaviour will give rise to different counterfactuals, and thence to different assessments of UNDP's impact on promoting democratic governance. In practice, it may simply prove infeasible to attribute causation to the interventions of a single organisation in complex policy processes which involve many partner organisations and which are subject to exogenous shocks.

2.7.1. A less ambitious goal might be to try and reach a rough-and-ready view as to how value-for-UNDP-money varies across its seven governance service lines. In an optimal allocation, spending an additional US\$10,000 on each service line should generate the same returns as measured by the value of resulting improvements in democratic governance. If marginal returns are not equated across different types of expenditure to promote democratic governance, then UNDP could improve its performance by reallocating its budget across service lines. An ordinal ranking of service lines according to their approximate marginal benefit/cost ratio would not provide a rigorous impact assessment, but might signpost areas where spending should be increased or reduced. It is not possible to be more specific as to how this might be achieved without greater knowledge of UNDP's internal management information systems. However, even with these data available, significant methodological problems would remain, not least that of how to value (say) a reduction of five days in the average time prisoners are held on remand and an increase of five percentage points in voter turn-out among low income households, so that these improvements in democratic governance could be compared.

**Figure 1: Honduras – Process Flow Chart of the Criminal Justice System with potential indicators**



Process analysis generated eleven indicators:

1. Delay in reporting crime to police (in days)
2. % of reported crimes which lead to an arrest:
  - robbery and theft
  - domestic violence
  - rape
3. Average time from arrest to charge (in days)
4. Average time on remand (in days)
5. Average length of trial (in days)
6. Clear-up rate (convictions/reported crimes)
7. Probability of assault by prisoners/warders while in prison
8. Access by prisoners to legal advice
9. Rehabilitation (training, education)
10. Extent and nature of support received by prisoners after release
11. Rate of reoffending

### **3. Issues Arising from Recent Innovations and Initiatives in Measuring Governance**

A variety of experiences were presented to the workshop and several themes emerged from the discussion. Many comments related to the credibility of different data sources used by researchers. In particular, given the political sensitivity of measuring both poverty and governance, concerns were raised about the integrity of official statistics in these areas. Several mechanisms were suggested for ensuring their credibility. One device was for the National Statistical Office (NSO) to stay clear of collecting data, such as surveys of political opinion, which might expose the organisation to undue pressure from the government of the day. Such information would be left for the private sector to gather. This topic is currently being debated by the NSCB in the Philippines.

#### **3.1. Mechanisms for safeguarding the integrity of official statistics**

Additional mechanisms proposed by participants for safeguarding the integrity of official statistics included:

- Building up the methodological capacity of NSO staff.
- Strengthening the NSO's internal procedures of scrutiny and quality control.
- Ensuring that informal processes of external scrutiny by academia and civil society are robust.

It was also noted that figures produced by Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) should be subject to similar scrutiny to that of any official data.

Other devices to ensure the objectivity and political independence of the national statistical system, which were not raised in discussion, include:

- i. Passage of a comprehensive **Statistical Law** which sets out the desired attributes of statistical processes and products, and provides the legal basis for the impartiality, transparency and accountability of the NSO.
- ii. **A review of the legal status of the NSO** itself: should it be a specialised government agency, wholly subject to public law and state bureaucratic rules, or a semi-autonomous agency contracting with the state to provide certain statistical services and products in return for a specified income from the national budget over a given period? In some cases, the latter may provide greater protection from undue and improper political pressures from government.
- iii. Introduction of **formal procedures of external scrutiny** by specialist committees of the legislature, e.g. the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) is held to account by a committee of the House of Commons.

#### **3.2. Strategies for developing more pro-poor and gender-sensitive governance indicators**

Participants inferred from the case-studies presented to the workshop that two methodological strategies exist for developing governance indicators which are more pro-poor and gender-sensitive. These options are not mutually exclusive.

3.2.1. Collect poverty data and governance data in the same instrument: Examples of this strategy considered at the workshop included:

- DIAL's insertion of a governance module into a standard household expenditure questionnaire which was used in West Africa, Madagascar and Latin America.
- TI's insertion of an income module into a household survey of corruption in Mexico.

3.2.2. Combine poverty data and governance data from different instruments: no examples were given of this strategy at the workshop. However, several possibilities exist which include:

- Combining different sources of administrative data, such as voter turn-out in electoral districts (available from the National Electoral Commission) with poverty proxies for those districts (such as access to safe drinking water available from the relevant line Ministry).
- Matching district level voter turn-out with consumption-poverty data from spatially disaggregated poverty maps. An increasing number of countries possess such maps, e.g. Ecuador, Panama, Mexico, Malawi, South Africa, Madagascar and Vietnam.

### **3.3. Urban bias**

Although a majority of the world's population will shortly be living in towns and cities, participants agreed that it was important to avoid 'urban bias' (or even capital city bias) creeping into governance indicators:

- UN-HABITAT's urban governance index (UGI) may be appropriate for the cities, but may need some refinement for use in rural areas.
- DIAL's governance survey was confined to seven capital cities in West Africa and seven cities in Madagascar. However, in Latin America, both rural and urban areas were included.

The challenge to researchers is that it is logistically easier to undertake rural field work precisely in those countries where the rural population is relatively less important and rural poverty relatively less significant.

### **3.4. Importance of balanced units of observation**

Workshop discussion of recent research on governance at the national level highlighted the importance of achieving balance among different units of observation in order to cross-check results and generate informational synergies. TI studies of corruption at the national level include complementary surveys of households, enterprises and public officials (Nigeria, South Africa). This allows the results to be checked for consistency. Something similar could be done for the criminal justice system by interviewing prisoners awaiting trial, prisoners after conviction, lawyers, judges, police, prison warders and probation officers<sup>12</sup>. In some countries, such as India, searching for such information has been seen by elements of the justice system as a threat to judicial independence.

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<sup>12</sup> It was unclear whether the Vera Institute conducts simultaneous surveys among different stakeholders of a single country's justice system.

3.4.1. DIAL's use of a 'mirror' survey on corruption prompted several questions: Which was an appropriate 'mirror' to choose? DIAL opted for a selected panel of experts whose views were compared with the results of a household survey. Other options include using a panel of civil society representatives, or even government officials. Furthermore, two expert panels might have been used: one composed of Northern experts and the other of Southern experts. The opinions of these two groups are likely to differ.

3.4.2. While the use of mirror surveys to check contrasting perceptions of corruption by different groups is interesting, it is also necessary to build in consistency checks for the opinions expressed by a single group. Thus, in DIAL's survey of urban households in francophone Africa, while only 13% of respondents reported that they had been victims of corruption, 90% of the sample indicated that they considered corruption to be a major problem. If respondents were using a consistent definition of 'corruption' when answering these two questions, it suggests that most corrupt practices in urban Africa are not perceived as involving households directly. Rather, corruption is concentrated in dealings between firms and civil servants, firms and politicians and/or civil servants and politicians. If this is true, then corruption like taxes, has an important indirect incidence on households as consumers which may have been missed by the survey.

3.4.3. Where a novel data initiative has proved successful, difficulties often arise in institutionalising these new activities within the national statistical system, so that they may be sustained. This problem tends to be most acute when the initiative is initially funded by donors<sup>13</sup>.

### **3.5. Dangers associated with single indicators**

An inherent danger associated with any single indicator is that, under certain circumstances, it may act as a perverse incentive. This was raised in discussion of the presentation by the Vera Institute. If the number of people awaiting trial is used as an indicator, then dropping charges is one way of improving its value. This may be an undesirable outcome, so how can it be prevented? There is no simple or single answer to this question. Perverse behaviour may be less likely if a cluster of indicators is always used to monitor performance rather than just one measure. Certain indicators in the cluster may be included for the sole purpose of identifying perverse responses. So, in the example above, the number of cases where charges were dropped could be selected as a support indicator in the cluster. Note that the use of performance targets (defined as setting values for indicators to be achieved by a specific date) greatly increases the risk of such perverse behaviour.

### **3.6. Criticism of the use of governance indicators**

One recent initiative in assessing governance which was discussed at the workshop adopted a more critical stance towards the use of indicators than the other projects. The *State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA)* programme suggests that indicators

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<sup>13</sup> One possible solution (not discussed at the workshop) is for governments to elaborate with stakeholders a 10 year National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS). This would include the creation of a common funding basket for donors, so that external assistance from a particular source would no longer be tied to a particular data collection exercise, such as a household survey or a Population Census. Common funding baskets are in the process of being established in several countries, including Tanzania.

should play a partial, subsidiary and largely invisible role in any discourse which attempts to assess governance. A much richer, more complex and multi-layered approach to the analysis of governance is required which cannot, and should not, be summarised by a set of indicators. SDSA explicitly challenges the use of indicator matrices containing inputs, outputs and outcomes such as those presented in Tables 1 and 2<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> The word ‘indicator’ was not mentioned in the CSDS presentation. De Souza characterises the use of terms such as ‘inputs, processes and outputs’ as system–centric thinking, which is viewed as a limited discourse for analysing governance.

## 4. Implications for the pilot study

The workshop addressed many topics relating to the measurement of governance from a pro-poor and gender-sensitive perspective, while a variety of viewpoints were expressed on each topic and at several different levels of abstraction. The very richness of the debate posed a big challenge to deriving practical implications for the design and implementation of the pilot study. Nevertheless, there was *a consensus regarding the strategic questions* which needed to be answered in order to take the project forward.

Consequently, this final section of the report outlines what these strategic questions are, and offers one set of answers which, taken together, constitute a practical vision of the pilot study. It should be stressed that while there was general agreement among participants regarding the questions, the same cannot be said about the answers.

### 4.1. Strategic questions related to the pilot study

The strategic questions are as follows:

1. What exactly are the aims and expected outputs of the pilot study?
2. What analytical framework or research design should be adopted for the study?
3. What happens after the pilot is complete?

### 4.2. Aims and expected outputs of the pilot

Discussion at the workshop suggested at least five objectives for the pilot study:

1. To identify a set of first- and second-generation pro-poor and gender-sensitive (PPGS) governance indicators across UNDP's seven service lines.
2. To explore and promote ways in which PPGS-G1 indicators can be used in an informed and innovative manner by a variety of stakeholders.
3. To achieve some 'learning-by-doing' and capacity building in the area of PPGS governance monitoring as a result of (i) and (ii). This achievement could be partially captured by the preparation of training material in the pilot countries.
4. To generate detailed and reliable information on the costs of collecting, analysing, disseminating and using information on PPGS-G1 governance indicators<sup>15</sup>.

### 4.3. Research design

The central issue concerns the *choice of six pilot countries* and deciding how these countries should be used to attain the goals of the pilot. Mongolia and the Philippines have already been chosen, which leaves four vacant slots<sup>16</sup>. Three selection criteria were articulated at the workshop, namely

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<sup>15</sup> Little information was forthcoming during the workshop as to the costs of producing different governance indicators. TI indicated that the first National Survey of Corruption and Good Governance in Mexico had cost approximately US\$400,000.

<sup>16</sup> Strictly speaking, the pilot study in Mongolia forms part of the ICNRD process rather than the UNDP project. However, the government of Mongolia asked for UNDP's assistance owing to a convergence of interest.

- Commitment to undertaking governance reforms: this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for inclusion.
- Ensuring representation of each region: depending on how many regions are identified, this implies at least one country per region.
- Willingness of the UNDP country office to participate in the study.

Other relevant criteria might include:

- Country size (measured by land area or population): the pilot study should include a mix of large and small countries.
- Capacity of the statistical system: the pilot study should include countries with high and low capacity.
- Level of governance: the pilot study should include countries which represent different levels of democratic governance.

One proposal for the research design of the pilot which is consistent with the criteria enunciated in the previous paragraph is as follows:

Step 1: Choose at least one country from each region and include five regions (Asia, Africa, Arab States, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe). There is a strong case for choosing two countries either from Asia, which has the highest absolute incidence of deprivation, or from Africa, which has the highest relative incidence of deprivation. This leaves one country to be selected from each of the other four regions.

Step 2: Assign four UNDP service lines of governance to each country, of which one would be **Policy Support and Dialogue on Democratic Governance**, which cuts across all the others. This will allow broader and deeper coverage of six service lines than would be possible if each pilot country attempted to include them all. It would also permit comparisons to be made between three countries and three regions for any one of six service lines.

This procedure would generate a grid, such as that shown below, where the choice of countries is purely illustrative of the research design. In each pilot country, an attempt should be made to identify ‘quick-wins’ whereby some PPGS-G1 governance indicators can be developed using existing administrative data sources.

	UNDP Governance Service Lines						
Region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asia	Mongolia	Mongolia	Philippines	Mongolia	Philippines	Philippines	Mongolia Philippines
Africa	Tanzania				Tanzania	Tanzania	Tanzania
Arab States		Egypt	Egypt	Egypt			Egypt
Latin America			Mexico		Mexico	Mexico	Mexico
Central and Eastern Europe	Poland	Poland		Poland			Poland

#### 4.4. Post-pilot stage

Depending on the resources available for the pilot study, follow-up work could be developed in one of two directions:

- i. Revised pro-poor and gender-sensitive governance indicators (most of which would be first generation) could be rolled out for a larger group of countries.
- ii. The results of the pilot could provide the basis for more refined work on governance indicators in the same six countries. This would allow the testing of G2 indicators which are likely to be superior to many G1 indicators.

The shorter the duration of the pilot study, the more limited the resources allocated to it and the higher the ratio of G2 to G1 governance indicators in pilot countries, the stronger is the case for choosing option (ii) above.

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## Annex 2: Workshop Agenda

### -AGENDA-

UNDP-ICSSR International Workshop, New Delhi April 20-22, 2005

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#### *Governance Indicators for Pro-Poor and Gender-Sensitive Policy Reform*

Venue: Hyatt Hotel, New Delhi

#### **Wednesday, April 20**

- 09:30 – 10:30 Welcome and inauguration  
(ICSSR and UNDP)
- Roundtable introduction
- Chair: R. Sudarshan**
- 10:30 – 11:15 Objectives and expected outputs of the workshop
- Sudarshan and Joachim Nahem (UNDP Oslo Governance Centre)
  - Q&A
- 11:15 - 11:30 Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 12:45 Workshop Themes
- Technical Framework- Matthew Sudders (DFID)
  - Evidence-based policy-making- Christopher Scott (LSE)
  - Discussion
- Chair: Atindra Sen**
- 12:45 Lunch
- 14:00 – 15:30 Workshop Themes
- Creating Local Governance Measurements- Shipra Narang, UN-Habitat
  - Gender-Sensitive Governance Indicators- Lorraine Corner (UNDP Consultant)
  - National Human Development Reports as framework for governance indicators (Andrey Ivanov, UNDP)
- Chair: Meenakshisundaram**
- 15:30 – 15:45 Coffee Break
- 15: 45 - 17:00 Plenary Discussion
- Wrap up session and overview of next day
- 19:30 Dinner Hyatt Hotel (ICSSR and UNDP)

## Thursday, April 21

- 9:30-11:00 National Measurement Initiatives
- Mongolia- Ulziibayar Vangansuren (ICNRD Project)
  - Philippines- Romulo Virola (National Statistical Co-ordination Board of the Philippines)
  - African and Andean Surveys- Mireille Razafindrakoto and Javier Herrera (DIAL)
- Chair: Thomas Heimgartner (Metagora)**
- 11:00-11:15 Coffee Break
- 11:15-12:45 Discussion
- 12:45 Lunch
- 14:00 – 15:45 Innovations in Measuring Governance
- Corruption Monitoring- Alejandro Salas (Transparency International)
  - Justice Measurements- Jim Parsons (Vera Institute)
  - State of Democracy Project- Peter de Souza (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies)
- Chair: Ozias Tungwarara (International IDEA)**
- 15:45 – 16:00 Coffee Break
- 16:00 – 17:00 Discussion
- 17:00 – 17:30 Wrap-up and overview of next day

## Friday, April 22

- 9:00-10:45 Breakaway groups:
- Discussion on the objectives and processes of developing national governance indicators, partners, experiences, and identifying SWOTs
  - Questionnaire to be distributed
- Chair: Shipra Nerang**
- 10:45 – 11: 00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 – 12:45 Summary of deliberations and recommendations for the pilot project:
- Project Structure
  - Processes of developing indicators
  - Potential pilot countries
  - International, national and local partnerships
- 12:45 – 13:15 Closing Remarks  
**UNDP-Gita Welch and ICSSR-**
- 13:15 Lunch