EVALUATION OF
UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
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**EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES**

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**Design:** Suazion Inc. (NY, suazion.com)  **Production:** A.K. Office Supplies (NY)
Nearly 33 million people around the world were rendered homeless last year due to violent conflicts. The many agencies of the UN system are actively engaged in supporting these communities to reclaim the right to live with dignity and security. Crisis prevention and recovery is a core practice area for UNDP, with activities in conflict-affected countries constituting nearly 40 percent of global expenditure in 2005. Given the significance of this work, the UNDP Executive Board requested the Evaluation Office to conduct an independent evaluation of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries.

This evaluation documents the changing character of conflict in the past few decades, underlining that violations of human rights and human security are not a side effect but a central methodology of current violent conflicts. The report concludes that while the international community has succeeded in stabilizing conflicts, it has not adequately addressed the structural conditions conducive to conflict. The response needs to be more coherent, integrating humanitarian and development concerns into peace-building efforts. A strategy to prevent conflict must address the conditions that are conducive to violent conflict and be bound up integrally with improving human security. For this reason, the report uses the analytical framework of human security to capture the sustainability and effectiveness of UNDP assistance to prevent conflict and build peace.

The analysis of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries since 2000 is based on detailed case studies of six Security Council-mandated countries (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan). This was supplemented by a survey of 24 countries receiving support from the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

The evaluation recommends that UNDP take a bolder position in impressing upon the Security Council and the international community the paramount importance of integrating development concerns within UN strategies for security. Recognizing that UNDP is best placed to address the structural conditions conducive to conflict, the report urges the organization to strengthen its analytical and programmatic capacity in core development areas rather than in carrying out ad hoc gap-filling exercises. And UNDP is encouraged to finance these activities through increased core funding.

This report is a result of the dedication and contributions of many people. The Evaluation Office is deeply grateful to the evaluation team that produced it. The team was led by Mary Kaldor. She was supported by Rajeev Pillay and Carrol Faubert. The international consultant for law and gender, Christine Chinkin, provided support to the team in drafting the report. The international team was joined by a team of national experts: Andrea Calvaruso (Guatemala), Parviz Mullojanov (Tajikistan), Victor Mantantu Nathazi (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mohamed Niaizi (Afghanistan), Michèle Oriol (Haiti), Omar Sharifi (Afghanistan), James Vincent (Sierra Leone).

The evaluation benefited from the advice of an advisory panel of leading international experts drawn from academia and the public arena: Dame Margaret Anstee, Graham Brown, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Robert Picciotto, Gunnar Sørbø and Nira Yuval-Davis.

The team was assisted by researchers Mat Bolton, Nayma Qayum, Sally Stares and Sabine Selchow. Concepcion Cole and Michelle Sy provided administrative support to this exercise and Anish Pradhan provided technical support to the publication process. We would also like to express our appreciation to Lois Jensen, editor of this report, and to

FOREWORD
Shreya Dawan, editor of the country studies. In the Evaluation Office, the evaluation was task-managed by Khaled Ehsan and S. Nanthikesan.

We are very grateful to government and civil society representatives in the case-study countries who candidly fielded many questions from the team. I would like to single out for special thanks all the Resident Representatives and UNDP staff of the countries visited by the team, the Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and other colleagues in Headquarters units who provided vital feedback to the team and the Evaluation Office. Without their interest and involvement, the evaluation would not have been possible.

I hope that this evaluation will be useful to a broad audience and that it will contribute to more effective support from UNDP to building societies where people can live free from fear and free from want.

Saraswathi Menon
Director
UNDP Evaluation Office
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

This study on UNDP support to conflict-affected countries was conducted by UNDP’s Evaluation Office in response to a request from UNDP’s Executive Board. In a decision taken in 2000, the Board decided that crisis prevention and recovery should become a core practice area for UNDP. By 2005, activities in conflict-affected countries constituted nearly 40 percent of UNDP’s global expenditure.

SCOPE AND APPROACH

This evaluation was designed to assess the extent to which UNDP has helped address the structural conditions conducive to conflict so that a recurrence of armed conflict could be prevented. Towards this end, it looked at the changing character of conflicts around the world and the international response to growing human security concerns. UNDP’s policies and operations in conflict-affected countries were examined in the context of UN reform, especially integrated UN peace-keeping and peace-building missions.

Research and analysis covered the period 2000-2005 and involved in-depth case studies in six countries—Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan—all of which were, or still are, under Security Council mandate. The case studies were supplemented by a tailored, results-oriented survey of 24 countries or areas that are recipients of assistance from UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), along with stakeholder interviews, desk research and data collection.

The evaluation relied upon both primary and secondary source data, including past thematic and programme outcome evaluations. In order to gain an independent perspective, national consultants were recruited in each of the case-study countries. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with UNDP staff along with government officials, civil society members, parliamen-tarians, international observers, UN mission and agency personnel, bilateral and other multilateral agency staff, national and international academics, members of the military and the police, private businesspeople, journalists and other media representatives.

The evaluation was undertaken by a core team of three senior international consultants, supported by national consultants in each country visited.

KEY FINDINGS

In the six case-study countries, overt conflict continues only in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, in all cases, there are low levels of human security, measured in terms of population displacement, human rights violations, high crime rates, violence and discrimination against women, economic insecurity (especially joblessness), and vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters. In all six case studies, it is possible to identify common structural conditions that make conflict more likely to be violent. These include weak state institutions, low participation in decision-making, weak civil society institutions, inadequate institutions to ensure the rule of law, erosion of the monopoly of legitimate violence (that is, the emergence of private armed groups), an undiversified economy dependent on primary products and external markets, the availability of small arms, large numbers of unemployed young men, unequal gender relations, a decline in human development, and the spread of an illegal/illegal economy. These conditions are aggravated by the experience of conflict or by conflict in neighbouring states.
The role of the international community

The international community has contributed to a decline in the overall number of conflicts by helping to sustain peace agreements, often through the United Nations. It has stabilized conflicts mainly through a substantial international presence. But it has not adequately addressed the structural conditions conducive to conflict. Human security, therefore, remains precarious and there is a risk of recurrence of armed conflicts if the international presence is reduced or withdrawn.

Weaknesses of the international role include: failure to provide sufficient protection to civilians; failure to establish legitimate political authority; insufficient engagement with civil society; failure to prioritize development from the outset; failure to mainstream gender; insufficient attention to regional dimensions of conflict; the undermining of national structures through the creation of parallel structures that leave a heavy ‘footprint’; and an excessive preoccupation with security.

The role of UNDP

UNDP is an essential component of the international effort and is uniquely positioned within the United Nations to address the structural conditions conducive to conflict.

As a resident agency, UNDP undertakes a wide range of activities in conflict-affected countries that are specific to each situation. Broadly speaking, these include activities aimed at recovery and reintegration of war-affected populations, restoration of state authority and governance capacity-building, justice and security sector reform, poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, support for civil society, and regional cooperation. Much more effort is expended on the first three goals than on the last three, however, reflecting the fact that UNDP is developing a niche expertise in these areas. UNDP has played a pioneering role in developing new strategic responses to conflict and has introduced many innovative projects, especially community-based ones.

However, UNDP’s effectiveness is constrained by the architecture of international agencies. The international response continues to be structured around a phased approach to conflict despite the integration of development agencies in the UN’s post-conflict response. UNDP is also constrained by the lack of guaranteed core funding for development. Sixty-seven percent of UNDP’s global expenditures in the 24 conflict-affected countries or areas included in the survey are non-core; in the case-study countries, the proportion of non-core to core was far higher. Partially as a result, in the immediate post-conflict period UNDP has tended to undertake gap-filling and administrative functions in order to be of maximum relevance and utility to the international community. In these new types of conflicts, there are often urgent needs that do not fit the mandates of specialized agencies. UNDP has clearly built a reputation for managing direct budgetary support in an efficient and accountable manner in the immediate post-conflict period and for meeting needs that might otherwise be left unfilled. Its ability to strengthen relevant institutions beyond this, however, depends to a large extent on the interest of donors and the availability of third-party funding.

Other weaknesses of UNDP include: lack of systematic analyses of conflict or best practices in conflict areas; insufficient attention to civil society and gender; lack of expertise on the part of staff sent on missions to conflict-affected countries and training for such staff; bureaucracy and delays; difficulty in obtaining information about what UNDP does and the procedures through which it operates.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Formulate a strategic vision. In order to strengthen its intellectual leadership, UNDP, in conjunction with other UN bodies, especially the Department of
Political Affairs (DPA), needs to elaborate a strategic vision based on the concept of human security. The concept of human security provides an umbrella under which the structural conditions leading to conflict can be addressed. This strategic vision should highlight the importance of:

- **Human rights (both political and civil and economic and social rights).** The physical and material security of individuals is the primary goal of any post-conflict intervention. This should receive priority over top-down political concerns. In some places, the view prevails that political stability—meaning deals with former warlords or commanders—takes precedence over political and civil rights, and economic stability—balanced budgets and low inflation—takes precedence over economic and social rights. In contemporary conflicts, this is misguided since stability, in the long run, depends on respect for human rights. The rule of law, political participation, and the livelihoods of individuals are critical to conflict prevention and recovery.

- **Legitimate political authority.** In order to create an environment in which human rights are respected, the establishment of legitimate political authority is necessary. The emphasis on legitimacy implies that this is not just a matter of establishing state institutions; it also requires the building of trust and respect for institutions. The engagement of civil society is just as important as the construction of formal institutions. And non-formal institutions such as families, companies or educational facilities also need to be sustained throughout conflicts.

- **Coherence.** Poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods must be key components of the overall vision and need to be integrated into strategic planning at all stages of a conflict. Debate and discussion with all partners—including other agencies, government and civil society—on how to achieve a coherent approach are critical.

- **A bottom-up approach.** The people who have lived through conflict are usually the best guides to the specific mix of policy responses that are required. At all stages of peace-building, it is important to listen to and involve a range of groups in civil society, including women and grass-roots organizations as well as politicians and former warlords/commanders.

- **Regional focus.** Conflicts tend to spread over borders. Yet programmes are country-based. Much more attention needs to be paid to regional frameworks.

2. **Integrate development concerns within United Nations strategies for security.** Development is still seen as an add-on to conflict recovery programmes. Nevertheless, development is critical to addressing the structural conditions conducive to conflict. UNDP needs to take a bolder position in impressing upon the Security Council and other political bodies the paramount importance of development concerns. In order to improve the integration of development concerns in conflict situations:

- The Administrator of UNDP should brief the Security Council, as do the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees.

- Development assistance should be included in funds earmarked for missions with a Security Council mandate.

- UNDP should be involved in the negotiation of peace agreements and should press for the involvement of civil society and women’s groups.
Development concerns should have a stronger voice in integrated offices.

Development should be considered one of the priorities in the new Peace-building Commission.

3. Build substantive capacity in core areas of peace-building. Recent conflicts, including those studied for this report, have exposed the need for certain types of activities that deal with the conditions that lead to conflict and that are not addressed by other agencies. Rather than carrying out these activities in an ad hoc fashion, UNDP needs to develop a substantive capacity in core areas that builds on the innovation and the best practices of existing UNDP programmes and that can be replicated in different situations.

UNDP’s mandate in these areas places it, potentially, at the very centre of a concerted peace-building programme. More specifically, within the framework of a strategic vision, UNDP needs to address the following:

- **Recovery and reintegration of war-affected populations**, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action; long-term political reconciliation that extends the political agreements reached at the centre to local levels, including the equivalent of truth commissions and/or war crimes tribunals.

- **Governance and capacity-building**, including strengthening parliametary institutions to broaden participation and inclusion in decision-making; decentralization, with a view to empowering local communities; strengthening the role of key civil society institutions—not just in the delivery of services, but also as sources of knowledge, as watchdogs and as independent advocacy groups; public sector reform; accountability and anti-corruption programmes.

- **Justice and security sector reform**, including independence of the judiciary; access to justice; key institutions for guaranteeing human rights; and the restructuring of the civilian police and the military.

- **Poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods**, especially community-based development that emphasizes local empowerment and the creation of employment and sustainable livelihoods through people-centred, area-based programmes and small-scale credit schemes; and the development of policies that foster the growth of small enterprises and sustainable livelihoods.

4. Improve the effectiveness of implementation. One of UNDP’s perceived strengths is that some of its procedures are currently more flexible than those of other actors in the UN system. As a result, it is often better able to innovate in response to crises. This edge should be maintained. But to further increase operational flexibility, intellectual responsiveness and speed of delivery, UNDP should:

- **Develop analytical capacity to understand specific conflicts and monitor human security.** UNDP needs to build capacity among think tanks and academic institutions in conflict-affected countries so as to have a long-term analysis of the conflict situation and relevant data on human security.

- **Enhance human resources in conflict-affected countries.** This should include the development of a clear and effective set of incentives to attract experienced staff to serve in conflict-affected countries; training programmes in all facets of human security designed to facilitate adaptation to new activities for
national and international staff in countries affected by conflict or in fragile states; workshops, seminars and other forms of debate about human security policies and specific contexts, both in New York and in-country.

- **Strengthen internal UNDP decision-making mechanisms.** Conflict situations tend to require intensive oversight and management. Such support could be provided through the re-establishment of the committee for the management of UNDP operations in all conflict-affected countries. This committee, which could be chaired by the UNDP Administrator, Associate Administrator or Director for the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, would be responsible for reviewing policies and approaches, capacity requirements, the allocation of resources, partnerships and political relations, resource mobilization and the effectiveness of programmes.

- ** Undertake a systematic review of its financial and administrative procedures.**

- **Emphasize full transparency,** particularly by ensuring the regular updating of its national websites and by posting more systematically user-friendly information on projects, budgets, procurement and recruitment.

- **Improve its outreach beyond capitals,** including through the establishment of field offices with the necessary delegation of authority.

5. **Enhance coordination and partnerships.** Coordination mechanisms should be streamlined and reduced in overall number. Moreover, they should provide substantive, clear-cut, general strategic frameworks for addressing the structural causes of conflict rather than the management of funds. Subsidiary teams could be established in order to address contributing themes, such as macroeconomic policy and revenue and budget management, the rule of law and access to justice, public administration and civil service reform, gender and the role of women, and the construction of essential infrastructure, among others.

UNDP also needs to further develop certain key strategic partnerships. It has already begun to develop its partnership with DPA and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as witnessed in the establishment of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the integrated offices. UNDP also needs to strengthen its partnership with the World Bank with a view to mobilizing resources to generate jobs and sustainable livelihoods, as well as the revenue base of national institutions. It needs to help build government capacity while ensuring that external assistance reaches beneficiaries. And it needs to engage with civil society so as to help shape legitimate institutions.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Conflict is a normal part of social and political interaction. It is, however, a failure of development when institutional and structural failures cause conflict to take violent forms. Indeed, armed conflict can be viewed as a failure of key institutions of governance—that of the state and in civil society. It is also often a result of economic stagnation and a failure to provide economic and social opportunity to significant portions of the population. As such, UNDP’s development, capacity-building and governance mandate should be central to the United Nations—and, by extension, the international community’s—response to conflict.

This results-based evaluation has been conducted by the UNDP Evaluation Office to inform the policies and approaches that UNDP adopts in conflict-affected countries, especially countries under Security Council or General Assembly mandates. To do so, UNDP’s response was looked at in terms of its operations, its coordination of the UN system and its policy work, encompassing the entire organization and not just its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). More specifically, the evaluation was intended to:

1. Help UNDP document and analyse the post-conflict assistance it has provided in selected countries since 2000 in the sensitive and frequently fragile post-crisis (cease-fire) period. The analysis will focus on specific human security issues and their human development dimensions to reveal patterns of intervention that have been both successful and unsuccessful.

2. Provide critical guidance on improving the effectiveness of current programming approaches in the early recovery period by assessing the results of UNDP programming interventions to date. These recommendations will take into account the implications of these approaches for longer-term development. The evaluation aims to highlight areas where UNDP’s comparative advantage has been proven or is emerging as well as to identify gaps and provide recommendations on how UNDP could address these gaps.

3. Indicate how UNDP has used partnerships at local, national and international levels and positioned itself vis-à-vis other actors, who provide both transition and longer-term development support. This will include suggestions as to what capacities and skills the organization most needs and that could be further developed to bring greater coherence and relevance to its post-crisis interventions.

4. Provide substantive insight on how lessons from programmes and strategies implemented in the immediate post-crisis period can be institutionalized within the organization through systematic monitoring and evaluation, and adapted and made more relevant to country needs.

This report was based on six case studies of countries in which UNDP was operating under a UN Security Council mandate: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. (Annex 1 provides a summary of each case study.) In addition, the report was asked to provide further evidence from selected countries receiving assistance from the BCPR. (The complete terms of reference, from which these points were drawn, can be found in Annex 2.)

1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Human security means more than just the security of states. It is about the security of individuals and communities. It is
concerned with both physical and material security, and confronting the insecurities that arise from political violence as well as from poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Physical insecurity usually refers to threats emanating from the use of violence, while material insecurity is the consequence of threats emanating from lack of basic necessities, including food and water, shelter, and medical care. In an era of globalization, the concern with human security is linked to interdependence and the fact that no state can insulate itself any longer from insecurity in other parts of the world.

The idea of human security was first promulgated in the 1994 Human Development Report. The report argues that the concept of security has “for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people.”¹

In the Report of the Commission on Human Security,² human security is a narrower concept than either human development or human rights. In relation to human development, the report focuses on the ‘downside risks’: that is, the “insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or expose human beings to the uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury.” In relation to human rights, the report refers to “a class of human rights” that guarantee “freedom from basic insecurities—new and old.”³ Thus, human security could be conceptualized as incorporating minimum core aspects of both human development and human rights.

It is sometimes assumed that security is related to the absence of physical violence while development is related to the absence of material need. In fact, both concepts include ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Security is about confronting extreme vulnerability, not only in wars but in natural and man-made disasters, including famines, tsunamis and hurricanes. Development, as UNDP’s mandate makes clear, is concerned with constructing the capabilities needed to meet human need, especially the building of institutions. Human need means more than a decent and sustainable standard of living. It also means feeling safe on the streets and being able to influence political decision-making. Since violent conflicts are the consequence of a failure of development, the human security response not only has to include development, but the lessons learned may also indicate more general lessons for development. Crises expose the weaknesses and gaps in development efforts.

In order to meet the terms of reference defined above, the evaluation adopts a demand-driven or bottom-up approach. Rather than starting with existing UNDP programmes and assessing their effectiveness, it began with human security needs in conflict countries and investigated how well UNDP was performing in relation to those needs. Since the role of UNDP was often difficult to separate from the role of the international community and the United Nations in general, the evaluation set out to answer the following questions:

1. What are the trends in human security and conflict in the case-study countries and other selected countries since 2000?
2. Since the absence of violent conflict is an important component of human security, what can this evaluation learn

² The 12-member Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 and was co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen.
from these case studies about the character of conflict? Furthermore, can this study identify the underlying conditions that make violence more or less likely?

3. In countries where the United Nations has intervened before, during or after conflict, is it possible to conclude that the intervention as a whole has contributed to an improvement in human security? In particular, has the intervention addressed the conditions that are likely to exacerbate conflict?

4. Is it possible to identify a specific UNDP role in contributing to human security? Was UNDP assistance targeted at human security needs as identified above?

5. Did institutional arrangements within UNDP and with partners help or hinder UNDP’s role in contributing to human security?

6. What lessons can UNDP learn for future strategy, institutional arrangements, and monitoring and evaluation?

Questions 1-5 were intended to address objectives 1-3 of the terms of reference. Question 6 was aimed at objective 4.

In Security Council-mandated countries, UNDP’s performance has to be measured within the framework and the milestones established by the Security Council. As the leader of the Development Group and, by extension, usually the leader of the development and humanitarian pillars of peacekeeping and peace-building offices, UNDP’s efforts in conflict-affected countries can also be judged by the extent to which it provides intellectual and substantive leadership to the rest of the system. It can be judged as well by the extent to which its programmes support the broader UN effort and the effectiveness with which it can support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in marshalling the array of UN capabilities to address the most critical structural causes of human insecurity and conflict.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was based on studies in six countries preselected by the UNDP Evaluation Office and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. All six cases—Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan—are countries in which the UN has or had a Security Council mandate for peacekeeping and/or peace-building. In Guatemala, the UN peace operation was officially structured quite separately from the UNDP and the UN Country Team. In Tajikistan, the UN Security Council was involved in the establishment of a Peace-building Support Office managed by the UN Department of Political Affairs that was supposed to deliver on political responsibilities while drawing on the UN Country Team, composed of both humanitarian and development agencies. Afghanistan, Haiti, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in many ways constitute the earliest trials of the concept of the integrated office for conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict recovery and development.

The case studies were supplemented by the collection of data on human security indicators, a questionnaire (see Annex 3) addressed to countries receiving assistance from the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery as well as the use of general sources. These included interviews in New York and Washington, documentary research and the collection of macroeconomic statistics on countries receiving assistance from BCPR.

1.2.1 Case studies

The evaluation assessed the relevance of UNDP’s programmes in these six countries in light of the six questions mentioned above. The case studies investigated:

1. Trends in human security, including the character of the conflict and the conditions likely to lead to renewed or exacerbated conflict.
2. The overall role of the United Nations in contributing to human security and addressing the conditions conducive to conflict.

3. The role of UNDP, as measured by the following:
   - **Relevance and positioning**: The relevance of UNDP’s programme strategy and programmes within the framework of the international community’s response to the crisis in question.
   - **Results and effectiveness**: The ways and extent to which UNDP programmes have contributed to the achievement of human security. What did the programmes achieve and how well were they achieved?
   - **Efficiency**: The timeliness and cost-effectiveness of programmes (to the extent that the latter could be assessed).
   - **Management**: The capacity of the country office to manage its programmes and the effectiveness and efficiency of management structures and processes. Also considered are the effectiveness of modalities of execution and implementation.
   - **Coordination**: What mechanisms and tools did UNDP use to support coordination of external assistance to the country? What was its relationship to partners? How effective was the coordination?
   - **Substantive leadership and credibility**: To what extent did UNDP help to define the development agenda and priorities during the post-conflict period? How is UNDP perceived?

The evaluation was conducted using meta-evaluation techniques combined with the direct evaluation of programmes and projects. In the absence of systematically collected programme-related outcome data, the evaluation relied heavily on secondary sources of information, output and input-based project information and qualitative structured and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders (partners, civil society, government, political parties, the media and programme beneficiaries).

Because the evaluation was results-based, it placed considerable emphasis on the importance of gaining an independent perspective. To achieve this, independent national consultants with a civil society background were recruited to help arrange interviews and meetings, and to contribute their own ideas to the study. In addition, the interviews and stakeholder meetings included as many independent commentators, practitioners and activists as possible.

The case studies involved four types of activities:

- **‘Insider’ stakeholder meetings**: Workshops were held with four groups: representatives of political parties; non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists and religious leaders; women’s groups; and independent intellectuals, including journalists, academics and think-tank staff.

- **‘Outsider’ stakeholder meetings**: Workshops with UN Country Team, UN mission and UNDP staff, along with bilateral donors.

- **Semi-structured interviews**: Individual interviews were conducted with a range of key national actors, including relevant government ministry officials, police and military officers, religious leaders, leading political figures, the Resident Coordinator and/or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

- **Field visits**: On each mission, one or two UNDP programmes were visited in the field as a means of verifying the information received.

The following tools and sources of information were used in the evaluation:

- A survey of available statistical data pertaining to human security as defined...
above (see Chapter 1.2.2), supplemented by national statistical data collected during the case studies.

- Secondary sources of information pertaining to human security and the perceptions of people, including reports prepared by third parties, surveys and opinion polls and news articles.
- Relevant past programme and project outcome evaluations and/or country reviews.
- Financial budget and delivery data pertaining to UNDP programmes in relevant countries on a national and global basis.

- Progress reports and other project documentation.
- A list of general questions distributed in advance to all individuals and groups interviewed in each of the countries visited by the mission.
- Semi-structured interviews with individuals.
- Semi-structured interviews with groups.
- Structured interviews with individuals.
- Structured interviews with groups.
- Project site visits.

The use of these sources of information to assess the various dimensions of UNDP performance is elaborated in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance dimensions</th>
<th>Main sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance and positioning</td>
<td>Political analyses prepared by think tanks and independent academic sources. UN Security Council resolutions and reports. UNDP Country Programme Action Plans and Country Cooperation Frameworks. Interviews with UNDP and UN staff, government officials, political parties, and staff of international financial institutions and key multilateral and bilateral agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results and effectiveness</td>
<td>Project monitoring data. National and global human development reports. National statistical information. Reports of other UN agencies. UN Common Country Assessments. Evaluations conducted by academic institutions or other agencies. Third-party opinion polls. Interviews with UNDP staff, project personnel, project beneficiaries. Interviews with representatives of civil society, donor agencies, government, political parties and the media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Budget and delivery data. Project documentation. Interviews with beneficiaries, government officials and project personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Management audit reports. Staffing tables. Interviews with UNDP staff, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/UN Resident Coordinator and the Country Director. Interviews with project personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Records of inter-agency meetings. Resident Coordinator reports. UN Development Assistance Frameworks. Records of thematic group meetings. Joint needs assessment reports. Interviews with government officials. Interviews with UN agencies. Interviews with bilateral and multilateral agency personnel. Interviews with staff of international NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive leadership and credibility</td>
<td>Review of issues papers, country assessments, country reviews, and national or regional human development reports. Review of documentation on the Millennium Development Goals. Interviews with staff of UN agencies, the World Bank, bilateral and multilateral donors. Interviews with civil society actors and government representatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluation conducted extensive semi-structured interviews with UNDP, the UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Office for Project Services, the Office of the United Nations Development

| TABLE 2. CATEGORIES OF ACTORS INTERVIEWED FOR COUNTRY CASE STUDIES |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| **Actors** | **Main evaluative questions** | **Type of meeting** |
| Civil society leaders, politicians, national NGOs | To what degree have conditions of human development and human security improved or worsened during the period in question? What do you think of the overall peace-building strategy adopted by the parties involved, the international community and UNDP in particular? What do you think of the role and performance of UNDP and its programmes? | Separate semi-structured group meetings with each subgroup: national civil society organizations; representatives of political parties; national NGOs. |
| Government | What aspects of UNDP’s role did the government appreciate the most? How could UNDP raise its value-added? What does the government think of UNDP’s programmes in terms of their relevance to needs, effectiveness, and efficiency? What arrangements have been made to ensure sustainability of externally funded programmes? How should UNDP change? | Individual meetings with ministers and government officials directly involved with UNDP programmes. Group meetings with members of the judiciary. Group meetings with members of parliament. |
| Multilateral and bilateral UN partners | What are your views on trends and progress made towards peace-building and human security? What are your views regarding the performance (effectiveness, efficiency, competence, strategic role) of the UN and of UNDP in particular? How could UNDP have been more effective? What value-added did UNDP provide? What substantive leadership did UNDP provide? | Semi-structured individual meetings with agencies that contribute to UNDP programmes or those that have taken a lead role in the process of peace-building. Semi-structured group meetings with others. |
| UN peacekeeping or peace-building support office | Describe the peace process and its successes and failures. What inherent dangers are there in the current situation for a return to conflict? What role did UNDP play in peace-building? What was your relationship with UNDP? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship? How effective was UNDP? How did UNDP support the peace process? How did UNDP support your role? What handover arrangements do you envisage upon completion of your mandate? | Semi-structured individual meetings with senior officials of the UN operation. |
| UN agencies and Bretton Woods institutions | What are your views on trends and progress made towards peace-building and human security? What role did UNDP play? What is the value-added of UNDP? How effective was it in supporting the coordination of the UN system? What was your experience of joint strategy development/resource mobilization/programme implementation? How did UNDP contribute to the effectiveness of the UN system? What could it have done better? What do you think of the capacity of UNDP? What substantive role did UNDP play? | Semi-structured group meetings with UN agencies. Semi-structured bilateral meetings with senior officials of the UN peacekeeping or peace-building support office. Semi-structured bilateral meetings with World Bank representatives. |
| UNDP programme beneficiaries | How has your situation improved? How specifically have you benefited from UNDP’s projects/programmes? Overall, are you optimistic or pessimistic about your future? How did UNDP contribute to development in your area? What did it do right? What did it do wrong? How could it improve? | Semi-structured group meetings at project sites. |
Group, and a selection of UN fund and programme staff in New York. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the senior management of UNDP as well as desk officers responsible for the case-study countries and relevant staff in the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships, Bureau of Management and elsewhere in the organization. One mission member also conducted semi-structured interviews with World Bank and US Agency for International Development staff in Washington, DC. (See Annex 4 for a comprehensive list of people interviewed.)

The evaluation team met and interviewed six categories of actors in each country, as described in Table 2.

In general, because much of the information collected was qualitative, the evaluation sought to cross-reference and verify information obtained by repeating questions from different angles and by asking similar questions to different actors.

1.2.2 Selected statistics relating to human security

The case studies were partly informed by a survey of available statistics relating to human security for the six countries. The statistics covered four central aspects of human security: deaths from armed conflict, human rights violations, refugees and internally displaced persons, and victims of natural and technological disasters. The indicators were chosen with Amartya Sen’s definition in mind—for their immediacy in relation to the physical security of the individual, but with a broader focus than battle deaths. The data chosen reveal the difficulty of distinguishing physical and material security. Population displacement data reflect both types of insecurity. Likewise, natural and technological disasters include famine or homelessness as a consequence of floods or earthquakes, for example. (See Annex 5 for a list of printed and web-based resources consulted.)

The information does not include more comprehensive data on aspects of human development. First, data on human development tend not to distinguish between immediate threats to human life and longer-term threats, which are a consequence of underdevelopment. This report focused on the ‘downside risks’ to human beings, which is a much narrower concept than human development. Second, human development indicators are more readily available through the Human Development Reports and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators; both sources of information were used for the case studies. Third, to choose particular human development or MDG indicators as more suggestive than others of downside risks is a major conceptual task—well worth doing but beyond the scope of this report.

The data also leave out some important aspects of human security, namely violent crime and domestic violence, because of the difficulty in identifying relatively comprehensive data.

In general, there is a paucity of data on human security, especially in relation to the most insecure countries, which includes the case-study countries. Moreover, the data tend to reflect earlier analytical paradigms. Just as data on gross national product (GNP) or government expenditure are much more readily available than data on human development, so, too, data on physical insecurity tend to focus on battle deaths, even though most deaths in contemporary conflicts are the result of violence deliberately inflicted on civilians or of disease and hunger associated with war. Perhaps the best indicator of human security is population displacement, including both refugees and internally displaced persons, since it encompasses both physical and material security and since relatively good, comprehensive data are available.

1.2.3 The questionnaire

A questionnaire was sent to UNDP country offices of the 46 countries or areas that receive assistance from UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. The questions were designed after the case studies were completed and were aimed at
verifying some of the findings from the case studies. Country offices for 24 countries or areas responded to the questionnaire (Table 3).

For a fuller analysis of the responses, the reader may refer to the online version of this report on the UNDP Evaluation Office website (www.undp.org/eo).

1.2.4 Limitations of the evaluation

Evaluating UNDP’s activities in conflict-affected countries is a massive and complex task. The evaluation team faced the following key constraints:

- **Appropriateness of the sample**: The six case-study countries selected for the evaluation team by UNDP emphasize UNDP’s role in Security Council-mandated missions and serve to support an analysis than can generate conclusions about UNDP’s participation in integrated UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions. This is important for assessing the direction of future UNDP strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country or area</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia*</td>
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<td>Lao PDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina*</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia (TFYR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Two entries were received for each for these countries.
in conflict-affected countries within the context of UN reform. However, it does not fully reflect the role that UNDP plays at present in other countries faced with major or incipient internal conflicts or in areas affected by conflict in neighbouring countries.

- **Limitations of the survey:** In order to address the above limitation, the evaluation team issued a questionnaire to conflict-affected countries that are not under Security Council mandates. The list was limited to those countries in which the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has provided technical support; 24 of the 46 countries/areas contacted responded.

- **Time limitations:** Five of the six case studies involved country visits of one week each. Despite the extremely intensive nature of the visits and the considerable volume of information and evidence collected, it is fair to say that the team, without exception, would have benefited from more time in each country, particularly to verify documentary evidence.

- **Scope:** The terms of reference stipulated that the evaluation team was to review UNDP activities during the period 2000-2005. Yet key events in some of the case-study countries, such as Guatemala and Tajikistan, took place before this period. In such instances, the team reviewed activities in 2000 and prior years, compounding the difficulties faced in conducting a thorough review in the time allotted. Furthermore, the quality of data on UNDP performance prior to 2000 was uneven.

- **Absence of systematic monitoring data:** Although programme outputs were better documented in the countries visited than in some other UNDP programmes, the absence of monitoring systems at the project or programme level to verify the achievement of outcomes (as defined in the Strategic Results Framework/Results-oriented Annual Report, project documents or action plans) presented a problem. This required the evaluators to identify potential indicators of performance and seek third-party sources for the information collected or to attempt to define and collect information on a snapshot basis. Furthermore, outcomes were rarely explicitly presented in terms of human security indicators, meaning that the evaluation team had to identify and develop appropriate human security indicators. Data was then collected from a variety of sources of varying degrees of reliability. The limitations of the human security data are presented along with an analysis of the data on the online version of this report available on the UNDP Evaluation Office website.

- **Limitations of financial data:** It has been virtually impossible to obtain reliable, comprehensive, aggregate figures on resources managed by UNDP in conflict-affected countries. While information pertaining to core resources is readily available, the fragmented nature of cost-sharing and trust fund resources has rendered reliable financial data very difficult to come by.

- **Aggregation of data:** The varied sources of data used has made it difficult to aggregate quantitative indicators in a meaningful way when attempting to measure performance or make inter-country comparisons of performance. Where broad national indicators were used, attribution to the UNDP programmes was a problem.

- **Meta-evaluation:** In accordance with the overall intent of the evaluation, this study did not include direct verification of programme outputs. Rather, the evaluation used data collected and presented in progress reports and prior evaluations of individual programmes and projects.
1.2.5 Review process

This evaluation report was subject to a rigorous quality assurance process. The draft report was shared with UNDP senior management at Headquarters and in country offices and with key stakeholders in all case-study countries for verification of facts and accuracy in the interpretation of data. In addition, the draft report was presented to the UNDP Executive Board in an informal session and benefited from the comments of delegates. It was also reviewed internally by the UNDP Evaluation Office and externally by an Advisory Panel comprising international development experts working in the area of peace and human security as well as evaluation experts. These reviews focused on the operationalization of the terms of reference and the conceptual framework, the methodology employed, and the validity of evidence used in the study.
During the first five years of the 21st century, the number of armed conflicts around the world was lower than at any time since the 1950s. According to the Human Security Report, the number of battle-related deaths was also at an all-time low, though the number does not reflect civilians deliberately targeted in war. Table 4 summarizes the main indicators for the six case-study countries. Only two countries (Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) are still experiencing direct conflict-related deaths. Needless to say, indirect deaths from conflict, resulting, for example, from landmines, unexploded ordnance and illegal armed groups continue long after the cessation of hostilities.

Despite the decline in the number of people killed in conflicts, many people in large parts of the world live in intolerable situations of insecurity, often as a result of conflict. High levels of insecurity in all the case-study countries are indicated by the levels of refugees and displaced persons and the low ranking in human development indicators. Although Guatemala and Tajikistan fare better in terms of population displacement and human development indicators, they also experience high levels of crime and human security challenges.

### Table 4. Human Security, ODA and UNDP Expenditure in Six Case-Study Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Battle-related deaths in 2003</th>
<th>Internally displaced persons in 2003</th>
<th>Refugees abroad</th>
<th>HDI 2003&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>HDI ranking 2003&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>ODA 2003&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; (US$ millions)</th>
<th>ODA/GNI 2003&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt; (%)</th>
<th>UNDP total expenditures in 2004&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt; (US$ millions)</th>
<th>UNDP expenditures/ODA (%) in 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>200,000 - 300,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>34.74</td>
<td>328.564</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>3,200,000 - 3,400,000</td>
<td>429,000</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>5,421*</td>
<td>98.61</td>
<td>32.037</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>55.199</td>
<td>25**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>25,800</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>17.710</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>31.51</td>
<td>14.457</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>59,800</td>
<td>.652</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>8.802</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Official development assistance (ODA) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was particularly high in 2003, so this figure should be read with caution: annual ODA receipts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2000 to 2005, respectively, were 184; 263; 1,186; 5,421; 1,815. In Afghanistan, ODA receipts increased steadily during the period 2000 to 2005 (with the 2003 figure slightly higher than the average for this period); in the other countries in this table, ODA receipts remained relatively stable over this period.

** For all countries this figure should be treated with caution due to the possibility of double-counting aid in terms of ODA and UNDP expenditures: UNDP figures contain large elements of trust funds that donors probably report separately to the World Bank and OECD. This should be a minor problem as the volume of UNDP is relatively small; however, in Guatemala, the government contributes large sums to UNDP projects under cost-sharing arrangements. The figure for Guatemala should therefore be treated with particular caution.

Sources: (a) Human Security Report; (b) US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants; (c,d) UNDP; (e,f, g) OECD/World Bank; (g) UNDP Intranet.
rights violations, as well as unemployment, as discussed below. Most remain heavily dependent on external assistance, especially Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. Moreover, the rise in terror and the war on terror, especially as pursued within conflict-affected areas, has compounded the sources of insecurity.

2.1 TRENDS IN HUMAN SECURITY IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

2.1.1 Conflicts

Civilian deaths probably account for around 80–90 percent of total casualties in contemporary warfare. This includes deaths from deliberate violence and deaths that result from the humanitarian crises associated with war. A noteworthy feature of contemporary conflicts is the very high level of population displacement. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the global refugee population rose from 2.4 million people in 1975 to 14.4 million people in 1995. It subsequently declined to 9.6 million in 2004, primarily as a consequence of increased repatriation. This figure only includes refugees who cross international boundaries. Figures provided by the US Committee on Refugees and Immigrants include internally displaced persons (IDPs) and are much higher, increasing from 22 million in 1980 to 38 million in 1995 (of whom approximately half were internally displaced), and declining to 32.8 million in 2004 (of whom two thirds were IDPs). The number of refugees and internally displaced persons per conflict can be estimated to have increased more than threefold from 1969 to 2004—from 327,000 to 1,093,300.

Table 5 and Table 6, respectively, present indicative figures for casualties and population displacement in the six case-study countries. The scale of civilian casualties, both as a result of political violence and war-related disease, and the scale of displacements given by even the most conservative estimates, are striking. An important feature of the tables is the variation in reported figures from the small selection of sources presented. The reader may wish to refer to the UNDP Evaluation Office website (www.undp.org/eo) for a short discussion of the considerable problems associated with data on human security, and a fuller presentation of data from a number of sources.

The sections that follow summarize the main trends in other aspects of human security in conflict-affected countries.

2.1.2 Human rights violations and crime

Contemporary conflicts are associated with high levels of human rights violations and violations of humanitarian law, including forced detention, atrocities such as amputation or decapitation, widespread or systematic rape and other forms of sexual abuse and violence, the use of child soldiers, child labour and using women and children as sex slaves, abduction and kidnapping of hostages and of women into forced marriages, and the destruction of historic buildings and cultural symbols. All the conflicts in the case-study countries witnessed most of these human rights violations, although the conflict in Sierra Leone was probably the most gruesome in terms of all these types of violations.

In most cases, human rights violations continue after the cessation of overt hostilities, although their form may change. The reasons have to do with a weak rule of law,
## TABLE 5. CONFLICT CASUALTIES IN SIX CASE-STUDY COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years of conflict</th>
<th>Uppsala/PRIO Lacina &amp; Gleditsch Battle deaths estimates</th>
<th>Project Ploughshares</th>
<th>Genocide Watch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1989-</td>
<td>250 (1991)</td>
<td>Over 2,000 people have been killed by armed and criminal groups since February 2004 (implied until January 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2002</td>
<td>12,997 (1991-2000)</td>
<td>Implied 1991-2002: Estimates of the total conflict deaths range from 20,000 to over 50,000. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, have had limbs hacked off by the rebels. An estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women have been victims of sexual violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:*
- 'Best estimate' for period given in parentheses
- As many as 1.5 million people, two thirds of whom were civilians, have died since 1978
- No figures available for Northern Alliance, Taliban, or Al Qaeda losses since 2001
- The invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1996-1997 was accompanied by large-scale massacres, not included here as battle deaths. About 350,000 civilians were killed by violence from 1998-2001, and approximately 2.5 million have died from all war-related causes
- (Implied 1990-January 2006): Total: An estimated 350,000 people killed as a direct consequence of violence. In total, an estimated 4 million deaths resulting from the conflict, mostly from malnutrition and disease
- Estimates for the total number of people killed in political violence since 1954 range from 100,000 to over 200,000, with many authors citing a figure of 140,000. Mostly civilians murdered by the government and right-wing death squads
- Over 2,000 people have been killed by armed and criminal groups since February 2004 (implied until January 2006)
- One estimate of war-related deaths from 1991 to 1995 is 30,000
- Implied 1991-2002: Estimates of the total conflict deaths range from 20,000 to over 50,000. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, have had limbs hacked off by the rebels. An estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women have been victims of sexual violence
- The war is estimated to have killed about 50,000 people, most of them in 1992

the availability of small arms, and the presence of illegal armed groups. In the case studies, the presence of international troops does seem to have reduced the incidence of human-rights violations committed by governments, particularly in Sierra Leone and Haiti, although it is difficult to establish a direct link in the case of Haiti. In Guatemala and Tajikistan, the governments continue to be repressive. And although the right to life is respected, arbitrary arrest and detention remains frequent. In Afghanistan, there continue to be widespread reports of murder, rape, kidnappings, illegal detentions, torture and land seizures committed by both state agents and non-state actors, and lack of access to justice (see case study). And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ordinary citizens are subject to daily harassment, illegal taxation and bribe-taking as well as other violations of human rights at the hands of the police and armed forces.

In all these cases, crime levels are very high and, indeed, it is often difficult to distinguish between crime—acts undertaken for private motives—and human rights violations undertaken by illegal armed groups or by people in the uniforms of state agents. High-crime statistics can be viewed as an indicator of the weakness of institutions that are supposed to uphold the rule of law and the lack of opportunities for legal employment. In Haiti, the presence of illegal armed groups has created ‘no-go’ areas, such as Cité Soleil, where neither the police nor international troops dare enter. In Guatemala, violent crime is rising dramatically—from some 27,000 incidents in 2001 to 34,000 in 2004. In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many former militia groups and warlords have been absorbed into the police and armed forces, but continue to be responsible for crime and human rights violations. Trafficking in people, arms, drugs or valuable commodities is also characteristic of all case-study countries.

2.1.3 Violence and discrimination against women

All forms of violence against women remain high in post-conflict situations, including domestic violence, rape, forced and child marriage (Afghanistan), harassment and trafficking. Its incidence ranges from ‘common’ (Haiti), ‘widespread’ (Tajikistan), ‘persistent’ (Afghanistan), to ‘alarming’ (Guatemala).[^9]

[^9]: A list of human rights violations recorded in the six case-study countries can be found on the online version of this report on the UNDP Evaluation Office website: [www.undp.org/eo](http://www.undp.org/eo)
In Guatemala, women are the victims of *feminicid*ó—murders targeting women that continue to be a phenomenon around the country. A typical feature of contemporary conflict is widespread or systematic rape. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in South Kivu, for example, some 5,000 women were raped between October 2002 and February 2003, according to UN estimates. Women and children are also abducted and detained as ‘bush wives’, ‘sex slaves’ and, especially children, as spies.

In many cases, continued violence against women remains linked to the conflict. For example, violence committed by those suffering from post-traumatic stress, by men returning to households headed by women during the war, by men facing dislocation and unemployment on return, by a reinforcement of traditional/conservative attitudes towards women, and by continued violence from armed groups, as in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. The destruction of communities during the conflict may also mean the disappearance of social structures that might previously have offered a safety net. The health consequences of violence may prevent women from being able to work or attend school. Women survivors of violence during the conflict may find their reintegration and return to normal life prevented by attitudes that condemn or even ostracize women and men who have suffered sexual abuse.

Other forms of violence are rooted in traditional attitudes and practices (for example, in Sierra Leone, some 80 percent of women have undergone female circumcision), which are sometimes reinforced by conflict.

The consequences of violence are accentuated where there are no refuges, where law enforcement and health officials are not trained in gender-based violence and legal remedies are inadequate. Women have particular problems in accessing justice and, in all the case studies, levels of literacy and numeracy are lower for women than for men. In Afghanistan, despite huge improvements, there are still 1.5 million girls who do not attend school—indeed, 79 percent of all women, and 90 percent of women in rural areas, cannot read. In many conflict-affected countries, health facilities for women are non-existent or inadequate.

### 2.1.4 Economic insecurity

Contemporary conflicts often result in dramatic falls in gross domestic product (GDP) and in the human development index (HDI). Figures 1 and 2 show that this has been the case in all six countries studied except Guatemala. Afghanistan,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone have among the lowest HDIs in the world. In all six countries, there are very high levels of poverty and unemployment. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is probably the poorest, with over 80 percent of the population estimated to be living on less than $1 a day. In Sierra Leone and Haiti, 51 percent and 56 percent, respectively, are living on less than $1 a day. Insecurity is also the consequence of a lack of sustainable livelihoods. High levels of population displacement are linked to the loss of rural occupations as people are forced to leave their homes, which were the traditional source of subsistence. In addition, conflicts contribute to the destruction of urban infrastructure, including opportunities for work in manufacturing and services. Data on levels of unemployment or participation in precarious activities in the informal sector are inadequate. But it is evident from all the case studies that high levels of joblessness are a common feature of conflict-affected countries. Bands of unemployed young men provide a ready source of manpower for conflicts, and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Access to improved sources of water: proportion of population (%)</th>
<th>Access to improved sanitation facilities: proportion of population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Millennium development indicators.
loss of hope contributes to the willingness to engage in violence.

Lack of environmental health is an important indicator of material insecurity. This includes inadequate health care and lack of access to primary health care as well as to clean water and sanitation facilities. Table 7 illustrates the inadequacy of water and sanitation facilities in the six case-study countries.

Illiteracy rates are also high in all the case-study countries except Tajikistan, ranging from 22 percent in Guatemala to 39 percent (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 49 percent (Haiti) and 64 percent (Sierra Leone and Afghanistan). The one indicator that has significantly improved for all six countries is communication, that is, access to telephone lines and the Internet.

Women’s economic security is undermined by sex discrimination, for example, in the context of labour and job allocation and in laws relating to access and ownership of land. Fear of violence, or shame, may inhibit women from going out in public and thus from working. Poverty makes women vulnerable to sexual exploitation, trafficking and further violence. Where there is no employment (or where preference is given to former male combatants), women may resort to prostitution or begging.

Although economic stability and economic growth greatly improved after the establishment of international missions and the return to relative stability, the domestic revenue base of governments in all the case studies is very low. There is a heavy dependence on external assistance, either in the form of official aid (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone—see Table 4) or remittances, especially in Tajikistan and Haiti.

In addition, government capacity remains very low. The proportion of national budgets devoted to wages is very high, while average salaries are very low and usually well below minimum levels required. This results in moonlighting, loss of the best qualified civil servants and general weakness of key institutions. Thus the sustainability of stability and growth is open to question, both because it depends on external assistance and because the capacity of national institutions to take over the international role is inadequate.

2.1.5 Environmental insecurity

Contemporary conflicts often contribute to environmental degradation and greater vulnerability to natural disasters. Moreover, emergency responses are weakened or non-existent as a result of conflict. In Tajikistan, for example, the conflict diminished the country’s capacity to respond to frequent earthquakes and flash floods. In Haiti, the continuing political crises are said to have contributed to the severity of no less than 20 internationally recognized natural disasters, including hurricanes and tropical storms, earthquakes, floods and landslides. The increased frequency and intensity of such disasters is believed to be linked to severe environmental degradation in Haiti. Chronic poverty, a high population density 10 and a weak institutional capacity to address long-term issues such as the environment have contributed to anarchic urbanization, deforestation and overexploitation of agricultural land.

2.1.6 Terror and the war on terror

Terror, meaning violence for the deliberate purpose of intimidation, is typical of contemporary conflicts. However, the term is usually used just to refer to "violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, ... designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take" 11 undertaken by non-state actors. On the basis of this definition, terrorism has increased over

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10 The population density in Haiti is nearly 300 inhabitants per square kilometre.
11 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Terrorism Knowledge Base. Available at: http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp
the last five years—from 1,139 domestic and international incidents in 2000 to 4,924 in 2005.\footnote{Ibid. 2000: 1,139 incidents; 2001: 1,733 incidents; 2002: 2,647 incidents; 2003: 1,898 incidents; 2004: 2,646 incidents; 2005: 4,924 incidents.}

The war on terror has had considerable impact on human security, as is evident in Afghanistan. The use of military means to combat terror has led to high civilian casualties, especially in south-eastern Afghanistan, partly because it is difficult to distinguish terrorists from civilians and partly because civilians are unprotected.\footnote{Taking Iraq as an example, estimates of civilian casualties can go up much higher. There are two main sources of data for civilian casualties in Iraq. One is Iraqbodycount.org, which is based on reports of violent incidents in the media. The estimates for October 2005 range from 26,457 to 29,795. The other is a painstaking study reported in the British medical journal, The Lancet. This study estimated that there were an additional 98,000 deaths throughout Iraq, excluding Fallujah, compared to a similar period before the war. See also Kaldor, Mary (forthcoming). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Third Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, chapter 7.}

Addressing terror through ‘war’, rather than criminal justice, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, involves military—not policing—action. This can result in shoot-on-sight policies, intrusion into people’s homes, a spiralling of violence in terrorism and counter-terrorism, and non-observance of the principles of international humanitarian law (for example, proportionality).

The war on terror has also reduced humanitarian space, as the United Nations discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Heavy security restrictions, especially in countries where the war is taking place, have greatly hampered the capacity to respond to human security needs (see below).

In addition, the war on terror has influenced priorities for official development assistance as well as the conditions attached to aid, and has affected the legitimacy of international efforts. Priorities for aid are often based on a country’s allegiances in the war on terror, rather than on need, and repressive regimes that are engaged in the war are less liable to be challenged by the international community. Among the case-study countries, this has affected Afghanistan, and to some extent, Tajikistan, as well as neighbouring Central Asian countries.

\section*{2.2 THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONFLICT}

\subsection*{2.2.1 Weak states and weak civil societies}

In the 20th century, war was often linked to the construction of militaristic states. Contemporary wars tend to be associated with the disintegration of such states. All the case-study countries were formerly authoritarian regimes, either closed one-party states (Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan) or oligarchic dictatorships (Guatemala, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti). Moreover, they were regimes heavily dependent on outside support—either through foreign assistance, external fiscal transfers or dependence on mineral exports. Cold War politics served to prop up dictatorial regimes, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guatemala, or led to proxy wars, as in Afghanistan and Guatemala.

All of these regimes underwent a process of state unravelling, sped up by the impact of liberalization and opening up to the outside world (both politically and economically), especially after the end of the Cold War. Tajikistan became independent as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan led to a shaky coalition of former Mujahadeen factions. In the other case-study countries, challenges to repressive dictators were compounded by external pressures for political and economic liberalization.

All the case-study countries had a low domestic tax base that fell further because of declining investment and production, increased corruption and clientelism, and declining legitimacy. The declining tax revenue led to even greater dependence on external or private revenue sources, through,
VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ARE NOT A SIDE EFFECT OF WAR, BUT THE CENTRAL METHODOLOGY OF VIOLENT CONFLICT.

For example, access to mineral rents (Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), private oligopolies (Guatemala) or criminal/corrupt activities. Reductions in public expenditure as a result of the shrinking fiscal base as well as pressure from external donors for macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization (which also may reduce export revenues) led to weakening public services and further eroded legitimacy. A growing informal economy associated with increased inequalities, unemployment and rural-urban migration, combined with the loss of legitimacy, further weakened the rule of law and indeed led to the re-emergence of privatized forms of violence.

These are the typical conditions in which contemporary conflicts take place. The rationales of conflict are varied; they include social and economic exclusion (Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo) as well as ethnic and religious grievance or ideology (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo). But what these conflicts have in common are the conditions that make it more likely that conflicts will be pursued through violent means.

It is often argued that conflicts are more likely to take place in societies that are divided ethnically or religiously. It is true that many contemporary conflicts are fought in the name of identity politics—that is to say, the claim to power on the basis of identity, be it ethnic or religious. However, most societies are characterized by ethnic and religious pluralism. What has to be explained is why, in some countries, these differences lead to violence during certain periods. In former authoritarian states, ethnic or religious ideologies are often constructed by leaders anxious to retain power or by opportunists who try to use moments of transition to gain power, and mobilize through the media, especially radio and television. Indeed, war itself can be considered a form of mobilization around exclusive or sectarian identities because of deliberate strategies to generate fear and hate.

By and large, the regions most prone to violence are those in which civil society is weakest. Where liberalization is the consequence of external pressure rather than pressure from civil society, transitions are particularly fragile. Political legitimacy is constructed by civil society. A strong civil society promotes civic as opposed to sectarian values, as well as the norms that underpin the rule of law and political authority. It also increases accountability and transparency and contributes to the efficiency of tax collection. Of course, civil society has its dark side, but this argument is predicated on the assumption that public debate as opposed to violent conflict provides space for democratic opinion. Linked to civil society are the informal institutions around the family, small businesses, educational establishments and local media outlets that play an influential role in shaping the strength of social networks and community ties.

A number of scholars have made the point that it is the opportunity for conflict, rather than the proximate causes of conflict, that have common characteristics that can be identified in order to develop methods of conflict prevention.14 All human societies are prone to conflict. The real question is what determines the resort to violence.

2.2.2 Military means

All of the conflicts discussed have been fought by armed networks of non-state and state actors. They include paramilitary groups organized around a charismatic leader,

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warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, volunteers such as the Mujahadeen, organized criminal groups, units of regular forces or other security services as well as mercenaries and private military companies. Often these networks cross borders, making use of members of the diaspora, foreign mercenaries or volunteers, or agents of neighbouring states. Thus the war in Sierra Leone began with an invasion from Liberia backed by Charles Taylor. The Afghan Mujahadeen recruited from all over the Muslim world. Seven neighbouring states were involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For most of these conflicts, the availability of small arms—often as the result of previous wars or of the Cold War—has been a significant contributing factor.

As mentioned previously, the typical military strategy in these wars is deliberate violence against civilians. In much of the literature, the debate about ‘greed and grievance’ tends to focus either on economic motives for killing civilians (looting and pillaging, for example) or psychological motives for atrocities. What is often neglected is the military logic of contemporary wars. In contemporary conflicts, the warring parties, like guerrilla movements, aim to control territory politically. But they do so through terror, rather than by capturing popular support. This is why the warring parties use techniques such as genocide, population displacement and systematic rape as deliberate war strategies. Violations of humanitarian and human rights law are not a side effect of war, but the central methodology of violent conflict. This explains the high level of civilian casualties and population displacement.

2.2.3 The conflict economy
Contemporary conflicts also generate a specific type of economy. Or, to put it another way, as exemplified by all the case studies, these wars speed up the unravelling process described above and stimulate not a capitalist market but a new type of informally regulated economy based on violence. Because these conflicts take place in states where systems of taxation have collapsed and where little new legitimate wealth is being created, and where the conflict has destroyed physical infrastructure, cut off trade and created a climate of insecurity that prohibits investment, the warring parties have to seek alternative, exploitative forms of financing. They raise money through looting and plundering, through illegal trading in drugs, arms, oil, diamonds, illegal immigrants, cigarettes or alcohol, through ‘taxing’ humanitarian assistance, through support from sympathetic states and through remittances from members of the networks. Women are sold and bought for sex and other forms of exploitation. All these types of economic activity are predatory and depend on an atmosphere of insecurity. Indeed, the new wars can be described as a central source of the globalized informal economy—the transnational criminal and semi-legal economy that represents the underside of globalization. Thus both the economy and the state are even weaker in the aftermath of conflict.

2.2.4 Effects in time and space
Contemporary conflicts are very difficult to end because they exacerbate the conditions that led to conflict—weak states lacking effective and operational institutions, weak civil societies, high unemployment, criminality and the availability of arms and ex-combatants. Moreover, the warring parties may have a vested interest in continuing conflict, either for economic reasons, or because their political power depends on fear, or because of complicity in war crimes. The areas where conflicts have lasted longest have generated cultures of violence. Indeed the most important condition conducive to conflict is past conflict. A number of conflicts, especially in Africa, have very long histories. Indeed, they have mutated from liberation wars through counter-insurgency to low-intensity wars to the typical wars of the last two decades. This is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and partly the case
in Afghanistan. Sometimes, the warring parties have an interest in peace agreements so as to regroup and re-energize. The last two decades were characterized by large numbers of serial peace agreements, many of which failed. One study of 38 peace agreements between January 1988 and December 1998 showed that 31 failed to survive more than three years.\textsuperscript{15} What has changed since 2000 is that more peace agreements have been sustained, for example, Dayton (11 years) and Guatemala (10/11 years), and this may be due to the role of the international community (see discussion below).

Contemporary conflicts are also very difficult to contain. They have a tendency to spread. They spread through refugees and displaced persons, through criminal networks, and through the extremist viruses they nurture. Thus refugees from the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda helped to ignite a new phase of the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The movement of unemployed ex-combatants has shifted violence back and forth in Sierra Leone. The war in Afghanistan is spilling over into Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Indeed, there is a propensity for regional clusters of warfare in West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa, Central America, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Thus, to the list of conditions conducive to conflict enumerated above (a weak or failing state and weak civil society, dependence on external revenue sources, especially primary commodities, the erosion of the monopoly of organized violence, the availability of small arms and unemployed young men, often former soldiers or policemen, and the spread of an illegal/informal economy) should be added previous violent conflict and proximity to conflict. All of these can be summarized as lack of human security.

\subsection*{2.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY}

There are a number of implications of this analysis for policy.

First, the distinction between different types of insecurity is blurred. Contemporary conflicts involve massive violations of human rights, including violence against women, organized crime, and economic and environmental insecurity. Hence any policy towards conflict needs to be holistic, involving military/political, civil/legal, and economic/social approaches. In particular, humanitarian and development concerns need to be incorporated into peace efforts. Addressing the issues of joblessness, criminality and gender discrimination have to be seen as integral components of peace processes. A strategy for improving human security is, at one and the same time, a strategy for addressing the conditions that lead to conflict.

Second, because the most important condition contributing to conflict is the lack of legitimacy, the core of peace-building has to be the construction of an inclusive political authority, whether this means a state, an international administration or a local municipality. Political authority depends on legitimacy, and legitimacy can only be conferred by the people living in a particular region. External actors can, at most, help to create enabling conditions. But in order to build legitimacy, it is critical that policy-making is inclusive and involves local civil society representatives, and not just the warring parties. Particularly important in this respect is the participation of women. In all the case studies, women played a key role in the processes leading to peace, although they have been made less important—even invisible—in implementation.

Linked to the re-establishment of political authority is legal security. Procedures for legal reform (potentially the entire framework

for civil and criminal law and procedures) might have to be put into place (for example, where there has been a collapse of the legal system or it is rejected as belonging to the previous regime, as in Afghanistan). Reform of substantive law must operate alongside the reform of the police and judicial systems, all of which are central to constitution-building. Legal security is closely related to physical security. Judicial independence and measures to eliminate corruption among police, the judiciary and other law enforcement agencies are required. Training in prosecution and defence advocacy is required. Such measures offer a significant opportunity to build capacity for the protection of human rights. The applicability of non-discrimination and equality to legal institutions must be emphasized and a strategy put in place to ensure their implementation.

Third, because levels of insecurity remain high after overt phases of conflict and because the conditions that led to conflict are exacerbated by conflict, it is difficult to distinguish between phases of conflict. Relief, recovery and reconstruction are, at one and the same time, prevention. Development, for example, which is supposed to come after the immediate recovery period, needs to be emphasized at all stages of the conflict so as to sustain productive activities. Of course, it is sometimes necessary to prioritize for planning purposes. And, of course, there are many components of strategy—for example, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or transitional justice—which are common to all conflicts. But exactly what needs to be done when will be specific to each conflict. There are no standard phases. Consulting with people on the ground and taking seriously their views as to needs, priorities and obstacles are crucial in developing specific strategies.

Finally, any approach to conflict has to have a regional focus because of the tendency of contemporary conflicts to spill over borders, through refugees and displaced persons, transnational criminal networks, or extremist ideologies. Regional issues are not just about porous borders and cross-border operations, but also about general instability in neighbouring countries.

Since 2000, the international community has placed increasing emphasis on assistance to countries in conflict. This is evidenced by the patterns of official development assistance as well as international and regional peacekeeping and international administration.

Between 2000 and 2004, the share of total aid going to conflict countries rose from 27 percent to 34 percent. In 2000, conflict countries received 20 percent more aid than the global average. By 2004, this had increased to 50 percent (see Table 8). This is partly explained by the war on terror; if Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded, then the increase is much smaller, rising only 1 percent by 2004. Even without Afghanistan and Iraq, aid to conflict countries is much higher than the global average. However, the more important question is whether this aid has contributed to an improvement in human security.

The increase in aid has been accompanied by important changes in the strategy towards conflict countries, in which the United Nations has taken the lead. In November 1999, the Security Council discussed how to increase the focus on conflict prevention. And in March 2000, in preparation for the Millennium Summit, the UN Secretary-General established a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8. ODA TO SELECTED COUNTRIES RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNDP BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net ODA receipts (US$ millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries, TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, TOTAL*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ODA for conflict countries as percent of global total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries, AVERAGE**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, AVERAGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*45 countries: see footnote.17

**Mean, calculated by the London School of Economics from: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures, excluding all ‘unallocated’ and ‘unspecified’ amounts.


panel to provide a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations on how best to conduct peacekeeping operations in the future. Lakhdar Brahimi, the chair of the panel, submitted his report in August 2000.\textsuperscript{18} The report noted in particular the changed nature of UN missions, the broader scope of mandates and the resulting need for more cohesion and more effective integration between the activities of the peacekeeping operation and those of other members of the United Nations system.

The Brahimi Report\textsuperscript{19} was a turning point, and most peacekeeping operations approved by the Security Council since 2001 are both 'multidimensional' and 'integrated'. As multidimensional operations, they address a broad range of issues, such as the creation of a secure and stable environment, support to political processes, the promotion of human rights and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and economic recovery. As integrated missions, they aim to better merge various components of the UN system, including a very specific role for UNDP (see below). However, although development is now included in the integrated mandate, it is not funded like the rest of the peacekeeping operation and is dependent on a separate pledging drive.

From the case studies, it can be concluded that the overall increase in assistance and, more importantly, the presence of peacekeeping forces, has helped stabilize these countries. Thus, they resulted in an improvement in human security, although this was also true of previous missions, such as those in Cambodia and Mozambique. In Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Tajikistan, the international presence helped to sustain peace agreements. In Sierra Leone, for example, there were several previous agreements. It was only after the deployment of a substantial UN peacekeeping force and after that force began to act in more robust ways to protect civilians and carry out a process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration that it became possible to implement the agreement and begin a genuine process of peace-building. In Haiti, where there has been prolonged political turmoil, no less than six different United Nations missions were deployed to the country between 1993 and 2001, each generally considered a failure. It was only starting in 2004 that the international community recognized the need for a long-term commitment to the future of Haiti. And, although it is too early to make judgements, there does seem to be an improvement in political and economic stability. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan, stability has improved in the areas where there is a strong international presence. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment of an inclusive Transition Government in June 2003, the full deployment of peacekeeping troops in the second half of that year, and the adoption of a more robust approach\textsuperscript{20} by these troops as from mid-2003 are all factors that led to a significantly improved security situation in the eastern provinces. The situation in Afghanistan is, of course, complicated by the insurgency and the war on terror in south-eastern parts of the country.

Nevertheless, in all six countries studied, human security remains precarious and the conditions that gave rise to conflict persist. These conditions represent a risk that conflict may erupt again in the future, especially if the international presence is not sustained. Particularly noteworthy in all six countries is the fact that the developmental underpinnings of newly created institutions were not addressed early enough.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Through its resolution S/RES/1484 of May 2003, the Security Council authorized the deployment to Bunia of an ‘Emergency Multinational Force’. By resolution S/RES/1493 of 28 July 2003, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to "use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capability, in North and South Kivu."\
\end{itemize}
What are the weaknesses in the role of the international community that need to be addressed if lasting peace is to be established? From the outset it is important to stress that each conflict is context-specific. It is difficult to generalize from one context to the next. Nor can one assume that what works in one place will necessarily work in another. That said, certain conclusions can be drawn from the case studies—and questions asked—about what worked or did not work and why.

3.1 PROTECTING CIVILIANS

The presence of peacekeeping troops is still no guarantee that civilians will be protected. Such troops need to be restructured for human security tasks instead of fighting wars. The job of the military in a human security framework is to protect individuals and create public security rather than to defeat enemies, while cooperating with development agencies so as to build an interrelated approach to security. The failure to deploy international security forces outside Kabul, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, is one reason why power remained in the hands of former commanders and why the insurgency, which receives cross-border support, is growing. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there needs to be much greater and more sustained deployment of UN troops in the eastern parts of the country. And in Haiti, peacekeeping forces need to be able to assist the police in dealing with illegal armed groups.

3.2 ESTABLISHING LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY

3.2.1 Top-down politics

The political approach in conflict-affected countries tends to be ‘top-down’ and dominated by those who mediated a peace agreement. Political agreement is reached first at the centre, often leaving a vacuum in rural areas. In addition, more emphasis is often placed on stability than on human rights and justice, including accountability for the commission of war crimes. Thus in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, former commanders and their militias have been co-opted into the security forces and the political process. While the short-term imperatives of stabilization have to be taken into account, this has led to continuing human rights abuses and a culture of impunity, which undermines the legitimacy of the newly established political and security institutions. This is partly a consequence of an inadequate security presence. But it is also the result of failing to include civil society activists and groups in the political process, especially women’s groups. Generating an atmosphere in which inclusiveness and respect for justice prevails is just as important in underpinning political authority and the rule of law as security. Similarly, an emphasis on macro-economic stabilization often means that there is not enough money in the national budget to pay civil servants, establish public institutions or deliver public services. This also causes loss of trust in a new regime and undermines its legitimacy.

In all the case-study countries, the international community replicated a political strategy in which elections constituted a key benchmark. Elections were supposed to establish legitimate governments and offer an exit strategy for the international community. There is no doubt that elections play an important symbolic role in such countries, and that the first post-conflict elections usually have very high turnouts. But the effort devoted to organizing quick elections may divert attention from the important institutional and structural underpinnings of democracy, such as rule of law, including functioning

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and independent legal institutions, and free media and association, and may fail to build local capacity. Key to democracy is the construction of a democratic political culture—democratic politics are needed to establish democratic institutions.22

3.2.2. Engaging with civil society

A particular problem is the failure to engage with civil society. In several of the countries studied, civil society groups played critical roles during the conflict. For example, in Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace helped create the conditions for an end to military rule and the elections of 1996, which paved the way for the first peace agreement. However, women were marginalized both in the agreement and in the newly elected government. And in Afghanistan, development assistance during the Taliban years was delivered through local NGOs, which were frequently pushed aside in the aftermath of the Bonn agreement.

By civil society, this study refers to those groups and individuals who actively engage in debates about public affairs. This can include both urban intellectuals—journalists, teachers, academics, human rights activists, clergymen and imams—as well as grass-roots groups, especially women’s groups. There is a tendency among international donors to assume that civil society is a ‘good thing’ that should be assisted, without recognizing it as a source of knowledge and information and ignoring the fact that those who are less interested in winning power may be more likely to promote an understanding based on public as opposed to sectarian interests. It is true that civil society cannot be artificially created by capacity-building programmes and that large influxes of funding can sometimes be counterproductive to genuine grass-roots efforts. On the other hand, authentic local civil society is often squeezed by both UN bodies and international NGOs. What is more important than funding is engaging with civil society, taking its concerns seriously and providing a forum where civil society groups can be heard. Engaging local civil society organizations, both intellectuals and grass-roots groups at national, district and local levels, by soliciting their opinions, stimulating their activities, and encouraging civic mobilization is a precondition for building a substantive democracy, rule of law and legitimate political authority.

One reason for the failure to engage civil society is cultural. International development workers, including UNDP staff, often lack local knowledge and language skills. Moreover, locals who are recruited to work with them often come from a certain class because they speak a major European language and are less interested in communicating with local grass-roots civil society. Agency staff (both governmental and non-governmental) are often recruited on short-term contracts, which means that they lack an institutional memory and tend to ‘reinvent the wheel’; they also lack the time necessary to build solid relationships with local communities. In addition, they may be less invested in the success of a particular mission than in their next career move. This is exacerbated by the insecurity and hardships that go along with working in conflict zones, where it may be hard to get people to commit for long periods of time. Rapid turnover of international staff also means that local people have to constantly repeat themselves in explaining crucial information (if they are asked for it).

Even without these limitations, the difficulties of engaging civil society, including women, should not be underestimated. Obstacles include resistance from authoritarian parties to the conflict, the general powerlessness of civil society, as well as the problems that arise from uncivil society—including the expression of particularistic and sectarian interests. Civil society is a reflection of

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broader opinion within society and is a source of extremist sentiment as well as the source of democracy. The point is rather that civil society is the arena in which these competing views can be discussed rather than fought over. Moreover, the stronger and more effective a civil society is, the more it is likely to veer in a democratic as opposed to sectarian direction.

### 3.2.3 Legitimacy of the international community

It is not only the legitimacy of newly established political institutions that is crucial, but also the legitimacy of the international community. To gain such legitimacy, international actors must act in accordance with international law and in a transparent manner—whether they are engaging in the war on terror or in peacekeeping.

Human rights abuses committed by UN peacekeepers and other internationals (NGOs and international NGOs) have become the subject of Security Council debate and a number of reports within the UN system. For example, following a 2002 report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services[^23] on sexual exploitation of refugees in three West African countries, including Sierra Leone, the Security Council included an explicit reference to the need to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation when it renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (resolution 1436, 2002). The March 2005 report of the Secretary-General, ‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (UN Document A/59/710), specifically discusses the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It describes the fact that sexual exploitation often occurs through the exchange of sex for food and contributes to a downward spiral towards prostitution with its attendant “violence, desperation, disease and dependency.” Sexual exploitation undermines the image and credibility of the peacekeeping operation. The report makes recommendations on issues including respect for the codes of behaviour, disciplinary action and training.

### 3.3 PRIORITIZING DEVELOPMENT

Insufficient attention is paid to economic and social development, especially job creation. Instead, immediate post-conflict priorities tend to focus on humanitarian relief and macroeconomic stabilization. Civil and political rights are favoured over economic and social rights. Development concerns are usually relegated to the ‘post-recovery’ period. In all six countries studied, high levels of unemployment, especially among young men, created a condition for renewed conflict, since the only way they may be able to marry and make a living is through criminal activities or by joining a militia.

### 3.4 MAINSTREAMING GENDER

Much more effort needs to be devoted to mainstreaming gender into all policies, practices and programmes in conflict-affected countries[^24]. In addition to the demographic imbalance registered in most post-conflict environments and the increased incidence of female-headed households, such countries tend to have high levels of violence against women both during and after conflicts and unequal gender relations. While no clear link has been established between domestic violence and conflict, it is reasonable to infer that unequal gender relations are among the conditions that are conducive to conflict. Moreover, the active


A major problem has been a preoccupation with a phased approach to dealing with conflict. The notion of a prevention phase, which deals with the grievances that cause conflict; a relief phase that provides humanitarian assistance as well as some form of political/military intervention; a recovery phase in which the emphasis is on stabilization; and finally, a reconstruction phase where development gets a greater priority. In fact, all these phases are intermixed. A failure to address conflict holistically results in a vacuum and an exacerbation of those structural factors conducive to conflict, rendering the recurrence of conflict more likely. This is why so many peace agreements fail. This analysis of conflict suggests that prevention requires, above all, dealing with the conditions that are conducive to conflict rather than with grievances that are sometimes constructed or exaggerated to justify violence. These conditions involve the sorts of policies that are usually considered relevant to recovery and reconstruction. What is needed is a longer-term commitment and a mix of policy approaches that are relevant to each situation.

In a questionnaire addressed to 24 countries or areas receiving assistance from UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, only seven said that they did not follow a phased approach. Among the remaining respondents, most followed the kind of phases defined above, although not all were standard phases.

3.6 FOCUSING ON THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT

Not enough attention is paid to the regional dimensions of conflict. Dealing with the nexus between corrupt governments, insurgent groups, drugs, minerals or other valuable primary products and weapons is crucial to dealing with most chronic internal armed conflicts. Of the six case-study countries, only in Sierra Leone and, to an extent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (through the Great Lakes region conference), were there clear efforts to develop a concerted regional programme to tackle insecurity. In West Africa, this has entailed cooperative efforts in four main countries (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire) through the establishment of the Mano River Union and dialogue and cooperation among border communities. This effort is helping to develop ways to limit the smuggling of arms, people, drugs and diamonds. In Afghanistan, the need to develop a regional approach to deal with insurgents coming from abroad is crucial in confronting the growing insurgency. The international community and UNDP have been involved in the administration of a border management project involving two of the case-study countries, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, though a visit to the Afghan-Tajik border showed few signs of border forces. In Central America, UNDP, in collaboration with UNHCR and other agencies, managed an area-based programme called PRODERE with linkages across sub-regional borders in response to cross-border migration in the midst of conflict.

26 One example is the inter-agency legal working group on domestic violence in Kosovo. The UN-appointed expert was a male professor of family law who asserted that “it would be unthinkable to forbid all kinds of domestic violence” in Kosovo. This became the accepted position of the working group until the late intervention of a female prosecutor from Kosovo who strongly asserted the opposite viewpoint. Kvinna Till Kvinna. 2001. Gender Awareness in Kosovo. Getting it Right? A Gender Approach to UNMIK Administration in Kosovo, p. 16.
Nevertheless, the architecture of the international community and of sovereign states renders it far more difficult to address cross-border issues than domestic ones. Yet in many instances, domestic conflict cannot be effectively tackled without addressing its cross-border dimensions.

3.7 AVOIDING A HEAVY ‘FOOTPRINT’

In most conflict countries, one of the parties to the conflict has dominated the various branches of government and has often been complicit, if not directly responsible for, human rights violations and other atrocities. Despite the now widely recognized importance of national ownership and the need to support national institutions, a weighty international presence, or ‘footprint’, is often required to ensure a level playing field for all parties to the peace agreement, adequately monitor its implementation and ensure that structural changes essential for long-term peace-building are implemented. In most instances, this has entailed the creation of temporary parallel structures with a large expatriate staff. In other cases, such as Guatemala, it has also involved the establishment of temporary stand-alone commissions for monitoring and tracking implementation.

These parallel structures absorb the most skilled national staff and are often criticized for undermining the capacity of national institutions. Especially where there is a sudden influx of agencies and NGOs and where donor fashions tend to determine the scale of the effort, these parallel structures can create layer upon layer of donors, implementing agencies, contractors and subcontractors, each taking their share of the budget and generating a competitive culture in which the self-interest of each agency may come before the goal of helping the victims of conflict. A heavy footprint can also mean a preponderance of administrative staff over operational staff, lack of accountability to the local population, a confusion of mandates and a tendency for both duplication and gaps. Even where, as in Sierra Leone, the international effort has been relatively effective, there remains a problem of the diversion of scarce national skills and of the legitimacy of the Sierra Leone Government.

The most justified criticism is that, while peacekeeping missions are a necessary evil and perform an essential function in the short term, their exit strategy is not sufficiently thought through and national capacity is not sufficiently developed to take over upon their departure. Such an exit strategy needs to be planned for from the very outset of the peacekeeping operation, taking into account all of the inevitable mitigating factors such as low national salaries, insufficient national revenue bases and recurrent budgets. To the extent possible, these parallel operations should attempt to skew national employment conditions as little as possible so that long-term sustainability of national institutions is not undermined.

3.8 ENSURING SECURITY

The final problem is security. Although there have been numerous attacks on UN offices, vehicles and staff before, the attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 was a watershed in that it was systematic, premeditated and of significant proportion. It also constituted a precedent that has since been emulated. Also, for the first time, lower and mid-level officials most directly responsible for security in Iraq were severely disciplined. This and subsequent strict tightening of security measures (confined living areas, barriers, armed guards, geographic restrictions on travel, curfews, armed escorts, etc.) have had a marked effect on the work of all UN agencies, including UNDP. More specifically, and to varying degrees, it has:

27 The discussion of ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ footprints was particularly intense in Afghanistan where, despite the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi to mount a UN mission with a ‘light footprint’, the actual size and cost of the mission became a matter of concern for many observers.
Dramatically raised the level of caution and the reluctance of the organization to take risks

Reduced access to UN premises by nationals who are not UN staff because of the severe security restrictions

Reduced the mobility of UN staff considerably because of restrictions on the areas to which staff can travel without additional, sometimes armed, escorts and the time that they can return to their home bases

Reduced the ability of staff to interact with people at the local level, including to assess needs and monitor programmes thoroughly

Created a psychological barrier between UN personnel and the ordinary person on the street and even between UN and government officials

Rendered it considerably more difficult to recruit or assign staff to offices in conflict zones—particularly because of the implications for families

Forced the UN to work through intermediaries—particularly through subcontracted national NGOs and consulting firms for whom UN staff do not have the same level of responsibility for their safety

Raised considerably the cost of programmes and the UN presence at the country level

Required the UN and its executing agents to seek innovative, and sometimes quite expensive, solutions for the monitoring of project implementation

Led to more frequent delays in the mounting of missions because of the potential for danger

Reduced the willingness of managers to take risks due to the potential for disciplinary action, forcing them to err on the side of caution

Created a siege-like mentality that can lead to overreaction and the likelihood of further escalation of violence, with an emphasis on military responses, not policing.

Security is a particularly difficult problem to overcome and a very sensitive one as the perceived threat is increasingly real. The usual tendency of a bureaucracy caught short is to subsequently err on the side of extreme caution. A delicate balance needs to be struck and the overall objective should be to do everything possible to ensure that interaction with civil society as well as government is negatively affected as little as possible.

In the case-study countries, security problems were most notable in Afghanistan. But the effect of the war on terror may make the situation of the UN more risky in other places as well. In answer to the question 'Does the security situation and the constraints introduced by UN security regulations hamper your ability to carry out your mission?', only 11 of the 24 respondents in the survey said no. Of the majority that said 'yes', a number of shared concerns were raised, including restrictions on travel inside a country, the dangers associated with working in particular areas, and restrictions on contact between members of particular ethnic groups. Other practical limitations include having to adopt security measures for offices or, in more extreme cases, evacuating staff, and/or relocating offices. The resource implications of these measures (in both time and money) were explicitly pointed out by respondents.

28 Extreme examples include: 1) in Iraq, the implementation of UNDP’s infrastructure programme is monitored by consulting engineers from Jordan and elsewhere with the use of remote closed-circuit televisions; and 2) in Afghanistan, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has also recruited Gurkha companies to provide security on their projects. Generally, because of cost considerations, some of these more innovative and effective solutions can only be implemented on large infrastructure projects.
4.1 UNDP’S ROLE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Increasingly, UNDP has become an essential component of the United Nations’ peacekeeping/peace-building operations. Indeed, UNDP’s core mandate places it at the very centre of the challenge of long-term post-conflict recovery and peace-building. The UN Country Team is generally present before and during conflict and remains beyond the limited duration of Security Council-mandated missions run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Department of Political Affairs. As a key member of the UN Country Team, UNDP has added responsibility for ensuring that armed conflict does not recur, requiring it to address structural conditions conducive to conflict from a development perspective. UNDP now also has ‘crisis prevention and recovery’ explicitly within its core mandate.29

UNDP has already made remarkable progress in adapting its procedures to its evolving mandate. It should be recalled that the organization started focusing on post-conflict activities only towards the end of the 1990s with the creation of an Emergency Response Division, later transformed into the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The table below shows the expenditure of UNDP in selected countries receiving assistance from the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

| TABLE 9. UNDP EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNDP BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY |
|---|---|---|
| **Global total expenditure (US$ billions)** | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| **Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, total expenditure* (US$ billions)** | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| **Total expenditure on selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, as share (%) of global total** | 33.8 | 37.2 |
| **Global programme expenditure (US$ billions)** | 2.9 | 3.7 |
| **Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, programme expenditure* (US$ billions)** | 1.1 | 1.5 |
| **Total programme expenditure on selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, as share (%) of global total** | 37.4 | 41.0 |
| **Average global total expenditure (US$ thousands)** | 18,388 | 23,443 |
| **Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, average total expenditure* (US$ thousands)** | 28,809 | 39,535 |
| **Average global programme expenditure (US$ thousands)** | 16,692 |
| **Selected countries receiving BCPR assistance, average programme expenditure* (US$ thousands)** | 26,137 |

*41 countries: see footnote.30

Source: UNDP Intranet.

29 Approved by UNDP’s Executive Board decision 2000/1.
Recovery in 2001. In 2005, the BCPR recorded a total expenditure of some $398 million under the service lines it manages. This represented nearly 11 percent of UNDP’s global expenditure. BCPR supports country offices in conflict-affected countries and leads the UNDP in crisis prevention and recovery, one of its five practice areas.31

To that amount must be added the much larger sums spent in transition countries on electoral assistance and other activities that fall outside the scope of BCPR. In 2005, UNDP’s total expenditure on conflict-affected countries was more than $1.6 billion (see Table 9). In terms of programme expenditure, spending in conflict-affected countries accounts for 40 percent of UNDP total programme expenditure. On average, spending on conflict-affected countries is 70 percent higher than spending on all countries.

Table 10 shows that UNDP supports a wide range of activities; the mix in the various countries is very different as are the so-called cornerstone projects. From the case studies it appears as if more effort is expended on the first three aims: recovery and reintegration, the restoration of state authority, and justice and security sector reform than on the other goals. In particular, it appears that governance and capacity-building account for the biggest share of expenditures in the case studies. Under governance, support to electoral processes is by far the largest activity, although it is an area where UNDP generally performs a service function more than a substantive one.32 Thus in Haiti, 48 percent of the total went to governance in the years 2000-2003, rising to 76 percent in 2004-2005. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, spending on democratic governance increased dramatically in 2005 to 69 percent of the total. In Sierra Leone, governance and capacity-building accounted for 40 percent of the total in 2004; recovery and peace-building accounted for 48 percent. And in Afghanistan, state-building and governance, together with democratization and civil society empowerment accounted for over 70 percent of all expenditure. Support for civil society and regional cooperation seems to be the weakest of the components listed in Table 10.

Innovative projects include:

- Community-based approaches to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, especially in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti
- Combining justice with security sector reform and trying to introduce holistic concepts of security; this is particularly important in Sierra Leone
- New processes of consultation, especially in relation to poverty reduction strategies and the MDGs. A particularly innovative project involves ‘Dialogue Tables’ in Guatemala.

A wide range of activities were described in response to the questionnaire. Country offices were asked to describe their cornerstone projects. These fell into the categories summarized in Table 11.

As in the case-study countries, priority areas appear to be recovery and reintegration, governance and institutional capacity-building and community-based projects, especially disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and reconciliation.

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31 Crisis prevention and recovery includes the following service lines: conflict prevention and peace-building; recovery; security sector reform and transitional justice; small arms reduction, disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants; mine action; natural disaster reduction; and special initiatives for countries in transition.

32 A notable exception is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where UNDP is more closely involved in the management of electoral support (see case study).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recovery and reintegration of people affected by conflict</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of armed forces</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is included as part of the security sector reform in Afghanistan; support for mine clearance under the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan includes assistance in the preparation of a plan to make the transition to a national mine action agency, help in drafting legislation for the establishment of the agency and a performance assessment of the UN Mine Action Centre to improve the structure of the transition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mine action</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo: Establishment of a UNDP Post-Conflict Unit; community-based approaches to DDR that include extending assistance to local communities receiving former combatants; support of national DDR institutions and a national plan for DDR; establishment of a Rapid Response Mechanism; projects that support former combatants; support to regional disarmament efforts (the overall strategy is to link demobilization with community development); advocacy for the inclusion of problems associated with dependents of combatants and women and girls who were forced to accompany armed groups in DDR-related programmes. DDR has become part of the security sector reform since the former members of armed groups were given the option of joining the new national army or the police. Other efforts include a project for Small Arms Reduction in five eastern provinces; reintegration and health services for the disabled</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rebuilding schools, health centres, etc.</td>
<td>Guatemala: Support for the creation of a governmental Special Commission for Attention to Refugees, and Technical Commission for the Implementation of the Agreement on Uprooted Populations (1995-2005); support for specific projects (1998-2001) targeting displaced persons (PRADIS); a project called Dignifying and Psychosocial Attention to War Victims (DIGAP, 2001-2008), which includes technical assistance for economic compensation and searching for ‘disappeared’ children; support to resolution of land conflicts; support to deactivation and reintegration of the Military Police (including economic compensation, training, reference systems in Ministry of Labour in-country offices), facilitating the demobilization of the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit and preparation of camps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reintegration of conflict-affected populations, including refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants, and the development of surrounding communities</td>
<td>Haiti: Since 2005, established an integrated structure between the UN Stablization Mission in Haiti and UNDP programmes in order to approach DDR; in 2003, UNDP launched a successful one-year pilot project for the reduction of armed violence and insecurity, following an innovative concept that linked disarmament to a community-based approach involving information campaigns, support to community conflict-resolution mechanisms and micro-projects benefiting community groups as well as former members of armed gangs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone: Various measures to reduce weapons, including legislation, community-based weapons collection, prevention of arms trafficking, and community recovery and development in border areas. Youth engagement projects for war victims including ‘Girls off the Street’</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan: Support to the government in establishing the Tajikistan Mine Action Cell, which is responsible for policy development, strategic planning, priority identification and coordination of mine action activities; advice and assistance on the fulfilment of the Tajik Government’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines, and on destruction of mine stockpiles</td>
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TABLE 10. UNDP ACTIVITIES IN SIX CASE-STUDY COUNTRIES (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of state authority/ governance and capacity-building</td>
<td>The management of elections and development of election management capacity</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional and legislative reform</td>
<td>Since 2004: strong focus on governance and state-building activities; special focus on formal state institutions of the executive, judiciary and the legislature branches; extensive involvement in managing and administering the presidential and local and parliamentary elections; capacity-development for the civil service in the form of training; assistance with the preparation of a training policy; funding of a major Civil Service Leadership Development programme; support to the government’s National Drug Control Strategy programme</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rebuilding and furnishing administrative centres</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Setting up local government</td>
<td>Support to institutions important to the transition; successful support in registering 25 million voters and organizing a referendum; launch of a project called Support for Securing the Electoral Process, which provided training, equipment and logistical support to nearly 60,000 police and security officers; ad hoc support to administrative tasks, such as direct payment of salaries to electoral agents and police officers; the information campaign under the programme of support to the electoral process also promoted the participation of women both as voters and as candidates; participated in an international effort aimed at reforming the public sector; planned projects include support to political parties and an anti-corruption programme</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public sector reform</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of parliamentary institutions</td>
<td>Support to ensure the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, including strengthening of the Office of Indigenous Women of the Indigenous Defender, the Penal Public Defender Institute and training of Indigenous Defenders, and support to a National Programme for Popular Traditional and Alternative Medicine; strengthening of the Ministry of the Interior; support for the security of the president and vice-president and the Strategic Analyses Secretariat; investigation into electoral participation; support to the political integration of the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit (1997-2005); facilitation of processes aimed at defining public agendas related to peace, including the National Shared Agenda (2002-2003), generating trust within and between political party structures and governmental programmes; support for the regional offices of the Human Rights Ombudsman; strengthening of community and grass-roots organizations in their capacity to participate in local development councils; strengthening political party structures at the municipal level; reconciliation and conflict-reduction activities, for example, through projects to solve community problems, such as water, sanitation and roads, in collaboration with local and national government, NGOs and international donors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of accountability and the reduction of corruption</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In terms of elections, UNDP’s role is limited to financial and logistical support; provision of logistical support for managing the Electoral Trust Fund, including provision of offices, payment of salaries and recruitment of personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for local elections and implementation of a decentralization policy, including establishment of local councils and ward committees, training, and activities aimed at local service delivery and resource mobilization; support for the Senior Executive Service (a new reformed institution for high-level civil servants) and national procurement processes</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishment of a Legal Education Centre to support the rule of law and an independent judiciary; initiating the Working Group on Anti-Corruption to promote discussion among donors, information-sharing, coordination and identification of entry points for tackling corruption; funding of a nationwide survey on corruption managed by the Office of the President; funding and equipment for the Prosecutor General’s Office in anticipation that a more comprehensive programme will be launched to address corruption</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>justice and security sector reform</td>
<td>■ Strengthening of the judiciary, rehabilitation of prisons and courts</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Improving access to justice, including the codification of traditional forms of justice and their adaptation to conform to human rights conventions</td>
<td>■ Assistance to the government in preparing a ten-year plan for reforming and strengthening the justice sector called ‘Justice for All’; rehabilitation of physical facilities and procurement of equipment; capacity-building in court administration, including provision of computers, management and English language courses; training of judges; advisory services to the Law Curriculum Development Committee of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Kabul University in preparing a new curriculum for legal studies. Support for the creation of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Support for the war on drugs is included under security sector reform.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Training judges, justices of the peace, court clerks, etc.</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Strengthening and training the civil police</td>
<td>■ Mainly technical support for the development of essential legislation; projects in traditional core activities of UNDP such as support to the secretariat overseeing reform of the judicial system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Small arms action</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Assisting emergency responses for crises and natural disasters</td>
<td>■ Support to the Human Rights Ombudsman and Public Prosecutor’s Office in following up on cases of human rights violations. General support for the reform of the judiciary, including the National Commission for the Strengthening of the Judicial Sector, including analysis of and proposals for public policy, alternative methods of conflict resolution, speeding up bureaucratic processes and various human resources issues; strengthening of the civilian national police</td>
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<tr>
<td>poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods</td>
<td>■ Decentralization and community-based development</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Support to and reform of essential services and service institutions</td>
<td>■ Provision of technical expertise to the Ministry of Justice; continued support to the prison system and courts; leading role within the context of the UN response in addressing both the emergency and the need for a strengthening of national capacity to cope with recurring natural disasters; UNDP has contributed substantially to addressing the consequences of natural disasters and to improved national-capacity to deal with disaster risk; additional projects for the justice and security sector are scheduled to start in early 2006 with the end of the transition period</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ Small arms action</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Assisting emergency responses for crises and natural disasters</td>
<td>■ UNDP initiated disaster management activities that identified key areas for capacity-building and coordination to strengthen disaster prevention and mitigation; UNDP and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have helped the Ministry of Emergency Affairs establish a Rapid Reaction Team with the purpose of coordinating the operational response to emergencies during and after disasters; UNDP has also helped establish an information centre on disasters and a website for the ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Decentralization and community-based development</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Support to and reform of essential services and service institutions</td>
<td>■ Constructing and rehabilitating police and prison facilities and courts; conducting risk assessment and developing a risk assessment and emergency response plan and establishing an emergency response system; support to the Special Court and for human rights legislation and sensitization, mainly police training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Small arms action</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>■ Assisting emergency responses for crises and natural disasters</td>
<td>■ Special focus on strengthening centralized mechanisms for the management of local development at the provincial and lower levels; area-based development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>■ MDG awareness campaigns and reporting—support for secretariat, production of strategy, monitoring and implementation; establishment of micro-finance initiatives with special emphasis on women’s groups; support for the establishment of the Development Assistance Coordination Office within the Office of the Vice-President; support for local enterprise, especially among women and youth; capacity-building for small farmers and rural communities</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
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## TABLE 10. UNDP ACTIVITIES IN SIX CASE-STUDY COUNTRIES (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Countries</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods</strong></td>
<td>Creation of sustainable livelihoods through microcredit and small enterprise development, Helping to prepare poverty reduction strategies, Increasing awareness of the MDGs</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo: A variety of projects, the largest of which include community development projects in selected provinces, projects to prevent the spread of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, a Bio-Diversity Protection Programme, and a Reconciliation and Community Development project in Ituri.</td>
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<td>Haiti: Production of a report on vulnerability in Haiti, a national human development report; participation in the formulation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Support for civil society</strong></td>
<td>Organizing dialogues, Capacity-building, Preparing national or regional human development reports</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Provision of support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; production of a national human development report.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for civil society</td>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dialogue Tables on: peace culture and reconciliation, defense policy, indigenous people, rural development, economic development, human rights, justice and security. Supporting trust and consensus-building for interaction between civil society organizations and the state; support to the Truth Commission, including intersectoral dialogue; human and community development and participation with reference to DIGAP; facilitation of civil society participation in the Fiscal Pact process (1999-2003) and in Peace Accords implementation; support to intersectoral dialogue on land conflicts; general strengthening of civil society organizations, including NGO Directory (1997-1998); strengthening negotiation capacity of communities with public institutions for project financing; strengthening communities' organizational capacity</td>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong>&lt;br&gt;Consultations with members of the civil society for the preparation of the national human development report and the poverty reduction strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional cooperation</td>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone</strong>&lt;br&gt;Support for the Mano River Union Secretariat; border strengthening and cross-border community dialogues</td>
<td><strong>Tajikistan</strong>&lt;br&gt;Management of a regional programme (BOMCA) that is intended to train and equip border forces to replace the Russian troops; UNDP essentially provides a service function, serving as a channel for funds from the European Community and purchasing and equipping depots, offices and units of the border forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative functions</td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong>&lt;br&gt;During 2002-2004, there was a strong focus on administrative functions, including reliable financial management services in the post-conflict period (managing of the Afghan Interim Authority Fund; the Law and Order Trust for Afghanistan; the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund; involvement in the management of the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund; support provision to key processes that the UN and international community were involved in (for example, convening of the Loya Jirga, the preparation of documentation and needs assessments for the Bonn Conference); service provision for most of the agencies that constitute the UN Country Team</td>
<td><strong>Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong>&lt;br&gt;Management of a large trust fund for elections as well as other smaller trust funds; creation in the UNDP country office of a ‘service centre’</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong>&lt;br&gt;Management of a dedicated trust fund (1997-2005) for use in population resettlement, plus support to project identification, formulation and execution (1995-2006); facilitating encounters of political actors, coordination with the international community, supplying technical assistance in the negotiation process, support to the Peace Secretariat, peace commissions, including strategic intergovernmental coordination and resource mobilization, information system on compliance of Peace Agreement; technical assistance for consultative group meetings focused on peace (1997, 1998, 2003), including coordination with the international community and resource mobilization and management; facilitation of participation of the private sector (1998-2000), for example, in initiatives for agroforestry development and eco-tourism</td>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong>&lt;br&gt;International trust fund to support the electoral process established through UNDP; provision of logistical support for managing the trust fund; coordination of and support to inter-agency group on uprooted and demobilized populations (1997-2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tajikistan</strong>&lt;br&gt;Provision of services—particularly through the management of funds on behalf of donors (for example, the Border Management and Control Project)</td>
<td><strong>Tajikistan</strong>&lt;br&gt;UNDP served as a channel and a link between the Ministry of Emergency Affairs and the donor community; staff in the Ministry of Emergency Affairs that are directly involved with UNDP’s project are paid salary supplements</td>
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</table>
4.2 THE RELEVANCE OF UNDP’S PROGRAMMES IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

4.2.1 Strategic leadership

UNDP, by virtue of its mandate and role in the UN system, has the potential to offer a distinct intellectual perspective on conflict and insecurity that could influence the climate of opinion within the international community. UNDP has pioneered concepts such as human development and human security and was among the first to implement participatory approaches to community development that have now been taken up by other agencies. In all case studies, UNDP plays a key role in strategic coordination, and in dialogue and consultation with government and civil society. UNDP has taken the lead in developing new approaches to conflict recovery, including the emphasis on the restoration of state authority, community approaches to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and justice and governance capacity-building.

In several of the case studies, it was emphasized that UNDP has a particular role to play because, unlike Security Council missions, it has a long-term presence. UNDP has been present in most conflict-affected countries before, during and after conflicts. Although institutional memory is sometimes weak, this experience on the ground, which involves knowledge of people and institutions, does give UNDP an advantage in formulating strategy.

UNDP’s strategic leadership is, however, hampered by the fact that it rarely plays a role in the negotiation of peace agreements. Unless it is possible to influence the mandate of peacekeeping or peace-building operations, it is very difficult to shape policy, set priorities or raise resources. In all six case studies in this evaluation, with the exception of Guatemala, programmes were largely defined based on the international community’s strategy for dealing with the conflict—that is, the strategy established by the Security Council. The UNDP has not been actively involved in defining the international community’s strategy in providing support for the peace process. Moreover, as a general rule, the structural, institutional underpinnings necessary for lasting peace have not been addressed as part of the process. In the few instances where UNDP was involved in the actual peace process (Afghanistan, Burundi and Tajikistan), UNDP delivered only administrative support to the UN represented by the Department of Political Affairs and the international community. This included contracting for venues, equipping buildings used for negotiations, paying for the travel of...
national participants from all sides and providing them with logistical support.

One exception was Guatemala, where the UN Resident Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative was intimately involved, along with the Representative of the Secretary-General, in most, if not all of the peace negotiations. The UNDP also provided venues and facilitation for subsidiary ‘Dialogue Tables’. These were intended to promote reconciliation at different levels around thematic issues and helped define the approach and detailed strategy for the attainment of a lasting peace. It is worth noting that, unlike other peace agreements that emphasized the attainment of strictly political milestones, the case of Guatemala integrated structural dimensions of peace into the agreements. Direct involvement in the negotiations also better enabled UNDP to orient its own programme of assistance in support of the peace process. The other notable exception was Haiti, where, in the days that followed the departure of President Aristide, the UNDP Resident Representative was asked to sit as the representative of the international community on the Tripartite Council that organized the political transition process.

The survey also shows that, in other countries, UNDP has rarely been involved substantially in peace negotiations, although it has funded projects that have facilitated and paid for the travel of participants to venues for negotiations when they have been abroad. As a result, it has relatively little say in the definition of milestones during the peace process. None of the respondents to the questionnaire reported a major role in organizing or contributing to a peace agreement. However, all reported a role in either facilitating or implementing peace agreements, where these have taken place. Eight (out of 24) respondents reported a role in facilitating peace agreements, that is to say, organizing round tables and donor conferences or trying to involve NGOs. In Somalia, for example, UNDP supported local NGOs that pressed for women’s participation in the peace process and supported internal reconciliation and dialogue at district and local levels. In Aceh, Indonesia, UNDP plays a central role in the Advisory Board to the peace process, which is composed of donors, international NGOs, community leaders and representatives of the insurgent movement. Twenty-two respondents reported a major role in implementation of peace agreements through rehabilitation and return of refugees and IDPs, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and support for elections and constitutional reform.

It is sometimes argued that UNDP can have a more effective role in peace negotiations by acting informally—through parallel civil society meetings, for example, since it is advantageous not to be identified with some of the unsavoury compromises that have to be made to end a conflict. Every situation is specific, but the presumption should be that involvement in peace negotiations is more likely to ensure that development considerations are central to peace implementation.

By virtue of the nature of the peace agreements reached, in the majority of Security Council-mandated operations there is relatively little feedback to the Security Council on the building of institutions, the capacity being developed or structural transformations that can address the long-term aspects of peace-building. Rather, the principal focus of the Secretary-General’s reports continues to be on the attainment of narrowly defined political and humanitarian milestones. The UNDP Administrator does not separately brief the Security Council, as do the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees. This also implies that UNDP programmes do not have the explicit backing of the Security Council, which limits UNDP’s ability to put pressure on relevant actors.

As a result, UNDP’s ability to reorient the strategy adopted by the UN is largely dependent on the Representative or Special

33 In the case of Burundi, for instance, travel of the participants to the peace negotiations was paid for by UNDP.
Representative of the Secretary-General concerned. In most instances, these officials are more focused on shorter-term political imperatives and less on the structural underpinnings of peace and security. UNDP has had to adapt itself to some of the weaknesses of the overall Security Council approach, such as the priority accorded to political stabilization or the phased approach. Partly as a result of this, and partly because of the need to mobilize resources in order to maintain a credible presence, UNDP country offices have often tended to focus on implementation of Security Council mandates and peace agreement benchmarks rather than substantively contributing to the international community’s strategy and the approach adopted in Security Council resolutions.

UNDP, in turn, needs to develop a clearer conceptual framework for the development of a strategy that addresses the most common structural conditions conducive to conflict. It also needs to undertake a systematic identification of modalities and approaches that have proved successful in addressing these issues. There is little evidence in the six case studies of systematic conflict analyses preceding UNDP’s programming exercises. Nevertheless, UNDP has attempted to link its analyses to the work of the UN under its Security Council mandate through national or regional human development reports as well as Common Country Assessments. In Tajikistan, UNDP has attempted to argue that the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is essential to long-term stability and economic development; in response, a very high-profile effort championed by the government is being mounted to shift the attention of the international community to the achievement of these goals and to back it up with funding. However, a systematic conflict analysis would probably highlight the continuing importance of promoting sustainable livelihoods in rural areas, of raising incomes and of reforming the police force for instance—none of which would receive the type of concerted attention that would probably be necessary if the international community were to reorient its attention to the MDGs. A systematic conflict analysis would, undoubtedly, enable UNDP to better prioritize its activities in Tajikistan and elsewhere to address those structural conditions conducive to conflict that are most critical to long-term stability and also advocate for additional support in these areas.34

Such an analysis would need to be developed in conjunction with civil society and local experts.

4.2.2 A specific niche in governance, capacity-building and post-conflict recovery

UNDP is developing a substantive expertise in governance and capacity-building and in post-conflict recovery and peace-building. In effect, UNDP has developed a specific niche within the UN system. No other organization has an operational mandate in the area of governance, including justice and security sector reform, or in multisectoral programmes that combine decentralized governance with the creation of jobs and sustainable livelihoods that are so critical to peace-building, long-term development and the prevention of the recurrence of armed conflict.

UNDP is, therefore, in a position to strongly support the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the implementation of Security Council mandates. UNDP country offices are also in a position to provide feedback and advice to these two departments in countries that are not yet under a Security Council mandate. Indeed, the United Nations—UNDP in particular—

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34 In fact, it has been argued that UNDP should undertake conflict analyses not just in countries that are in the midst of conflict, or emerging from conflict, but also those that are in a fragile state (with a view to better conflict prevention and management). See Pillay, Rajeev. April 2003. ‘Halting the Downward Spiral: Returning Countries with Special Development Needs to Sustainable Growth and Development’. Paper prepared for the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy, as a conceptual framework for addressing the structural causes of armed conflicts.
remains the one truly global institution that has the political legitimacy required to undertake these sensitive tasks, despite the criticisms it has received.

However, as this analysis suggests, UNDP is overextended. All of the case studies and the longer list of conflict-affected countries and areas that receive assistance from the BCPR demonstrate a recurring demand for UNDP activities in the areas enumerated in Table 10. There are compelling reasons why an operational agency from within the UN system that is closely integrated within the UN peace operation would be the ideal candidate to take the lead in each of these areas. For disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, for example, there is no other UN institution with a clear mandate in that regard; it is only UNDP that is in a position to effectively link disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. Yet, given the significant funding constraints and the lack of independent income, it is impossible for UNDP to have sufficient standing capacity to address all of these thematic areas.

The result is that while several programme models are in practice replicated from country to country (for example, community-based reintegration and development programmes and the building of civil police capacity), mistakes and shortcomings in terms of programme design and implementation are often repeated. For UNDP to be effective, it needs to have: 1) clear policies for each thematic area; 2) a codified body of experience and lessons learned that are readily available to staff; 3) ready access to specialized expertise through consulting firms, academic institutions and even government departments in third countries that are on a standing roster and can be quickly and efficiently deployed; and 4) realistic and ready funding to meet the considerable challenge faced in each thematic area. Considerable work has already been done to systematize the experience gained and to establish a framework for the development component of the UN’s interventions in post-conflict settings. This work needs to be updated and further developed into practical tools and instruments that can be readily applied at the country and subregional levels.

In some thematic areas UNDP has undertaken systematic reviews of its experience with a view to creating a knowledge base and numerous evaluations—both of individual programmes and of country experience. However, it is apparent this experience is not always reflected in the design and implementation of programmes.

4.2.3 Gap-filling and administrative functions
UNDP plays a role in filling gaps that other agencies are unable or unwilling to fill with targeted interventions. It was repeatedly emphasized to the evaluation team, both at Headquarters and in the field, that UNDP has adopted an approach that highlights gap-filling and providing administrative functions for the rest of the international community. UNDP has filled essential gaps where other donors have been unwilling to step in, and it has undertaken administrative functions to facilitate the work of the rest of the international community in the peace-building effort. In conflicts where new challenges and problems are continually faced, there is a real need for an agency that can meet unanticipated needs. The problem with narrow mandates is that they are determined by past experience that does not always fit current realities. In particular, BCPR has developed a ‘surge capacity’ to respond nimbly to crises. Moreover, the capacity to fill gaps is a learning experiment that leads to new and


36 Ibid.
innovative approaches and helps to inform the overall strategic direction.

Gap filling and administrative functions also have their downsides, however. They carry the risk that UNDP will be spread too thin and that its core capacity will suffer. While small targeted projects can be very important in meeting urgent needs—a good example is the training of justices of the peace and court clerks in Sierra Leone so as to re-establish district courts quickly—too many small projects may easily dilute the ability to make a substantive contribution and weaken the coherence of the overall response.

Gaps are, almost by definition, ephemeral. In the 1980s it was very difficult to find a bilateral agency that was prepared to field civil police advisers, and this constituted a critical gap in the post-conflict environment. Yet today, bilateral donors consistently field civil police and civil police advisers. A strategy that is centred on gap-filling, therefore, precludes UNDP from investing sufficiently in the development of technical, substantive and operational capacity, since the gaps can be expected to change from conflict to conflict and over time.

There are also concerns that administrative functions will detract UNDP from its core development mandate and divert human resources that could be used to further develop UNDP’s lead role in development. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan, UNDP managed a trust fund for the payment of the salaries of the civil police. In Tajikistan, UNDP is managing funds to enable the Tajik border forces to replace Russian troops on the country’s international borders. In both instances, the substantive advice and capacity-building is either provided directly by bilateral development agencies or the European Commission. Electoral support programmes are perhaps the best illustration of that dilemma. UNDP’s role in such projects should be enhanced, first, by a systematic linkage of electoral support with more substantive activities, such as civic education and capacity-building for institutions of democracy37 and, second, by promoting full participation in the management structure of the programme. This could include the creation of units jointly managed by the UN mission, UNDP and the national electoral body and housed in common premises.

The answers to the questionnaire suggested that in other conflict-affected countries, there are fewer instances of administrative functions without substantial inputs. Seven respondents said that they did not undertake purely administrative or financial activities; four respondents said that they were involved in administrative or financial functions only as they related to UN common services. Other country offices reported substantial administrative activities, included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Somalia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The most significant example was the country office in Burundi, where such activities are said to account for 30 percent of its total activities. It may be, however, that examples like Afghanistan are setting a trend for other conflict-affected countries.

It is true that the solutions to each country must be different.38 But taken to its extreme, an approach that argues that each situation is different would result in UNDP becoming simply a gap filler or provider of administrative functions. Gap filling is a role that is clearly much appreciated by the international community. However, it mitigates against the development of substantive expertise in any specific area except management and logistics, since the core competencies sought are: 1) nimbleness; 2) strong systems of accountability and transparency; and 3) an ability to coordinate effectively with other

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37 The Brahimi Report already recommended “… a better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions” (executive summary of UN document A/55/305 – S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000).

38 This was repeatedly stated to the evaluation team by senior BCPR staff.
donor programmes that deliver the substance. UNDP needs to continue to improve its capabilities in these areas (see section on efficiency), but there are also strong arguments for UNDP to develop standing substantive capacity in certain areas to consolidate and maintain its niche in conflict-affected countries.

4.2.4 Insufficient emphasis on civil society and gender
Although all UNDP offices stress the importance of civil society and of gender, there is a tendency to give priority to relations with government. Serious attention to civil society concerns is critical if political legitimacy is to be established. Likewise, much greater attention to the gender dimension of governance and post-conflict recovery could be critical for long-term peace-building.

All of the respondents to the questionnaire mentioned civil society. Five said that relations with civil society were weak or non-existent because of lack of credible partners or the absence of a legal framework. Nineteen respondents mentioned civil society partners; 10 referred to civil society consultation; and 12 referred to capacity-building. The responses from Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed to indicate extensive relations of various kinds with civil society groups in a range of activities, such as area-based development, the small arms and light weapons monitoring programme, and citizen awareness, especially at the municipal level. However it is clear that, from the general responses, partnerships with government and other internal agencies take priority.

4.3 FUNDING
UNDP’s foray into gap-filling and administrative functions may be as much a consequence of its need to mobilize non-core resources to enable it to remain relevant as it is the result of perceived development need. UNDP is underfunded to meet the challenges that it faces within its mandated areas. Moreover, both its relevance and effectiveness are undermined by the lack of predictability of resources even for development activities most crucial to post-conflict recovery and peace-building. Even where the UN has provided for integrated missions, the development component has never been covered in the assessed contribution. All development assistance in the context of post-conflict countries is in the form of voluntary contributions, generally mobilized through dedicated international conferences.

The case studies suggest that UNDP is increasingly dependent on non-core, earmarked resources for its activities in conflict-affected countries. In 2004, the share of core spending in total expenditure was 1 percent in Guatemala, 21 percent in Haiti, 29 percent in Sierra Leone and 73 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Afghanistan, the share of core spending was 5 percent for the entire period 2000–2005. Whereas core spending tends to remain roughly constant or increases somewhat, surges in spending are explained by influxes of non-core expenditure.39 Thus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, core spending rose in 2005 from $11.8 million to $14.5 million, but declined as a share of the total from 73 percent to 7 percent. This was the result of a huge increase in external funds, mainly as a result of launching the electoral support project.

The same trends are evident for the respondents to the questionnaire. Over the period as a whole, 2000–2005, non-core resources as a percentage of total disbursement for the 21 countries that responded to this question accounted for 67 percent (rising from 47 percent in 2000 to 72 percent in 2005). For individual countries, the shares varied from 20 percent in the lowest case, Uganda, to 97 percent, the highest case, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

39 Because of the inadequacy of the data available, it was only possible to undertake a comparison for one year.
This growing dependence on non-core funding has meant that priorities are dependent either on the preoccupations of different donors or on the energy and success of local staff in mobilizing additional funding for projects. It has also resulted in an impression that UNDP is sometimes ‘the beggar of the system’—forced to go with cap in hand to donors in search of non-core resources to implement even its most essential programmes.

UNDP staff have adapted by doing their utmost to mobilize non-core resources to address the challenges they face. On the positive side, this has resulted in:

- Considerable effort on the part of UNDP in the preparation and holding of special conferences on development and humanitarian assistance needs resulting from peace agreements in all of the countries concerned. This includes participation in large multi-thematic, multisectoral, multi-agency needs assessment missions, usually led either by UNDP and the World Bank, or by the World Bank alone.

- Reorientation of UNDP’s programmes to support implementation of Security Council mandates and the international community’s interventions in conflict-affected countries as defined through the UN.

- Creation of some significant capacity at UNDP Headquarters, such as the BCPR.

- The alignment of BCPR so that it can provide a limited amount of ‘surge capacity’ in the form of missions to support country offices in the immediate post-conflict phase.

- Greater mobilization of UN Country Teams to support the implementation of peace agreements both at Headquarters and the field.

- The development of a considerable body of experience that can be exploited further to inform and mould UNDP’s approach to future conflicts.

On the less positive side, this has resulted in:

- Reorientation of programmes to match donor interests, sometimes without due prioritization to meet requirements of the peace agreement or national demand.

- Adoption of a phased approach to post-conflict recovery and peace-building.

- Adoption of an administrative approach in which UNDP’s role, in many cases, is one of managing resources and providing an umbrella of UN-derived legitimacy, but is largely devoid of policy content.

- The definition and launching of programmes in the expectation that resources required for full implementation will become available over time. This has sometimes resulted in important programmes being only partially implemented and a failure to fulfil expectations that are inevitably created. In general, where funding has come up short, this has resulted in stabilization and relief activities taking precedence over longer-term development.

- The reduction of implementation capacity below minimum critical mass in order to keep overheads in line with the actual level of resources being managed,

40 Examples abound, including the Bonn conference for Afghanistan, the Joint Needs Assessment for Iraq, the Joint Assessment Mission (a year-long exercise) and the Joint Needs Assessment Mission for Muslim Mindanao.

41 Evaluations conducted as recently as 2001 found that UNDP’s programmes in conflict-affected countries were only partially re-oriented in address peace-building—for example, see UNDP/DPA Joint Review of Peace-building Support Offices, by Rajeev Pillay and Robert Piper, May 2001, which reviewed the collaboration between UN Country Teams and UN missions in Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia and Tajikistan.

42 See the Border Management and Control Programme in Tajikistan.

43 In some instances (see Afghanistan and Tajikistan), this has resulted in emergency/stabilization activities within the programme being implemented, while crucial, longer-term capacity-building activities have remained underfunded or unimplemented.
thereby compromising programme quality and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{44}

By being forced to define its programmes to match donor interests, the UNDP has often prioritized activities that overlap directly with the priority areas for bilateral donor programmes, creating competition for resources with the donor agencies themselves. This is one of the reasons why the UNDP has often been shunted into a ‘gap-filling’ mode, implementing programmes that, for one reason or another, would not be picked up by other agencies.

UNDP success in mobilizing resources has varied considerably from country to country. This is partly due to the fact that the reputation and overall standing of UNDP is heavily dependent on the personalities of senior staff and their relationships with donor mission personnel (senior and not-so-senior). In some countries, donors have been keen to put substantial volumes of resources through UNDP, while, in others, they have continued to build up the volume of grant resources delivered through the World Bank and other multilateral agencies, even though the World Bank is not yet, strictly speaking, a grant-making organization.

4.4 HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY

UNDP’s staff recruitment, development and placement policy appears to still be heavily focused on a career path culminating in a position as Resident Coordinator. As a result, it continues to encourage the recruitment of generalists with strong leadership and management capabilities, good interpersonal skills and a broad understanding of development. Yet, with more candidates for the Resident Coordinator function coming from other agencies, and with the concurrent migration of UNDP itself from a central funding agency to one that is intended to deliver substantive value-added in areas of its mandate, this staffing policy appears outdated. There is an urgent need for UNDP to recruit and appropriately award staff and a network of consultants with specialized expertise in areas such as:

- Macroeconomics
- Post-conflict recovery and conflict prevention
- Conflict analysis and early warning
- Civil society and human rights
- Parliamentary systems
- Constitutional law
- Rule of law
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintroduction of war-affected populations
- Gender issues
- Sustainable livelihoods and small credit
- Rural area-based, community-based development.

Having staff with specialized skills, in addition to generalist managers, will provide UNDP with added credibility and position it more centrally in the field. It is doubtful whether the housing of limited capacity of this type in UNDP’s regional centres or in BCPR or the Bureau for Development Policy will serve the purpose. To be effective, such personnel will need to work in conflict countries on a longer-term basis, so that they can build relationships and foster national capacity.

BCPR now serves, among other things, as a source of surge capacity for UNDP country offices in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Yet, such capacity cannot be sustained for long periods of time since BCPR’s resources are limited. Moreover, they must be available to a large number of countries as the need arises. The mix of expertise available from BCPR may also need to be carefully reconsidered. It currently possesses sound capacity in some technical areas, such as small arms and mine clearance as well as conflict analysis. Consideration should

\textsuperscript{44} See the Communities Programme in Tajikistan.
possibly be given to attracting and retaining capacity in some of the above thematic areas as well—either through full-time staff or through retainers with a network of consulting firms.

UNDP currently appears to have a serious problem in the recruitment and retention of staff for assignments in conflict-affected countries. This problem is compounded in those countries that are non-family duty stations where security is a particular problem. Yet it is in conflict-affected countries that UNDP is in the spotlight and where its performance is scrutinized the most. It is essential that career and other incentives be built in to ensure that the very best staff are attracted to assignments in conflict-affected countries on a consistent basis. This should include guarantees of rapid career advancement.

One of the strengths of UNDP is the presence of a large and experienced pool of national staff in all of its country offices. The vast majority of country office and programme staff encountered in the case-study countries were nationals who were paid at the high end of the national wage scale (UNDP salaries for nationals are pegged in line with those paid by the best employers), but are significantly lower than what would have been paid to international personnel. The involvement of UNDP in post-conflict and transition-support activities changes their work environment considerably. They have to face often increased work pressure and have to adapt to new types of programmes. In some of the case-study countries, there were problems in recruiting local staff from particular clans or tribes. In other cases, it was not clear whether their tasks, as translators for example, were commensurate with their skills and whether the work was providing an opportunity to further develop their chosen careers.

Both national and international staff need a more supportive and stimulating environment in which time and effort is devoted to reflection and analysis, to developing a culture in which local concerns take priority over UN concerns, and to the needs and wishes of those on a career path.

4.5 MANAGEMENT AND EFFICIENCY

The progress made by UNDP in adapting to the needs of conflict-affected countries should be accompanied by a transformation in institutional culture. In most cases where UNDP has been involved in supporting a transition process and the mandate of a UN mission, there has been a massive increase in activities and in the financial volume of operations. The support given to the electoral process, in particular, has often meant that UNDP has had to administer large trust funds and complex logistical and administrative programmes. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, UNDP was responsible for registering 25 million voters and organizing a referendum in a difficult security environment; to make matters worse, many parts of this vast country were completely without roads.

The UNDP has been extremely nimble—in the countries reviewed—in identifying gaps, designing programmes to address them and responding to urgent needs in the immediate post-conflict period. In fact, it worked far more quickly than many other development agencies. However, this nimbleness could be further reinforced if some shortcomings in management and efficiency were addressed.

4.5.1 Managing trust funds

One of the major features of UNDP programmes in post-conflict and transition situations has been the establishment of large trust funds. These have often been established at the request of donors, who saw several advantages to UNDP involvement. First, UNDP represented a neutral conduit for funding, acceptable to the host government as well as donors. Second, smaller donors found it convenient to channel contributions through the UNDP-managed trust funds, since they didn't have to set up an implementation or follow-up mechanism of their
own. Third, UNDP’s procedures were often found to be more flexible than other means of implementation.

That last reason was mentioned by a number of interviewees, who, surprisingly, also complained about UNDP’s heavy and bureaucratic disbursement procedures. In fact, the opposite seemed to be the case. Donors appreciated the possibility of having resources pooled through UNDP as this, in many cases, compensates for their own delays in honouring their pledges with actual transfers of funds. UNDP has now given itself the possibility of advancing funds on the basis of firm pledges from reputed donors, although the internal procedure for doing so appears cumbersome. On the other hand, many of the same donors complain that UNDP itself is slow in transferring money downstream—to contractors and implementing partners.

4.5.2 Management costs

From the point of view of management costs, programmes such as the Communities Programme in Tajikistan have been held to a strict limit on the staff and operational budget that they are allowed to sustain. A cap of 18 percent has been placed on staff and operational costs. Such a cap is arbitrary and relatively low for community-based programmes that are notoriously labour-intensive. International organizations such as the World Bank have determined that on their much larger-scale community development programmes, the cost of project personnel and the rest of the operational budget has to be closer to 30 percent in order to deliver with sufficient effectiveness. International NGOs are known to have an even higher percentage of their budgets devoted to personnel and operational support costs—sometimes reaching well over 60 percent.

Under other UNDP programmes, technical advisers take up more than half of the budget since the main purpose is to develop national capacities through on-the-job training.

Government units in all of the case-study countries complained about the service charges that UNDP imposes for the management of funds on behalf of the international community. While they are not in themselves very high, amounting to about 2 percent on average, they note that the 2 percent is withheld for the management of the funds. Execution generally involves another charge for support costs amounting to between 5 percent and 8 percent, bringing the total up to between 7 percent and 10 percent.

Security costs under the more extreme conditions experienced in places such as Iraq have significantly increased the costs of doing business. It is estimated that costs associated with security constitute about 13 percent of programme budgets, although many of the costs are subsumed elsewhere. While this is high, costs incurred by other agencies that are also targets of attack are of several magnitudes higher and are reflected in significantly higher consulting fees, ‘danger pay’, added international travel on leave, special housing arrangements and, of course, massive security around all international staff.45

4.5.3 Bureaucracy and delays

To implementing partners, many donors and most civil society organizations, UNDP is generally perceived as an opaque and bureaucratic organization. The major complaints relate to the rigid requirements for documents supporting expenditure, the slowness in processing financial reports from contractors and implementing partners and the resulting delays in transferring funds, a lack of information on criteria for the selection of contractors and implementing partners and, on the human resources side, a lack of transparency in recruitment.

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45 See Abacus International Management LLC, Governance Programmes. An Interim Note for UNDP-Iraq, July 2005, especially pp. 21-22 for estimates of the costs incurred by other international partners and security costs of UNDP programmes.
UNDP can improve this image while ensuring that accountability and operational efficiency are both upheld. There is, however, a real danger that the current changes under way in the wake of the oil-for-food scandal (that incidentally left UNDP relatively unscathed, despite the very large volume of funds channelled through it) will only serve to further compound the problem by unnecessarily deepening the bureaucracy involved.

Counterpart units in all six case-study countries—be they government entities or civil society organizations—complained that UNDP is slow to make payments, and in each case numerous examples were provided of unacceptable delays. UNDP staff in several cases indicated that delays were due to the lack of substantiating information or the failure of the counterparts to fulfil all of the procedural requirements to obtain reimbursement. It is clear that UNDP’s procedures are complicated and slow and probably require further streamlining, even if the introduction of the ATLAS financial management system makes transactions more efficient.

This complaint was echoed in the answers to the questionnaire. Thus, for example, the Indonesian respondent said that although some BCPR funding made UNDP’s involvement in implementation possible, expenditure for implementation has not been authorized nine months after the signing of the Aceh Memorandum of Understanding. As a result, UNDP’s activities have been considerably delayed, compared to other agencies and donors.

### 4.5.4 Outreach

UNDP is still perceived as an organization with very limited presence and outreach beyond capital cities. UNDP offices should be established more systematically when programmes such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or community development are implemented in remote parts of a country. Such field offices should benefit from a large degree of delegation of authority so that they do not become yet another administrative layer.

Information about what UNDP does should be presented in simpler, more accessible ways. In addition, methods of project selection and procedures need to be more transparent. It was often very difficult for the researchers on this project to track down information about projects, funding and expenditure or staffing; it must be even more difficult for the beneficiaries of UNDP programmes. Indeed, several local groups complained about the difficulties of finding out about project opportunities or about general information on programmes and budgets.

### 4.6 SUSTAINABILITY: DIRECT VERSUS NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

The vast majority of UNDP experts and project personnel in the six countries studied were citizens of the country concerned or national staff who had returned after the start of the peace process. In comparison to most donors, UNDP’s programmes are more geared to nurturing national capacities and encouraging national ownership of programmes, which are designed to work with national institutions—be they government units, national NGOs or civil society organizations. However, the grant nature of the funding and concerns over accountability require considerably more direct UNDP involvement in the disbursement and management of financial resources than would perhaps be the case under a lending programme where the principal objective is to ensure that payments of debt service and the repayment of principal are carried out in a timely fashion. Concerns of this type are further emphasized in a weak institutional environment.

Ensuring the sustainability of capacity built constitutes one of the biggest challenges in most post-conflict countries. In the majority of these countries, the revenue base is low, the wage bill constitutes a very large proportion
UNDP has increasingly resorted to the establishment of the equivalent of project implementation units within ministries, which tend to monopolize the better qualified staff, re-orient priorities to donor interests and trade long-term sustainability for the achievement of results in the short term. Higher salaries are paid to government staff working in project implementation units (now called project management offices), and they are provided with added professional incentives, including authority not only over government budgets allocated for their work, but also funds channelled through them by UNDP.

National ownership and buy-in into the main elements of the peace agreement are, as always, a critical factor in long-term sustainability. In most instances, government has allocated national budgets to the best of their abilities to ensure the sustainability of capacity created and structural reforms that have been instituted. In a few instances, where political buy-in is limited, they have starved new units of funding, ensuring that they become less effective and less important within the system. For example, in Guatemala, the civil police unit newly assigned to the Ministry of Interior that has been supported by UNDP has been forced to obtain budgetary resources at the expense of other units in the ministry. This is a sure sign that the arrangement is not favoured by government, even though it was provided for as a part of the structural reforms that formed an integral part of the agreements.

4.7 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Records of project outputs are readily available for UNDP projects in conflict-affected countries. In general, outputs have been achieved as planned, despite delays and constraints inherent in all conflict situations. However, it has proved consistently difficult to assess the effectiveness of UNDP's programmes in terms of outcomes and impact as there is no independent, stand-alone capacity created to identify indicators or monitor trends over a period of time. For instance, under small credit schemes,
the volume of total credit distributed, the number of beneficiaries, the terms of the loans, the purpose of the loans and the repayment rates were all readily available. However, data that could demonstrate the impact of these loans on the number of people involved or on incomes were not tracked in any of the cases reviewed.

In all the case studies, it was extremely difficult to obtain useable data on the size of programmes in financial terms, annual expenditure, sources of funding, staffing, etc. It was somewhat easier to obtain global figures after the introduction of the ATLAS system in 2004. Nevertheless, comparisons of programmes were largely indicative as demonstrated above.

This evaluation, therefore, has attempted to:

- Use macro human security indicators to assess the effectiveness of the international community’s assistance as a whole, based on the rationale that UNDP’s assistance has been consistently deployed in support of the broader effort of the international community.

- Solicit the views of stakeholders, especially members of civil society and independent experts.

This could offer a model for future evaluations provided the collection of human security indicators is greatly improved.
In answer to a question about the biggest challenges UNDP faces, one respondent to the survey said “turf-fighting.” Independent stakeholders interviewed also complained about the tendency to give priority to inter-agency concerns before the needs of beneficiaries.

In examining the issue, this study looked at coordination among UN agencies in conflict-affected countries and conducted a review of the general mechanisms existing within the United Nations to foster coordination in conflict-affected counties (see Annex 6). Within this context, the following sections focus on the coordination mechanisms within UNDP to strengthen assistance to conflict-affected countries as well as coordination in the special situation of integrated missions mandated by the Security Council.

All six case studies concluded that, to be effective, global and country-level coordination mechanisms and instruments need to be as simple as possible. Moreover, there is always bound to be bureaucratic competition unless there is shared commitment to a common strategy. UNDP can play a central role in developing such a strategy within the framework of human security.

**5.1 COORDINATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES**

Within UNDP, most conflict-affected countries are managed within the regional bureau concerned, in close collaboration with the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. A committee established for overseeing the management of all conflict-affected countries under the leadership of the Associate Administrator was disbanded about six years ago since it was structured around the use of TRAC 1.1.3 (the budget line of UNDP’s core resources devoted to immediate post-crisis response), which turned out to be insufficiently substantive. Now, conflict countries are only handled outside the ambit of the regional bureau and accorded organization-wide prominence when they are given special attention by the press and the international community. Countries accorded this type of concerted, intensive treatment include Afghanistan and Iraq, while countries such as Haiti, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan continue to be handled by the regional bureau directly. In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Administrator has taken the lead role to ensure that the resources of the organization are focused on these countries, maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP’s response. In the case of Afghanistan, the Administrator of UNDP was instrumental in defining a strategy that carved out a niche for UNDP in the immediate post-conflict period—managing the payment of civil service salaries. There is no doubt that in cases in which the entire organization has been galvanized into action under the leadership of the Administrator, UNDP’s response has been more rapid and robust.

Yet no conflict-affected country can be treated as a run-of-the-mill development situation. Conflict situations require specialized knowledge and experience and require more intensive oversight and management. Consideration should be given to re-establishing a committee for the management of UNDP operations in all conflict-affected countries. Such a committee should consider policies and approaches, capacity requirements, the allocation of resources, partnerships and political relations, resource mobilization and the effectiveness of programmes. It could be chaired by the Administrator, Associate Administrator or Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
5.2 INTEGRATED MISSIONS

In integrated UN missions, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General combines the functions of UNDP Resident Representative, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. The application of the concept of integrated missions has meant that UNDP has been associated more closely than ever with UN missions deployed in conflict-affected countries. UNDP’s involvement in integrated missions spans three main types of activities:

Mission planning: UNDP is now systematically involved, together with other relevant UN organizations, in initial UN Headquarters planning for the deployment of peacekeeping operations and the subsequent formulation, generally in the field, of the more detailed Mission Implementation Plan.

Joint units: In a number of cases, staff and resources of both the UN mission and UNDP have been merged and jointly housed in common premises so as to increase policy and operational coherence. This has been the case particularly for support to the electoral process, in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other areas of activity that correspond to UNDP’s traditional mandate for governance and institution-building.

Follow-on missions: The case of Sierra Leone presents yet another new form of participation by UNDP in a Security Council-mandated mission. For example, when the UN Mission in Sierra Leone completed its mandate and withdrew at the end of 2005, a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, received a Security Council mandate to help consolidate peace in the country. The UNDP Resident Representative has been appointed the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General heading the UN mission. This experiment has the potential of becoming a model for managing the transition from a large peacekeeping operation to the resumption of normal activities of the UN system in a country, while keeping the situation on the agenda of the Security Council.

The association of the UNDP Resident Representative with the UN mission has also had consequences for the internal management of country offices. On the one hand, there is an increase, at times very important, in the volume of activities. More importantly, there could be a leadership problem within the UNDP country office in view of the additional demands on the time and attention of the Resident Representative. This has been compensated for by the creation of the post of Country Director. Too often, however, these posts have remained vacant for long periods. Country Director posts should be filled with senior staff of Resident Representative calibre.

There is general consensus that the concept of integrated missions has been a positive development, despite some initial concerns about associating activities such as human rights or humanitarian assistance to the more political aspects of mandates of UN missions. The first Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone emphasizes the importance of integrated thinking rather than integrated institutions. In his note written on leaving Sierra Leone, he said: “Effective coordination does not necessarily imply a single institutional response but rather a coherent institutional response” (Doss 2004, para 7, emphasis in the original).

Coherence can be achieved if the humanitarian/development agencies have a voice in formulating strategy. An effective political and security strategy in conflict

46 In the early months of the establishment of the first ‘integrated mission’ in Afghanistan in 2001, intense concern was voiced within some UN agencies and among NGOs about the necessary independence and neutrality of humanitarian and human rights work.

47 Alan Doss, in a telephone interview with the evaluation team.
areas needs to give centrality to humanitarian and development concerns since they play a central role in the way conflict unfolds on the ground. This means building on the complementarities of different UN agencies and the expertise of particular bodies, for example, UNICEF for issues concerning children, UNHCR (refugees), or WHO (health). To quote Doss again:

It is easier to find common ground between political/security actors and humanitarian/development agencies when the discussion centres on issues rather than institutional mandates. In Sierra Leone, we tried to do that within the UN by jointly developing the UN Peace-building and Recovery Strategy followed by the longer term UN Development Assistance Framework and helping the government develop its own National Recovery Programme and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In developing these instruments we used an iterative approach, mindful of an earlier effort to construct a UN-led ‘strategic framework’ which had not worked well because of the perception that the UN was imposing this initiative in a top-down fashion and obliging others to join in. (Doss 2004, para 8).

With an integrated conceptual approach, it is possible to capitalize on the complementarity of different agencies instead of competing. The extension of state authority in Sierra Leone in the immediate post-conflict period provided a good example of this approach, “with UNDP contributing expertise and programme funds, while UNAMSIL [the UN Mission in Sierra Leone] provided staff throughout the country”(Doss 2004, para 12). Yet even in Sierra Leone, the case study revealed that there was much less coherence at the provincial level than for the country as a whole.

There is still a considerable need to further improve the coherence and cohesion between the UN mission and the agencies with a permanent mandate and a longer-term presence in the country. One of the strengths of an organization such as UNDP is that it was present before the crisis, very often remained during the conflict and is committed to staying on beyond stabilization into a development phase. The UN mission, on the other hand, has a much shorter planning horizon but it benefits from larger budgets and has specialized sections with human resources that vastly exceed those of the resident UN agencies with a specific longer-term mandate in the same field of intervention. The two approaches could be better reconciled through even more integration.

The issue of predictable resources is another area in which UNDP should continue to seek improvements. The Brahimi Report already noted the important role of development in a UN strategy of prevention and stabilization and made some proposals for the consolidation of certain activities, in particular disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, into assessed contributions. UNDP, in liaison with the UN Development Group, should reinforce its interface with the Security Council as proposed elsewhere in this report.

5.3 OTHER PARTNERSHIPS

UNDP rightly attaches a good deal of importance to developing partnerships at the international and national levels. In fact, this has become central to the strategy of the organization, and a Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships is charged with coordinating and nurturing working relationships with donor countries, regional organizations (such as the European Union, the African Union and the Organization of American States), civil society organizations, foundations, international financial institutions, regional development banks, the private sector and the rest of the UN system. Despite the fact that it associates resource mobilization in

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48 In some of the countries visited during the course of this evaluation, it was noted that the budget of the UN mission very often exceeded that of the government.
its Headquarters administrative structure, UNDP understands partnerships as being much more than a fund-raising activity, and the case studies prove that diverse partnerships are a central feature of UNDP’s work.

Table 12 provides a summary of the range of partners cited by the 24 respondents to the questionnaire who were asked to identify their five major partners. The most consistently mentioned partner to UNDP was the government of the country or various government departments, cited in 21 of the 24 responses. Donor countries and their agencies (such as the UK’s Department for International Development, the Swedish International Development Agency, etc.) were most frequently mentioned next (in 18 entries). Other UN agencies are the next most frequently cited partner (13 mentions). Table 12 shows figures for a range of other partners, from local authorities to civil society organizations and international financial institutions.

5.3.1 Relations with governments
As shown in Table 12, UNDP generally considers governments and government institutions as its major partners. In countries emerging from conflict or going through a formal transition process, strengthening the capacity of governments and national institutions is one of the strategic objectives of the international community. The dilemma faced by UNDP between ensuring long-term sustainability of programmes by favouring national ownership and the need for speed and efficiency has been discussed earlier (see Chapter 4.6). Government officials interviewed during this evaluation have shown appreciation for the role of UNDP, citing in particular the support received in developing policy and strategy documents, material assistance and equipment for re-establishing ministries and the provision of technical expertise. They also appreciated the advocacy role played by UNDP to help the government renew its dialogue with financial institutions and donors in periods of crisis.

5.3.2 Relations with donors
In conflict-affected countries, UNDP’s partnership with donors is of particular importance given the greater need for cohesion and coordination within the international community and the importance of non-core funding. In the six case-study countries, the interaction between UNDP and donors revolved around three main areas.

First, UNDP has been active in supporting the preparation of strategic documents, action plans and programmes for presentation to donor conferences, round tables and special meetings and appeals. In several cases, donors

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Government of country, including government departments, statutory bodies, etc.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor countries, including government departments of these countries</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or regional authorities, including local government</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations, non-profit organizations, foundations, civilian agencies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International financial institutions (World Bank in all cases here)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic institutions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International governmental organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional development banks</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
complained of insufficient consultations and coordination, but also mentioned appreciation for the capacity of UNDP to inject technical expertise and to act as a convenor. A point of particular relevance is UNDP’s capacity to take the lead in the preparation of post-electoral strategies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Haiti.

The second major area of interface with donors is the participation of UNDP in assistance coordination mechanisms put in place in conflict-affected countries. The most common model of coordination currently applied is sectoral. This may take the form of pillars and consultative groups, as in Afghanistan, of clusters, as in Iraq and the Sudan, or thematic groups or round tables, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. It has been noted, however, that in situations were a UN mission is established, the mission itself and not UNDP becomes the focus of humanitarian and development coordination, although the leadership for that function remains with the Resident Representative serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Finally, UNDP’s role in managing multi-donor trust funds is another important area of interaction between UNDP and donors. This is true both for the larger trust funds, such as those established for electoral assistance as well as smaller ones, where steering groups including the government, concerned donors and UNDP are convened. UNDP’s role in the management of trust funds is discussed in Chapter 4.5.1.

5.3.3 Relations with the World Bank and other agencies and institutions

The creation of integrated UN missions and the resulting transfer of coordination responsibility have had two major consequences for the interaction of UNDP with the rest of the UN Country Team. First, the post of Country Director has been created to ensure the day-to-day management of UNDP, and the leadership of the Country Team is further dissociated from the UNDP office. Second, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General takes on the roles of Resident Representative, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator while assuming new responsibilities as part of the senior management of the UN mission. Some of the representatives of agencies interviewed for this evaluation felt that the UN Country Team was not sufficiently consulted. The role of the Country Team, however, remains crucial, particularly with a view to avoiding duplication and planning properly the future scaling down and withdrawal of the UN mission. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has created an ‘integrated office’ headed by a senior officer and merging the mission staff’s functions assigned to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General with those of the Resident Coordinator’s own staff, thereby ensuring that the Country Team is appropriately serviced. This could provide a model for similar situations.

A particularly important partner (or competitor) to UNDP is the World Bank. The latter has boosted its physical presence in post-conflict countries and positioned itself as the principal rival of UNDP in the management of international contributions to post-conflict peace-building. It has also begun a programme that differentiates ‘Low-income Countries Under Stress’, begun to convert its IDA resources to grants for the exceptional circumstances found in post-conflict situations, increased its involvement in public administration reform and greatly increased its portfolio of community-based development programmes using models that have been applied by

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49 The World Bank has been the manager of the large trust funds that constituted the principal repository for the international community’s in contributions to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Sudan and Timor-Leste, for example. In some instances, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community has either set up a parallel trust fund for management by UNDP or has channelled additional funds directly through UNDP.
UNDP and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for years.\textsuperscript{50} It has also become a major recipient of grant funds in post-conflict countries. Indeed, it is a mark of UNDP’s success that the World Bank has replicated community-based models on a much larger scale—albeit (according to critics) in a more formulaic way—than would be possible for UNDP.

It is in the interest of UNDP to strengthen this partnership as part of an overall strategy of conflict prevention. UNDP’s involvement in integrated mission structures with the Resident Representative serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General has positioned it to better dialogue with the World Bank because of its renewed political standing. UNDP has the flexibility and creativity to respond rapidly to changing circumstances and initiate programmes that can be taken up by larger agencies. UNDP can also try to influence World Bank policy and to press for approaches that can foster social justice, sustainable livelihoods and community focus. Furthermore, critical structural factors that contribute to the potential for violent conflict—such as high levels of unemployment—require multifaceted approaches that cannot be addressed by UNDP alone. While UNDP’s community-based employment generation, microcredit and vocational training programmes can help rectify the problem, unemployment cannot be tackled in a meaningful way without developing economic stimulus packages, addressing tariff barriers and working on legislation that can create an environment conducive to the growth of small private-sector entities. UNDP needs to create a pragmatic partnership with the World Bank and the IMF to advocate for and foster such important economic reforms. Such a partnership will require that UNDP develop the substantive capacity to advocate in this manner, since solutions conducive to a reduction in the potential for conflict often differ from the standard prescriptions imposed.

5.3.4 Relations with civil society and NGOs

In conflict-affected countries, two types of partnerships, apart from those with governments, donors and other UN agencies, become particularly relevant. The first one concerns the interface with civil society. There are some good examples of intensive consultation with civil society, particularly in the formulation of poverty reduction strategies or other strategy papers, but also for the elaboration of national human development reports. Too often, however, the participation of civil society takes the form of consultations and, at times, consultancies with individual members of civil society organizations in a personal capacity. There is a need to develop institutional partnerships with civil society organizations as well as a framework for amplifying the voices of civil society and allowing the non-violent expression of conflict. Academic institutions, for example, could be encouraged to develop conflict-prevention centres or to engage in a systematic collection of indicators of human security.

Relationships with NGOs are the second type of partnership emerging as crucial to the success of UNDP when the organization is called upon to operate in difficult areas, such as the Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UNDP does not have a long-established tradition of working with and through NGOs. It has been noted that the capacity of UNDP to associate with national NGOs is limited by internal rules that stipulate that agreements with such NGOs can be signed only up to a level of $30,000 at the discretion of the country office. Any agreement with a greater value would require a process of certification of the NGO by a Headquarters Advisory Committee on Procurement. This limits the flexibility of UNDP when it is required to work in a quasi-emergency situation. It also gives the message that NGOs are contractors or providers of services rather than partners.

The main conclusion of this report is that the international community is learning how to stabilize conflicts and, in particular, to sustain peace agreements. However, this achievement is at risk due to a number of external factors, including the war on terror. Developments on the ground have resulted in growing security concerns among UN missions, as documented in a number of case studies. And in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, the United Nations itself is less secure, despite increased security precautions.

In addition to the challenge of this increasingly complex environment, the international community has yet to successfully address the structural conditions conducive to conflict. These include a weak state and civil society, the erosion of the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence (that is, the emergence of private armed groups), joblessness, especially among young men, poverty and lack of access to health care and education, criminality and an illegal/informal economy, gender-based prejudice and stereotyping leading to unequal gender relations, and the experience of and proximity to conflict. In most conflict-affected countries, human security is precarious and there is a risk that, in the event of an international withdrawal, conflict may erupt again.

UNDP has played a crucial role in the process of stabilization. Moreover, it is uniquely positioned within the United Nations to identify and begin to address the underlying conditions that lead to violence, to combine conflict recovery and conflict prevention. It has the potential, together with the UN Department of Political Affairs, to provide intellectual leadership, to act as an innovator in conflict situations, and to play a coordinating and connecting role among different partners.

The main findings of the case studies in relation to substance, management and efficiency, and coordination and partnerships is summarized in Table 13.

The scale and range of UNDP activities in conflict-affected countries indicate that UNDP has already made considerable progress in responding to conflict. However, its capacity is hampered by:

- Insufficient consideration by the UN Security Council of development issues and, hence, an insufficient involvement by UNDP in peace processes. This has meant that UNDP concerns have been subordinated to the immediate exigencies of reaching peace agreements, which tend to give priority to the warring parties, and to establish the benchmarks and phases of post-conflict planning.

- Overextension and insufficient attention to building up substantive capacity in core areas such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, administration of justice reform and training in the rule of law, and management of elections.

- Insufficient core funding, thereby allowing strategy to be donor-driven.

- Lack of systematic conflict analysis, especially within conflict-affected countries.

- Insufficient attention to civil society and gender relations.

- Excessive bureaucracy.

- A tendency for staff to get caught up in inter-agency preoccupations rather than the needs of beneficiaries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Democratic Republic of the Congo</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance and positioning</td>
<td>Very wide range of programmes. Overemphasized on elections and administrative functions. No regional programmes.</td>
<td>Played a key role by promoting continued donor interest during the conflict and later by providing support to the democratic transition.</td>
<td>At the centre of the post-conflict peace process. Instrumental in encouraging a structural approach.</td>
<td>UNDP and the Resident Coordinator played a central role prior to the establishment of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), particularly in discussions that led to the creation of the government of transition.</td>
<td>Played a key role in restoration of state authority, justice and security sector reforms, and youth programmes.</td>
<td>Hampered by lack of funds, but was, in the early post-conflict period, involved in key aspects, including demobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results and effectiveness</td>
<td>Has contributed to the Bureaucracy.</td>
<td>Support to the electoral process has been a major success. UNDP has also effectively promoted a linkage between humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in the post-electoral phase.</td>
<td>Has contributed to stability and restructuring of key institutions. Public awareness has also been raised dramatically through dialogue. Private sector-based powers remain extremely influential and holding people accountable for human rights violations remains problematic.</td>
<td>Has contributed effectively to the Security Council mandate related to the transition in Haiti, particularly through programmes in support of elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the justice system.</td>
<td>Risk of conflict is a key problem relating to the legitimacy of government and the situation of youth.</td>
<td>Mixed. Successful models are severely hampered by lack of funds, lack of core funds, UNDP viewed as competition by some bilateral agencies. UNDP is forced to take on poorly conceived, donor-driven programmes in order to mobilize resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>UNDP is overextended and hampered by security concerns and bureaucracy.</td>
<td>Generally efficient, despite procedural and administrative delays in dealing with partners and contractors.</td>
<td>Complaints of delays in administrative procedures and payments. However, in general, apparently well managed and efficient.</td>
<td>Assistance to the electoral process was limited mainly to administrative and technical support. Outreach outside the capital city has generally been limited.</td>
<td>Assistance has reached beneficiaries. Some problems from bureaucracy and delays.</td>
<td>Complaints of delays may be due in part to lack of government understanding of UNDP procedures. There are few international project personnel, thus the programme is relatively cost-efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Plays a key role in managing trust funds. Some problems of national recruitment.</td>
<td>A number of imaginative and innovative management initiatives have been introduced, related mainly to support to elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the coverage of field operations.</td>
<td>Complain about delays in administrative procedures and payments. There are improvements in managing beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Effective management of both UNDP programmes and development coordination.</td>
<td>Extensive management of donor funds for demobilization and for border control.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Development subordinated to integrated office. Weak relations with civil society. World Bank has taken over some traditional UNDP functions.</td>
<td>The transformation of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) into a fully integrated UN operation has enabled UNDP to further enhance its coordination role.</td>
<td>Central role in coordination, both because of UNDP’s role in the peace process and because of its credibility with government. Delays in the placement of Resident Coordinator, which is creating a vacuum.</td>
<td>The promotion of integrated areas of activity between MINUSTAH, UNDP and the UN Country Team has the potential of fostering more coherence within the UN family.</td>
<td>Has played a key role in the integrated office. On the whole, coordination is good, but some problems remain outside the capital.</td>
<td>World Bank has taken a lead role under the PRSP process. UNDP has recently launched a high-profile, highly controversial MDG planning process that has strong support from the Government because of resource implications. Neither process explicitly addresses key structural concerns for continued peace-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial leadership and credibility</td>
<td>Took the lead in the early days of the post-Taliban period, paying civil servants, salaries and organizing donor meetings.</td>
<td>UNDP has demonstrated its capacity to mobilize donors, government partners and the UN team for the preparation of strategy papers for each of the successive phases of the conflict and post-conflict period. UNDP’s management of multi-donor trust funds has represented a major service to the international community.</td>
<td>Huge credibility derived from central role played by the former Resident Coordinator in the peace process and subsequent peace-building. Strong, strategy-based coordination.</td>
<td>UNDP has shown leadership through its capacity to adapt, anticipate and innovate. UNDP’s management of multi-donor trust funds is a service valued by both the Government and donors.</td>
<td>UNDP has played an important leadership role in the UN effort and in shaping the post-conflict programme.</td>
<td>Lack of funds hampers capacity and credibility. Closeness to the UN Peace-building Support Office has enhanced credibility. MDG process is a high-risk strategy. Coordination meetings considered by many to be insufficiently substantive. Lead is contested with the World Bank.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To overcome these obstacles, the evaluation recommends the following:

1. **Formulate a strategic vision, based on the concept of human security.** In order to strengthen its intellectual leadership, UNDP, in conjunction with other UN agencies, especially the UN Department of Political Affairs, needs to elaborate a strategic vision based on the concept of human security. This concept provides an umbrella under which the structural conditions leading to conflict may be addressed. It is true that the mix of policy responses will vary in different situations. Nevertheless, the concept of human security could be given substance by developing a set of principles that would need to be applied in each case and that could enhance the coherence of the UNDP response. These principles could include:

   - **Human rights, including both political and civil and economic and social rights.** The physical and material security of individuals is the primary goal of any post-conflict intervention. This should receive priority over top-down political concerns. In some places, the view prevails that political stability—meaning deals with former warlords or commanders—takes precedence over political and civil rights, and economic stability—balanced budgets and low inflation—takes precedence over economic and social rights. In contemporary conflicts, this is misguided since stability, in the long term, depends on respect for human rights. The rule of law, political participation, and the livelihood of individuals (especially jobs and sustainable incomes) are critical for conflict prevention and recovery.

   - **Legitimate political authority.** In order to create an environment in which human rights are respected, the establishment of legitimate political authority is necessary. The emphasis on legitimacy implies that this is not just a matter of establishing state institutions; it also requires the building of trust and respect for institutions. The engagement of civil society is just as important as the construction of formal institutions. Moreover, non-formal networks such as those linked with family, workplace, or schools also need to be sustained throughout conflicts.

   - **Coherence.** Poverty reduction and human development have to be key components of the overall strategic vision and need to be integrated into strategic planning at all stages of a conflict. Debate and discussion with all partners—including other agencies, government and civil society—on how to achieve a coherent approach are critical.

   - **Bottom-up approach.** The people who have lived through conflict are usually the best guides to the specific mix of policy responses that are required. At all stages of peace-building, it is important to listen to and involve a range of civil society groups, including women and grass-roots organizations, as well as politicians and former warlords/commanders.

   - **Regional focus.** As noted previously, conflicts tend to spread over borders. Still, there is a tendency to develop separate programmes for each country. It is very important to build regional programmes.

All of these principles need to integrate a gender and youth perspective.

2. **Integrate development concerns within United Nations strategies for security.** Development is still seen as an add-on to conflict recovery programmes. Yet development is critical in addressing the structural conditions conducive to conflict. UNDP needs to impress upon...
the international community, including the Security Council and other political bodies, the paramount importance of development. In order to improve the integration of development concerns:

- The Administrator of UNDP should brief the Security Council as do the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Refugees.

- Development assistance should be included in assessed contributions for missions with a Security Council mandate.

- UNDP should be involved in the negotiation of peace agreements and should press for the involvement of civil society and women's groups.

- Development concerns should have a stronger voice in integrated offices. UN Country Teams should be better integrated into the UN mission, and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General responsible for development and humanitarian affairs should be assigned additional support staff. Some in the development and humanitarian community are sceptical about integrated missions on the grounds that their interests would be subordinated to political/military concerns. This study takes the view that political/military concerns need to be adapted to development priorities rather than separated. In contemporary conflicts, humanitarian space no longer exists. These are not wars with sides fought by militaries where the humanitarian agencies can negotiate a neutral position. These are wars where violence is directed against civilians and the humanitarian task is to defend civilians, which can often only be done through the support of political/military actors. On the other hand, the political/military actors also have to adapt. They can no longer keep the peace between sides or take a position on one side; they have to adopt a more bottom-up approach. Hence the integrated office can only function if all the actors understand this changed situation. The political/military actors have to incorporate the thinking of development/humanitarian actors and the latter have to be ready to work more closely with their political/military counterparts.

- Development concerns should receive priority in the new Peace-building Commission.

3. **Build substantive capacity in core areas of peace-building.** UNDP tends to undertake gap-filling and administrative functions in many countries. There is a good case for both since in these new types of conflict there are often urgent needs that do not fit the mandate of other specialized agencies. But gap-filling and administrative functions can never be more than short-term. Recent conflicts, including those studied for this evaluation, have exposed the need for certain types of activities that address the conditions that lead to conflict and that are not in the domain of other agencies. Rather than carrying out these activities in an ad hoc fashion, UNDP needs to develop a substantive capacity in core areas that builds on innovation and the best practices in UNDP programmes that can be replicated in different situations.

UNDP’s mandate in governance, reintegration of war-affected populations and the development aspects of arms control and mine clearance all place it potentially at the very centre of a concerted peace-building programme. More specifically, within the framework of a strategic vision, UNDP needs to further develop clear policies and approaches in the following core areas:

- **Recovery and reintegration of war-affected populations,** including...
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action; long-term political reconciliation that extends the political agreements reached at the centre to local levels, including the equivalent of truth commissions and/or war crimes tribunals.

- **Governance and capacity-building**, including strengthening parliamentary institutions to broaden participation and inclusion in decision-making; decentralization, with a view to empowering local communities; strengthening the role of key civil society institutions—not just in the delivery of services, but also as sources of knowledge, as watchdogs and as independent advocacy organizations; public sector reform; accountability and anti-corruption programmes.

- **Justice and security sector reform**, including independence of the judiciary; access to justice; key institutions for guaranteeing human rights; and the restructuring of the civilian police and the military.

- **Poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods**, especially community-based development that emphasizes local empowerment and the creation of employment and sustainable livelihoods through people-centred, area-based programmes and small-scale credit schemes; and the development of policies that foster the growth of small enterprises and sustainable livelihoods.

4. **Improve the effectiveness of implementation.** One of UNDP’s perceived strengths is that some of its procedures are currently more flexible than those of other actors in the UN system. Thus it is better able to innovate in response to crises. This edge should be maintained. To further increase operational flexibility, intellectual responsiveness and speed of delivery, UNDP should:

- **Develop the analytical capacity to understand specific conflicts and monitor human security.** UNDP needs to build capacity among think tanks and academic institutions in conflict-affected countries so as to have a long-term analysis of the conflict and to collect data on human security. At present, data on human security are very sparse, as became evident in undertaking this study.

- **Enhance human resources in conflict-affected countries.** This should include the development of a clear and effective set of incentives to attract experienced staff to serve in conflict-affected countries; training programmes in all facets of human security designed to facilitate adaptation to new activities for national and international staff in countries affected by conflict or in fragile states, which would emphasize a ‘service’ rather than control orientation; workshops, seminars and other forms of debate about human security policies and specific contexts, both in New York and in-country.

- **Strengthen internal UNDP decision-making mechanisms.** Programmes in conflict-affected countries tend to require more intensive oversight and management than those of non-conflict countries. Such support could be generated through the re-establishment of the committee for the management of UNDP operations in all conflict-affected countries. This committee, which could be chaired by the Administrator, Associate Administrator, or Director for the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, would be responsible for reviewing policies and approaches, capacity requirements, the allocation of resources, partnerships and political relations, resource mobilization and the effectiveness of programmes.
Undertake a systematic review of its financial and administrative procedures.

Emphasize full transparency, particularly by ensuring the regular updating of its national websites and by posting more systematically user-friendly information on projects, budgets, procurement and recruitment.

Improve its outreach beyond capitals, including through the establishment of field offices with the necessary delegation of authority.

5. Enhance coordination and partnerships. Coordination mechanisms should be streamlined and reduced in overall number. Moreover, they should provide substantive, clear-cut, general strategic frameworks for addressing the structural causes of conflict rather than the management of funds. Subsidiary teams could be established in order to address issues that can contribute to conflict, such as macroeconomic policy and revenue and budget management, the rule of law and access to justice, public administration and civil service reform, gender and the role of women, and the construction of essential infrastructure, among others.

UNDP also needs to further develop certain key, strategic partnerships. It has already begun to develop its partnership with the UN Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as witnessed in the establishment of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the integrated offices. Three other key strategic partnerships that would benefit greatly from improvement are with the World Bank and IMF, regional development banks, and civil society.

The World Bank and IMF. The UNDP and the World Bank currently collaborate closely in conflict-affected countries on Joint Needs Assessments, in the management of country-specific trust funds and in the preparation of country-specific (pledging) conferences. Yet there is considerable room for more substantive collaboration to the benefit of both organizations, especially in dealing with the crucial problem of youth unemployment. The judicious use of World Bank IDA credits or grants, combined with UNDP’s more people-oriented perspective as well as management and technical skills, including those drawn from other agencies of the UN system, would provide a strong basis for a partnership that could yield important results in terms of human security. To raise the impact of these schemes requires not only project-based support but also incisive policy reforms. Neither can be effectively scaled up without the reform of macroeconomic policies and improvement of the overall environment for private sector growth and employment creation. UNDP needs to press the financial institutions to include social justice and employment as key priorities. Moreover, it should partner with the World Bank and the IMF to influence government and even interim-government policies on a range of issues—from tariff and non-tariff barriers, rules and regulations that affect the growth of private enterprise to fiscal and monetary policies that encourage small enterprises.

Regional development banks. Post-conflict reconstruction requires extensive investment in essential infrastructure: from primary to tertiary feeder roads, from power plants to irrigation schemes, and from houses to educational and health facilities. Area-based development with community participation can effectively serve as a planning and capacity-building mechanism for the management of financing and
even grant funds from regional development banks where capacity is perceived to be low and guarantees of the reliable use of funds are required.

Civil society. UNDP needs to give much greater priority to civil society groups, both as partners and as guides to the formulation of strategy. There is still a tendency to prioritize relations with those in power. Civil society groups need to be regarded as a resource, a repository of local knowledge as well as a strategic partner rather than as a beneficiary or an implementing agent. In this respect, women’s groups are particularly important since they are least likely to be pursuing political or sectarian goals. For lasting peace, it is absolutely essential for civil society institutions to be encouraged in a manner that ensures public and community oversight over: essential government functions and expenditure; the management of key institutions, including the courts, the police and the military; the safeguarding of human rights; and conflict resolution and the preservation of minority rights, to name just a few areas of concern. UNDP and other UN agencies can provide legitimizing support for civil society institutions that, in the past, have often been targeted and marginalized.

Like other institutions, UNDP has tended to regard civil society as a monolithic entity, without sufficiently understanding its diversity, its strengths and its weaknesses. It encourages the development of civil society organizations largely through subcontracts, direct support and capacity-building. It is recommended that a new approach be adopted based first and foremost on the principle of mutual respect and realism. Civil society groups—including NGOs, community-based organizations, religious organizations, women’s groups, labour and professional associations, the media and others—should be invited for regular consultations, and UNDP should take seriously their views and recommendations. It is natural that civil society organizations should have their own vested interests and biases, and these need to be discerned with a degree of hard-nosed realism. However, a failure to consult with civil society organizations in a sincere manner is likely to lead to failure in preventing the recurrence of conflict. Such consultations can also facilitate better public understanding of the objectives and approach adopted by the UN and the UN Country Team that is so often subject to misinterpretation and consequent suspicion.
AFGHANISTAN

The human security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. On the positive side: Since 2000, the Taliban have been overthrown, three elections have been held and formally democratic institutions established, some five million refugees have come back to Afghanistan and four million girls have returned to school. At the same time, the insurgency is intensifying, especially in the south. Moreover, the legitimacy of the government is weak because of the role of former commanders in key positions, crime and human rights violations are widespread (especially crimes against women), unemployment is high and access to public services is weak and in some areas nonexistent, and poppy cultivation is increasing.

The international community, especially the United Nations, has contributed to stabilization through its presence, through the Bonn process, which has established political institutions, and through community-based reconstruction programmes. However, the role of the international community is hampered by an overly top-down approach. As a result, stability takes precedence over justice. In addition, the large-scale international effort is inefficient; a regional approach, which would tackle insurgency by dealing with instability in neighbouring countries, is lacking; security regulations are stringent; and there is an excessive preoccupation with time-frames in the country’s reconstruction.

UNDP has provided continuous assistance to Afghanistan through decades of war and during the period 2000-2005. In 2000-2002, the UNDP office was based in Islamabad and assistance consisted largely of the PEACE programme, a community-based initiative executed by UN agencies, but implemented mainly by Afghan NGOs. Since 2002, UNDP has developed one of its largest programmes. The primary focus has been filling critical gaps, with considerable nimbleness and speed, and in managing large trust funds that have been essential for the overall international programme. In particular, it managed to pay the salaries of civil servants and the police in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taliban. It has also carried out programmes in nearly all areas important to long-term recovery—rule of law (judiciary and police), elections, parliament, area-based rural development, women’s rights, sustainable livelihoods and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Over 95 percent of the programmes have been financed from non-core funds.

Perhaps because of the scale of the programme and the need to act quickly, UNDP has tended to act in a service-provision role, and has often lacked a substantive input into the work it manages. Since 2002, it has shifted from civil society and community-based programmes to an exclusive focus on government institutions, which may have reinforced centralized decision-making. Moreover, because of short time-frames, direct support has meant inadequate attention to capacity-building. UNDP’s effectiveness has also been constrained by security concerns.

It is generally agreed that the experience of the integrated office in Afghanistan has been positive. However, traditional UNDP concerns have been subordinated to the overall mandate and to the preoccupation with time-frames. UNDP has worked...
closely with the Government of Afghanistan and with the World Bank. However relations with Afghan NGOs and civil society have been less close since 2002, not least because of the difficulty of access due to security concerns.

Lessons learned for the international community include the need:

- To integrate human security into overall programmes, including more attention to human rights, especially economic and social rights, legitimacy, consultation with civil society, and the regional dimensions of conflict
- For structural change in delivery so as to assist the development of national capacity, reduce duplication and waste, and increase transparency
- To rethink security rules.

Lessons learned for UNDP include the need to:

- Supplement gap-filling and service-provision with substantive capacity that builds on knowledge and experience in conflict countries, especially in governance, recovery and community-based development
- Create a ‘surge’ capacity for development
- Increase transparency and the speed and efficiency of delivery
- Improve the quality of personnel in conflict countries, through appropriate incentives and fair, meritocratic and broad-based recruitment at the national level.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

After decades of a debilitating dictatorship and two successive wars between 1996 and 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has engaged, since June 2003, in a process of political transition that should culminate in the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in the second half of 2006. Despite recent improvements in some macroeconomic indicators, the long period of dictatorship and the instability, conflict and violence that followed have left the population in a situation where poverty and human insecurity have reached almost unparalleled proportions: 80 percent of the population live in conditions of extreme poverty (on less than $1 a day), 71 percent suffer from food insecurity, 57 percent have no access to safe drinking water, and 54 percent lack basic health services.

Despite some improvements in the security situation since the establishment of the Transition Government and the full deployment of a more robust UN mission (known as MONUC), human rights violations persist and outbursts of violence continue to affect many parts of the country.

UNDP contributed significantly to the international effort in addressing the evolving situation in the DRC in three different periods from 2000 to 2005:

- Until the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement at the end of 2002, a situation of conflict persisted in eastern DRC despite the cease-fire of 1999. UNDP concentrated its efforts on facilitating the re-engagement of the donor community and the Bretton Woods institutions while initiating recovery activities in the more secure western provinces.
- In 2003-2004, UNDP initiated programmes of support to the transition through its participation in the development of a ‘Minimum Partnership Programme for Transition and Recovery’, which was finally adopted at the Consultative Group meeting of November 2004. It also launched programmes of support to the national institutions involved in transition and built up an internal capacity to handle an increasing volume of operations. The creation of a Post-Conflict Unit within the UNDP country office increased the visibility of UNDP programmes in that area and helped attract additional funding.
Since the end of 2004, with the appointment of the UNDP Resident Representative as Deputy Special Representative in MONUC, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator, UNDP participated more closely in the Security Council-mandated mission. The organization embarked on large-scale programmes of support to the electoral process and expanded activities under the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme. It developed field activities in cooperation with NGOs, particularly in the Ituri district and planned the establishment of UNDP offices in several provinces of eastern DRC. UNDP was also instrumental in developing a Plan of Action for the post-electoral phase. The senior management of MONUC developed a number of innovative ideas aimed at improving the efficiency of the integrated mission and cooperating more closely with the UN Country Team.

The major contribution of UNDP over recent years has no doubt been its support to the electoral process where, in 2005, the integrated MONUC/UNDP Electoral Unit successfully managed to register 25 million voters and organize a national referendum with the participation of nearly 62 percent of the electorate. When considering the size of the country, the roughness of the terrain, the absence of roads in many areas and the conditions of insecurity prevailing in many locations, this is by all accounts an outstanding achievement.

Major lessons learned through this case review include the following:

- The Global and Inclusive Agreement remained largely a power-sharing agreement among warring factions. The international community and the United Nations could have achieved more coherence and better coordination if they had insisted more strongly on a linkage between the political negotiations and clear benchmarks related to human rights, humanitarian and recovery programmes.

- A number of innovative management decisions have helped improve the coherence of the overall UN effort and have allowed UNDP to be more effective. These included 1) the creation of a dedicated ‘integrated office’ to assist the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his multiple functions, 2) the creation of a fully integrated Electoral Unit, managed by MONUC and UNDP under the supervision of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is also responsible for UNDP, and 3) the expressed wish of the senior management of MONUC to integrate more fully members of the UN Country Team in areas of shared responsibility.

- UNDP demonstrated leadership under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes by promoting new approaches, such as linking them to community development programmes and developing more flexible operational management through a Rapid Response Mechanism.

- The creation of a dedicated Post-Conflict Unit helped UNDP itself focus on the issue and increased both the visibility of related activities as well as funding.

- UNDP programmes benefited from a dedicated post responsible for gender issues and from a very active UN inter-agency team of gender advisers.

- Post-conflict situations such as the one in eastern DRC require flexible management approaches. UNDP’s decision to open offices in some provinces could go a long way in improving the effectiveness of the organization, provided that it is given the necessary authority and accountability and does not become just another administrative layer.
The close cooperation developed with NGOs has helped UNDP become more operational in areas such as Ituri, where programmes have to be implemented under fragile security conditions. Relations with NGOs have been constrained, however, by UNDP’s own regulations.

The perception of UNDP’s efficiency suffers from the frequent delays in processing financial reports received from implementing partners and in transferring funds to them.

GUATEMALA

Although there was no formal guidance for collaboration between the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and UNDP, the relationship between the two has been exceedingly close. UNDP was intimately involved in all phases of the peace process, including the actual negotiations, in both a substantive and service function. Unlike many of the other peace agreements studied, the one in Guatemala was notable because it incorporated important structural, institutional changes that were intended to broaden democratic participation, reduce the influence of the armed forces and the business elite in governance, bring an end to egregious violations and install a culture of human rights, bring satisfactory closure to past wrongs and return the country to sustainable development. From supporting the dialogue, to facilitating the demobilization of armed forces and the return of refugees to the process of reconciliation and the reform of institutions of central importance to the peace process, UNDP has been a central player in Guatemala despite its own lack of core resources to deliver on its mandate.

MINUGUA and UNDP opened a wide array of ‘dialogue tables’ that brought together the government, military, guerrillas, political parties, the Church, indigenous groups, civil society organizations and the private sector to work on the various sub-agreements of the peace process. In close partnership with UNDP, MINUGUA also launched several temporary institutions geared to the resolution of the conflict (such as the peace commission and the land fund). The success of these forums and institutions has been considerable but, in some instances, incomplete.

The peace process facilitated by the international community through the UN has brought about national consensus on the underlying causes of conflict as well as the extent of the massacres and other violations of human rights that took place. The peace process has not altogether removed the influence of groups that have controlled the fate of the country since the 1920s, nor has it achieved real consensus on the solutions that need to be applied.

Nevertheless, individuals and groups are now generally able to express their views in private and in public. Expectations have also been raised, although in real terms access to opportunities for sections of the population that were traditionally excluded has been slow to follow. There is now a gap between expectations versus actual opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and access to essential services, some of which has been fulfilled through the migration of labour abroad.

Open conflict has ended and rebel forces were either successfully integrated into the armed forces or demobilized. However, threats of politically motivated violence continue against those who dare to either further investigate the underlying powers or speak out against them—even though the tolerance of criticism is far greater than in the past.

Well over 95 percent of resources delivered by UNDP were non-core, a large share of which has come from the government. The credibility and trust that UNDP has established with successive governments and with opposition and civil society groups has afforded it significant leeway in its programme focus and the way in which resources are utilized. Nevertheless,
dependence on government cost-sharing has brought with it added criticism that UNDP is too close to the authorities. With the end of the Security Council mandate, UNDP’s leverage to ensure commitment to institutional reform has also declined.

UNDP’s dependence on cost-sharing has negatively affected implementation, since programmes have been launched without full funding. This has meant less than seamless implementation, and activities have, at times, come to a halt pending the receipt of additional contributions.

Programme monitoring needs to be strengthened both from a technical perspective and also to ensure that it is more outcome-based. This is not unlike the situation of UNDP in virtually all countries; there is no independent, stand-alone capacity to monitor programme outcomes and impact over an extended period of time.

National ownership of UNDP’s programmes appears sound, and sustainability has been largely provided for with sufficient integration into the national budget. However, it was also noted that political commitment appeared to be lacking for the implementation of some of the key structural reforms associated with the peace process. The sustainability of these reforms has been placed in question by the allocation of insufficient funds to selected institutions, such as the civilian-controlled police force.

The UNDP has been relatively successful in its coordination functions in Guatemala. And some of the available system-wide tools, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework, have been used relatively successfully for joint post-conflict programming by the UN system. UNDP’s close relationship with MINUGUA has served to enhance its relationship with the World Bank, and UNDP has managed significant volumes of funds derived from World Bank loans to the Government.

**HAITI**

The situation in Haiti is not a post-conflict situation, but rather a protracted and violent 20-year-long transition following the end of the predatory dictatorship of the Duvaliers. The crisis left Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with 56 percent of the population living under conditions of extreme poverty (on less than $1 a day). The situation is the result of a prevailing culture of violence, widespread corruption, the criminalization of armed groups as well as neglect by the international community.

Since 2004—after six United Nations missions that were generally considered failures—the United Nations and the international community finally recognized that a long-term commitment and a robust multidimensional Security Council mandate were required for the new UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

The new mission was also established in line with the concept of ‘integrated missions’, and the Resident Representative of UNDP was appointed as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which combined the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. The role of UNDP during the period under review (2000-2005) had to adapt to the evolution of the internal situation and the nature of the United Nations presence in the country.

During a first phase, up to the departure of President Aristide in February 2004,
UNDP operated in the absence of a Security Council or General Assembly-mandated mission. UNDP’s major contribution during that period was the launching of a multi-year programme that contributed significantly to the resumption of humanitarian and recovery assistance in a situation where most donors rejected direct cooperation with government authorities. Following the withdrawal of the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in February 2001, the Resident Coordinator became the senior-most UN official in the country. As a result, he played a prominent role in the days and weeks that immediately followed the exile of President Aristide.

With the establishment of MINUSTAH in 2004, UNDP’s had to adapt to new responsibilities in support of the Security Council mandate. Through its participation in the mission, UNDP has become an integral part of the renewed international effort to support transition in Haiti and improve the day-to-day situation of its people. Support to the justice sector and other programmes that began prior to 2004 continued. However, UNDP has also been involved in a number of new activities during the transition period, including supporting for the electoral process and a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme. The role of UNDP in the electoral process represented a major increase in the financial resources administered by the UNDP country office and put a heavy toll on limited human resources. This role, however, remained very administrative and technical, increasing an often expressed perception that UNDP was moving away from its core development mandate into a service-provision function. Despite slow progress on the DDR programme, some interesting innovations were introduced in Haiti that could serve as models elsewhere. On the management side, this included the creation of a totally integrated management structure, involving both UNDP and MINUSTAH. Another major advance was the decision of the Security Council to allocate limited resources from assessed contributions for reintegration activities.

Major lessons from the Haiti case study:

- The international community shares responsibility for the crisis in Haiti since it lacked a proactive prevention strategy and sustained, long-term commitment.
- The concept of integrated missions is being promoted through the formal adoption of ‘integrated areas of activity’ (including DDR, justice, electoral support, national dialogue and protection of children). The formula could prove effective in promoting more coherent cooperation between the UN mission and members of the UN Country Team.
- UNDP’s role in support of the electoral process has been effective, but limited only to providing administrative and technical assistance, thus raising questions about the justification of UNDP’s participation in terms of the organization’s core mandate.
- Important management and funding innovations introduced in the DDR programme could serve as models in similar situations.
- UNDP has shown leadership through its capacity to adapt, anticipate and innovate.
- UNDP’s capacity to create trust funds and manage them flexibly is a positive development for both UN Secretariat and donor partners. On the other hand, the image of the organization suffers from its heavy and slow procedures when it comes to disbursing funds to implementing partners, contractors and staff.
- UNDP’s outreach beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince, is rather limited. Opportunities have probably been lost since the security situation is reportedly more favourable in the countryside and urban centres outside the capital city.
- Relations with civil society have been intense, but often based on personal contacts more than structured institutional arrangements.
SIERRA LEONE

The war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002. It involved some 70,000 casualties and displaced 2.6 million people from their homes. The war was characterized by widespread atrocities, including the abduction of children and systematic rape. The conditions that led to the war included a repressive predatory state, dependence on mineral rents, the impact of structural adjustment, a large excluded youth population, the availability of small arms after the end of the Cold War, and interference from regional neighbours.

Human security has improved because the conflict is over and because of the international presence. But the state is still very weak despite the extension of state authority and the establishment of local councils. Legal and security institutions are weak, corruption is endemic, and there is a pervasive distrust of politics. Civil society is also weak despite its key role during the war, especially by women's groups. Youth unemployment is very high and youth literacy very low. The situation of girls is particularly bad; some 80-90 percent undergo female genital mutilation/cutting.

There are some self-organized youth initiatives, such as the bike riders association or the cassette sellers association although they are also potential sources of youth disgruntlement. Since 2002, economic growth has been rapid, but Sierra Leone remains one of the poorest countries in the world and near the bottom of the human development index. Regional instability could easily reignite the conflict.

Since 2000, the international community, particularly the United Nations, has played a critical role in sustaining the peace agreement. Between 2000 and 2002, the focus was DDR, the return and resettlement of displaced people, and the extension of state authority, including both line ministries and traditional authorities. In addition, after 2002, the international community helped to implement the Interim Poverty Reduction and National Recovery Strategy, which included the establishment of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, justice and security sector reform and poverty alleviation. Expenditure by the international community runs at 80 percent of gross national income and is more than double government expenditures.

UNDP has played a pivotal role, both in strategic coordination and in filling in gaps through targeted interventions. Since 2002, UNDP's programmes have covered three practice areas: recovery and peace-building, governance and democratic development, and poverty reduction and human development. The first area is the largest. Particularly important projects include Arms for Development, an innovative community-based DDR programme, a youth policy, support for elections, especially local elections, and access to justice.

Sierra Leone provides a model for the integrated office concept, not least because of the role of Alan Doss, the former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Victor Angelo, the current Special Representative of the S-G. Alan Doss stressed the importance of coherent thinking and the need to involve the development/humanitarian agencies in decision-making. Partnerships with other agencies have also been effective, at least in Freetown. Outside the capital, the problems of duplication and competition persist. A particular problem has been the difficulty for the Transition Support Teams, based in UNDP, to coordinate the transition from recovery to development.

UNDP was criticized by the Government for overemphasis on direct rather than national implementation, though not by beneficiaries and the civil society. The main problem is how to build national capacity in the context of such a large and effective international presence. UNDP is trying to achieve this through project implementation units, reforms at the senior levels of the civil service and partnership with the Ministry for Youth and Sports. UNDP is
also widely criticized for bureaucracy and delays in payments.

Overall, the international community has played a positive role. The big problem is that its very success detracts from the legitimacy of the government. In addition, despite innovative community approaches, there is a need to generate jobs on a large scale and to improve the situation of women. In Sierra Leone, UNDP’s gap-filling role has been effective because it has been demand- rather than donor-driven and because of the efficiency of local staff. More attention needs to be paid to civil society and gender.

TAJIKISTAN

The UN and the international community have played an important role in achieving greater human security in Tajikistan. Open conflict of the type seen during the civil war has been eliminated. But while democratic processes and institutions have been used to bring about stability, the authorities have manipulated them skillfully to attain their political goals and legal means have been used to eliminate most opposition. Democratic institutions have been systematically subverted in the interest of stability. The international community has not used the Security Council mandate to insist on the further development of democratic institutions as a stable Tajikistan is in the geopolitical interests of most international partners.

The UNDP programme has supported the international community’s efforts and the UN Peace-building Support Office. Indeed, its programme has been centred on post-conflict recovery and peace-building since the start of the war in 1992. Consistent with the international community’s phased approach, the UNDP’s programme has reflected a transition from immediate post-conflict relief and stabilization (particularly the reintegration of combatants into their local communities), to a more recent focus on the potential future causes of internal friction (the lack of economic opportunities, the need for strengthening of essential institutional capacities, especially for the rule of law, the management of subregional transit and preventing the collapse of essential services). This has, in large part, been driven by the peace process as defined in the agreement and by the flow of donor resources.

Despite very limited core resources, UNDP has managed to mobilize enough resources to make itself an important player in the establishment of some of the most important institutions for post-conflict recovery. It has undertaken a programme that has been at the centre of many of the most critical responses to the conflict, be it in the areas of DDR, area-based development, rule of law or the promotion of public administration reform.

UNDP’s dependence on non-core resources to perform its responsibilities within a common, UN-derived peace-building mandate has had a profound effect on the way in which these programmes have been undertaken and how programmes, activities and outcomes have had to be prioritized. At times this has reduced both the level of efficiency and effectiveness, as insufficient funds have been available to ensure adequate programme capacity. It has also, at times, resulted in a focus on activities that are not centred on peace-building, such as HIV/AIDS (despite low incidence), the environment, and mitigation of natural disasters. The UNDP has also performed a service function, providing a reliable and politically acceptable vehicle for managing funds for some programmes of the international community, such as border management.

Tajikistan has a long way to go to establish institutions that even vaguely resemble a liberal democratic system of governance. Yet, with the attainment of stability there are clear signs of donor fatigue. UNDP is finding it increasingly difficult to find non-core resources that are required to develop essential institutions and to continue to work at the rural level to promote sustainable livelihoods.
While both the IMF and the World Bank have deemed the government’s macro-
economic management to be sound, the vast majority of the population is able to
survive largely because of remittances from the Russian Federation and other countries
of the CIS. Education and health services have deteriorated, and a failure to accelerate
human development or a disruption in the flow of remittances are likely to be the
most likely causes of future instability. In recognition of this, the UNDP has shifted
its attention to using the framework of the Millennium Development Goals as a basis
for promoting accelerated human development. This has provoked considerable
controversy because of the considerable funding shortfall that has been identified
in meeting the MDG targets. However, it is also an effective means to orienting
development efforts towards both human development and human security.

As with most of the other case studies, the UNDP has yet to systematically establish
outcome-based monitoring systems that would enable truly results-based management.
Changes in financial management systems also rendered the review of historical trends
in the structure of the programme difficult.
BACKGROUND
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant increase in the incidence of war and violent conflict. According to the Human Development Report 2002, over the past decade there were 53 internal conflicts resulting in 3.6 million deaths, immense political upheaval, immeasurable social damage and billions of dollars’ worth of economic destruction. In response to this deteriorating international environment, the Executive Board of UNDP revisited the organization’s role in crisis and post-conflict development and urged the organization to renew its commitment to peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation.\(^1\) As a result, UNDP launched several new initiatives in conflict-ridden countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This has been done in coordination with the mandates of other key UN partners. Four years have passed since this policy shift was first articulated, and the organization is now in a position to conduct an independent evaluation of the nature and effects of its post-crisis transition assistance to improve future interventions.

The overall aim of UNDP’s efforts has been to identify and elaborate options for policies and instruments to enhance transition assistance during the immediate post-crisis period in order to avoid the recurrence of violence and assist the country towards recovery and development. These efforts have focused on providing physical and socio-economic security, rebuilding governance structures for a political framework, fostering reconciliation and justice, and facilitating mechanisms for transition, where short-term and long-term frameworks—i.e., the sum total of many different interventions at various times within an overall process—may be analysed in terms of promoting ‘human security’.

The idea of ‘human security’ marks a new threshold in the ongoing redefinition and broadening of traditional concepts of security in development thinking. In recent years, the policies of the international aid community, including UNDP, have increasingly incorporated into the post-crisis agenda a range of social, economic, legal, environmental, demographic and cultural concerns. In fact, few post-crisis situations can be framed without reference to human security issues arising from poverty, gender disparities, continuing conflicts often along ethnic and/or religious lines, landmines, refugee problems, illicit drugs, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation. Indeed, much of the ‘old’ development agenda can now be found under the ‘human security’ rubric in one form or another, partly because countries that are no longer actively ‘at war’ with other countries do not necessarily achieve ‘peace’ within their own borders. Peace increasingly means more than the absence of threats and discrimination. It means freedom from fear and want (e.g., economic security and basic human rights) for which responsive, accountable governance structures are prerequisites. As such, human security has acquired a dimension far larger than the original State-centred notion of the UN Charter, and its absence at the local and national levels has demonstrated long-term negative consequences. Peace-building

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efforts towards legitimate and lasting security in post-crisis situations are now expected to be rooted in the well-being of people, and the security of people emerged as a complementary and distinct notion from that of the security of the State.  

Building up pluralist democratic politics shares much with the fundamental principles underlying human security, since both are grounded in human development perspectives. Human security has evolved to mean inclusion, cohesion and integration—a sense of belonging to a society and a prevailing order within and among nations that is predicated on fairness and respect for differences and human dignity. It is a concept that focuses on the viewpoints of individuals to protect them from threats to their lives, livelihoods and dignity. However, human security cannot be equated with human development since it is both the outcome of a successful development process and a condition, if not a cause, of human development. Human development, on the other hand, is only possible in a ‘secure’ context. As such, human security is reinforced by human development and ultimately realized through it.

The implications of this redefinition of terms are significant and present a number of unique challenges, not the least of which is the expansion of the traditional development policy agenda in post-crisis situations into issue-areas that have traditionally been viewed in a narrower social, economic, and developmental—as opposed to ‘human security’—context. Yet, every stage of crisis and post-crisis has a development dimension and, in real life, development and humanitarian concerns very much tend to overlap. Therefore, the evaluation would focus on some of the broader conceptual and policy implications of the widening ‘human security’ issues in transition assistance and what this means for enhancing development effectiveness of UNDP and partners in responding to post-crisis situations from a human development angle.

OBJECTIVES

The evaluation will cover four key objectives:

1) To help UNDP document and analyse the transition assistance it has provided in selected countries since 2000 in the sensitive and frequently fragile post-crisis (cease-fire) period in reference to specific human security issues and their human development dimensions to reveal both patterns of interventions that have been successful and those that have been less successful.

2) To provide critical guidance by assessing results of UNDP programming interventions to date and providing recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of current programming approaches in the early transition period and their implications for longer-term development. In doing so, it aims to highlight areas where UNDP’s comparative advantage has been proven or is emerging as well as to identify gaps and provide recommendations on how UNDP could address these gaps.

3) To indicate how UNDP has used partnerships at local, national and

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2 While each country, as a nation state, is still responsible to its people for ensuring state security and in control of security and economic policies at the state level, such policies are now expected to be complemented by efforts focused on individuals to ensure human security and human development.


international levels and positioned itself vis-à-vis other actors, who provide both transition and longer-term development support, including suggestions as to what capacities and skills the organization should prioritize and further develop to bring greater coherence and relevance to its interventions in post-crisis situations.

4) To provide substantive insights on how to ensure that lessons learned from programmes and strategies implemented in the immediate post-crisis period can be institutionalized within the organization through systematic monitoring and evaluation, adapted and made more relevant to country needs.

SCOPE AND COUNTRY CASES

The term ‘post-crisis’ reflects a complex and protracted process. However, while the main focus of the evaluation is on the immediate post-crisis period, it is necessary to take into account a broader perspective to include the preparatory work undertaken before an actual crisis, which tends to be critical. For instance, UNDP presence is likely to shift depending on different and emerging priorities during the different phases, from ‘normal’ development, through the crisis to transition and recovery efforts towards achieving normalcy. Also, UNDP is increasingly involved in countries where steps towards attaining a peace agreement have been forged but not finalized, and/or where crisis levels have subsided but conflict continues. Thus, it is necessary to look at UNDP programming in both these uncertain contexts and in the more traditional post-conflict environment where a peace agreement has been finalized and where armed conflict has ceased. The evaluation is further circumscribed by the time-frame being considered. In many instances, UNDP plays a dual role: it first designs programmes to support the peace and bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and development; but it subsequently designs and implements recovery and governance programmes that have much longer time horizons. Therefore, key questions that the evaluation will try to address are how to improve the effectiveness of UNDP strategy (i.e., is it doing the right things?) and interventions (i.e., is it doing things right?). The overall scope of the evaluation will include the following:

- UNDP’s performance within its existing role in providing post-crisis assistance, in particular preparations for peace-building activities in the period prior to crisis so as to ascertain the relevance of different phases of interventions in the past and programmatic shifts and key decisions on planning resource mobilization.
- UNDP’s response during the immediate post-crisis period, including the level of understanding within the organization—and in its programming—of its immediate post-crisis role, and what is required to improve coordination and delivery of interventions.
- UNDP partnerships with relevant organizations within the UN system and clarity of the delineation of roles and responsibilities.
- Level of consistency in the implementation of policy by UNDP and relevant partners in their coordination and development efforts, including the level of flexibility required in the mechanisms and instruments for developing and implementing policy.
- Critical gaps between humanitarian efforts and promotion of a longer-term

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7 Although ‘immediate’ is usually understood as the first 12 months following the adoption of a cease-fire agreement between warring parties, this evaluation will take a more flexible approach with regard to the period before and after crisis, based on country context.

8 The threshold for looking at pre-crisis interventions is likely to vary from country to country according to the duration of conflict and other factors, and, therefore, should be defined on the basis of the specific country context.
human security agenda and human development, and their policy implications for UNDP, UN partners and other stakeholders.

- Results of local partnerships in immediate post-crisis assistance, including level of ownership of initiatives and activities (e.g., identification of problems, needs and solutions) and their implications for partnership and cooperation with formal, non-formal and traditional structures of leadership, assessing operational needs, risks and opportunities.

- UNDP approaches in monitoring and evaluating programme activities, and how monitoring and evaluation knowledge is used to contribute to operational guidelines, programme implementation, evaluation of programme performance and criteria for success.

A number of key issues and questions are highlighted in Addendum 1 that should be included under the general scope of the evaluation highlighted above. These specific issues are by no means exclusive, and the evaluation is expected to address and clarify these issues, and provide answers to the questions in relation to the general scope.

The evaluation will have a corporate focus. However, in order to ensure the feasibility of the evaluation, specific case studies will be limited to the following six countries: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. These countries represent a good cross-section of cases where the post-crisis period is in various stages of development and where UNDP has engaged in multiple cross-sectoral transition initiatives with greater focus on policy instruments and advocacy in supporting these countries to move away from crisis and conflict towards recovery.

Finally, the evaluation seeks to be more of a learning and forward-looking exercise than an evaluation of past results. It will lay special emphasis on lessons learned in terms of what has worked and what has not worked to help practitioners and decision-makers to be able to review and better understand the quality and relevance of UNDP services in addressing human security issues, their flexibility, acceptability and adaptability in different context/roles, as well as to guide future planning and implementation of programmes in immediate post-crisis situations.

EVALUATION TEAM

The core evaluation team will comprise three international consultants. One of the international consultants will be designated as the Team Leader, the other two will be designated as Principal Consultants. In addition, and depending on the evaluation methodology developed by this core team, other national consultants/advisers/agencies may be hired to contribute to the evaluation process. Each of the three core international evaluators (i.e., the Team Leader and Principal Consultants) will conduct the evaluation in at least two countries with the support of the relevant UNDP country office. The country office will designate a focal point to provide such support during the respective country missions.

The team will be supported by one or two research assistants in New York Headquarters. The composition of the Evaluation Team should reflect the independence and substantive results focus of the exercise. The Team Leader and all other members of the Evaluation Team

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9 Country selection was determined by BCPR, using a number of criteria: i) representing innovative cross-sectoral programmes since 2002; ii) reflecting geographic diversity; iii) providing a good cross-section of cases where the post-crisis period is in various stages of development.

10 Job descriptions for Team Leader, international consultant, national consultants and research assistants will be based on these Terms of Reference and issued separately.
will be selected by the Evaluation Office. See Addendum 2 for the specific roles and responsibilities of the Team Leader and the Principal Consultants for undertaking the evaluation.

**METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation will follow the guidance issued by the Evaluation Office, and consist of three key phases: **preparation** (with preliminary desk review, programme mapping, Terms of Reference proposal, theme-specific desk research and developing a web-based document repository for the evaluation); **conduct of the evaluation** by designated members of the evaluation team; and **follow-up** (dissemination, corporate discussions, country office management response, stakeholder consultations, learning events).

The evaluation will employ a variety of methodologies, including desk reviews, stakeholder meetings, client surveys, and focus group interviews and select site visits. The Evaluation Team will review all relevant national policy documents, including current national plans and strategies of the selected countries and all other relevant documents that give an overall picture of each country context. The Team will also consider any thematic studies/papers, select project documents and programme support documents as well as any reports from monitoring and evaluation at the country level, as well as available documentation and studies from other development partners. Statistical data will be assessed where relevant. The evaluative evidence will be gathered through three major sources of information: perception, validation and documentation—according to the concept of 'triangulation'. Evaluators are expected to draw on reviewed documents, field visits and consultations with programme implementers, all relevant partners and programme recipients to obtain data and information for their analysis during the selected country missions.

**Preparatory phase and desk review**

The Evaluation Office will engage a research assistant who will be responsible for working with focal points in country offices to collect relevant programme documents: project documents, relevant evaluation reports, reports to donors, old SRF/ROAR (Strategic Results Frameworks/Results-oriented Annual Reports), Common Country Evaluations, UNDAF’s (UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and the new corporate MYFF (Multi-year Funding Framework). Concurrently, the Evaluation Office will hire an Evaluation Team.

The Evaluation Team will initially meet to a) develop specific methodologies to carry out the evaluation; b) develop a work plan to operationalize this methodology. The work plan will build on this Terms of Reference and should describe how the evaluation will be carried out, refine and specify expectations, methodology, roles and responsibilities, documentation and time-frame.

Evaluators will conduct a comprehensive desk review of programme documents provided by the Evaluation Office in consultation with UNDP country offices, bilateral and multilateral donors and other national and international partners. Evaluators will also draw on relevant discussions in UNDP knowledge networks and, where appropriate, use these networks to gather further data not provided by document review. They will design a comprehensive questionnaire that will assist in gathering data needed to answer

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11 The more detailed modalities of the evaluation will be agreed among the Evaluation Office, UNDP country offices, and the Evaluation Team members. It will include a briefing of the international consultants by the Evaluation Office and the country offices; setting up country mission parameters and responsibilities for data- and information-gathering; post-evaluation briefing in Headquarters and final report-writing.

12 A web-based document repository for the evaluation will be developed by the Evaluation Office and will be accessible by the Evaluation Team and the relevant UNDP country offices.

13 See Assessment of Development Results (ADR) methodology paper, Evaluation Office, UNDP.
the evaluation questions. This questionnaire will guide their interviews in New York, UNDP country offices and the Geneva Office of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). The questionnaire will be reviewed by the Evaluation Office, BCPR and other select Headquarters units.

Evaluators will meet with Headquarters-based units (including BCPR, the Bureau for Development Policy and the regional bureaus) in New York and in Geneva and conduct interviews using the questionnaire. They will also contact, where appropriate, identified experts in the relevant UNDP regional centres and conduct phone interviews.

The preparatory work will be carried out in advance based on guidelines provided by the Team Leader and the designated Evaluation Office Task Manager. This will include an analysis of key issues to be explored and documented by the Evaluation Office. This work will entail the review of available reports and surveys, collecting additional documentation, conducting select interviews, analysis and brainstorming, and will be based on specific Terms of Reference in addendum to these generic Terms of Reference.

As part of the methodology, the evaluation will use a set of key indicators (or ‘markers’) that are (i) country-specific and (ii) more generic. Both types of indicators are to be used to analyse pre- and post-crisis phases in each of the selected country cases to not only assess major ‘turning points’ in the environment and strategic choices made by UNDP in its transition assistance, but also to allow comparison of UNDP approaches to transition assistance from a wider, human development perspective. The country-specific indicators will be developed by the Team Leader with the help of the desk review.

**Country visits and country case studies preparation**

Prior to the country visits, team orientation will take place in New York with the Team Leader and Evaluation Office, including a brief orientation on outcome and other evaluation methodologies, in addition to a review of documentation and desk review mentioned above. The Evaluation Team will be divided into two groups. Each international consultant will visit at least two countries. In each country, s/he will be supported by a focal point from the UNDP country office and an independent ‘national adviser’ to be identified by the Team Leader. The UNDP country office focal point will be expected to organize all relevant meetings with the country office team, government representatives and all other relevant partners, including civil society institutions, NGOs, and selected beneficiaries of projects/programmes. The evaluation questionnaire will also serve as a guide for collecting data during the interviews. Visits will involve meetings, interviews, surveys and focus group discussions with stakeholders.

In each country the international consultant and the selected national adviser will receive backstopping from i) the other members of the core Evaluation Team on all evaluation issues; and ii) a focal point designated by the UNDP country office on all local administrative issues. Country visits will each be 7-10 days in duration. During the country visits, the national adviser will provide relevant support to the international consultant, including access to civil society and political representatives in the country.

**ADVISORY GROUP**

As part of the consultative process in undertaking such an evaluation, an external Advisory Group comprising 2-3 individuals (composed of well-known development experts) will be established to advise the evaluation team. This group will provide guidance on the selection of countries for evaluation, the methodology and indicators to be used, and the analysis and reporting of the findings. The Advisory Group will meet with the evaluation team to discuss the evaluation progress and provide feedback. The Group will also be involved in the final reporting of the evaluation findings.
thinkers, academics and practitioners) from different countries, including representatives of international development agencies, will be set up by the Evaluation Office. Each member of this group will a) oversee and identify the substantive evaluation issues highlighted in this Terms of Reference as an independent expert; b) ensure quality control of the evaluation; and c) review and provide comments on the draft evaluation report before submission to the Evaluation Office. The Evaluation Office will form part of the extended Advisory Group, which will remain in existence until the completion, dissemination and final review of the evaluation. The inputs and comments from the Advisory Group are expected to enrich the process and enhance understanding of the issues among a wide audience.

FINALIZATION OF STUDY, EXPECTED OUTPUTS AND TIME-FRAME

The Team Leader for the Evaluation will ensure:

- Presentation and review of the preliminary main draft report and findings—i.e., review by the Evaluation Office and Advisory Group, by other UNDP country offices and Headquarters units and stakeholders
- Finalization of report and debriefing of relevant stakeholders in New York through a lessons learning workshop to be organized in consultation with BCPR after the submission and approval of all products expected from the Evaluation.

The Evaluation products will consist of the following:

- A main evaluation report between 50 and 70 pages (excluding annexes), using 12-point type with an executive summary (5-6 pages) that will include the results of the six country visits, key findings and forward-looking recommendations for UNDP’s future transition assistance in conflict-affected countries, taking into account the objectives and scope of these Terms of Reference
- A summarized analysis and evaluation of the results of the questionnaire to all relevant countries/stakeholders, as an annex to the main report
- Six separate country reports—between 20 and 30 pages each, using 12-point type (including annexes)—that describe UNDP’s transition assistance in these conflict-affected countries in terms of programme strategy, contribution to results, lessons learned and future directions.

The main evaluation report and the six country reports are to be formally submitted to the Evaluation Office by 28 February 2006 by the Team Leader. These will be approved by the Evaluation Office and the findings will be presented to UNDP’s Executive Board at the UN in 2006 and circulated to participating country offices, partner organizations and other key stakeholders.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The Evaluation Office will manage this independent evaluation and ensure coordination and liaison with all concerned units at Headquarters. The designated Task Manager of the Evaluation Office will support the evaluation process, in close consultation with BCPR and the relevant country offices. The Evaluation Office will also ensure substantive supervision of all research, and determine the Evaluation Team composition.

The six UNDP country offices will take a lead role in dialogue and interaction with stakeholders on the findings and recommendations, support the Evaluation Team during the country mission in liaising with key partners and in discussions with the team, and make available to the team all relevant evaluative material. They
will also provide support on logistical issues and planning for the country visits by the Evaluation Team. In addition, each country office will appoint a focal point for this evaluation who will assist in preparing relevant documents, hiring national consultants, and setting up meetings with all relevant stakeholders.

The international Evaluation Team will be responsible for the development, research, drafting and finalization of the evaluation. However, they will consult with the designated Evaluation Office Task Manager and other relevant staff from BCPR, Bureau for Development Policy, the regional bureaus, Operational Support Group and the Human Development Report Office to obtain more information on lessons learned and their technical agreement.

The Evaluation Office will meet all costs related to conducting the Evaluation.

**FOLLOW-UP AND LEARNING**

This corporate evaluation is expected to help UNDP identify key lessons on strategic positioning and results that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNDP support to country offices in post-crisis situations. It will present good practices from the country case studies in terms of ‘what works’ and also draw lessons from unintended results. The relevant country offices will be able to use the evaluation to strengthen their strategic position and vision vis-à-vis partners; UNDP Headquarters is expected to use the evaluation as a tool for advocacy, learning and ‘buy-in’ among stakeholders.

The evaluation report and recommendations will be shared within the organization through a variety of means. First, they will be posted on the BCPR and Evaluation Office websites and country offices will be encouraged to discuss findings. Second, the recommendations will feed into ongoing UNDP and partner organizations’ policy discussions and strategic planning exercises for post-conflict scenarios. Third, the findings will be presented and discussed at national-level workshops.

**ADDENDUM 1: KEY ISSUES AND QUESTIONS**

1. **Country context, intervention phases and instruments**

The evaluation will analyse the specific context of each country as indeed the trigger, the nature and the period of transition will be different in each case and should be documented in objective and rigorous terms in order to understand the rationale of UNDP and relevant partners in adopting the kind of programming interventions they chose to pursue in each case. Results achieved in each country context should be used to assess the validity, scope and depth of approaches used by UNDP and identify good practices, weaknesses and possible constraints.

What was UNDP’s overall strategy in each country? What specific tools and methodologies were used to analyse the country situation prior to conflict and further down the line to design its strategy for deploying or mobilizing what is generally understood as ‘transition assistance’? The comparison is intended to capture the dynamic of change and transformation. What were the results in terms of delivery efficiency, which in a post-crisis situation is of essence? What needs to be done to improve delivery efficiency?

2. **Longer-term development perspective**

Notwithstanding close linkages between the human development and human security agendas, in practice there is still in the human security outlook the notion of urgency, i.e., implicitly, or in terms of priority. While development is a condition of human security, crises will be linked to the latter, calling for immediate action, staking primary claims to resources, and demanding political priority. There is a risk that overlapping agendas between different government departments will mean less
visibility for long-term development and for government’s action toward these problems as a whole, since short-term problems—like humanitarian emergencies—take precedence over longer-term ones.

Therefore, what are the key challenges for UNDP to incorporate longer-term developmental principles and approaches into the immediate, routine operations to address different types of human security concerns? For instance, to what extent do trade, human rights and governance aspects reflect part of a common policy strategy in the country or region? What are key criteria or principles used by UNDP to assist institutions capable of providing human security for the well-being of communities and individuals within the state?

3. Physical security
The process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or failure of this endeavour directly affects the long-term peace-building prospects for any post-crisis situation. Since there is a close relationship between peace-building and the DDRR process, it needs to be analysed in relation to other approaches—for instance, promoting dialogue between citizens and security officials, assisting in the protection and relocation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, ensuring protection from mine fields, and launching HIV/AIDS-awareness training for ex-combatants, IDPs and post-conflict communities.

It may be possible to focus on three specific DDRR issues: disarmament as a social contract; demobilization without cantonment; and the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance. When such initiatives adopt a ‘guns–camps–cash’ approach, they seem to provide only a limited perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to the DDRR process. Therefore, the evaluation should review and clarify whether there is a need for a more comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its social, economic and political implications for other human security concerns.

In war, HIV/AIDS tends to spread rapidly as a result of sexual bartering, sexual violence, low awareness about HIV, and the breakdown of vital services in health and education. In conflict situations, young people are most at risk. Many young women and girls in refugee and post-crisis settings are forced to use their bodies to get food and clothing for themselves and their families.

What kind of initiatives were taken as part of early planning (i.e., what was done in terms of pre-negotiations to prepare during and after conflict)? Do these initiatives reflect a longer-term development approach? Did UNDP exploit key entry points with other UN agencies (UN Country Team) to enhance aid coordination and overall operational response to providing physical security to returning IDPs and refugees? How have local authorities integrated human rights policies and mechanisms into the national reconstruction efforts? What have been the effects of these on vulnerable groups (women, children and ethnic minorities, in particular)?

4. Coordination & partnership
The fact that human security, because of the range of issues it addresses, brings together a broad array of players, a central issue in the implementation of a human security agenda is institutional coordination. Given the range of issues covered and their mutual embeddedness, effective tackling of any significant human security situation calls for coordination and partnership among major government and donor agencies and other stakeholders. In finding entry points and strategies, the strengths and weaknesses of all potential partners (international, regional, local) need to be analysed. Within this context, UNDP’s support to the UN’s Resident Coordinator
function plays a key role in assisting national authorities to set up an accountable and rational coordination system for international aid. The measures that UNDP takes to assist in coordinating donors and aid providers have important implications for the design and implementation of post-crisis responses. In this context, the issue of distribution of roles within UNDP and among UN agencies and its implications for UNDP’s policy in post-crisis assistance are critical.

Therefore, are interventions well coordinated within different parts of UNDP? Within the UN family (e.g., the UN Development Group Office, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and the UN Children’s Fund, among others)? With external actors like the national government, neighbouring governments, the NGO community, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions? What are the decisive elements of a partnership strategy at the national or local level in so far as they relate to coordination? To what extent has UNDP drawn upon the most relevant partners, making use of their comparative advantages? What lessons can be learned about coordination (or the lack thereof) in the approach or strategy employed by different UNDP Headquarters units in terms of providing support to country offices? What specific actions are needed by UNDP to institutionalize and strengthen post-crisis transition assistance at i) the policy level; and ii) the operational level?

5. **Rebuilding governance structure**

In post-crisis situations, short-term, tangible reconstruction measures need to be balanced by concern for long-term civil society and social programmes that incorporate mechanisms of local participation and a culture of multifaceted accountability, which can help rebuild governance structures. The role that UNDP plays in providing governance assistance is designed to strengthen democratic processes, ensure democratic accountability of state institutions, and support the emergence of robust economic management and social service delivery. Weak or dysfunctional governance structures are characteristic of post-crisis countries. It is the failure of governance and breakdown of legitimacy that frequently contribute to the outbreak of violence and that, if not remedied, can thwart recovery. For this reason, key features of UNDP’s transition assistance include programmes that help government set up truth and reconciliation commissions, assist government in formulating national recovery plans and policies and reform public sector administration (this includes the justice and security sector institutions), and, where appropriate, creating the conditions and mechanisms for free and fair elections. At a very early phase in the recovery, UNDP’s role in fostering national reconciliation dialogues can serve as a first step towards fostering good governance practices. However, rebuilding governance structure cannot necessarily rely on state initiatives alone since, more often than not, the governance structures of the states are responsible for the conflict and may be resistant to changes. It may well be partnerships with civil society that provide the most leverage in fostering peace and changing governance structures.

To what extent have pre-existing governance programmes shifted to respond to new needs during post-crisis assistance? What were the key challenges and how was this process handled by UNDP and partner agencies? How did UNDP and local partners continue to undertake activities on the ground that were in themselves contributing to the promotion of peacebuilding or community reconciliation during the post-crisis period? What have been the effects of UNDP interventions on social/community/civil society mobilization and national dialogue? Was UNDP support adequate to ensure appropriate governance of national institutions in accordance with the principles of human development, democracy and civilian oversight?
6. Economic security
In order to promote sustainable livelihoods, and address recovery and reconstruction needs, post-crisis assistance is designed to jump-start local economies (quick impact projects) and to provide a means of livelihood for different communities of ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons. Programmes that seek to revive the private sector, agriculture and mining and provide local infrastructure and credit facilities may also be initiated during the early stages of post-crisis assistance. Also falling under this category are UNDP programmes that support the provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, energy, health care, education and communications.

What are the critical challenges in promoting dialogue for economic security among returnees, local beneficiaries and different factions? Have the various interventions strengthened social capital among different communities? Have sufficient measures been taken to revive trade and investment, including the formulation of trade policies, procedures and relevant institutions? How do interventions reflect women's economic security and empowerment as part of a strategic focus? How have UNDP interventions contributed to define longer-term needs of different communities and groups, including the development of skills for livelihoods, social relations, leadership structures, etc.? Were these interventions part of a comprehensive approach (i.e., managing conflict between local people and returnees, and, in addition to other aspects of economic security, providing basics such as health care, access to clean water and other types of protection and services)?

7. Civil society and participatory processes
Central to the concept of human security is the specific focus on issues related to personalization, globalization, democratization, and demilitarization, where a special role needs to be given to civil society and its organizations in the development and implementation of human security policies. This is necessary in view of the fact that the central role of the state is displaced by a wide array of actors in the management or elimination of human security threats. Experience indicates that civil actors and organizations gain access to the very definition of human security issues, where their security becomes the core preoccupation of policies and they are key players in the design and implementation of those policies. Furthermore, civil society and local support programmes, including citizens groups and human rights organizations, should be in the mainstream of international responses to rehabilitation. Glaring imbalances between short-term, project-centred funding for physical rebuilding, and funding for social and civil development where long-term qualitative change is made, could thus be avoided. The emphasis on elections as a test of democracy is often a cosmetic exercise, at least during the early phases of post-crisis assistance. It overshadows the need to support, where appropriate, civil society projects and local support networks that promote political responsibility and accountability. Furthermore, problems of transition arising from criminalized war economies and donor policies of neo-liberal conditionality might be better addressed by promoting transformation strategies that enhance capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities. In particular, higher levels of public participation might be incorporated into strategic plans to make external and local implementers more accountable to recipients.

Therefore, to what extent have UNDP and local partners taken advantage of participatory approaches to gain better understanding of ‘local knowledge’ and resources (i.e., carefully considered and corroborated information from refugees and other local people) in planning and in making strategic decisions? Do UNDP interventions reflect sufficient consultations with civil society representatives and non-governmental organizations? If so, how have they added value to UNDP’s role in post-crisis transition assistance?
8. Gender

The evaluation needs to focus on how gender concerns have been integrated into policies and programmes at local and national levels. Available evidence indicates a slow but positive shift in international opinion and understanding about the consequences of conflict on women and the importance of their participation in peace-building processes and post-crisis social transformation. However, gender discrimination continues to manifest itself in such forms as political exclusion, economic marginalization, and sexual violence during and after conflict, which deny women their human rights and constrain the potential for development. In post-crisis situations, rape, domestic violence and sexual exploitation often go unchecked. Peace-building, despite being arguably more gender-sensitive, has so far given inadequate attention to the construction of gender norms and the processes by which they can be transformed to ensure more equitable gender relations in post-crisis situations.

What are the effects of UNDP efforts to introduce gender-sensitive approaches to peace-building? To what extent do they address underlying norms that define gender relations and power dynamics in the design and implementation of interventions in the immediate post-crisis assistance? Does the level of competence on gender issues and training among UNDP staff enable the organization (UNDP country offices) to provide effective programme support?

ADDENDUM 2: GENERIC ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR DEVELOPING THE EVALUATION CRITERIA

- The nature and scale of UNDP’s geographic coverage—i.e., the types of interventions and the number of personnel and sub-offices on the ground prior to the crisis and afterwards.
- The timeliness and level of operational response at the onset of the crisis.
- The relevance of interventions and responsiveness to the core needs of the communities affected by crisis, taking into account demographic and ethnic factors.
- The extent to which relevance, design and scale of transition assistance provides scope for longer-term development assistance around human security issues from a human development perspective.
- The level of engagement with civil society actors in interventions before and after the crisis, taking into account the role generally played by civil society actors at the national level.
- The level of human and financial resources mobilized in relation to intended objectives and results achieved.
- The percentage of the returnee population served by interventions.
- The quality of ratings and perceptions provided by external partners and local communities of UNDP’s coordination efforts and other interventions.
- The extent and quality of gender perspectives applied in interventions.
- The percentage of most vulnerable and/or marginalized groups served by interventions and quality of support provided after crisis.
- The presence of clear, well-designed exit strategies.
- The types of post-crisis issues not being addressed or poorly addressed by interventions.
- The extent and quality of the documentation/recording of decision-making and monitoring and evaluation during different phases of interventions—i.e., pre- and post-crisis—and how such information is used.
- The use of relevant and credible local knowledge and expertise in planning.
- The types of strategic choices and strategic connections between interventions made based on lessons learned to define UNDP’s role and build its capacity for future work in post-crisis environment (e.g., a comprehensive country policy on peace-building).
Annex 3

Questionnaire

1. Country:

2. Region:

3. If there has been a peace agreement or political settlement, what role did UNDP play in organizing, facilitating, or implementing it?

4. Did UNDP’s programme, either formally or informally, follow a phased approach? If yes, how would you best characterize the phases?

5. What, in your view, are the cornerstone projects undertaken by UNDP to address the conflict, including prevention, peace-building and reconstruction? Please provide a brief summary of their achievements.

6. In what ways are you working with civil society, both in the capital and beyond?

7. Do you undertake service-provision activities, i.e. activities where UNDP’s role is limited to administrative and financial management support? Can you give an estimate of the proportion of these activities in UNDP’s total programme in your country?

8. Does the security situation and the constraints introduced by UN security regulations hamper your ability to carry out your mission?

9. What are the challenges of coordination with other agencies and NGOs?

10. Who are the five principal partners of UNDP in your country?

11. What support did you get from UNDP Headquarters in developing your programme in response to conflict?

12. What is the level of UNDP’s financial disbursement in the country since 2000? Please provide a breakdown of how much was delivered each year between 2000 and 2005, divided between core and non-core resources.
Annex 4

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HAITI CASE STUDY

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United Nations System
Officials at FAO, UNHCR, the UN Industrial Development Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO)

UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
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French, Lona, Recovery Unit
Kamara, Mohamed, Project Coordinator, Arms for Development
Ljunggren, Bengt, Head, Recovery Unit
Muana, Joseph, Project Coordinator, Resettlement and Reintegration Programme
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Vincent, Emma, Communications Officer, Recovery Unit

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Others
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Koroma, Anthony, Director of Youths, Ministry of Youth and Sports
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Rogers, John, Desk Officer, Office of National Security
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Sessay, Abraham, Deputy Minister of Development & Economic Planning
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**TAJIKISTAN CASE STUDY**

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**TAJIKISTAN CASE STUDY**

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Mokuo, Yukie, UNICEF Assistant Representative
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Khushvaktova, Nozigul, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Monitoring Unit, Office of the President
Najmidinov, Safarali, Ministry of Finance
Nazarmad, Madaminov, Chairman of Panjob Jamoat Resource Centre, Hamadoni District (plus six members)
Nazarov, Talbak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Safarali, Gulov, Chairman, Hamadoni District
Safarli, Zokirov, Chairman, Muminabad District
Savarbi, Gozieva, Deputy Chairman, Kulchasma Jamoat Resource Centre, Muminabad District (plus 12 members)
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Ziyoev, Mirzo, Ministry of Emergencies
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Ilolov, Mamado
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Kabutar Independent Analytical Research Centre
Mamadshoev, Marat
Manija Information Centre
National Association of Politologists of Tajikistan
Panorama Social Research Centre
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Couanon, Alan, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative
International Crisis Group
Lagus, Maria, SIDA
Pichon, Cécile, Correspondent, European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
Rajabov, Shuhrat, DFID Representative
Saito, Yukiya, Project Manager, European Delegation
Zuest, Daniel, Representative, Swiss Cooperation

**National NGOs**
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Foundation to Support Civil Initiatives
‘Dastgirie Centre’
Gender and Development
Human Rights Information Centre
Tradition and Modernity
Youth 21st Century

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Iskandarov, Mahmudruzi, Chairman, Democratic Party of Tajikistan
Nazriyev, Mirhuseyn, Chairman, Socialist Party of Tajikistan
Nuri, Sayeed Abdullo, Chairman, Islamic Revival Party
Qaraqulov, Amir, Chairman, Agrarian Party of Tajikistan
Shabdolov, Shodi, Chairman, Communist Party of Tajikistan
Zoirov, Rahmatullo, Chairman, Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan
Annex 5

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Coordination mechanisms and instruments have proliferated in conflict-affected countries—particularly where there has been a concerted international response. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to see how these various coordination mechanisms can coordinate among themselves. There is an urgent need to streamline and simplify such mechanisms and infuse them with clearer approaches and strategies for dealing with UNDP’s operations in conflict-affected countries. Additional guidance and support is required from UN Headquarters on how the various arms of the UN system should work together in the context of an integrated office.¹

GLOBAL AND OTHER COORDINATION MECHANISMS

Coordination mechanisms exist at several levels. At the global level for countries with a Security Council mandate, there are two principal mechanisms:

- **Security Council:** The Security Council constitutes a forum for decision-making that sets the overall direction for the international community in countries with peacekeeping or peace-building missions. It focuses principally on stabilization and the humanitarian response. However, because of its enforcement function, the Security Council presents the only reliable means for UNDP to apply pressure to effect structural changes at the country level. The head of the UN mission (usually a Special Representative of the Secretary-General) and also, periodically, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, provide reports to the Security Council, which determine the structure and resources of peacekeeping missions. Progress is monitored strictly within the framework of the (short-term) parameters of the Security Council mandate. The developmental and institutional aspects of the transition are not independently reported on (for example, by the Administrator of UNDP) and are rarely explicitly covered in the formal report presented. As a result, key structural and institutional concerns remain peripheral, raising the potential for regression upon the completion of the Security Council mandate. Furthermore, as discussed elsewhere in the evaluation, despite the move towards integration, the development arm of peacekeeping operations is never funded from the assessed budget defined by a Security Council resolution.

- **International pledging conferences:** Needs assessments covering humanitarian and development needs are presented by the UN system and, now, increasingly, by the World Bank at international pledging conferences in support of a peace process. Since the development component of a post-conflict response is not covered by the assessed budget authorized by the Security Council, these pledging conferences are the principal source of funding for development activities in support of a peace process. UNDP and the UN Country Team

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¹ An initiative on the part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to jointly prepare a ‘United Nations Manual for Multidimensional Peacekeeping’ that would have helped establish a frame of reference and standard procedures for the UN system and the World Bank was completed in 2002, but the manual was never promulgated due to objections from some entities within the system.
generally play a critical support role in the preparation of joint needs assessments for such pledging conferences (see below), but take a back seat in the conferences themselves. Pledging conferences are heavily dominated by current donor interests and needs. And they are increasingly led by the Bretton Woods institutions, which represent the development side of the equation because of their role in the management of debt as well as grants, and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, representing the political side. Both objectively identified needs as well as ongoing plans of donors are presented without real distinction. Such conferences are as much intended as a show of resolve and political support on the part of the international community as commitment to the structural aspects of post-conflict transition. As a result, experience has been that the actual appropriation of funds and most certainly their commitment and disbursement under specific programmes is subject to extensive delays.

Within the UN itself and beyond, the following coordination mechanisms are used at different levels in the case of conflict-affected countries:

- **Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS):** Chaired by the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs in New York, this Committee brings together the lead departments, funds and programmes of the UN system on peace and security, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The UNDP Administrator represents the UN Development Group and UNDP at such meetings. The ECPS meets according to need to discuss broad policy issues pertaining to countries in conflict or countries of particular political concern. It constitutes a forum for UNDP to draw attention to some of the key structural concerns pertaining to peace-building and recovery.2

- **Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC):** The IASC is a forum established in response to General Assembly resolution 46/182 on strengthening humanitarian assistance. It is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and is composed of key humanitarian agencies of the UN system, international organizations (such as the International Committee for the Red Cross) and select NGOs.3 Though UNDP is a member of the IASC, the heaviest emphasis is placed on the coordination of humanitarian assistance and the monitoring of humanitarian needs assessments and appeals for funding. To the extent that it does the latter in the context of pledging conferences for countries in conflict, it is relevant to post-conflict peace-building. Meetings are held in New York and Geneva based on need. The IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. Together

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2 The Executive Committee for Development Operations, or UN Development Group, chaired by the Administrator of the UNDP, is the principal Headquarters-based mechanism for the coordination of development operations of the UN system, and is attended at the level of heads of departments, funds, programmes and specialized agencies. Conflict-affected countries are, however, rarely a principal focus of the committee's sessions.

3 The IASC membership includes the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (chair), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNDP, World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Standing invitees include: the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The World Bank, the International Committee of the Red Cross, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs, and the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.
with the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), the IASC forms the key strategic coordination mechanism among major humanitarian actors.

**Inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (the Framework Team):** The Framework Team, created in 1995 as an informal, inter-departmental mechanism to identify countries requiring special attention before intensive armed conflict sets in, has grown to include 24 entities of the UN system. The World Bank participates on a selective basis. Membership spans the peace and security, development and humanitarian assistance sectors. A recent evaluation suggested that the Framework Team could benefit from a clearer conceptual framework in which it could organize programme strategies. It also recommended that the Team work towards identifying needs earlier in the process; transcend the current phased approach; and become more formalized in order to ensure effective follow-up either directly or through the ECPS, to which it currently reports. The UNDP has played an important role in the Framework Team throughout and has chaired it repeatedly.

At the country level, a variety of coordination mechanisms also exist:

- **UN heads of agency meetings:** UN heads of agency meetings are convened and chaired by the Resident Coordinator of the UN System/Resident Representative of UNDP. Representatives of all UN funds and programmes and specialized agencies participate. In most instances, World Bank and IMF Representatives also attend. There is no formal guidance from UN Headquarters regarding coordination in the case of non-integrated peace-building or peacekeeping missions. In most such cases (as in Tajikistan and Guatemala), the UN Resident Coordinator has usually opted to co-chair the meetings with the Representative of the Secretary-General. Leadership has sometimes been contentious, but generally the lead function has gradually shifted from the Representative of the Secretary-General to the UN Resident Coordinator as the peacekeeping or peace-building operation phases out.

- **Inter-agency coordination meetings:** In many countries (such as Afghanistan and Sierra Leone), the Resident Coordinator or Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General responsible for humanitarian and development operations chairs broader meetings of most of the key development and humanitarian agencies in the country concerned. Such meetings include international organizations, bilateral agencies, international NGOs and the international financial institutions. Thematic working groups are often established based on need, and these are chaired by lead agencies that have a particularly strong presence in the thematic area or sector concerned. National representatives tend to be invited to these meetings only sporadically.

- **Ambassadors’ meetings:** In many countries, the UN Resident Coordinator convenes meetings of heads of missions to discuss political developments and policy issues. These meetings are informal and are not binding in any way.

- **National coordination mechanisms:** In most countries, UNDP provides support to national coordination mechanisms through advisers, funding and systems support. The lead ministry for this purpose is usually the Ministry

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of Economy and Planning or the Ministry of Finance. In the case of the immediate post-conflict environment, however, this poses special problems since development assistance is viewed as a means of influencing political outcomes. Such mechanisms are therefore given less importance or are chaired by the UN with participation of all of the parties to the peace agreement, rather than the government alone. In the case of Tajikistan, several years into the post-conflict period, the UN Resident Coordinator has encouraged the creation of a series of (controversial) thematic national coordination mechanisms centred around the Millennium Development Goals as an alternative. These are nationally run forums for the coordination of both domestic resources and ODA.

IN-COUNTRY INSTRUMENTS FOR COORDINATION

In the immediate post-conflict period, most of the instruments that apply in the case of countries in normal development circumstances and require extensive government involvement are suspended. This is because, in most instances, there are multiple parties involved in a peace process and, pending free and fair elections, there is no internationally recognized government in place. Over the past decade, however, several instruments specifically adapted to conflict-affected countries have been developed to serve as a frame of reference for substantive programming, monitoring, evaluation and resource allocation.

Joint needs assessments: Joint needs assessments are intended to lay down the substantive framework for programmes in support of a peace agreement. They are linked to international pledging conferences and the global trust funds. Such needs assessments, which are increasingly led by the World Bank and feed into World Bank-led pledging conferences for the mobilization or resources, have been conducted for Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Muslim Mindanao (the Philippines), Somalia, Sudan (joint assessment mission) and Timor-Leste. In most such instances, UNDP engages with the World Bank through its regional bureau, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the UN Development Group Office, which represents the operational agencies of the UN as a whole. Joint needs assessments are divided into sectoral missions and, at the insistence of the World Bank, the UNDP has usually been restricted to leading the mission on local governance. Governance at the centre is either managed outside the framework of the joint needs assessment, as in the case of Iraq (by the United States Government) or by the World Bank itself. Joint needs assessments enable the entire UN system to be involved in their areas of expertise and have, increasingly (as in the case of Sudan), attempted to estimate the availability and allocation of both domestic resources as well as ODA. They have also attempted to factor debt into the equation. The quality and methodology followed in the joint needs assessments have varied considerably. Most have been heavily dominated by international consultants and agency staff, while some (such as Sudan) have included the full involvement of senior advisers from the various sides of the peace agreement throughout. The latter approach is clearly the most appropriate if national ownership is to be fostered in the long run.

Joint needs assessments have generally been linked to pledging and the establishment of country-specific global trust funds administered by the World Bank in Washington, DC. Funds

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5 Drawing on the experience gained in conflict-affected countries, a joint needs assessment was also undertaken for tsunami-affected countries.
 earmarked for thematic or sectoral activities are contributed to the fund and projects submitted by agencies (UN and others) are approved by the World Bank following a prioritization of proposals at the country level. This includes projects now implemented through grant funding by the World Bank itself. This has resulted (fairly or unfairly) in accusations of manipulation of the fund to favour World Bank initiatives (as in Sudan) and in extensive delays (as in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste), resulting in donors establishing trust funds in parallel through UNDP. In general, UNDP has been found to be quicker and more nimble in the management of funds, while providing acceptable levels of accountability. The establishment of this mechanism has also clearly facilitated access to grant funding on the part of the World Bank and extended the scope for its involvement in post-conflict situations, even where conditions do not permit lending.

- **The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF):** This joint programming tool for UN agencies has, in some instances, been adapted to fit the specific needs of post-conflict countries and to lay a framework for the UN Country Team’s involvement in peace-building.

- **Direct budget support:** Direct budget support has become an increasingly important instrument for the co-ordination of assistance to certain sectors in post-conflict situations. For example, the civil police force in Afghanistan was established and managed by UNDP with bilateral donor funding through sector-wide approaches (SWAps). UNDP’s capacity in-country and the relative rapidity with which it is able to mobilize to manage such funds in the absence of reliable national capacity has meant that it is becoming a preferred administrator of SWAps. SWAps can help to enforce a policy framework for the management of a sector. Yet in Afghanistan it was noted that there was no explicit policy framework or strategy established for the management of budgetary support. As has been discussed in the case study reports, the UNDP should use its role in the management of direct budget support to help establish policies for the implementation of capacity development programmes and the strengthening of the institutions concerned.