



ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION **SOMALIA**

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ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: SOMALIA

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABER	Area-Based Early Recovery project
ADR	Assessment of Development Results
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CACAS	Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CBO	Community-based organization
CISS	Coordination of International Support to Somalia
CPD	Country programme document
CSO	Civil society organization
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DEX	Direct execution
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
EC	European Commission
EGER	Employment Generation for Early Recovery project
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
ETA	Emergency Technical Assistance Project
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FPRM	Fiscal Policy and Reforms Management Unit
FSANU	Food Security and Nutritional Survey
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
HDEU	Human Development and Economics Unit
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICG	International Contact Group on Somalia
IFCC	Independent Federal Constitutional Commission
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
JPLG	Joint Programme for Local Governance
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NEX	National execution
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee

PAC	Policy Advisory Committees
PRSL	Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods
QUESTS	Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support Project
RBAS	Regional Bureau for Arab States
RC	Resident Coordinator
RDP	Recovery and Development Programme
RSL	Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods programme
ROAR	Results-oriented Annual Report
ROLS	Rule of Law and Security programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIDP	Somali Institutional Development Project
SPF	Somali Police Force
SPU	Special Protection Unit
SSS	Somali Support Secretariat
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNTP	United Nations Transition Plan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

FOREWORD

This is an independent country-level evaluation called the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Somalia, conducted by the Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This evaluation examined the relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP support and its contributions to the country's development results from 2005 to 2010. It assessed the UNDP Somalia interventions under the three main programme areas and cross-cutting themes, with the aim of providing forward-looking recommendations that are useful for the formulation of the new UNDP country programme.

The UNDP Somalia programme is unique in many respects and UNDP is implementing programmes under extremely challenging circumstances. Almost two decades after the collapse of the State, Somalia continues to experience violence, political instability, governance and human security challenges. Enhanced security measures, as a consequence of grave incidents that affected UNDP staff members in 2008, present challenges to UNDP operations on the ground. Some of the unique characteristics of the UNDP programme in Somalia, such as the full direct implementation and remote management of its projects from the head office in Nairobi, reflect the very special operating environment. In analysing the UNDP contribution in Somalia, it was important for the ADR team to take into account these special contexts.

The complex political process, continued armed conflict in many parts of the country, and general instability influenced decisions made by UNDP and its donors. The evaluation concluded that UNDP assumed responsibility for certain tasks and services, which have, as a result, reduced the credibility of the organization as a neutral and impartial development partner. A notable portion of UNDP expenditure has concerned activities that eliminated opportunities for UNDP

to take strong leadership in its core corporate areas of work. In the recent past, however, UNDP Somalia has strived to address this image-related challenge by diversifying its portfolio in favour of UNDP traditional areas, such as pro-poor and Millennium Development Goal support activities.

The evaluation found that the UNDP contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented. The regional diversity of Somalia was not sufficiently reflected in UNDP programmes and, oftentimes, UNDP corporate instruments were not suitable for programming in Somalia. Also, policy and operational guidance provided by UNDP headquarters was often insufficient or untimely. Despite the challenges and shortcomings in programme management, UNDP Somalia continued to seize opportunities as they emerged through the peace process and enjoy a privileged relationship with the authorities and donors. UNDP has initiated a process of change that should transform the institutional culture by emphasizing more cohesion and synergy between programmes, a results-based management as well as the mainstreaming of a rights-based approach and gender in programming. The evaluation strongly endorsed these approaches.

The evaluation identified a number of important lessons and recommendations for UNDP programmes operating in a complex and challenging environment. In a context of remote management of programmes, UNDP needs to ensure sufficient capacity to analyse and manage risks associated with reduced access to beneficiaries and to information, hence, addressing challenges of accountability and efficiency, as well as potential consequences of decisions and actions taken. UNDP should also focus its activities on the organization's core activities promoting human development. Such transformation is possible

only through a transparent dialogue with donors. Despite the challenging circumstances, UNDP should stop working in an emergency mode by focusing on quality and long-term sustainability of efforts and results achieved. Moreover, UNDP corporate programming instruments, guidance and support need to be more responsive to the realities faced by UNDP Somalia. For example, there should be clearer corporate guidance on ‘remote management’ approaches or the stated role of UNDP as a ‘provider of last resort’, a notion that has considerably influenced the country programme in Somalia. The Evaluation Office sincerely hopes that this evaluation will generate meaningful discussions which can lead to concrete actions both at the headquarters and country levels and help improve UNDP efforts in conflict-affected, complex environments, like the one in Somalia.

A number of people made this evaluation possible despite a very tight timeline and logistical challenges. First and foremost, I would like to thank the evaluation team comprised of team leader Carroll Faubert, team members Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Daudi Ekuam and the Evaluation Office task manager Azusa Kubota. I would like to acknowledge the contributions made by the external reviewer of the draft report, John Rogge, former senior UNDP and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs staff member, Alan Fox, the Evaluation Office internal reviewer, as well as the research assistant Chelsey Wickmark. My sincere gratitude is extended to stakeholders and partners of UNDP Somalia, including authorities, civil

society, international development community, the UN family, and members of the communities. Special thanks go to partners who participated in the ADR at the stakeholder workshops held in March 2010 in Nairobi and have shared written comments on the draft evaluation report.

The evaluation would not have been possible without the commitment and leadership demonstrated by UNDP Somalia senior management: Resident Representative Mark Bowden, Country Director Alvaro Rodriguez, Deputy Country Director (programme) Marie Dimond, Deputy Country Director (operations) Sergio Valdini. All programme and project staff in Nairobi, Hargeisa and Garowe provided the ADR team with invaluable support. In particular, members of the programme management support unit, Laurel Patterson, Ugo Okoh, Clement Gorrisen and Dennis Kenyanjui provided useful support throughout the ADR process. I would also like to thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, in particular Sunil Saigal and Mohammad Younus, and colleagues in the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery for supporting the ADR process. Finally, let me thank our colleagues in the Evaluation Office: Caroline Monyi, Thuy Hang To, Flora Jimenez, Anish Pradhan and Marina Blinova for their support.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Between December 2009 and July 2010, the Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) carried out a country-level programme evaluation called an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Somalia. This report presents the findings of the ADR based on an analysis of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP interventions implemented between 2005 and 2010. The ADR also addresses the strategic positioning of UNDP. The evaluation relied on documents, interviews with approximately 200 individuals, including beneficiaries, Somali authorities, donors, civil society, representatives of international organizations and independent observers.

CONTEXT

In 1991, after the collapse of the government, parts of the north-western area of the Somali Republic declared independence as the Republic of Somaliland. To this date, no country has formally recognized it as a sovereign state. In 1998, the leaders of the north-eastern region of Puntland declared it an autonomous state but without seeking secession from Somalia. Most of South and Central Somalia remained in turmoil despite international military interventions mandated by the Security Council between 1992 and 1995. Levels of human security vary significantly across these regions and the assessment of UNDP contributions must reflect this reality.

A United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was created in 1995 to promote peace and reconciliation. In 2004, a Somalia National Reconciliation Conference convened in Kenya adopted a Transitional Federal Charter and soon afterwards a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed. In 2006, the takeover of most

of the region by the Union of Islamic Courts was followed by a military intervention by Ethiopia, in support of the TFG. UNPOS facilitated a conference in Djibouti in 2008 that established a broader-based transitional government. The TFG is now installed in Mogadishu, where it controls part of the city with support from AMISOM, a military mission deployed by the African Union. The transition period is due to end by August 2011, but there are growing doubts about the possibility to achieve required benchmarks.

The Recovery and Development Programme (RDP) (2008-2012) is considered the main framework for international support to Somalia. The RDP formed the basis for the formulation of the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP) (2008-2010) for the UN country team (UNCT) for Somalia and, consequently, of the current UNDP country programme.

UNDP PROGRAMMES

UNDP support during the evaluation period was delivered through the following main programmes: Governance and Reconciliation; Rule of Law and Security (ROLS); and Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL), as well as smaller cross-cutting programmes covering HIV/AIDS, gender and economic and human development. Eighty percent of programme expenditures during the period covered by the ADR concerned Governance and ROLS programmes that have received strong donor backing. In comparison, expenditure related to RSL has represented only some 16 percent, with half that amount covered by UNDP core resources.

Governance and Reconciliation programme: Over the years, UNDP has been called, and responded in a timely manner, to engage in activities in support of **national reconciliation, peace promotion** and political processes such as the

organization of the Djibouti Conference (2008) that led to a ceasefire between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia and the formation of a broader-based government. UNDP is currently involved in the payment of salaries for TFG parliamentarians and other officials. Apart from important support for the drafting of a new federal constitution and some efforts to develop government capacities, mainly in Puntland and Somaliland, the value added of UNDP support in this area in terms of the organization's development mandate has been limited. While some of these activities are one-time inputs, others such as the payment of salaries would require a viable exit strategy. Such strategies have been difficult to implement owing to the complex political process, poor security and the general weakness of the federal Government.

Through the UN joint programme (2008-2012) and its preceding projects, UNDP supported **local governance and service delivery** at the district and community levels. The joint programme adopted a much-appreciated participatory process within communities and also mainstreamed gender. UNDP also supported **capacity development of key Somali institutions**. Support to federal institutions, such as the 'start-up package' designed to facilitate the TFG installation in Mogadishu in 2009, has often been administrative more than traditional capacity development. In contrast, governance programmes in Somaliland and Puntland cover more traditional areas of intervention through technical inputs, capacity development and some infrastructural work and provision of equipment, and have produced tangible results and progress in, for example, civil service reform.

ROLS is the second largest programme and has attracted considerable donor support. In 2008 and 2009, UNDP shifted the programme's emphasis from the strong institutional-support approach since 2002 to community level interventions and a more assertive rights-based approach.

UNDP has supported **civilian police** through training, capacity development, provision of basic

operational equipment and infrastructure in all three regions. It is now a central element of the programme, in terms of resources allocated and, unfortunately, controversy. UNDP support to civilian police in South and Central Somalia, particularly the payment of stipends since 2007, has affected the perception of UNDP as a neutral partner and the organization's relations with humanitarian actors. In Somaliland and Puntland, UNDP continues to build the capacity of the civilian police services while supporting Special Protection Units for international operations. UNDP support has significantly contributed to improved security in the two regions. For all three regions, UNDP ensured the inclusion of human rights in the training curriculum for police officers and promoted gender considerations, including through innovative interventions such as the establishment of special desks for women and children in police stations, in cooperation with UNICEF.

Through the projects under the **Access to Justice** component, UNDP has supported the drafting of a code of conduct for the judiciary and promoted the harmonization of formal and customary laws; the training of judges, prosecutors and assessors; the creation of legal clinics providing free-of-charge legal aid to the vulnerable and the poor. UNDP support has produced positive results in Somaliland and Puntland, particularly in improving the outreach of the judicial system to rural areas through the creation of mobile courts and mobile legal aid clinics. The cooperation established between the ROLS programme and various faculties of law in all three regions is also a very positive development. This is an area where UNDP can achieve results and has developed a strong comparative advantage.

In the area of **disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)**, UNDP supported the downsizing of security forces mainly in Puntland and Somaliland. In South and Central Somalia, the fragility of the different political advances and the repeated resumptions of conflict have negated any possibility of effectively implementing a DDR programme. UNDP has gradually moved away from DDR operations in favour of small

arms control programmes in Somaliland and a community safety approach under an armed violence reduction programme. The latter programme has started only recently but has already developed a promising participatory approach with communities.

RSL programmes have continued to grow in the past three years, indicating the priority UNDP is giving to activities directly impacting on the lives of the Somali people. Unfortunately, donors have been less forthcoming in their support to this third thematic area.

Income generation through work for the improvement of social and economic infrastructure has been one of the objectives of the **employment generation for early recovery** (EGER), **area-based early recovery** (ABER) and watershed management projects. For example, during its first year, the EGER project generated a total of 430,000 workdays; 35 percent of the beneficiaries were women and 20 percent internally displaced persons. Infrastructure that was rehabilitated included water catchment areas, rural access roads, irrigation canals and strengthened river embankments. However, most of the income generated is short term in nature, and the emphasis has been more on generating income than leaving behind a sustainable product from that work. The **integrated watershed management** project supports the implementation of a wide variety of community priorities, ranging from infrastructure rehabilitation to vocational training. Its implementation has suffered from a number of technical weaknesses and it calls for UNDP to develop its expertise in watershed management. UNDP has made two very significant interventions in promoting the **private sector**: strengthening the Somali remittance sector to ensure that key remittances companies complied with international standards and supporting the Somali meat export industry. The environment component of the UNDP programme has remained small so far.

Under **HIV/AIDS programmes** UNDP strengthened the institutional capacity of the three AIDS Commissions, developed and tested

a number of training tools for general awareness and worked with populations that are most at risk. By December 2009, UNDP had trained some 1,000 religious leaders in advocacy methods they could use in their communities. Women and youth educators, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and members of the uniformed services received training on behaviour change. In general, the programme is well targeted in its focus on the most vulnerable in society.

UNDP has supported authorities in different regions of Somalia in taking forward the **gender** agenda. A national gender policy was developed by the Government of Somaliland in 2009 and gender focal points are being set up in each ministry. In Puntland, UNDP has supported the development of a gender policy and a gender strategic plan. Gender mainstreaming in programmes has too often been seen as quotas to be achieved in terms of women beneficiaries (30 percent in most projects). While this is a positive step and gives a concrete measure in the short run, a more nuanced and holistic understanding of gender in programming needs to be reinforced.

In general, projects implemented in the more stable northern regions have been more effective. Despite a few good examples of results achieved and sustained, many UNDP interventions in the South and Central region have resulted in inputs such as infrastructure, equipment and even training being lost following the resurgence of conflict. In other cases, it is too early to assess results and sustainability as interventions, particularly for capacity development and institutional building, require a long-term comprehensive approach that has not often been present. The ADR found, however, that UNDP was still often operating in an emergency mode, not paying enough attention to technical quality and longer-term sustainability. The institutional culture of UNDP Somalia needs to be more focused on results.

The internal coherence in programmes has been weak and there has been a 'silo' approach in programme management, but efforts are being made to correct this by promoting more synergy

between projects and programmes. The inclusive and participatory internal process put in place for the drafting of the next country programme is a good illustration of such efforts.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Like most of the organizations assisting Somalia, UNDP has its head office in Nairobi. Until 2008, UNDP had a sub-office in Mogadishu (with a liaison office in Baidoa) in South and Central Somalia, and sub-offices in Hargeisa, Somaliland, and Garowe, Puntland. The grave security incidents of 2008 and the subsequent revision of security phases resulted in the closure of UNDP offices in South and Central Somalia. UNDP now operates under severe security restrictions with a security phase V in Mogadishu and a phase IV in the rest of the country. To address accessibility issues, UNDP has engaged NGOs and commercial firms to conduct monitoring of projects, and whenever possible, UNDP staff members also try to monitor progress through field visits, telephone interviews and the use of photographic evidence. This remote management formula has allowed UNDP to continue some activities despite the difficulties of the situation. For UNDP as for all organizations operating in Somalia, the cost of delivering assistance is extremely high, owing mainly to expenses linked to remote management and to security.

During the period covered by this ADR, the programme cycles have been limited to two years with the last CPD extended for a third year to 2010. This has been a reflection of the unpredictability of the situation in Somalia and the fragility of political advances. As most programmes are national in their design, programme documents do not reflect sufficiently the vast differences that have emerged since 1991 among the three regions that were part of the pre-1991 Somali Republic. In addition, this short planning horizon was accompanied by the development of single-year workplans, a situation not conducive to the longer-term approach needed for development work nor to the predictability sought by partners.

The ADR also found that UNDP corporately had been somewhat inadequate in providing support to the Somali programme. There is insufficient written institutional guidance for programmes operating in special and complex circumstances, such as failed and fragile states with security classifications as high as the ones applied in Somalia. The country office itself was perhaps not proactive enough in seeking guidance and tapping all possible institutional resources. More recently, a very useful strategic partnership agreement was concluded with the headquarters Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), bringing both resources and technical support to the programme.

STRATEGIC RELEVANCE, POSITIONING AND PARTNERSHIPS

UNDP is often seen as the 'provider of last resort' and some major donors as well as UNPOS expect the organization to support the political process or dispense administrative services on their behalf. For many observers and organizations involved mainly with humanitarian assistance, this association with the political process has damaged the image of the organization and reduced its capacity to fully deploy some of its traditional development activities.

UNDP has often responded with nimbleness to requests to undertake new and unforeseen activities in response to requests from donors or from UNPOS. It has not displayed, however, the capacity of analysis of the Somali context that would have helped guide strategic choices or reorient some activities when needed. UNDP has been relying too exclusively on its own staff and partners, without sufficiently reaching out to independent and more varied sources of information such as human rights, advocacy or women NGOs and professional associations with a broad constituency.

UNDP has maintained good partnerships with government authorities in the various regions and the organization's long presence in the country make it a trusted interlocutor. Government

partners would be eager, however, to participate more fully in the development of programmes although they understand that they cannot be the sole implementers. Relations with NGOs and civil society have concerned mainly the implementation of programmes and have therefore been of a contractual more than of a partnership nature.

CONCLUSIONS

1. UNDP has been pushed – and has allowed itself to be pushed – into assuming responsibility for certain tasks and services that have reduced the credibility of the organization as a neutral and impartial development agent. This has resulted in a loss of ‘development space’. Understandably, UNDP is committed vis-à-vis some donors to pursue the activities that have brought about this negative image. The organization cannot simply walk out of such commitments. UNDP will need to find means, however, to develop exit strategies that would enable the organization, with support from donors, to gradually concentrate more of its resources and energy on core mandate activities.
2. The term ‘dealing with a virtual Somalia’ is often used to describe a situation where most of the international community handles all interventions related to Somalia – whether they are of a political, humanitarian or developmental nature – from the comfortable distance provided by operational bases in Nairobi. Working from a distance or applying ‘remote management’ to a situation such as the one in Somalia means not only reduced access, but more importantly reduced information, a more limited capacity of analysis and an increased exposure to operational risks regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency and accountability.
3. UNDP is generally perceived as displaying a weak capacity to analyse the Somali context and apply in a comprehensive manner conflict analysis and risk management methods. Conflict analysis methods, however, have been emphasized in the formulation of the next country programme, a clear indication of progress in the right direction. On the other hand, for risk management, the focus so far has been almost exclusively on operational risks during implementation as opposed to the institutional risks involved in making strategic decisions about whether or not to enter into new areas of activity. The sources of information of the country office are considered too limited, based mainly on staff and implementing partners and often neglecting independent sources, such as human rights NGOs, academics and the websites flourishing in Somalia and among the diaspora.
4. The UNDP contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented. This regional diversity is not reflected sufficiently in programming instruments. South and Central Somalia has immense difficulties emerging from a protracted conflict situation and still faces a severe humanitarian crisis. In Somaliland and Puntland, relative stability and improving governance allow for genuine development support to take place. While it is fully understood that UNDP cannot develop separate programme documents, instruments such as workplans could adopt a pragmatic approach and reflect the reality more adequately.
5. Despite some of the problems described above, UNDP continues to enjoy a privileged position in Somalia based on its long-term presence in the country, on the trust it has established with authorities and donors, as well as on results achieved over the years in many areas of intervention. The country office has also initiated a process of change that should transform its institutional culture by emphasizing more cohesion and synergy between programmes, a results-based management, as well as the mainstreaming of a rights-based approach. The ADR team strongly endorses these recent efforts and approach, and would argue that more intensive support from UNDP headquarters

and understanding from international and national partners will be helpful in enabling the country office to manage a comprehensive change process. Some of these changes have to go beyond introducing or changing systems and procedures, and will involve changes in the institutional culture of the office.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP Somalia needs to re-anchor its country programme to areas which build on its core competence and are central to its mandate. It should work towards finding an alternative ‘provider’ or mechanism to take over activities related to providing services to political processes or for simple administrative functions which are not central to its mandate.

Recommendation 2: The next country programme for Somalia should strike an appropriate balance between interventions in support of building capacity of government institutions and initiatives to help address, in the short and medium term, the chronic development needs of the vulnerable groups of population, with a view to achieving progress towards MDGs, including on pressing issues related to environment.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Somalia needs to reassert overall leadership on development issues within the UN community and ensure that development needs of the Somali population and support for achievement of MDGs receive increasing attention from authorities as well as development agencies, NGOs and the donor community.

Recommendation 4: In line with the decision to present for approval a five-year cycle for the 2011–2015 country programme, UNDP Somalia should develop three region-specific five-year operational workplans in full consultation with relevant partners. This should be accompanied by a system of annual participatory reviews in order to increase ownership of the planning process and to address

issues of predictability and transparency in UNDP planning and budgeting processes.

Recommendation 5: UNDP Somalia needs to engage with a wider range of actors, including independent observers, researchers, academics and civil society in order to sharpen its analysis and understanding of the complex context of its operating environment.

Recommendation 6: UNDP Somalia needs to ensure greater coherence within and between programmes and establish mechanisms that promote coherence, complementarity and synergy as key elements of the institutional culture.

Recommendation 7: UNDP Somalia should increase the presence of Nairobi-based staff in the field by making full use of existing possibilities, including slots, and increase interaction with Somali counterparts by using temporary proximity hubs easily accessible for the authorities with the aim of ensuring timely decision-making and resolution of problems.

Recommendation 8: UNDP Somalia should pursue a conscious strategy to enhance the quality of programme planning and the delivery of results and financial resources by:

- Securing necessary technical inputs in design/implementation and monitoring processes
- Mainstreaming a results-oriented culture through monitoring and evaluation by ensuring that all programme staff are trained in monitoring and evaluation, seeking the necessary monitoring and evaluation technical expertise, and assuring adequate institutional arrangements and incentives
- Undertaking a review of existing programme management capacity and taking corrective actions to enhance quality and ensure good financial management
- Undertaking a systematic capacity assessment of implementing partners and monitoring contractors to ensure that they are capable of delivering to quality standards.

Recommendation 9: UNDP Somalia needs to develop a gender strategy and implementation framework. There is a need for dedicated staff resources to ensure that the necessary structures, systems and institutional culture are in place to promote gender mainstreaming.

Recommendation 10: UNDP headquarters needs to provide more active and timely support to UNDP Somalia, to develop guidance for offices

operating in conflict environments with restricted access and to facilitate sharing of knowledge and best practices between offices operating in similar environments around the world. Additional guidance would be needed *inter alia* on the application of the notion of ‘provider of last resort’ and on operations run through remote management, including quality programming and monitoring and evaluation of related interventions.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE ADR

The Evaluation Office of UNDP conducted an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) of UNDP programmes for Somalia between December 2009 and July 2010. The overall goals of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability to the Executive Board
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the country
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

In addition, the ADR is intended to provide inputs to the design of the next country programme document (2011-2015), to be submitted to the Executive Board in September 2010.

The ADR covers the period 2005 to 2010 and concerns three UNDP programme documents.¹ The evaluation concentrates mainly on activities still under implementation at the time of the evaluation as well as activities from preceding cycles that are closely linked to current ones.

The evaluation criteria² used for this ADR – effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, relevance and responsiveness, comparative advantages and

promoting UN values – are consistent with the draft ADR Methods Manual. The ADR team did not restrict the scope of the evaluation to programme and project activities but also examined non-project interventions such as coordination, advocacy, advisory support, communication and knowledge sharing, as well as partnerships with key stakeholders.

1.2 ADR PROCESS

The Evaluation Office carried out an evaluability assessment in December 2009 and concluded that an ADR was feasible despite the limited time available and the difficulties of access to the country due to the security situation. The ADR process was divided in three phases:

1. **Preparation** (December 2009–February 2010). In addition to the evaluability assessment mentioned above, this first phase included the identification of three independent consultants to constitute an ADR team, an intensive review of documentation, as well as an inception visit to New York by the two international consultants for discussions with the Evaluation Office, the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS), the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), and relevant UN departments. This was followed by a one-week scoping mission to Nairobi for discussions with the UNDP Somalia country office, based in Nairobi, and a small representative group of partners. The first phase resulted in the preparation of an

¹ Assistance to Somalia (2005-2006), Note by the Administrator (DP/2004/43), 23 August 2004; Draft country programme for Somalia (2007-2008) (DP/DCP/SOM/1), 13 July 2006; and Draft country programme document Somalia (2008-2009), September 2007 (this CPD was extended until end 2010).

² The presentation of key findings and conclusions in this ADR report is not necessarily structured around these evaluation criteria.

inception report that spelled out the design and methodology of the ADR. The terms of reference (see Annex 1) have been adjusted on the basis of this inception report.

2. **Conducting the ADR and report drafting** (March-July 2010): The main evaluation mission was conducted during the month of March and ended with the presentation of emerging conclusions and areas for possible recommendations at stakeholders' workshops held on 29 and 30 March 2010. A draft report went through an extensive process of quality assurance involving the Evaluation Office and an external reviewer before it was shared with RBAS, the UNDP Somalia country office, BCPR and Somali authorities, who provided comments regarding factual corrections and omissions and errors of interpretation.
3. **Follow-up:** This phase covers the follow-up to the final report, including the management response prepared by the country office as well as the monitoring of the follow-up actions by RBAS.

1.3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The overall methodology adopted in this evaluation was guided by the latest draft of the ADR Methods Manual and the terms of reference for the present ADR. Through the application of triangulation,³ the ADR team attempted to strengthen the validity of findings.

The team applied the following methods of data collection:

- **Document review,**⁴ conducted mainly during the interval between the scoping and the main missions. An impressive quantity of pertinent documentation has been assembled, thanks to the focal point for the ADR and the programme staff of the country office as well as the Evaluation Office research assistant
- **Semi-structured individual or group interviews**⁵ held during the main mission complemented discussions that took place in New York and during the scoping mission. The ADR team met some 60 UNDP staff members and 130 other persons from Somali authorities, donors, UN agencies, UNDP implementing partners, members of the civil society, independent observers and project beneficiaries. The interviews sought to establish trends in the assessment of the UNDP contribution by asking similar questions to a wide range of partners, independent observers and experts
- **Field visits** organized over an eight-day period in Somaliland and Puntland. The field visits allowed the team to see 12 sites⁷ where UNDP project activities are or have been carried out and also to hold discussions with local authorities, partners and beneficiaries. Prevailing security considerations and logistical complications⁶ largely determined the selection of sites visited by the team. However, the end result was a fairly representative sample of key UNDP interventions.

The most important analytical framework is based on the evaluation criteria and questions detailed in the evaluation matrix⁷ developed

³ 'Triangulation' means deliberate attempt to confirm information through: reference to multiple data sources; use of multiple methods of data collection; data collection by multiple evaluators; repeated observation over time; and analysis of findings against multiple hypothesis (draft ADR Method Manual – January 2010).

⁴ A list of major documents consulted for the ADR is provided in Annex 5.

⁵ A list of persons consulted during the evaluation exercise is provided in Annex 4.

⁶ The team's itinerary to and from Somaliland and Puntland was largely determined by the availability of United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights. Movements in the field were also constrained, at times, by logistical complications and security requirements under security phase IV.

⁷ The Evaluation Matrix appears as Annex 2.

during the scoping mission. The ADR team organized information collected around these criteria and questions. The team also identified specific examples to illustrate general findings that served as a basis for drawing conclusions and recommendations. The last week of the main mission was dedicated to this analytical work that provided the basis for report writing.

1.4 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

The major constraint faced by the ADR resulted from a security situation that prevented the team from visiting Mogadishu or any part of South and Central Somalia and thus limited the possibility of interaction with the federal authorities, project partners and beneficiaries. Fortunately, this could be compensated partly during the stakeholders' workshop, held in March 2010, attended by a number of representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and civil society.

The difficulty of establishing a causal link between the outputs of a programme and the anticipated outcomes is well known to UNDP.⁸

The scoping mission confirmed that this would also be the case for programmes implemented in

Somalia. This problem is compounded by weaknesses in the definition of outcomes that are often confused with outputs, the general absence of baseline data or statistics related to Somalia, and a weak monitoring and evaluation function in programme management. Only a limited number of evaluations were carried out by the country office during the evaluation period, and their focus was most often limited to outputs and projects. Also, the ADR team had difficulty obtaining financial data as explained later in this report.⁹

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The present report is organized in five chapters. Following this introduction a chapter 2 outlines the development challenges facing Somalia as well as the status of international aid to the country. Chapter 3 presents UNDP strategies and approaches, and provides an overview of the major characteristics of the UNDP programme. Chapter 4 examines the contribution of UNDP to development results and discusses its strategic positioning. Finally, chapter 5 draws major conclusions and offers recommendations.

⁸ This problem is mainly discussed in the 'Guidelines for an Assessment of Development Results' (UNDP Evaluation Office, January 2009) and 'Evaluation of Results-based Management at UNDP' (UNDP Evaluation Office, January 2007).

⁹ See chapter 4, section 4.5.2 for findings on monitoring and evaluation, and section 4.5.3 for financial management.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL CONTEXT AND INTERNATIONAL AID

2.1 NATIONAL CONTEXT

2.1.1 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Located on the east coast of Africa north of the equator, Somalia borders Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. It comprises Italy's former Trust Territory of Somalia and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. In 1991, after the collapse of the government of the Somali Republic, parts of the north-western area formerly under British rule declared independence and became the Republic of Somaliland.¹⁰ In 1998, the leaders of the north-eastern region of Puntland declared it an autonomous state but without seeking secession from Somalia. The remainder of the territory, now called South and Central Somalia, spreads along the Indian Ocean up to Kenya. Somalia has one of the longest coastlines in Africa extending 2,720 kilometres. The country has an estimated total area of 637,657 km² and a population of 8.7 million.¹¹

About 60 percent of Somalis lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic life, raising cattle, camels, sheep, and goats. Close to a quarter of the population comprises settled farmers living mainly in the fertile agricultural zone between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in southern Somalia. The remainder is urban.¹²

Somalia is thought to have large unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, uranium, copper, and salt - with a likelihood of petroleum and natural gas reserves. Thirteen percent of the

land is arable with only 2 percent of that arable land actually under cultivation.

2.1.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT

Somalia has lacked a functional central government for nearly 19 years. The international community and virtually all of the country's neighbours have been engaged in efforts at mediation of the Somali internal dispute. For Somalia's neighbours, stability in the region as well as relieving the burden of the large number of refugees they hosted were paramount considerations. The turning point in the reconciliation efforts was probably in 2000 when Djibouti hosted a major reconciliation conference, which culminated in the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG), whose three-year mandate expired in August 2003. Under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya organized the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in 2002, which adopted a Transitional Federal Charter in June 2004. A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in October of the same year. A UN-sponsored peace conference was held in Djibouti at the beginning of 2008, resulting in a ceasefire and power-sharing agreement between the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia and the TFG. A brief chronology of major political events in Somalia is given in Table 1.

¹⁰ The international community has since insisted that the territorial integrity of the former Somali Republic should be maintained and, to this date, no country has formally recognized Somaliland as a sovereign state.

¹¹ Human Development Report 2010.

¹² The percentages given are based on a pre-1991 breakdown and have now most probably been altered by internal (internally displaced persons) and external (refugees and diaspora) population movements.

Table 1. Chronology of major political events in Somalia

PERIOD	NOTABLE EVENTS
26 June 1960	British Somaliland gains independence
1 July 1960	Italian Somalia becomes independent and joins Somaliland to form the Somali Republic (Somalia)
1991	Siad Barre is overthrown and flees the country to Nigeria through Kenya
	The Somali National Movement, a mainly Isaaq insurgency group, declares Somaliland independent
1992	UN Security Council resolution 794 (1992) authorizes use of all necessary means to secure humanitarian relief
	United States-led Operation Restore Hope begins its peacekeeping role in Somalia
1993	Operation Restore Hope hands over to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) under Security Council resolution 814 (1993)
1995	UNOSOM II withdraws from Somalia followed by heavy looting in Mogadishu
1998	A Majerteen clan conference at Garowe declares a new State of Puntland
2004	A Transitional Federal Charter is adopted in February 2004 following the negotiations facilitated by Kenya
	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is elected president in October 2004 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is formed in Nairobi
2005	June – The TFG relocates to Somalia
2006	June – the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) gains control of Mogadishu and Jowhar
	December – Ethiopia launches a major assault on UIC
2007	The TFG moves to Mogadishu with heavy Ethiopian military support
	The UN Security Council authorizes the deployment of an African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
2008	June – the TFG and the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia sign an agreement at the Djibouti peace conference under the auspices of the UN
	December – resignation of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed
2009	Ethiopian troops complete their withdrawal from Somalia
	Re-emergence of Islamist groups, among them the Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
	Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is elected as President of the TFG
	The TFG extends its mandate and the transition process for 2 years until 2011
2010	January – a spokesperson claiming to represent Al-Shabaab confirms officially that the organization has joined Al Qaida's 'international jihad'

^a Excerpts from Lewis I.O. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland Culture, History, Society*, Hurst and Company, London, 2009.

2.1.3 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

In the absence of a functioning central government, Somalia has not developed a national development strategy. The Recovery and Development Programme (RDP) is considered the main framework for international support for Somalia. It was developed by the international community under the joint leadership of the UN and the World Bank, mainly based on the Joint

Needs Assessment (JNA) undertaken in 2005 and 2006. The RDP went through intensive consultations with Somali authorities and the civil society. It covers the period 2008 to 2012 and is currently being updated. Authorities in Somaliland have formally endorsed the document while both Puntland and South and Central Somalia have stated that they agree with the broad priorities set out in the document.

Table 2. Select human development indicators

Indicators		Year	Data
Demographics	Total population (millions) ^a	1990	6.6
		2007	8.7
	Urban share of the population (percentage of total) ^a	2000	12
		2010	15
	Total fertility rate (births per woman) ^a	1990-1995	6.5
Economic status	Population living below \$1.00 a day (%) ^b	2005-2010	6.4
		2002	43.20
Health	Life expectancy at birth (years) ^a	2007	49.7
	Under five mortality rate ^c	2007	142 / 1000
	Prevalence of under-nourishment in total population ^c (5)	2006	71
	Children underweight for age (% under age 5) ^d	2000-2006	36
	% of population w/out sustainable access to an improved drinking water source (%)	1999 ^{e,a}	77
		2006 ^{e,b}	71
	Maternal mortality ratio ^f	2006	1,044/10,000
Education	Infant mortality rate ^f	2006	86/1000
	Access to basic education in the North (%) ^g	2010	40
	Access to basic education in the South and Central Somalia (%) ^g	2010	22
Gender	Seats in parliament (% held by women) ^h	1990	4
		2007	8.2
Environment	Est. Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) (% in girls and women aged 15-49 yrs) ^c	2006	98
	Forest and woodland (% of total land area) ⁱ	1988	14
		2005	11.4
Other vulnerability indices	Internally displaced people (thousands)	2000 ^{j,a}	300-350,000
		2009 ^{j,b}	1,550,000
	Refugees (Somalis in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen only) ^k	2009	529,700
	ECHO vulnerability and crisis index score ^g	2008/09	3/3 (most severe rank)
	IASC Early Warning – early action rating ^g		Red Alert

Note: This table draws from various sources due to the limited availability of data in Somalia.

^a UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009*, Table L.

^b UNDP, Somalia/World Bank (2002). Socio-Economic Survey.

^c WHO, *WHO World Health Statistics 2009*.

^d UN (2009), 'Millennium Development Goals Indicators Database,' (<http://mdgs.un.org>). Accessed June 2009 based on a joint effort by UNICEF and WHO.

^e UNDP (2001), 'Somalia Human Development Report'; and UNDP (2009). *Human Development Report 2009*.

^f WHO EMRO, 'Country Profile: Somalia' (accessed 2010).

^g 'UN Consolidated Appeal: Somalia 2010'.

^h UNDP, *HDR 2007/2008*, Table 33: 343-346.

ⁱ UNDP, 'Arab Human Development Report 2009'.

^j 'UN Consolidated Appeal: Somalia 2000'; and 'UN Consolidated Appeal: Somalia 2010,' (*Estimates maintained by the IDMC are based on various sources and are associated with high levels of uncertainty*).

^k 'UN Consolidated Appeal: Somalia 2010'.

The long-standing political instability and the absence of an effective government have had a negative effect on human development, particularly in South and Central Somalia. Although accurate and reliable socio-economic data are lacking, poverty levels are high with an estimated 43 percent of the population living on less than a dollar per day. Poverty is more prevalent in the rural areas, where intractable conflicts, persistent droughts, lack of economic resources, and paucity of infrastructure have rendered many people helpless.

UNICEF realized a nationwide multiple-indicator cluster survey in 2006¹³ that offered the largest source of data for up-to-date monitoring of some of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It showed that achieving most of the MDGs remained a formidable challenge unless there were dramatic changes in security, stability and good governance. The first full assessment of Somalia's position regarding the MDGs was published by UNDP in early 2007. Table 2 provides some select indicators of the human development situation of the country.

Women's social indicators consistently lag behind those of men. For instance, the adult literacy rate is estimated to be 27 percent for females compared with 50 percent for males. The gross enrolment rate for girls is 15 percent compared with 27 percent for boys. It is estimated that 98 percent of Somali women and girls have undergone some form of genital mutilation.¹⁴ Women tend to occupy a lesser role in the public sphere in Somalia. Their position was not made

any easier by their effective marginalization during the formation of the Transitional Federal Parliament where women were initially being granted a 25 percent representation, then 12 percent, and eventually ended up with 8 percent following the negotiations of 2004.

2.1.4 ROLE OF THE DIASPORA IN THE ECONOMY

The Somali diaspora, estimated at more than one million persons,¹⁵ plays a central role in supporting both livelihoods and development. Remittances constitute the most important external input into the economy. They total up to \$1 billion per year¹⁶ and represent 71.4 percent of the gross national product, dwarfing even the assistance of traditional international donors. The diaspora has, during certain periods, been a critical source of funds for clan militias, which have raised funds (sometimes via coercion) from clan members living abroad.¹⁷

A household survey in Hargeisa found that up to 25 percent of households claim remittances as their sole source of income.¹⁸ Another study in Hargeisa, Burco and Bossaso found that 40 percent of Somali households benefited from the money sent by the diaspora¹⁹ and 80 percent of the start-up capital for small and medium-sized businesses in Somalia came from remittances.²⁰ There is no definitive information about the decline in remittances after the onset of the global economic crisis, but according to anecdotal information, remittances to Somalia decreased by about 25 percent.

¹³ 'Somali Multiple-Indicator Cluster Survey 2006', UNICEF Somalia, 2007.

¹⁴ 'Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting In Somalia', (World Bank, UNFPA, 2005).

¹⁵ 'Somalia's Missing Million: the Somali Diaspora and its Role in Development', Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy, UNDP-Somalia, March 2009.

¹⁶ <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100423085705/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Press-releases/2008/Better-deal-for-Somalis-who-send-money-home/>

¹⁷ 'Human Development Report: Somalia', 2001, UNDP, 2001.

¹⁸ 'Migrant Remittances in the Context of Crisis in Somali Society', Anna Lindley, Humanitarian and Policy Group Background Paper, London, 2006.

¹⁹ 'Remittances and Economic Development in Somalia' (World Bank, Social Development Papers, Paper No. 38, 2006).

²⁰ 'UNDP, Country Brief: Somalia', UNDP country office, updated in September 2009.

2.1.5 ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY

A large number of civil society organizations (CSOs), many of them non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged in Somalia since 1991, often in response to the requirement of international organizations and donors for national partners that could substitute for the absence of government structures. These CSOs are generally urban-based in their composition, comprise religious leaders, and other informal social and community groups, local NGOs, and professional associations of teachers, traders, medical personnel, lawyers, journalists, and artists. Some have a very small constituency and often limit their activities to being implementers for externally financed projects. Others, particularly the professional associations but also some human rights or women organizations, have a broader constituency and play an increasingly important role in society and even in the political sphere as shown in their participation in national conferences.

In parallel, more traditional forms of civil society are represented by a set of customary institutions for intermediation comprising mainly clan elders and local religious leaders who tend to hold sway in the rural areas. In the South and Central region of Somalia, these institutions have declined significantly as they are being either consumed or eliminated by militias. However, wherever they remain independent of militant political processes, these still constitute a dominant form of Somali civil society, with some form of accountability to the communities they represent.

2.1.6 SECURITY AND REGIONAL DIVERSITY

The international community has been implementing humanitarian, rehabilitation and development programmes for the Somali people in a complex and varied environment. The balance between humanitarian life-saving

needs and possibilities to undertake development work varies greatly between regions. South and Central Somalia has fallen back into active conflict and Mogadishu itself has become a protracted war zone. The region continues to face severe humanitarian needs despite the genuine hope generated by the 2004 establishment of the TFG and by the Djibouti Agreement of 2008. Puntland has been relatively stable despite weak governance and is advancing in its transition from a post-conflict to a development situation. Somaliland has achieved substantial progress towards building a democratic State despite the recent instability resulting from the postponement of presidential elections.²¹ Opportunities for genuine development work are already evident in Somaliland. The capacities and resources of local governing authorities also vary widely, with local authorities in Puntland and Somaliland being better established and more capable of providing services than in the South and Central region. Similarly, the economic and human development situation varies across the different regions, across rural and urban areas, and across social groups.

Following tragic security incidents in 2008,²² the UN adopted a security phase IV for all regions except Mogadishu and Badhade (phase V). Despite visible differences between various locations and regions, phase IV is still being applied across the board and many observers question the appropriateness of such an undifferentiated approach. With a view to comparing this security classification with the one applied in other countries where the UN is operating under stressful security conditions, the team obtained information about the UN classification for Afghanistan. It is worth noting that all of Afghanistan, including Kabul, has been classified as a phase III situation, the only exception being Kandahar, where phase IV is applied. Although it is understood that a number of different considerations

²¹ Elections planned for 2008 were finally held on 26 June 2010 and resulted in a peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected President.

²² The Head of the UNDP office in Mogadishu was killed in July 2008 and suicide bombings occurred in Hargeisa and Bossaso on 29 October 2008. In Hargeisa, the UNDP office was targeted, killing two UN employees and injuring six.

influence the security classification and that the two situations are very different, this simple comparison between Somalia and Afghanistan raises questions about the rigour of the security assessment process. This is of particular importance given the consequences of a phase IV on the efficiency of operations and the cost of delivering assistance.

2.1.7 SOMALIA IN THE REGION

Somalia occupies a strategic position in the Horn of Africa. In addition to ties with other African countries, it has close religious and historical links with the Arab and Islamic world and has a seat in both the African Union and the League of Arab States. Somalia is also a member of the regional Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Worried about the stability of the region and often concerned about the large presence of Somali refugees, a number of Somalia's neighbours intervened militarily or stepped in as mediators to facilitate reconciliation. In 2007, the African Union deployed a peace support operation, AMISOM, to Mogadishu with the approval of the UN Security Council but AMISOM operations have been hampered by a lack of troop contributions, logistical support, equipment and other resources.

2.1.8 SOMALIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Two recent trends have propelled Somalia to the forefront of the international agenda. The first concerns the rapid increase in the number of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia. The

risks associated with piracy could add considerably to the costs of manufactured goods and oil from Asia and the Middle East. At a time of high inflationary pressures, this is of grave concern. Because of the increasing use of powerful weaponry by pirates, there is also a greater risk of a major environmental disaster in the Gulf of Aden if a tanker is sunk or run aground or set on fire.²³

The use of Somalia for the expansion of global terrorism is the second source of international concern. The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin²⁴ or Al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the Union of Islamic Courts that took over most of South and Central Somalia in 2006 to be dislodged by Ethiopian troops supporting the TFG at the end of that same year. Al Shabaab and the Hizbul Islaami, a rival Islamic party, now control most of South and Central Somalia, with the exception of parts of Mogadishu where the TFG receives protection from AMISOM. In January 2010, Al-Shabaab confirmed officially that it had joined Al Qaida's 'international jihad'.²⁵

The international community initially provided strong backing to the TFG in the hope that a legitimate government would bring the peace and stability required to stem the advance of terrorism in Somalia and provide the secure environment conducive to combating piracy. The International Contact Group on Somalia²⁶ has been persistent concerning the need to support the TFG. The first meeting of the Group, in 2006, called on the international community to "support the consolidation of representative and effective governance in Somalia, capable of addressing the needs of the Somali people as well as common international objectives. The

²³ R. Middleton, 'Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars,' Chatham House Briefing Report (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2008).

²⁴ Literally 'Mujahidin Youth Movement'.

²⁵ See: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/>

²⁶ The ICG was created in June 2006 and has met regularly since then. The first meeting was attended by the European Union (Presidency and Commission), Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Kingdom and the United States with the UN and the AU participating as observers. The 16th meeting, held in Jeddah in December 2009, was attended by 34 States and 9 international organizations.

Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions provide a legitimate and viable framework for the continued process of re-establishing governance in Somalia.²⁷ This international support has consistently emphasized the priority to be given to the security sector, particularly since the advance of Al-Shabaab through most of South and Central Somalia. Many among the international community, however, have become increasingly disenchanted with the lack of progress of the TFG and its performance.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL AID TO SOMALIA


External aid has always played a critical role in the affairs of Somalia. In the past, the Somali State was funded almost entirely by Cold War-driven foreign aid. With the cold war over, aid started declining as the Somali State began to collapse in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, however, following the collapse of the State and the deployment of foreign troops, donor interest picked up again.

2.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL AID TO SOMALIA

In its 2010 Development Cooperation Report, the OECD/DAC indicated that total annual aid disbursements for Somalia have been in the range of \$200 million to \$380 million a year during 2004-2007 but that it rose to \$758 million in 2008.

Most of the increase is due to a dramatic rise in humanitarian funding reflecting both the greater number of people in need and the sharp rise in commodity and delivery costs for Somalia. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of humanitarian

**Figure 1. CAP funding: 2005-2009
(US\$ million)**



Source: CAP 2010 – all data from OCHA Financial Tracking System as at 12 Nov. 2009

funding under the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)-led annual consolidated appeal process (CAP).²⁸ As shown in Figure 1, actual humanitarian funding stood at \$476 million in 2008 and \$513 million in 2009, which represents an increase of more than 66 percent between 2007 and 2009. Taking the ODA data for volume of aid in 2008, the average per capita aid for every Somali stands at about \$90 per year. However, the transaction cost, mostly in terms of leakages²⁹ through corruption, siphoning off by warlords and militias and high cost of aid delivery means that little of the total amount goes to the poor and vulnerable families.

Table 3 shows the top five donors to Somalia between 2002 and 2008. The United States of America ranks as the first provider with 25.2 percent of the total, followed by the European Commission (EC), Norway, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

²⁷ International Somalia Contact Group – Communiqué, Permanent Mission of Norway, New York, 15 June 2006.

²⁸ UNDP participates in the annual CAP for a very small portion of its programme, dealing mainly with urgent recovery assistance.

²⁹ See, in particular, the ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia’ (S/2010/91), March 2010.

Table 3. Major donors to Somalia between 2002 and 2008 (US\$ million)

Donor	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Donor Totals	Percentage of total	Rank
United States	35.4	33.8	31.9	36.9	95.2	58.7	242.7	534.6	25.21%	1
EC	8.5	26	22.9	57.3	88.5	78.6	139.3	421.1	19.85%	2
Norway	25.4	40	33.8	31.3	33.8	43.1	44.2	251.6	11.86%	3
United Kingdom	2.8	4.9	14.1	9.9	51.6	26.4	74.6	184.3	8.69%	4
Netherlands	13.1	10.3	18.9	14.2	14.1	12.4	18.7	101.7	4.80%	5

Source: OECD Stats Extracts, Creditor Reporting System - <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW>.

In terms of overall donor priorities for Somalia, the RDP identifies three main pillars:

- Deepening peace, improving security, and establishing good governance
- Strengthening essential basic services and social protection
- Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce poverty.

In fact, priority has been given in recent years to the first pillar, particularly the support to the security sector and to AMISOM.

2.2.2 COORDINATION WITHIN THE AID COMMUNITY

The main coordination forum of the international aid community is currently the ‘Coordination of International Support to Somalia’ (CISS) whose membership includes the Somalia Donor Group, the NGO Consortium and the UN country team (UNCT). It is guided by a smaller Executive Committee co-chaired by the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN and the Representative of the World Bank. A Somali Support Secretariat (SSS) is responsible for providing secretariat support services to the Somali authorities and the international community in order to facilitate their efforts of coordination of the humanitarian, reconstruction and development programmes for the country. A 2009 review of the CISS concluded

that there were “too many overlapping coordination structures for Somalia. These include sectors (and a variety of working groups under them), clusters (linked to CAP) and the Programme Working Group and Outcome Groups (linked to the UNTP). Supporting these are OCHA, the RC system, UNDP (through its support to the coordination role of the authorities) and the SSS. The transaction costs of having all these structures are excessive and by far the greatest part of this problem lies in Nairobi – not only does coordination appear to work better in the field (a common finding) but the weight of international coordination in Nairobi is a source of great irritation to the Somali authorities who are trying to make progress in their own country.”³⁰

There is now a consensus among donors and other members of the international community that the existing coordination structure is ineffective and that it has become at best an information-sharing mechanism. Discussions are under way to reform the CISS, ensure a higher level of participation and improve the linkage with political actors such as UNPOS.

2.3 ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II at the beginning of 1995, the Secretary-General established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts

³⁰ ‘Review of CISS Excom and Somali Support Secretariat – Final Report’, Chris Johnson, August 2009.

with Somali leaders, civil organizations and the States and organizations concerned. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General now chairs the International Contact Group on Somalia and has been actively involved in supporting the TFG and working towards a more inclusive Government, particularly through the organization of the Djibouti Conference in 2008. In 2009, a United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA),³¹ headquartered in Nairobi, was established to provide logistical support to AMISOM. UNDP, like most other members of the UNCT, has expressed the need to receive more active political guidance from UNPOS. Annex 6 illustrates the complex structure put in place by the UN to support the political, security (in cooperation with the African Union), humanitarian, recovery and developments processes for Somalia.

The UNCT³² played an important role in leading the international community's effort to develop a

comprehensive strategy for assistance to Somalia. The Joint Needs Assessment carried out in 2005-2006 under the joint leadership of the UN and the World Bank formed the basis for the elaboration of the RDP (2008-2012). A United Nations Transitional Plan (UNTP) for Somalia, covering the period 2008-2010, has been developed based on the RDP and is considered the equivalent of a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) by the country team.

In parallel, the UN humanitarian agencies use the OCHA-led annual CAP as the document of reference and meet as a group together with NGOs and interested donors in the local Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). UNDP participates in the UNCT, the UNTP working groups and the IASC. UNDP is the lead agency for UNTP outcomes related to governance and the rule of law and security.

³¹ UNPOS is supported and overseen by the UN Secretariat Department of Political Affairs while UNSOA is led by the United Nations Secretariat Department of Field Support.

³² UNCT comprises 16 UN agencies and programmes as well as the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS). Meetings of the UNCT are also attended by UNPOS.

CHAPTER 3

UNDP RESPONSE AND STRATEGIES

3.1 OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

UNDP implements programmes in Somalia under extremely difficult circumstances in a context of violence and attacks on staff and in a situation where a good part of the country is without an effective government or secular rule of law. The killing of the Head of the Mogadishu sub-office in July 2008 and the car bombing of the UNDP Hargeisa office in October 2008 have been particularly traumatic and have impacted considerably on the capacity of the organization – and the whole UN – to operate. One of the many consequences of these grave security incidents has been the evacuation of staff from South and Central Somalia and the severe restrictions on travel to and within other regions. The chaotic political process, continued armed conflict in many parts of the country, the emergence of radical groups and general instability have also been factors influencing decisions made by both UNDP and its donors.

Such a context makes the decision-making process on strategic and operational matters difficult and implies an important element of risk-taking. UNDP had to seize opportunities that emerged from advances in the peace process although such decisions might appear misguided with hindsight. The alternative would have been a posture of inaction that would have a high cost in terms of denying support to the poor and to moderate elements. Some of the characteristics of the programme described in the following paragraphs result from the very special operating environment.

3.2 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE UNDP PROGRAMME

Most of the international and bilateral organizations assisting Somalia have had their head offices in Nairobi since the beginning of the 1990s. In mid-2005, following the establishment of the TFG and the hopes it carried of expanding assistance activities, UNDP sent a Management Change Team to examine the organization and structure of the country office in anticipation of an increase in the volume of operations. The Management Change Team recommended an increased presence in Somalia with delegated authority to sub-offices. The country office management decided instead to strengthen the Nairobi office. The following year, however, a new office management reversed the decision and made Nairobi a support office for three Somalia sub-offices with a large degree of delegated authority.³³

Until the latter part of 2008, UNDP had a sub-office in Mogadishu (with a liaison office in Baidoa) in South and Central Somalia, an additional sub-office in Hargeisa, covering Somaliland, and one in Garowe, for Puntland. Unfortunately, the security incidents of 2008 and the subsequent introduction of security phases IV and V resulted in the closure of the Mogadishu sub-office and its liaison office in Baidoa and crippled severely the two remaining sub-offices of Hargeisa and Garowe. The role of Nairobi again became prominent and the sub-office guidance manual was amended accordingly, particularly with regard to reporting lines. At the

³³ A ‘Task Force’ was created and submitted its final report on 15 December 2006. In developing the concept of delegation to sub-offices, the Somalia Country Office received support from the UNDP country office for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a similar process was already engaged. This was a good example of cross-fertilization between UNDP field offices working in difficult operational environments. The experience gained in Somalia and in other countries served as the basis for the development of a UNDP guidance note on the subject (‘Guidance Note: Establishing a UNDP presence outside the Country Office’, UNDP, New York, October 2009).

time of the ADR visit, the Hargeisa and the Garowe sub-offices were still operating with limited personnel, under a system of ‘slots’.³⁴

In the Nairobi-based country office, programme management follows the structure of the programme (see section 3.3): three main programme units and two stand-alone smaller units covering Gender/HIV/AIDS and economic and human development issues, respectively.

3.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE UNDP PROGRAMME

The programmes implemented by UNDP in Somalia between 2005 and 2010 are governed by three different basic documents approved by the Executive Board. The last CPD corresponds to the timeframe of the UNTP and represents

the part of that common UN programme for which UNDP has assumed responsibility. At the time of the evaluation team’s visit to Nairobi, the country office had started the process of preparing its country programme for the period 2011–2015 that will correspond to a new UN strategy for the same period being developed by the UNCT.

Over the period covered by this ADR, the interventions of UNDP covered three broad programme areas – Governance and Reconciliation, Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) and Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL), as well as some cross-cutting themes such as HIV/AIDS, gender and advocacy for human development issues. The programme areas adopted by the country office do not correspond to the ‘focus areas’ of UNDP corporate strategy for

Table 4. Evolution of core/non-core expenditure by thematic area: 2005-2009 (US\$ thousand)

Year/ Theme	Governance and reconciliation		Rule of Law and Security		Recovery/sustain- able livelihoods		HIV/AIDS		GRAND TOTAL
Source of funding	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	
2005	1,756	6,021	1,390	7,288	2,913	1,008	328	376	21,080
2006	2,348	14,141	1,824	9,339	2,632	1,949	278	1,004	33,515
2007	3,043	24,293	1,514	11,207	2,385	5,097	564	340	48,443
2008	2,266	26,010	1,342	15,369	4,289	3,527	386	868	54,057
2009	1,613	21,708	2,291	14,799	4,709	4,267	307	946	50,640
TOTAL	11,026	92,173	8,361	58,002	16,928	15,848	1,863	3,534	207,735
% core / non-core per theme	10.7%	89.3%	12.6%	87.4%	51.6%	48.4%	34.5%	65.5%	n/a
Total exp. per theme	103,199		66,363		32,776		5,397		207,735
% theme against total	49.7%		31.9%		15.8%		2.6%		100%

a For the purpose of this analysis, a total expenditure of \$36.7 million that could not be attributed specifically to thematic areas has been excluded. The total expenditure for the period 2005–2009 therefore stands at \$244.4 million. The country office informed the team that unattributed expenditures were of a cross-cutting nature and could not be apportioned between thematic areas.

³⁴ A maximum total number of UN personnel, both national and international is authorized for each location, based essentially on existing safe evacuation capacity. Individual agencies are then allocated a number of authorized personnel ('slots'), which are revised regularly by the UNCT. In March 2010, UNDP was operating with six 'slots' for each of its two sub-offices.

2008-2013.³⁵ Thus, a large part of the activities under Governance and ROLS would normally fall under Democratic Governance with some areas of ROLS belonging to Crisis Prevention and Recovery while most of the activities covered under RSL would relate to either MDGs and Poverty Reduction or some aspects of Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

The relative importance of the three major programmes and the ones related to HIV/AIDS³⁶ against total expenditure is illustrated by Table 4. Nearly 82 percent of all expenditure over the five-year period concerned Governance and ROLS, a clear illustration of a UNDP programme heavily tilted in favour of supporting the political and security agenda of major donors. The two programmes have received important support from donors as reflected in the high percentage of non-core resources made available for expenditure related to Governance (89.3 percent) and ROLS (87.4 percent).

By comparison, RSL programmes account for only 15.8 percent of total expenditure and the majority (51.6 percent) of these activities are financed from UNDP resources as opposed to non-core resources that are raised from donors and other resource mobilization mechanisms. This situation is also a reflection of an opinion prevailing among several donors that recovery and livelihoods in Somalia belong to humanitarian action and should be addressed mainly by NGOs.

Activities in favour of poverty reduction and the attainment of MDGs are nevertheless at the centre of UNDP activities worldwide (representing 30 percent of total programme expenditures in 2008)³⁷ and UNDP has a

considerable experience and knowledge in that core area of its mandate, applicable also in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Table 5. Ten major donors to UNDP Somalia: 2007-2009 (US\$ thousand)

	2007	2008	2009	TOTAL
1. EC	6,604	16,322	13,137	36,063
2. DFID	9,138	12,191	3,425	24,754
3. Norway	4,983	7,513	6,886	19,382
4. USAID	4,823	10,269	4,039	19,131
5. Italy	843	8,664	2,052	11,559
6. Denmark	1,181	3,907	5,392	10,480
7. Japan	-	4,544	5,000	9,544
8. Sweden	2,514	3,096	607	6,217
9. Netherlands	185	1,014	-	1,199
10. Ireland	713	-	452	1,165
All others	6,977	4,657	5,844	17,478
GRAND TOTAL	37,961	72,177	46,834	156,972

Source: UNDP Somalia.

During the period under review, approximately 80 percent of UNDP Somalia total expenditures represented non-core resources.³⁸ Among the donors who contribute non-core resources to the UNDP Somalia programme, the EC remains by far the largest contributor, followed by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) (until 2008, after which its funding declined), Norway, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Italian Cooperation. The 10 major donors to UNDP over the last three years are listed in Table 5.

³⁵ UNDP corporate strategic plan has identified the following focus areas: MDGs and Poverty Reduction, Environment and Energy, Democratic Governance and Crisis Prevention and Recovery. In general, UNDP country programmes worldwide, as well as the office structure, are structured around these corporate focus areas.

³⁶ Although managed as a cross-cutting theme, HIV/AIDS is included in table 4 because the related activities represent some 3 percent of total programme expenditure for the period 2005-2009.

³⁷ UNDP Annual Report 2009.

³⁸ UNDP Atlas.

3.4 MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDP PROGRAMME

The weakness of the TFG, its current incapacity to exercise effective control outside a few neighbourhoods of Mogadishu and the dominant position of extremist groups in most of South and Central Somalia have meant that programmes in Somalia are implemented under exceptional circumstances of insecurity, instability and unpredictability. This has been accentuated since 2008 following the grave security incidents that resulted in the adoption by the UN of security phases IV for most of the country and phase V in Mogadishu and Badhade. This situation increases the cost of delivering assistance and hampers the capacity of international actors to interact directly with communities and people. It also means that the international aid effort relies heavily on a number of Somali intermediaries for the delivery of assistance and for knowledge about the situation in country.

The chronic insecurity and lack of direct access to most parts of the country have had the implications for the implementation of UNDP programmes described below.

3.4.1 DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION

The standard mode of implementation for UNDP programmes around the world is national execution (NEX). Somalia is one of a few exceptions as all projects are implemented through direct execution (DEX).³⁹ This is a consequence

of the special circumstances under which UNDP is operating in the country, in the absence of a central government exercising effective authority and governance in all parts of the country.

In most of its Somali programmes, UNDP enters into contractual agreements with a government entity, an NGO or a community-based organization (CBO) generally through a Letter of Agreement,⁴⁰ a Micro-Capital Grant Agreement or a Project Cooperation Agreement.⁴¹ A majority of project activities under Governance and ROLS programmes are implemented through Letters of Agreement with the TFG or the authorities of Puntland and Somaliland.

3.4.2 A SHORT PLANNING HORIZON

In Somalia, during the period under review, UNDP programme cycles have not exceeded two to three years, contrary to the normal practice of five-year programmes. This was due mainly to the special circumstances prevailing in the country. These special circumstances have also meant that UNDP did not sign a Country Programme Action Plan⁴² with the Government as it does in most of the other countries. Instead, UNDP developed annual workplans on which it based its discussions with authorities in various regions. The authorities concerned, particularly in Somaliland and Puntland, were themselves developing longer-term plans and would have liked to see UNDP as a more predictable and transparent partner.

³⁹ NEX (for ‘national execution’) implies that projects are fully implemented by national authorities such as ministries or departments within ministries, semi-autonomous government institutions, regional or local authorities, including municipalities. DEX (for ‘direct execution’) applies when UNDP itself is responsible for the implementation of project activities. DEX is used mainly in countries with special circumstances and that exceptional mode of implementation has to be approved by the Associate Administrator.

⁴⁰ Letters of Agreement generally apply to situations where UNDP wishes to develop partnerships more than contractual relationships.

⁴¹ Letters of Agreement are signed between UNDP and a government entity or a national institution in cases when partnership and capacity-building need to be emphasized. Micro-grants or credits concern mainly NGOs or community-based organizations engaged in a specific small-scale activity, while Project Cooperation Agreements apply to NGOs undertaking the full responsibility for a project on behalf of UNDP.

⁴² An instrument adopted by UNDP to operationalize the CPD by refining the results framework, M&E framework and relevant projects. It is agreed and signed by the host programme Government.

3.4.3 REMOTE MANAGEMENT

The notion of remote management is not unique to Somalia. It is applied in Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan and the Darfur region of the Sudan. Somalia and Iraq represent the only cases, however, where country offices are located outside the programme country. Numerous papers exist on this operational approach but most of them seem to have been developed in the context of humanitarian assistance.⁴³ According to existing literature, there are three types of remote management:

1. Remote control: Evacuated international personnel works through national staff left in the country but fully retain control and decision-making functions. This is generally applicable in situations where agencies hope to return rapidly to the field;
2. Remote support: As above, but some level of authority and decision-making is left to local staff, the distant office providing guidance and backup services;
3. Remote partnerships: The agency works exclusively through local authorities and organizations, including NGOs. The distant office retains decisions on funding and the oversight of project execution. Monitoring functions are implemented mainly by NGOs or private firms used as proxies. The selection process for partners and monitors becomes crucial for the effectiveness of the formula.

In South and Central Somalia, in the absence of a UNDP sub-office, the formula of remote partnerships is the most commonly used and projects are implemented either through TFG

entities or through NGOs and local community groups. In Puntland and Somaliland, where staff presence is limited and travel outside Hargeisa and Garowe restricted, a combination of elements of ‘remote control’ and ‘remote support’ applies. In all regions, however, monitoring of projects rests largely with contracted NGOs or commercial firms.

3.4.4 UNDP AS A ‘PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT’

A number of strategic and programmatic decisions that have shaped UNDP programmes in Somalia have been based on the notion shared by many donors that UNDP had an obligation to undertake an activity as the provider of last resort when no readily available implementation alternative existed. Some of these activities have been one-time interventions and included for example the rehabilitation of infrastructure and general logistical support for special events. On the other hand, some activities have implied a longer-term commitment and a more direct and visible support to the TFG and its security sector institutions. As discussed later in this report, such activities, particularly the payment of salaries and stipends,⁴⁴ have had a negative impact on the image of UNDP as a neutral development partner. This image issue has been voiced by several persons interviewed, particularly those involved in humanitarian work.

The concept of ‘provider of last resort’ was developed in 2006 in the context of humanitarian emergencies and as part of the ‘cluster approach’.⁴⁵ Under that concept, the designated humanitarian cluster lead agency would have an obligation to act when no other agency is in

⁴³ See in particular: (i) ‘Remote Programming in Somalia,’ Discussion Paper, OXFAM and Merlin for the NGO Consortium, January 2009; (ii) ‘Operational Modalities in Iraq,’ Briefing Paper, NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq, January 2008; and, (iii) ‘Creating Humanitarian Space: a case study of Somalia’, Erik Abild, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, for UNHCR, January 2009.

⁴⁴ Stipends for the federal police are covered under the ROLS programme whereas salaries to officials are covered under both ROLS and Governance programmes.

⁴⁵ The term cluster is used to define a group of humanitarian actors cooperating to ensure that each sector of interventions for humanitarian emergencies benefits from a predictable leadership and increased accountability.

a position to deliver essential assistance.⁴⁶ The concept has never been fully implemented and by October 2009, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) still had on its agenda the need to clarify the formula.

UNDP itself mentioned the concept of provider of last resort in its strategic plan for 2008-2011 in the following terms:

“As part of the UNCT response to national demand, UNDP will stand ready to serve as the ‘provider of last resort’ in case of national capacity deficit or crisis when specifically asked to do so. Within the context of overall United Nations support for internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs and, when requested by national governments, UNDP, after consultation with United Nations organizations that have a mandate for operational activities in their respective areas of work, may exceptionally provide support in areas outside the agreed focus areas.”⁴⁷

This particular paragraph has not been translated into any form of operational guidance and it is not clear how it would apply to the Somali context given the references to development goals and the MDGs. Admittedly, there have been precedents elsewhere for UNDP

assuming unusual administrative functions. In Afghanistan, between 2002 and 2005, UNDP was restricted largely to providing administrative services, including the payment of salaries for civil service and the police, as well as capacity development in the formal institutions of state. Since 2005, UNDP has refocused its programmes in Afghanistan and adopted a broader approach encompassing support to the civil society, job creations and livelihoods.⁴⁸ There is a notable difference, however, between the approaches taken by UNDP in Afghanistan and in Somalia. Afghanistan engaged rapidly in a post-conflict and state-building phase and the UNDP approach to the provision of administrative services could incorporate development goals providing an exit strategy through the rapid transfer of responsibility to national institutions.

In a conflict situation such as the one prevailing in South and Central Somalia and in the absence of external security presence in most areas, the UNDP commitment as a provider of administrative services appears open-ended and without a viable exit strategy. The difficulty has been to implement an exit strategy in an unpredictable environment where the political road map is not linear, where operational alternatives are few and where immense pressure is put on UNDP to continue playing this role.

⁴⁶ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) ‘Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response,’ of November 2006, describes the ‘provider of last resort’ concept in the following terms: “Where there are critical gaps in humanitarian response, it is the responsibility of cluster leads to call on all relevant humanitarian partners to address these. If this fails, then depending on the urgency, the cluster lead as ‘provider of last resort’ may need to commit itself to filling the gap”.

⁴⁷ ‘UNDP Strategic Plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating global progress on human development’ (DP/2007/43/Rev.1), para. 55, 22 May 2008.

⁴⁸ Elements of analysis of the UNDP programme in Afghanistan are drawn from the ‘Assessment of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP contribution: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’, UNDP Evaluation Office, May 2009.

CHAPTER 4

CONTRIBUTION OF UNDP TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

4.1 GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

With a total of \$103.2 million spent during the period 2005 to 2009, activities under governance and reconciliation account for nearly half of total programme expenditure. This area of intervention is also the one that received the most support from donors, with 89.3 percent of the total amount financed from non-core resources. The management of the Governance Programme undertook a major effort in recent

years to consolidate and streamline a number of project activities implemented between 2005 and 2007 and mainly related to capacity development. The new programme started in 2008 has evolved around the four major components identified in Table 6. The table also indicates activities implemented before 2008 that were consolidated under the three active⁴⁹ components of the streamlined programme. In addition, the table states the expected outcomes (as per CPD 2008-2010), as well as the total expenditure for the period 2005 to 2009.

Table 6. Governance and reconciliation programmes (2005-2009)

Total expenditure: US\$ 103.2 million

Expected outcomes (based on CPD 2008-2010): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key Federal, Somaliland and Puntland government institutions administer and manage core government functions more effectively with accountability and inclusion Reconciliation advances with significant progress on remaining transitional tasks under the Transition Charter Selected local governments contribute to reconciliation and planning for equitable service delivery in select locations 				
Component/main activities		Project active in		Sources of funding
		SC*	PL**	SL***
Component 1: Reconciliation and Peacebuilding				
Constitutional dialogue and support to drafting of the Constitution	X			Denmark, DFID , EC, Norway, SIDA and USAID
Component 2: Local Governance				
Development of local governance, including cadastral survey in Somaliland and UNDP participation in the new UN Joint Programme for Local Governance in the three regions	X	X	X	Denmark, DFID , Italy, Norway, SIDA and USAID
Component 3: Somali Institutions Development Project				
- Policy and legislative systems development - Human resource development - Capacity development and training - Public financial management - Infrastructure development	X	X	X	Denmark, DFID , EC, Norway, SIDA and USAID
Component 4: Civil Society and Media				
	X	X	X	Project not started

*South and Central Somalia, ** Puntland, *** Somaliland

Source: UNDP Somalia, March 2010.

⁴⁹ Component 4 was developed in 2009 to address civil society and the media but it has not received donor support yet and remains unimplemented.

Pre-2008: Two important activities were completed in 2008 and have marked the period leading to the consolidation mentioned above: the cadastral survey undertaken in Somaliland and the district- and community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation activities in South and Central Somalia. The first Somaliland Cadastral Survey Project started in 2001 and represented a sustained effort to provide secure land-tenure arrangements for non-demarcated farms in Somaliland with the objective of reducing tensions arising from land-tenure disputes. The project resulted in 12,500 farms surveyed and some 12,000 certificates issued, although only 850 actual titles were issued, largely owing to the relatively high issuance fees levied by the Ministry of Agriculture. A 2008 evaluation⁵⁰ concluded that the project resulted in an important reduction of boundary disputes.

The second completed activity concerned district- and community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation implemented under two separate projects in South and Central Somalia between 2006 and 2008. The projects aimed at establishing sustainable local government structures through participatory community dialogue and at providing material support and capacity development for councillors and administrative staff. The project supported the establishment of 18 district councils through community participation. Unfortunately, the return of violence and insecurity weakened the sustainability of these councils. A 2008 review⁵¹ concluded that the laudable efforts to build a ‘bottom up’ approach had been compromised by a number of ‘top down’ interventions by TFG institutions and personalities and that sustainability and ownership had been weakened by the granting of high allowances and financial compensations to participants in the projects. Lessons learned through the two community-based projects have been important inputs for developing the new ‘Joint Programme for Local Governance’ (2008-2010).

Post-2008: Since 2008, UNDP has aligned its interventions to relevant outcomes identified in the RDP and the UNTP for Somalia. Most of the activities have been implemented under a broad strategic partnership agreement between UNDP and a group of donors (Denmark, DFID, Norway, Sweden and USAID) as well as contributions from the EC and UNDP/BCPR.

4.1.1 RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING

UNDP has been actively engaged in providing logistical and technical services in support of the process of national reconciliation and the promotion of peace during the whole period under review. This has included, among other initiatives, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the provision of equipment to help the Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government move to Baidoa (2005) and to Mogadishu (2009) or to facilitate the holding of the National Reconciliation Conference also in Mogadishu (2007). UNDP was also instrumental in supporting the organization of the Djibouti Conference (2008) that led to a ceasefire between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). These activities have been punctual interventions that served the purpose of reconciliation, although contributing only marginally to developing good governance. UNDP is currently engaged in providing direct technical support to parliamentarians and other officials of the TFG towards achieving specific tasks of the Transition Federal Charter. In addition, UNDP is managing the payment of contributions to salaries of public servants and political leadership at a cost of approximately \$500,000 a month.

Support for the drafting of a new federal constitution is also an important contribution to the ongoing transitional political process and certainly one that corresponds more to traditional areas of intervention of UNDP and to its core mandate and competence.

⁵⁰ ‘Evaluation of Somaliland Cadastre Survey Project’, Mark A. Marquardt, UNDP, October 2008.

⁵¹ ‘The District Based Peace Building and Reconciliation Project and the Community Based Peace Support Project, Somalia: Review Report’, Joakim Gundel, KATUNI Consult for UNDP, October 2008.

Box 1. The Somalia Constitution-Making Support Project

The adoption of a constitution is an essential requirement of the 'Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic', adopted in February 2004 following the 2002-2004 round of negotiations sponsored by IGAD^a facilitated by Kenya. In the words of a donor representative, "UNDP has spent six years on the process of drafting a constitution and not a single line has been written so far..." The case, however, is not so simple. The process suffered from a series of 'stop-and-go' decisions on which UNDP had no control, as they were due mainly to security and political considerations.

Indeed, the process suffered a number of delays. A first delay occurred with the late appointment, in May 2006, of the 15-member Independent Federal Constitutional Commission (IFCC), shortly after Parliament convened in Baidoa. The project was then put on hold following the assassination of the Minister for

Constitutional Affairs on 24 July 2006, the day after the opening of the inaugural workshop that was intended to kick off the constitution drafting process. It was only in 2008, after the Djibouti Conference that UNPOS and the donors insisted on renewing efforts to draft a constitution, but new delays occurred, owing mainly to late funding and organizational difficulties for the recruitment of project staff.

By March 2010, the project was still in a capacity development phase for members of the IFCC and the public participation phase was due to start in April. A first draft of the constitution is now expected for July 2010 with a final draft by December 2010, deadlines that appear unrealistic to many observers. Some have also suggested that UNDP has spent too much time on capacity development at the expense of public participation. The Charter foresaw that the constitution would then be adopted by

referendum before the end of the transition period in August 2011. The organization of a referendum is not considered implementable given the situation in Somalia and a simple adoption by Parliament is currently being discussed.

A major achievement of the project has been the introduction of a consultative management structure that ensures the full participation of donors as well as other organizations involved in providing support to the common effort. In addition to a large number of donors, organizations, such as AWEPA, COSTI, InterPeace, the National Democratic Institute, the Max Planck Institute, and UNPOS have joined UNDP (acting as coordinator) into a 'Consortium' that oversees the implementation of the support project. The project also managed to secure the participation of recognized national experts.

Source: Interviews with staff and donor representatives/project document and donor briefing papers.

^a The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 and includes six member nations: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

UNDP has shown a capacity to respond in a timely and efficient manner to requests for the type of support described above. In implementing many of those activities, however, UNDP acts mainly as a service provider on behalf of UNPOS and some major donors. While some of these activities are one-time inputs effectively supporting reconciliation, others such as the payment of salaries would require a clear and viable exit strategy.

4.1.2 PROMOTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZED SERVICES

Two UNDP projects implemented in South and Central Somalia between 2006 and 2008 addressed the need for improved local governance at the district and community levels and served as the basis for developing activities in the area of local governance in the post-2008 restructured Governance and Reconciliation programme. In 2008, the UNCT decided to

merge ongoing initiatives by ILO, UNCDF, UNDP, UN-Habitat and UNICEF into a five-year ‘United Nations Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery’ (2008-2012). The stated purpose of the Joint Programme is to contribute to peace by enhancing local governance and the delivery of equitable priority decentralized services to the Somali people in South and Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland.

Funding came in only by March 2009 and the joint programme encountered some delays. It also became necessary to reduce the number of target districts in South and Central Somalia owing to prevailing insecurity. The programme nevertheless succeeded in developing a comprehensive approach based on a participatory process within communities and incorporating aspects of gender. The Somali authorities and the donors have expressed their appreciation for the methodology developed by the joint programme and the initial results achieved in terms of benefits to communities. Some participating UN agencies have noted, however, that the administrative processes applied to joint programmes are cumbersome and slow and that perhaps upstream ‘joint programming’ should be pursued in the future, leaving the management of the projects directly to agencies with a very light coordination mechanism during implementation.

4.1.3 SOMALI INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT

The Somali Institutional Development Project (SIDP, 2008-2010) is providing capacity development and general support to key Somali institutions in Puntland, Somaliland and South and Central Somalia. The SIDP brings together five projects implemented between 2004 and 2008: the Somali Institutional Capacity Development Project (SICAD), the Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support Project (QUESTS), the Emergency Technical Assistance Project (ETA), the Start-Up Package and the Somali Institutional Support Project (SISP). The SIDP addresses four fundamental pillars of institutional development:

- The development of systems and processes for the making and implementation of policies and laws
- The development of human resources
- The improvement of public financial management
- The development of physical infrastructure.

UNDP support to TFG institutions under SIDP and predecessor interventions has represented the largest financial input under this activity. As an indication, the six-month ‘Start-up Package’ designed to support the TFG installation in Mogadishu at the beginning of 2009 was budgeted at \$12 million. Interventions in favour of federal institutions have often been of an administrative support nature to respond to new requirements resulting from advances in the political process and only a limited number of initiatives concern more directly traditional capacity development support provided by UNDP in most democratic governance programmes across the world.

By contrast, UNDP is not involved as a provider of administrative services in Puntland and Somaliland. Governance programmes implemented in both regions cover more traditional areas of intervention through technical inputs, capacity development and some infrastructural work and provision of equipment. These interventions have more effectively contributed to developing good governance in the two regions concerned.

The QUESTS project stands out as an innovative and useful initiative aimed at securing the temporary injection of Somali diaspora expertise to strengthen government administrations for the development of their country. The project is now implemented in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and thus benefits from that organization’s experience and expertise developed through its Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)

initiative. The number of placements under the new programme should soon reach 25 and Somali authorities have expressed appreciation for the scheme.

Another particularly successful intervention that the ADR team could document through field visits concerned the support to public financial management in Somaliland. Through funds made available (\$246,000 per year) by UNDP, the Fiscal Policy and Reforms Management (FPRM) Unit, under the Ministry of Finance in Somaliland, has been able to recruit senior economists and advisers with public finance expertise, some brought in through the QUESTS programme.

The FPRM focuses on five main areas of overall public finance management:

- **Expenditure management:** The broad aim is to improve the links between policymaking, planning and budgeting system through ensuring a stable fiscal policy, and improved allocation of resources and spending on development priorities.
- **Revenue mobilization:** The largely informal nature of the Somaliland economy makes it difficult to generate reliable statistics for tax purposes. Lack of data and poor tax regulation prevent policymakers and tax administrators from introducing any effective and efficient tax measures. Although not due solely to the FPRM work, it is to be noted that tax collection has increased from \$38 million to \$50 million in the past two years.
- **Financial sector development:** The unit supports the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Somaliland in establishing the institutional base for the development of appropriate macroeconomic policies. Currently, there is no functioning central bank in Somaliland and a new banking law has been drafted for presentation to Parliament.
- **Capacity development of integrity institutions:** The FPRM facilitates the adoption of best practices and learning from other countries in order to ensure that the

Office of the Auditor General and the Office of the Accountant General are capacitated to handle their mandates efficiently, effectively and independently.

- **Procurement systems:** The FPRM unit is working with the relevant department in the Ministry of Finance to develop clear guidelines for procurement by government institutions. A code of ethics for all government staff dealing with procurement has now been adopted.

4.1.4 ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

The outcomes stated for the Governance and Reconciliation programmes appear overly ambitious in the Somali context. This applies particularly to the South and Central region with regard to the first outcome stated in Table 6: “Key Federal (...) government institutions administer and manage core government functions more effectively with accountability and inclusion”. The extremely limited territorial control of the TFG and the current security and military quagmire in Mogadishu make it impossible for federal institutions to work effectively and have an impact on the quality of normal and essential core government functions. Effective work on governance issues requires a minimum of stability and the presence of authorities exercising to the largest extent possible all the prerogatives and duties of a state. This is clearly not the case in that part of the country and the programme implemented by UNDP has largely been one of filling administrative gaps in support of an elusive political process.

In contrast, Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland have reached a stage where development work can be done effectively and the institution-building programmes, in particular, have achieved significant results. Activities in support of the civil service reform and the introduction of fiscal and financial management provide good examples of interventions having produced tangible results and progress towards the first outcome stated above.

The second stated outcome – “Reconciliation advances with significant progress on remaining transitional tasks under the Transition Charter” – is being addressed by UNDP support for the drafting and adoption of a new Federal Constitution, one of the key benchmarks of the Transitional Charter. After major delays due mainly to security and political considerations outside the control of UNDP, the project is now well under way and UNDP has been praised for its efforts at developing a very inclusive and participatory method for advancing the process.

The third outcome is linked to the promotion of local governance: “Selected local governments contributing to reconciliation and planning for equitable services in select locations”. The joint programme for local governance represents a valuable experience in terms of a joint UN process but has suffered from delays and excessive emphasis on processes rather than results. On the other hand, the very systematic approach promoted to ensure effective community participation is appreciated by the national and local authorities as well as donors. It is too early, however, to assess the results of this new programme in terms of promoting both reconciliation and planning processes for equitable services.

In terms of management of the programme, better results could be achieved through more cohesion and synergy between the governance and ROLS programmes. As mentioned in section 3.2 of the preceding chapter, many of the activities implemented under each of the two programmes are interlinked and would generally be considered as falling under a broader ‘democratic governance’ focus area of the UNDP corporate strategic plan.

In the country office, two separate administrative units manage the Governance and ROLS programmes. There are valid reasons for this management structure to handle two very large portfolios but that only further underlines the

need for strong joint programming between the two units.

4.2 RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

With a total expenditure of \$66.4 million during the period 2005-2009, ROLS has been the second largest programme of the country office. It has accounted for 31.9 percent of all programme expenditure and has attracted considerable donor support with some 87 percent of the funding emanating from non-core resources. Since 2002, successive programmes have pursued two main objectives:

- The improvement of the security environment in Somalia through security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, small arms control and mine action
- Better protection and improved access to justice for the Somalis through the promotion of competent civilian police force, judiciary, and custodial corps operating in compliance with international human rights standards.

In 2008 and 2009, the management of the programme undertook to balance the strong institutional support approach that characterized programmes since 2002 with more emphasis on community-level interventions, a more assertive rights-based approach and a stronger focus on accountability. The internal review of the ROLS programme also emphasized the need for more coherence and synergy between components of the programme.

As illustrated in Table 7, the ROLS programme is organized around four main components with a fifth one being a cross-cutting component promoting the streamlining of the themes of gender and human rights in all other interventions.

Table 7. Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programmes (2005-2009)
Total expenditure: US\$ 66.3 million

Expected outcomes (based on CPD 2008-2010): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved security environment in Somalia • Somalis, especially vulnerable groups, have better protection under the law and improved access to justice. 				
Component/main activities	Project active in			Sources of funding
	SC*	PL**	SL***	
Component 1: Civilian Police (formerly law enforcement)				
- Establishment of community-based policing		X	X	Denmark, DFID , EC, Norway, SIDA and USAID
- Rehabilitation, construction and equipment of training facilities and police stations	X	X	X	
- Training	X	X	X	
- Payment of stipends	X			
- Special Protection Unit (SPU)	X	X	X	
Component 2: Access to Justice				
- Judicial system reform and legal education	X	X	X	Denmark, DFID, EC, Norway, SIDA, USAID and UNDP/BCPR
- Infrastructure rehabilitation/construction, furniture, equipment	X	X	X	
- Training of justice personnel	X	X	X	
- Support for legal resources and law review, production, distribution and gazetting		X	X	
Component 3: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration and Armed Violence Reduction				
- DDR programmes	X	X	X	Denmark, DFID, EC, Italy, Japan, Norway, SIDA, USAID and UNDP/BCPR
- Armed Violence Reduction (Community Safety Project)	X	X	X	
Component 4: Civil Society and Media				
Component 5: Human Rights and Gender (Inclusion of human rights and gender in all training)				
X	X	X		Denmark, DFID, Norway

Source: UNDP Somalia, March 2010

* South and Central Somalia, ** Puntland; *** Somaliland.

4.2.1 CIVILIAN POLICE

Public security is a central element of transitions from civil war to stability throughout the world. The paradox of post-conflict police reforms is that these settings offer both unparalleled opportunities to reconceptualize and reshape policing institutions and doctrines, and deeply hostile environments for the implementation of ambitious reform plans. International donors play a key role in these police reforms by providing expertise and resources to countries that lack them.⁵²

UNDP has been involved in the training of police officers in Somalia since the 1990s. With the creation of the Rule of Law and Security Programme in 2002, support to the civilian police was given more prominence and has now become a central element of ROLS, accounting for over 40 percent of UNDP total expenditure for that programme.⁵³ It has also become one of the most controversial components of the whole UNDP programme. Controversy arose from the decision to respond to donor requests and assume

⁵² Melissa Ziegler and Rachel Nield, 'From Governance to Peace: Police Reform and the International Community', A rapporteurs' report based on a November 2001 conference sponsored by The Washington Office on Latin America and the Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 2001.

⁵³ Adam Smith International, 'Evaluation of the UNDP Strategic Partnership for Somalia', table 1, p. 7, UNDP, July 2009. The figures given concern years 2006 to 2008.

responsibility for the payment of stipends to the TFG police force and from reports of human rights abuses committed by police officers.⁵⁴

Prior to 2007, UNDP support to the civilian police focused on capacity development of national partners, training, provision of minimum basic operational equipment and police station infrastructure in all three regions of Somalia.

From 2007, UNDP became engaged at the urging of its principal donors in the provision of stipends to the TFG police force (Somalia Police Force – SPF). At the beginning of 2008, UNDP suspended the payment of stipends because of the human rights abuse allegations mentioned above as well as general poor management of the police force and lack of financial transparency and accountability. The donor insisted that payments be resumed⁵⁵ and UNDP did so only for officers having undergone appropriate training with a human rights component and after having put in place additional mechanisms for control and monitoring. UNDP intensified its support to the SPF in 2009 when the new expanded TFG and the Parliament were established in Mogadishu. Out of the total programme budget estimates of some \$98 million for 2010, \$12 million is earmarked for the payment of the police stipend.

The International Contact Group, meeting in Brussels on 26 and 27 February 2009, welcomed “the commitment of UNDP to continue to act as the implementing agency in the development of an accountable civilian police force with a target of 10,000 civilian police to be achieved by the second quarter of 2010”.⁵⁶ By June 2010, UNDP will have trained 3,300 police officers in

addition to pre-existing contingents as well as some 2,500 others trained under bilateral programmes.

UNDP continues to build the capacity of the civilian police services in Somaliland and Puntland while at the same time supporting the Special Protection Units (see Box 2) in the hope that authorities will eventually take over that responsibility. The support to the SPU places much emphasis on improving command, control and management structures, and training. It also seeks to achieve a balance between recruit training and specialized training for mid-rank and senior officials.

The programme also contributed to the rehabilitation of various police stations and prisons, including one in Gardo that the ADR team visited. The prison in Gardo suffered from structural engineering problems resulting in parts of a wall collapsing and delaying the handover to authorities.

Training is provided at the Armo Federal Police Academy for Puntland and South and Central Somalia and at the Mandera Police Academy for Somaliland. The two facilities have been enlarged to host an expanded training programme and the Gardo Police Training School in Puntland has also been rehabilitated to take in recruits from that region. UNDP has also supported the formulation of a new police training curriculum that includes human rights, gender, HIV/AIDS, community-based policing, child protection, and sexual- and gender-based violence modules. This is indicative of a generally stronger human rights-based approach in the management of the ROLS programme in recent years.

⁵⁴ Rob Crilly, Times Online, ‘The British taxpayer funds Somali police force for regime accused of war crimes’, 2 June 2008; and Human Rights Watch, ‘So much to fear’: War Crimes and Devastation of Somalia, pp. 98-102, December 2008.

⁵⁵ The European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid wrote to the Secretary-General of the UN in July 2008 to make this point.

⁵⁶ ‘International Contact Group on Somalia Communiqué’, United Nations Political Office for Somalia, 27 February 2009.

Box 2. The Special Protection Unit

The Special Protection Unit (SPU) was established in 2003 and 2005 in Somaliland and Puntland, respectively, to provide protection to UN and international NGOs operating in the northern parts of Somalia. The decision to create that special force was a result of an escalation of the incidence of killings and kidnappings of aid workers. Services include the provision of stand-by guards, personal protection and convoy escorts. These special forces remain under the full command and control of Police Commissioners and are also occasionally used for other tasks such as crowd control on special occasions.

The SPU has had its fair share of positive comments and criticisms.

Most positive comments have revolved around the important role they have played in enabling aid workers to continue to access populations and supervise projects in otherwise insecure environments. UNDP staff and authorities also cited the positive role of SPU as a disciplined and professional crowd control force during demonstrations by the opposition calling for presidential elections in Somaliland.

Critics fault the large proportion of budgetary allocation consumed by the SPU for protecting the humanitarian and diplomatic community as opposed to meeting the actual law enforcement needs and expectations of the Somali people. The total cost

of the SPU currently stands at \$1.2 million annually. While the cost of protecting NGOs is fully met from a donor contribution, there was an issue, now resolved, about sharing the cost between benefiting UN agencies. Ensuring proper discipline and financial transparency in the government-handled distribution of salaries and allowances for escorts remains a problem.

In Somaliland, SPU staff is paid a salary by the government, while client organizations through UNDP pay them a daily 'lunch' allowance. The situation is different in Puntland, where the SPU officers are paid a monthly stipend and a daily allowance whenever they are engaged in protection operations.

Source: Project document and reports/discussions with Police Commissioners and UNDP staff in Hargeisa and Garowe.

UNDP helped create Police Advisory Committees (PACs) in the three regions where it implemented civilian police support programmes. The PACs are intended as a civilian oversight mechanism to ensure the respect of human rights standards. A UN Security Council report describes the Police Advisory Committee functioning in Mogadishu as follows: "The Committee is one of the civilian oversight structures that was established and assigned to all 18 Mogadishu police districts, following a 2008 Amnesty International report that documented gross violations of human rights allegedly committed by the Government forces. The Committee's membership includes parliamentarians, clan elders, journalists, representatives of the business community and the Association of Women. Its fundamental role is to ensure that the police officers respect the rule of law and human rights law."⁵⁷

UNDP also promoted the inclusion of women in the various police forces. In 2006, the first 46 formally trained female police officers joined the Somaliland Police Force and the same year, there were 19 women among the first 154 police cadets graduating from the newly rehabilitated Armo Federal Police Academy. UNDP also cooperated with UNICEF for the introduction of special desks for women and children in police stations.

More recently, the programme of support to the civilian police has been emphasizing the service aspect of the police force over a strictly public order approach. The new approach encompasses community policing, crime prevention and community/police dialogue to build citizen consensus and confidence.

4.2.2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Projects implemented under this component of the ROLS programme correspond to traditional

⁵⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, (S/2009/373), para. 28.

areas of intervention of UNDP in post-conflict, recovery and state-building situations. Although some projects were implemented in South and Central Somalia between 2005 and 2007, most activities came to a halt in 2008 with the total evacuation of UNDP staff from that region. In both Somaliland and Puntland, interventions related to access to justice have effectively contributed to the achievement of much-needed development goals. Activities implemented successfully in Somaliland during a first phase were replicated in Puntland. During the period under review, UNDP has contributed significantly to the following activities:

1. Assistance to the authorities for the drafting of a code of conduct for the judiciary, prosecutors and the wider legal profession;
2. The harmonization of formal and customary laws;
3. The construction or rehabilitation of courts and prisons, including the establishment of health facilities in central prisons;
4. The training of judges, prosecutors and assessors;
5. The creation of legal clinics providing free-of-charge legal aid to the vulnerable and the poor;
6. In cooperation with UNICEF, the development of a Juvenile Justice Initiative and the establishment of special desks for women and children in police stations;
7. The training and re-training of judges, prosecutors and assessors, as well as scholarship programmes for students, particularly girls, in cooperation with Faculties of Law.

The programme has been particularly successful in developing a working relationship with the academic world. In the three regions, UNDP has been assisting faculties of law of established universities and cooperating with them in the

implementation of various activities under the ROLS programme. Box 3 (next page) provides examples of the type of cooperation established over the years, using the particular case of the University of Hargeisa.

Under this project, UNDP also undertook to assist in the formation of a professional Custodial Corps in both Somaliland and Puntland, as well as the construction of a modern prison facility handed over to Somali authorities in December 2009, and another in Gardo in Puntland to be handed over to the authorities in the course of 2010 following delays due to engineering deficiencies. In conjunction with the support for judiciary prosecution activities, this line of engagement responded to core international concerns around piracy and the prosecution of pirates.

4.2.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION, ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION AND MINE ACTION

UNDP started its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme in 2003 with the objective of downsizing security forces mainly in Puntland and Somaliland, where conditions were thought to be conducive for such an approach. In South and Central Somalia, the fragility of the different political advances and the repeated resumptions of conflict have negated any possibility of effectively implementing a DDR programme. A 2008 evaluation⁵⁸ concluded that the effectiveness of the programmes in Puntland and Somaliland was adversely affected by the absence of a firm commitment to the process by the authorities.

UNDP has gradually moved away from DDR operations in favour initially of small arms control programmes, active only in Somaliland, and more recently a community safety approach under an ‘armed violence reduction’ programme. Some results could be achieved in Somaliland

⁵⁸ ‘UNDP ROLS – DDR/SAC Programme, Somalia : Evaluation Report’, Desmond Molloy, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and Sheku Silla, UNDP/BCPR, August/September 2008.

Box 3. UNDP and the University of Hargeisa Faculty of Law

The University has established cooperation agreements with the Universities of Pretoria, Addis Ababa, Khartoum and the Kenyatta University in Nairobi. The University receives no support from the Somaliland government and is financed exclusively from the fees charged to students (\$400/year), from donations from the diaspora and agreements with other universities and international organizations, such as the Islamic Development Bank and UNDP. The Chancellor was particularly proud of having the only institute for conflict analysis and peace-building in the whole of Somalia housed in his University. The Faculty of Law of the University of Hargeisa was established in 2002 with support from UNDP.

a) Legal Aid Clinics: UNDP helped the faculty establish a Legal Aid Clinic that has helped nearly 1,600 vulnerable and poor persons with their court cases since 2003. The number of persons seeking help from the clinic is increasing steadily and has now reached some 200 per month. The services of the legal aid clinic are free

and most settlements result from mediation through the various justice systems (sharia, customary or formal). The legal clinic has now extended its action to rural areas outside Hargeisa through a system of mobile clinics working in parallel with the mobile courts also assisted by UNDP.

b) Scholarships: In an effort to promote the access of girls and representatives of minority groups to legal professions, UNDP has been providing eight scholarships to help students complete their legal training at the faculty. Since the creation of the faculty in 2002, there have been a total of 185 graduates. The number of female graduates has increased steadily over the years from only 1 out of 32 (or 3 percent of total graduates) in 2005 to 25 out of 69 graduates (or 36 percent of the total) in 2008. Most of the graduates, male or female, find employment in the private sector, with international organizations or as independent practitioners. They have difficulties obtaining employment in the

formal judiciary system in the absence of a pension system that would allow over-aged personnel to retire and make room for the new generation.

c) Training of judges and other legal personnel:

The facilities of the Faculty of Law are being used for the implementation of UNDP-assisted training of judges, prosecutors and registrars. The ADR team was able to attend the inaugural course of the training session organized in March 2010 for some 35 judges and prosecutors working in first instance and appeals courts. The trainer was one of the judges of the Somaliland Supreme Court.

d) Observatory of violence:

UNDP is currently cooperating with the University for the establishment of an Observatory of violence financed under the ROLS community safety project. The Observatory is expected to become operational during 2010 and will process and analyse data on violence collected through communities participating in the UNDP project.

Source: Discussions with the Chancellor of the University of Hargeisa, the Dean of the Faculty of Law and site visit on 16 March 2010.

under small arms control with the adoption of new legislation, the beginning of registration of weapons and the rehabilitation of arsenals. The armed violence reduction programme has started only recently but has already developed a promising participatory approach with communities. It has also strived to establish baseline data on violence in communities targeted by the programme, despite the difficulties of the terrain and the limited resources of the project.

Progress has been achieved in establishing functional Mine Action Centres in Puntland and

Somaliland, where the problem relates more to unexploded ordnance than to actual mines. UNDP initially outsourced the implementation of this programme to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and has now fully transferred responsibility to the UN Mine Action Service.

4.2.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

The first anticipated outcome identified for this programme is an ‘improved security environment in Somalia’ while the second seeks to ensure

that “Somalis, especially vulnerable groups, have better protection under the law and improved access to justice”. Both outcomes concern human security and represent essential needs not only for the welfare and livelihoods of the population but also for the recovery and development of the country. As such, interventions promoting improved security are certainly relevant. The effectiveness of these interventions, however, needs to be assessed differently for the various parts of the country.

In South and Central Somalia, the general security situation has worsened since the end of 2006 after a period of stability imposed through the Union of Islamic Courts. Most of the pre-2008 UNDP investments in infrastructure, equipment and even human resources have been lost due to the resumption of conflict. Since 2007, the programme of support to civilian police in that part of the country has been emblematic of UNDP difficulties with activities perceived as ‘political’.⁵⁹ Many observers⁶⁰ have raised doubts about the exact nature between a paramilitary force and a democratic policing service of the SPF operating in Mogadishu. Inability to foresee the different conflict scenarios and plan with these in mind has exposed the programme to unnecessary criticisms where the humanitarian community views UNDP support to the TFG as contributing to the reduction of their own humanitarian space in Somalia, while UNPOS sees the role of UNDP as pursuant to various Security Council resolutions.

The UNDP support to the civilian police in the more conducive environments of Somaliland and Puntland has significantly contributed to improved security in the two regions. For all three regions, UNDP effectively ensured the

inclusion of human rights in the training curriculum for police officers and promoted gender considerations, including through innovative interventions such as the establishment of special desks for women and children in police stations. Regarding the management of support to the Special Protection Units in Somaliland and Puntland, questions have been raised about the relevance of UNDP involvement and whether other administrative arrangements could have been made.

The new programme for armed violence reduction through a community safety approach is also a good illustration of an innovative and imaginative approach to security. UNDP has now put the emphasis on a community approach for many of its programmes and effectiveness would be enhanced through more interaction and synergy, for example between community policing initiatives and the armed violence reduction-community safety project within ROLS and between the programmes of ROLS, Governance and Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods, many of which also focus on local communities.

Interventions for the promotion of access to justice have produced positive results in Somaliland and Puntland. This is particularly true for interventions aimed at improving the outreach of the judicial system to rural areas through the creation of mobile courts and mobile legal aid clinics. The cooperation established between the ROLS programme and various faculties of law in all three regions is also a very positive development. The programmes of access to justice definitely represent an area where UNDP can achieve results and has developed a strong comparative advantage.

⁵⁹ It should be noted here that UNPOS is currently exploring the possibility of paying stipends through an international commercial firm.

⁶⁰ See in particular paragraph 28 of the report of the ‘Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008)’ (see S/2008/769), which reads: “Although established as a civilian police force, the Somali Police Force has been increasingly drawn into Somalia’s civil conflict and effectively serves as a paramilitary force engaged in counter-insurgency operations. In some areas, it is virtually indistinguishable from the Transitional Federal Government military.”

4.3 RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME

The Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods (PRSL) programme, initiated in 2006, built upon past interventions under the Somali Watching Brief/Poverty Reduction and Economic Recovery programmes, and absorbed the former Somali Financial Services Programme, while incorporating findings of the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). Since 2007, this programme has been renamed Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL). Initially small, the programme has continued to grow in the past three years, indicating the priority UNDP has come to

attach to activities directly impacting on the lives of Somali people.

This new emphasis is partly a response to the image and perceptions problems that affected UNDP following its more visible association with political processes and partly an attempt to refocus activities on the basis of the UNDP mandate for pro-poor interventions and support for the attainment of MDGs. Between 2005 and 2009, expenditure for RSL has grown more than twofold, from \$4 million to \$9 million. For the five-year period between 2005 and 2009, UNDP devoted a total of nearly \$33

Table 8. Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL) programmes (2005-2009)
Total expenditure: US\$ 32.8 million

Expected outcome (based on CPD 2008-2010):

- Vulnerable communities have increased income from equitable and sustainable employment opportunities and are better able to manage natural resources

Component/main activities	Project active in			Sources of funding
	SC*	PL**	SL***	
Component 1: Employment Generation for Economic Recovery				
- Employment and income generation through rehabilitation of public and social infrastructure - Job creation initiatives - Capacity development and vocational skills	X	X	X	DFID, Italy, Japan, Norway and UNDP/core resources
Component 2: Area-Based Economic Recovery for Affected Communities in South and Central Somalia				
- Income-generating opportunities through training and vocations development - Employment generation and micro-grants - Community management of natural resources	X			UNDP/BCPR
Component 3: Integrated Watershed Management				
- Employment and income generation through infrastructure rehabilitation and vocational training	X	X	X	Norway, UNDP/core resources
Component 4: Private Sector Development				
- Improvement of the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks - Improvement of the business environment		X	X	UNDP/core resources
Component 5: Environment				
- institutional support and awareness - Enhancing alternative sources of energy			X X	UNDP/core resource
Component 6: Joint Programme for Internally Displaced Persons				
- Joint UN pilot project for nine IDP settlements in Bossaso		X		Japan

Source: UNDP Somalia, March 2010

*South and Central Somalia, **Puntland, ***Somaliland.

million to RSL activities, representing 15.8 percent of total expenditure. UNDP core resources have financed half the RSL programmes. Raising funds for RSL programmes has been a challenge as several donors hold the view that UNDP ought to concentrate on institutional support to the government while donor funds for livelihoods activities can be channelled through NGOs.

The Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods portfolio⁶¹ comprises the major components as summarized in Table 8 and described below.

4.3.1 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION FOR EARLY RECOVERY

The (Employment Generation for Early Recovery) EGER project started during the fourth quarter of 2008 and addresses the urgent need for income and jobs in South and Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland through work for the improvement of basic, social and economic infrastructure. It is a short-term intervention aimed at providing an injection of cash in the hands of vulnerable families. All interventions are implemented through NGOs and CSO.

During the first year of operations, the project generated a total of some 430,000 workdays; 35 percent of the beneficiaries were women and 20 percent internally displaced persons. Infrastructure that was rehabilitated included water catchment areas, rural access roads, irrigation canals and strengthened river embankments.

The team could not visit South and Central Somalia where EGER activities are implemented and is not in a position to comment on the actual results of interventions. In similar activities visited in Puntland and Somaliland, however, it was evident that, most often, the primary objective of the intervention was limited to providing income and not enough attention was given to the quality⁶² of the product generated by workers.

This raises fear that the situation could be the same for the EGER project, a potential problem that should be assessed independently.

4.3.2 AREA-BASED EARLY RECOVERY

The Area-Based Early Recovery (ABER) project also started late in 2008, primarily in the Bay and Middle Shebelle regions of South and Central Somalia. It is funded by the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR): \$2.28 million was spent in 2009. The intended outcome of the project is to ensure a tangible increase in income levels within vulnerable communities through the creation of sustainable employment opportunities and improved community capacities to manage natural resources. The project is implemented through pre-qualified NGOs and consulting firms.

During the first year of operations, some 4,400 persons in 50 communities benefited from activities that included training in various agricultural, livestock management and small business skills as well as hygiene, sanitation, participatory approaches, leadership, conflict management, early warning, drought management, HIV/AIDS, and gender. A micro-grant programme helped 156 families and 134 women-headed households in getting stable income. In parallel, 220,000 workdays were generated through one-time employment for the rehabilitation of infrastructure.

It is reported that the success rate for the micro-finance grants is about 90 percent, which would be far higher than the experience in other countries where microfinance is known to have been successful. Benchmarking with other organizations like World Vision, CARE and others, which have worked in the area of income-generating programmes in Somalia, would be useful for UNDP to assess the second-hand reports the organization relies on for tracking performance.

⁶¹ UNDP, 'Country Brief Somalia', updated September 2009.

⁶² See Box 5 for a description of some of the technical problems witnessed by the ADR team.

As UNDP staff has no access to the region where ABER is being implemented, all monitoring was done through private consulting companies and through a combination of, *inter alia*, telephone interviews with beneficiaries, video recordings, radio interviews of beneficiaries. While this approach had challenges and shortcomings, the RSL programme has experimented with innovative approaches in monitoring.

4.3.3 INTEGRATED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

The integrated watershed management project supports the implementation of a wide variety of community priorities, ranging from infrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation works, construction and rehabilitation of communal water supplies, soil and water conservation, environmental health, access roads, market-places, flood control, and support to agriculture infrastructure and crop production) to vocational training. The project is active in South and Central Somalia (Juba and Shebelle basins) and in Somaliland (Hargeisa flood control). In Puntland, the active water development and conservation projects are financed mainly from the EGER project. The integrated watershed management project applies a community-based approach in the implementation of activities and involves the beneficiary communities in all phases of the project, including identification of priorities, mobilization of community members, and implementation through CSOs, CBOs and local stakeholders.

UNDP has in the past done considerable work in water management, particularly in the Middle Shebelle region. Near Jowhar in South and Central Somalia, UNDP worked with the World Food Programme (WFP), the regional administration and the local beneficiary communities for the rehabilitation of a 15-kilometre portion of the Duduble (China) canal across the Shebelle River (see Box 4). One of the explanations for the success of the project is the strong ownership displayed by beneficiaries and authorities, including through direct participation in funding. Out of

the total cost of \$1million, two thirds were covered by the communities and the administration, and one third was contributed by UNDP and WFP. The project was designed to respond to emergency flood disasters along the Shebelle River basin. Diverted floodwater and agriculture potential of the surrounding areas were harnessed to increase food production benefiting the large local population. The project was completed by June 2005.

Box 4. A success story from South and Central Somalia

The following short article appeared in the March 2006 edition of 'South and Central Somalia: overview of humanitarian environment in South and Central Somalia', published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) for Somalia.

"Four months after the inauguration of the Duduble (China) canal in Jowhar, there has been a dramatic change, not only in scenery but also in the livelihoods of the people in the area. 14,000 hectares of simsim (sesame) have been planted fed by the waters of the recently rehabilitated 15-kilometre canal, some of which is now being harvested. Trucks are transporting the harvested grain to Mogadishu for sale and further for export to the Gulf. In Jowhar, the grain is being processed locally into sesame oil. The planting, harvesting and processing are all labour intensive and have created thousands of jobs in the area. The rehabilitation of the canal is a joint venture between the local community and administration, UNDP and WFP."

However, some of the projects implemented in the Puntland and Somaliland regions - at least on the few sites visited by the ADR - have suffered from a number of technical weaknesses (see Box 5). UNDP needs to develop its understanding and approach to watershed management if it seriously wants to intervene in this area. Watershed management requires a more holistic understanding of the principles of land and water use in the local context. Moreover, as UNDP staff has limited access to some of the areas where watershed management projects are implemented, it is important that they recruit the services of experts in watershed management to help in the design,

Box 5. Observations on the technical appropriateness of some watershed management interventions

The ADR team visited 11 sites in Somaliland and Puntland where UNDP has undertaken construction or rehabilitation of *berkads*,⁶³ water tanks or reservoirs and soil and water conservation measures through staggered '*bunding*'.⁶⁴ Berkads seen were of good quality and well maintained by owners. The soil conservations structures (bunds) in seven sites visited in Somaliland and Puntland were made at the end of 2009 and are already damaged or washed away by the first rains. There are two main reasons for this: (a) when the bunds were made, the loose soil needed compacting and this was not done (this was also the case in a water

reservoir which was newly constructed about four months ago, but the side embankments have already collapsed and the soil washed back into the tank); and (b) bunds were not made along the contours of the land terrain, and the land being moderately undulating, this causes uneven pressure on the bunds during rains, leading to cracks even with low amount of runoff.

Additionally, it was observed that the soil and water conservation structures were made on selected plots, leaving some adjoining plots untreated. This accentuates erosion problems in the untreated land of neighbouring

farmers as a large volume of runoff water now flows into lands that have no obstructions (bunds). Already gullies could be seen forming in some of these 'left out' plots, and unless corrective measures are taken, these could lead to conflicts between farmers. It needs to be noted here that the very concept of watershed management implies that the entire catchment or micro-catchment is considered as one single watershed requiring appropriate treatment. The current approach taken by UNDP is not watershed-based. These are simply soil and water conservation structures on individual farmer's plots.

Source: Field visits by the ADR team.

implementation and monitoring of such projects. The monitoring companies hired for the purpose have civil engineers, but not watershed experts.

4.3.4 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Despite going through two decades of unresolved conflict, the private sector has developed in Somalia and in some cases can be said to have thrived amid political instability, particularly in the areas of trade, commerce, transport, remittances and infrastructure services and in the primary sectors, notably in livestock, agriculture and fisheries.⁶⁵ Low-cost cell phone networks cover the country and cash transfers are handled by an efficient *Hawala*⁶⁶ system in the absence of a national banking system.

UNDP support to the private sector has been geared towards improving the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks and improving the business environment for private initiatives to flourish. UNDP has over the past five years made two very significant interventions in promoting the private sector:

Somali Money Transmitters Association: The Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods (PRSL) programme originally focused on strengthening, and increasing the capacity of the private sector in Somalia. In 2006, the programme initiated dialogue with the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland, and helped launch a process to review and enhance the legal regime affecting businesses in these zones. Given that remittances serve as the backbone of the

⁶³ Shallow open wells which conserve runoff water during rainy seasons for use during dry seasons – a common practice in Somalia and parts of Ethiopia.

⁶⁴ A technical term used in soil and water conservation to describe low height embankments within farmers' plots to conserve water, and, when done along contours, these also reduce runoff or soil erosion.

⁶⁵ World Bank/UNDP Country Re-engagement Strategy, 2003.

⁶⁶ The 'client' informs the *Hawala* company of the payee's name and telephone number and the *Hawala* agents on the ground deliver the funds. Once the payee confirms by telephone to the client that the funds have been delivered, the client pays the *Hawala* company the funds plus a commission.

economy, a great deal of emphasis was placed on strengthening the Somali remittance sector. This was done through the establishment of the Somali Money Transmitters Association—an association of the key remittance companies of Somalia. In addition, UNDP deployed a technical expert to facilitate the compliance of key remittance companies with international regulations and anti-money-laundering procedures.

Support to Somali Livestock Board Project (Phase II). In response to the detrimental effects of a ban imposed on the import of livestock from Somalia in 2000 due to the Rift Valley Fever, UNDP joined hands with FAO and the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development to support the Somali meat export industry. Meat traders and slaughterhouse personnel underwent training in 2006 to learn the importance of quality assurance of their products for exports. The project was complementary to the EC-funded programme sharing the same objective of promoting Somali meat trade, through the setting-up of a Quality Assurance System based on international standards and the upgrading of the skills of the export meat operators.

An earlier project funded by LICUS⁶⁷ and implemented through UNDP assisted Somali authorities in establishing more rigorous systems of health certification of livestock products for export. Regional livestock boards were established to strengthen the monitoring and certification of livestock and chilled meat, in order to conform to the standards of importing countries.⁶⁸

This set of concerted interventions produced visible and measurable results: between 2005 and 2009, the number of meat carcasses exported from Somalia rose from 340,409 to 800,000, a growth of almost 120 percent in just five years.

As part of another interlinked initiative, a livestock marketing information system was

developed in Somaliland with UNDP support. It collects and disseminates data from three livestock markets, namely Hargeisa, Burao and Tog Wajaale, as well as Berbera port. Implemented by the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce with the Ministry of Livestock, the system provides information on the number of exporters, statistics on prices paid to suppliers and retail prices of key staple foods commodities. Data are collected twice a week and disseminated to rural areas through truck drivers, radio broadcasts, local press, short message services (SMSs), etc., and covers about 300 villages, helping livestock owners to make informed decisions about the sale of animals.

4.3.5 ENVIRONMENT

UNDP supported the capacity development of the Somaliland Ministry of Environment through the provision of basic equipment, training in environmental management and enhanced land degradation monitoring, and the rehabilitation of government tree nurseries. The project also aimed at enhancing public awareness and advocacy by providing environmental education through the media.

The Ministry has not yet developed an analysis of the environmental issues in Somaliland, or how it intends to address them. Currently, the main plank of the Ministry's environmental awareness campaign is about not cutting trees, a message that rings hollow in a country where the sole source of fuel used for cooking purposes is firewood and charcoal, as no other alternative is available in rural or urban areas. A more nuanced approach to addressing the issues of deforestation which incorporates regenerative measures, scientific methods of tree cutting and use, introduction of firewood-efficient stoves, and management of common land (pastures) will be needed if the current campaign is to have any effect on people. The Ministry will continue to

⁶⁷ A special World Bank facility for 'Low-income countries under stress'.

⁶⁸ UNDP, 'Country Brief Somalia', updated September 2009.

need international support to move forward on the complex range of issues related to environment in Somaliland.

The environment component of the UNDP programme has been small so far, a deficiency that the next country programme document intends to address. The UNDP Somalia country office had an environment programme officer, but that post has been vacant for some time. UNDP Somalia sees environment as an important growing area for UNDP future programmes. It is understood that early in 2009, UNDP approached the Garowe municipality to manage its solid waste through a public-private partnership, but this has not materialized yet.

4.3.6 JOINT PROGRAMME FOR THE PROTECTION, REINTEGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

UNDP has been involved in providing support to internally displaced persons and returnees since 2001 under a project for the reintegration of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. The project was initially intended as a joint venture between UNDP and UNHCR but was later implemented solely by UNDP. A 2006 evaluation⁶⁹ concluded that the project had been overly ambitious in terms of stated outcomes and outputs and should have been reviewed during the course of implementation. It noted, however, the positive inter-agency collaboration that the project generated and recommended that joint programming should be pursued in the future.

The joint UN pilot programme for internally displaced persons⁷⁰ involving FAO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR and UNICEF started in November 2007 as a two-year programme that

has now been extended to June 2010. The total budget is about \$4 million for two years, with the largest share going to UN-Habitat (\$2.7 million) and UNDP (\$1 million approximately). The funds for the programme are administered by UNDP under a ‘pass-through’ fund management mechanism.⁷¹ With financial support from the Government of Japan, the five UN partners are providing assistance to internally displaced persons and host communities through a number of initiatives aimed at:

- a) Strengthening protection and security in nine existing temporary and permanent settlements
- b) Improving living conditions in the settlements
- c) Providing durable solutions for livelihoods, resettlement and reintegration.

UNDP participation in the joint UN programme has involved legal assistance to internally displaced persons and vulnerable groups through the Puntland Legal Aid Centre. The Centre referred legal cases from the traditional to the formal justice system, raised legal awareness and settled 30 cases through mediation at the local communities and internally displaced persons camps levels. The construction of a small market is planned and should benefit both the internally displaced persons and the host community. Finally, vocational skill training for 250 persons is programmed for the first half of 2010.

There is no single focal point for this project within UNDP to follow up on the implementation, and this has caused some delays. Focal points exist in all other agencies involved in the programme. At the time of the ADR visit, discussions were taking place between UN partners on the future extension of the programme with

⁶⁹ Andre Klap and Michael Adair, ‘Outcome Evaluation: Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (RRIDP-UNDP component)’, Nairobi, 3 March 2006.

⁷⁰ According to estimates from the local authorities, there would be some 70,000 internally displaced persons in Bossaso, up from 35,000 estimated four years ago.

⁷¹ UNDP, acting as administrative agency, receives funds from the donor and simply transfers these funds to other participating agencies according to agreed plans. The receiving agency assumes the full programmatic and financial responsibility and accountability for such funds.

some agencies stating a clear preference for a lighter form of ‘joint programming’ over ‘joint programmes’ structures.

4.3.7 UNOSOM LEGACY PROJECTS

Fifteen years after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, UNDP continues to administer two activities that the UN mission had assumed in the absence of functioning national authorities:

- The first project concerns the ‘Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia’ (CACAS) operating from facilities in Nairobi, and currently handling some 500 flights and 8,000 passengers each month. UNDP acts as a financial administrator for this operation supervised by ICAO.
- The second is the Mogadishu Port Project, under which UNDP held in trust some \$1.3 million generated from the operations of the port prior to the withdrawal of UNOSOM as well as some equipment stored in Mombasa.

These projects are administered by the RSL programme unit although they are not related to the outcomes of that programme but they have had an administrative and human resource cost for that unit. UNDP has made persistent attempts to regularize the situation and pass on the responsibility to competent international or national institutions. Considerable progress has now been made and the two activities are hopefully going to be transferred in the course of 2010.

4.3.8 ASSESSMENT OF THE RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME

The activities carried out under the RSL programme targeted vulnerable communities and groups in need of additional income and also addressed broader economic needs, particularly for meat exports in a country where more than half the population earns a living from livestock. As such, interventions have been relevant to people’s needs and to national priorities.

The RSL programme, however, would have benefited from increased internal coherence. The programme comprises a wide range of activities, some of which have been inherited from previous programming cycles while others represent more recent initiatives in an attempt to reorient the overall strategy of the country programme more towards interventions benefiting the poor and promoting MDGs. As such, the RSL programme remains more of an umbrella covering various activities, some of which are not interrelated.

The expected outcome under the RSL programme is that “vulnerable communities have increased income from equitable and sustainable employment opportunities and are better able to manage natural resources”. Income generation has been at the centre of projects such as EGER, ABER and watershed management and it is also present in the UNDP project implemented as part of the joint UN programme for internally displaced persons or some of the few initiatives concerning environment. In addition to generating that income, projects are most often linked to the rehabilitation of infrastructure or the construction of new facilities. The programme thus intends to pursue two parallel objectives: providing resources to economically or socially vulnerable groups and persons while at the same time contributing to community welfare by rehabilitating damaged social infrastructure and services, constructing new ones or undertaking work benefiting the community. However, in actual implementation, the emphasis has often been put on producing income more than leaving behind a sustainable product from that work, especially in EGER and watershed projects.

Opportunities have been missed to develop creative and productive initiatives while ensuring greater coherence and sustainability and more visibility for UNDP. For example, in both Puntland and Somaliland, management of non-degradable solid waste (plastics, household scraps, etc.) is a major problem resulting in the clogging of drainage systems during rains, aggravating floods that regularly affect larger towns.

This is a problem that is not addressed and UNDP could provide short-term employment through cleaning-up campaigns while helping the authorities in setting up waste collection and processing facilities to deal with this major environmental and health hazard. It is understood that in early 2009, UNDP approached the Garowe municipality to manage its solid waste through a public-private partnership, but this has not materialized yet.

Although the ADR team was unable to gather any primary data on the performance of income-generating projects and microfinance in the South and Central region, the EGER and watershed management work visited in both Somaliland and Puntland lacked a holistic analysis of vulnerability and livelihood strategies adopted by people.

UNDP interventions in cooperation with the private sector, particularly for the support to meat exports, have yielded positive results and, in general, cooperation with the private sector is an area where UNDP could build on its comparative advantage. Government authorities in Puntland were generally positive about the internally displaced persons project in Bossaso as they felt that local authorities were closely involved in its implementation.

4.4 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

4.4.1 HIV/AIDS PROGRAMME

With an estimated prevalence of 0.5 percent among the total population, HIV/AIDS infection rates in Somalia appear to be low. There is, however, new evidence that infection rates are higher at an estimated 1 percent.

This lack of reliable health data for Somalia is attributed to the absence of a comprehensive survey on HIV/AIDS prevalence,⁷² years of isolation and civil strife, and oscillating population migrations into and out of Somalia.

Three Somali AIDS Commissions have been established. The first one was set up in Somaliland, the second in Puntland, and the third in Baidoa (now moved to Mogadishu) in South and Central Somalia. The three national commissions have been successful in working together above politics in spite of conflict and divisions between and within regions.

The political commitment has uncharacteristically remained high, leading to securing of major response resources, including from the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM or 'Global Fund'). Currently, the Commissions function almost exclusively with external assistance and benefit from salary scales higher than those of the civil services. Their long-term sustainability will require that they be incorporated in the respective civil services and their status and conditions of service harmonized.

With expenditure totalling \$5.4 million between 2005 and 2009, UNDP programmes to address HIV/AIDS represent less than 3 percent of total programme expenditure for the period. UNDP HIV/AIDS programmes have been funded largely by the Global Fund supplemented by donor contributions and UNDP core resources. The GFATM has been the major contributor to the overall effort to combat HIV/AIDS in Somalia, with a total grant of \$24 million for the period 2005-2010. UNICEF has been designated as principal recipient of the Global Fund grant and signs Letters of Agreement with other participating agencies, as required.

UNDP interventions have concentrated on two major aspects: the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the three AIDS commissions; and advocacy programmes aimed at inducing behaviour changes. Table 9 provides an overview of UNDP interventions contributing to the fight against HIV/AIDS.

⁷² Current estimates are based on sero-prevalence survey on women attending ante-natal clinics.

Table 9. HIV/AIDS programmes (2005-2009)
Total expenditure: US\$ 5.4 million

Expected output (associated with CPD 2008-2010 outcome, which reads "Key Federal, Somaliland and Puntland governments administer and manage core government functions more effectively with accountability and inclusion")				
National HIV/AIDS commissions better able to coordinate an integrated response to HIV/AIDS				
Component/main activities	Project active in			Sources of funding
	SC*	PL**	SL***	
Component 1: Strengthening Institutional Capacity				
- HIV/AIDS response management - Multi-sectoral capacity-building	X	X	X	Denmark, DFID, Norway, USAID, Global Fund (UNICEF) and UNDP/ Core resources
Component 2: Advocacy and Behaviour Change				
- Programmes for most at risk groups - Religious leaders advocacy - Guidelines for clinical management and procurement of ART drugs	X	X	X	DFID, Global Fund (UNICEF), UNAIDS, World Bank and UNDP/ Core resources

Source: UNDP Somalia, March 2010

* South and Central Somalia, ** Puntland, *** Somaliland.

UNDP has strengthened institutional capacity by cooperating with the three AIDS commissions to develop and test a number of training tools for general awareness and to support work with populations that are most at risk. Support has also been provided for the development of policies and annual workplans by the commissions.

In Somalia, the stigma that is associated with HIV/AIDS is very high. Religious leaders play a pivotal role in their communities and have considerable influence and leverage. The Religious Leaders Advocate Project, which has been implemented since 2006, seeks to equip religious leaders with necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to play a greater role in HIV/AIDS prevention. By December 2009, some 1,000 religious leaders had been trained in advocacy methods. An additional initiative, the Behaviour Change Communication Project, which also began in 2006, supports the training of women and youth peer educators, religious leaders, NGOs and members of the uniformed services on behaviour change. UNDP has also

worked with NGOs representing people living with HIV/AIDS and promoting their rights. In general, the programme is well targeted in its focus on the most vulnerable in society (internally displaced persons, minorities, transactional sex workers, women, youths and truck drivers). In developing its advocacy interventions, the country office benefited from the support the Cairo Regional Office through its HIV/AIDS Regional Programme for Arab States.

The management of the country office has emphasized the need to streamline HIV/AIDS concerns in all programmes and this process is well under way.

4.4.2 ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Through its Human Development and Economics Unit (HDEU),⁷³ UNDP has been supporting the capacity of authorities in the areas of macro-economic and poverty-related data collection and analysis in Somaliland, Puntland and South

⁷³ The HDEU was established as a standalone unit in 2007.

and Central Somalia. The overall objective of these efforts is to generate a set of data that will enhance the local and national administrations in making data-driven development planning decisions.

Accurate and up-to-date development data for Somalia remains inadequate. Nevertheless, early in 2007 the first full assessment of Somalia's position regarding the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was published.⁷⁴ This assessment shows that Somalia is set to miss most of the MDG targets unless there is a dramatic turn-around in its economic and human development prospects.

Some partners of UNDP, including among donors and Somali authorities, have expressed the view that issues related to MDGs appear to be irrelevant – and even a luxury – in the context of Somalia. This underlines the need for stronger advocacy by UNDP to ensure that MDGs lie at the heart of the Somali development agenda.

In 2009, UNDP launched a new initiative⁷⁵ with the objective of supporting the Somali administrations to identify the necessary interventions required to meet basic service delivery functions and progress towards the MDGs. The project will support the production of the Somalia Human Development Report in 2010⁷⁶ and the introduction of a human development course in selected universities.

The project will also build and strengthen the foundations for a nationally owned, participatory process to prepare MDG-aligned development strategies and strengthen institutional capacity to achieve development results by helping to build capacity of the ministries of planning and the line ministries in all regions.

4.5 ASSESSMENT OF UNDP PROGRAMME INTERVENTIONS

4.5.1 RELEVANCE

UNDP interventions are fully aligned to the basic strategic documents governing assistance to Somalia. The basic strategic document guiding international assistance for Somalia is the RDP (2008-2012), which has often been perceived as a donor-driven exercise and as a framework more than an actual programme. Nevertheless, all Somali authorities have accepted it as a valid strategic document and an accepted basis for discussions with donors. In line with the RDP, the UNCT has developed a UNTP for 2008-2010. UNDP itself has based its current CPD (2008-2010) on the UNTP and the RDP.

The programme, however, has not addressed sufficiently some of the fundamental aspects of the organization's mandate. Supporting national efforts in the pursuit of MDGs is central to the UNDP mandate. UNDP has been tasked with a responsibility to engage in advocacy for MDGs, to help governments develop relevant strategies, to monitor and report on MDG progress and to engage in related operational activities.⁷⁷ The contribution of UNDP to advocacy for MDGs in Somalia has largely been limited to the publication of a national report in 2007.

As a result of circumstances in Somalia and the emergency and short-term approach of the aid community, UNDP has also not given sufficient attention to addressing the needs of the vulnerable and the poor through development measures. There have been efforts recently to redress that situation but the approach taken, particularly in the RSL programme, still lacks strategic coherence.

⁷⁴ Millennium Development Goals Report for Somalia, UNDP Somalia, 2007.

⁷⁵ Inclusive Development for Poverty Reduction in Somalia: Project Document 2009-2012, UNDP Somalia, 2009.

⁷⁶ The last one was published in 2001.

⁷⁷ UN Core Strategies on MDGs available at <http://www.undp.org/mdg/roles.shtml>.

Finally, the appropriateness of interventions in terms of responding adequately to the requirements of end-users and being technically sound is an important consideration when examining the relevance of programmes. Some of the examples mentioned in this report and resulting from site visits by the ADR team in Somaliland and Puntland illustrate this point. In all cases, the need was genuine but the technical design was flawed often due to insufficient consultations with the direct beneficiaries (e.g., the market hall in Garowe town) or absence of technical inputs in design or supervision (e.g., bunding work near Hargeisa or the Gardo prison).

4.5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The analysis in the ADRs focuses on outcomes, intended or not, to which UNDP contributed. In order to do so, the existence of baseline data becomes crucial to compare situations before and after the intervention. The ADR team found that strategic documents such as the UNTP and CDP state outcomes in very broad terms. In addition, there are generally no reliable or measurable indicators of progress towards achieving outcomes. The fundamental difficulty is that most projects, particularly the older ones, have been designed in the absence of reliable statistical baseline information. The emphasis therefore remains on inputs and outputs, a situation reflected in reports to donors. The mid-term evaluation of the UNTP conducted in 2009 noted that there was “very limited baseline data which makes assessment of the level of implementation difficult. It has led to absence of quantifiable objectives – it is not possible to measure if targets have been achieved”. The same evaluation concludes that “stakeholders also see shortcomings especially in effectiveness and in adding value, they are particularly critical of the capacity to measure impact or sustainability of outcomes”⁷⁸

An analysis of the Results Frameworks of the three successive programme documents covering

the period 2005 to 2010 reveals, however, that UNDP Somalia has improved its definition of outcomes and outputs, most of which are now being stated in terms of changes in the lives of communities and vulnerable populations and accompanied by more specific targets and indicators. It has nevertheless been noted that outcomes are often too ambitious for programme cycles of only two years each.

Some aspects of programme management in UNDP Somalia have not been clearly results-based. Interventions are still too often marked by an ‘emergency mode’ that has implied, for example, that priority is often given to the temporary income-generating objectives in some projects over the quality and sustainability of the output of the workforce. A sound results-based programme management implies a strong and efficient monitoring and evaluation function. There is a consensus that this function has been generally weak in the programme during the period under review. The ADR team could trace only seven project evaluations undertaken during the five-year period. Each project is expected to develop annual workplans that are expected to include a section on monitoring and evaluation. A cursory analysis of some of the workplans indicates that the focus of monitoring and evaluation is still very much on quantitative outputs rather than outcomes in terms of documenting a change in the situation that prevailed at the inception of the project.

There are, however, several examples of good practice. The Joint Programme on Local Governance is developing a monitoring and evaluation system through a private company expected to provide regular feedback allowing adjustments in the project approach on a continuous basis. The same type of effort aimed at establishing sound baseline information has been carried out in developing the new community safety programme (AVR). The project for Access to Justice provides another example of good

⁷⁸ Henrik Jespersen et al., ‘Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNTP in Somalia’, May-June 2009.

practice: a sample of 200 court users in four different districts of South and Central Somalia was interviewed in 2008 to obtain information about the quality and efficiency of services they received from the judicial system. The HIV/AIDS programme has also developed means of assessing the results of the advocacy programmes with religious leaders and groups at risk. It should be noted that efforts are under way to address this general weakness in monitoring and evaluation by engaging a monitoring and evaluation expert in the design of the new CPD.

Five categories of interventions emerge from an analysis of the effectiveness of UNDP operations over recent years:

- a) Interventions in which UNDP is acting as a provider of a service in support of the political process or of international strategic priorities. These include, for example, support for a particular conference or event through the construction or rehabilitation of buildings and other forms of administrative support, such as travel and per diem payments for participants or the rental of premises and conference services. Such activities do not have specific development objectives and most of them are one-time interventions. UNDP has also entered into longer-term administrative support for the payment of some salaries and stipends representing roughly \$1.5 million each month in 2010. This second form of administrative support is not accompanied by a clear development objective intended to capacitate the government to eventually assume the financial and administrative responsibility for its own functioning. Such activities have generally not lent themselves to the implementation of any exit strategy, largely as a result of the incapacity of the government to finance and manage the activity;
- b) Interventions that provided the planned outputs but where expected results did not materialize since the outputs were destroyed owing either to the resumption of conflict or to poor quality control in design and monitoring. This category includes most of the investments in infrastructure and equipment provided in South and Central Somalia prior to 2008 in the areas of law enforcement, access to justice or institution-building. The results of training programmes have also often been lost as administrations and services were disbanded as a result of fighting, corruption or by new power-sharing agreements that implied that new incumbent ministers would change most of the senior personnel. At times, as discussed earlier, results have been negated through poor design and quality control;
- c) Interventions whose results – and therefore effectiveness – cannot be fully assessed in the short term. This concerns mainly capacity development programmes addressing state institutions. Such programmes suffer from a short-term approach in programming, a lack of predictability in funding and, more generally, an absence of comprehensive long-term strategies and plans developed jointly between the authorities and the international community;
- d) Some interventions where results are more visible and measurable stand out as examples of good practice. Among many other projects, the support to chilled meat export, the improvement of public finance management in Somaliland, the relationship established with universities in all regions and the HIV/AIDS advocacy project with religious leaders can be mentioned as having achieved good results;
- e) For some new community-based projects, it is too early to assess results. But several have had a promising start by emphasizing groundwork with communities to develop a participatory approach and establish a solid knowledge of situations based on a detailed analysis of community dynamics. This has been the case, for example, in the project for local governance and the one for community safety.

4.5.3 EFFICIENCY

The nature of the operational environment in Somalia implies costs of delivering assistance that are much higher than usual. The following factors contribute to exceptionally high operating costs:

- a) The UN classification of the security situation as a phase IV or V necessitates special protection measures such as armoured vehicles, police escorts as well as protected offices and staff compounds;
- b) Head offices of UN agencies have been established in Nairobi since the beginning of the 1990s. Since the almost total evacuation of staff in 2008, all services are based in Nairobi and operations are run through ‘remote management’. This has resulted in high travel and per diem costs for the limited staff visits to Somalia and the setting-up of an expensive network of NGOs or commercial firms contracted exclusively to monitor the performance and outputs of other NGOs or local CSOs contracted to implement projects;
- c) The formula of remote management has also led to increased costs for liaising with Somali partners. For example, most consultations with authorities and other partners, meetings, conferences and training sessions take place outside the country and UNDP covers fully the expenses of participants, including the processing of visas, air travel, per diem allowances and the logistics of meetings and conferences. In addition to those direct costs, UNDP has had to devote an inordinate amount of valuable staff time on such purely administrative issues.

The cost of delivering assistance in Somalia is excessively high for all organizations and the ADR team heard a number of ‘guesstimates’ ranging from 40 to 70 percent. But little

documented information exists about these ‘administrative costs’, which are not even clearly defined. UNDP is in the same situation and the country office was not in a position to provide overall estimates that would cover the three categories of exceptional expenditure mentioned above. A partnership evaluation carried out on behalf of a group of donors in 2009, states that it “is interesting to note over the three years that 63 percent has been spent on administration, personnel and general management”.⁷⁹ The statement, however, is based on data relating exclusively to the ROLS programme for the period 2006-2008 and that data was ‘reconfigured’ by the evaluators. In addition, the categories of expenditure given in the evaluation report are not defined in detail.

Delivering assistance in the difficult political and security environment of Somalia requires effective risk management. At the end of 2008, in parallel with the decision to pursue operations through increased remote management, UNDP initiated a risk analysis that was soon expanded as a joint UNCT exercise. The inter-agency team working under the guidance of the UNCT Steering Committee comprising UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS and WFP produced a report in June 2009 that outlined 19 different risks affecting either the reputation of the UN or its capacity to deliver effectively and recommended mitigating action and procedures.⁸⁰

In 2009, UNDP Somalia (Operations Section) developed specific and very detailed guidelines and procedures to ensure appropriate risk management during the implementation phase of programmes, particularly regarding the commercial procurement of goods and services and contracting with NGOs and CBOs. On the programmatic side, the country office relies on the UNDP corporate Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework, which is not as situation-specific as the tool developed by the Operations

⁷⁹ ‘Evaluation of the UNDP Strategic Partnership for Somalia’, Adam Smith International, July 2009, p. 7.

⁸⁰ ‘Inter-agency Mission Report: UNCT Somalia Risk Management’, UNCT, 19 June 2009.

Section. In general, the ADR found that strong risk management procedures existed for the implementation of programme activities but that they were much weaker for the decision-making process related in particular to strategic choices for programme orientation and areas of intervention.

The financial management of programmes needs to be strengthened. Programme managers are competent in their field of expertise and can contribute effectively to the programme strategies and designs. They lack, however, specific training on UNDP financial management system and are generally not in a position to manage the financial aspects of programmes. For example, it has been extremely difficult for the ADR team to get precise information from the country office regarding expenditure for each of the programme components. The discrepancy that exists between the thematic areas of the Somalia programme and the corporate focus areas further compounds the problem as it becomes difficult to obtain from the central Atlas system financial information that corresponds to the Somalia programme structure.

Some interventions have often neglected quality control in design and monitoring. UNDP Somalia put in place an elaborate system of vetting potential NGO or CSO implementing contractors. As required, additional training was provided to ensure better performance. The vetting and the training, however, addressed primarily skills that have to do with compliance with UNDP systems and procedures, mainly for reporting and financial management. In a number of project activities visited by the ADR team – admittedly only a small portion of total interventions – it was evident that neither the implementing agent nor the NGO or commercial contractor employed to do independent monitoring possessed the specific technical knowledge that could help identify and redress quality faults that endangered the results of projects. No independent technical expertise was sought to compensate for this weakness.

A major effort has been undertaken in recent years to improve coherence and synergy between projects and programmes. A ‘silo’ approach has indeed been identified in the partnership evaluation⁸¹ as one of the problems limiting both effectiveness and efficiency. The management is now enforcing regular coordination meetings between programmes and the ongoing process of drafting the next country programme provides a good example of a fully participative and inclusive process at the level of the Nairobi office. The process would probably have benefited from more intensive participation of sub-office staff in the initial stages. There will be a need to formalize such processes further so as to ensure that they become fully integrated in the institutional culture of the office.

UNDP Somalia decided at the end of 2006 to establish three sub-offices with a large degree of delegated authority and to transform Nairobi into a support office. Following the 2008 security incidents and more stringent security restrictions, the delegation of authority had to be reduced. The long absence of heads of offices left more junior staff without the necessary financial and procurement training to implement delegated authority. As a result, renewed over-centralization in Nairobi led to considerable implementation delays. An almost caricatural example of such delays was given to the ADR team in Hargeisa: the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, with support from UNDP, has updated its list of members and professional services in Somaliland to be published as a booklet. UNDP ruled that the order be processed in Nairobi and 11 months later, the booklet is still not printed.

Most implementing partners complain of the slow procedures and heavy bureaucratic approach of UNDP, particularly for the approval of contracts and for payments. This is a complaint that is found in most programmes around the world and is often valid, as UNDP has developed an institutional culture that is very process- rather

⁸¹ ‘Evaluation of the UNDP Strategic Partnership for Somalia’, Adam Smith International, July 2009.

than results-oriented. It has to be mentioned nevertheless that the special operating circumstances in Somalia and the remote management formula impose prudence on the part of an organization that wishes to promote full accountability.

4.5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

UNDP was engaged in certain activities where the results are either short-term or non-developmental in nature and, therefore, are not sustainable. In general, however, sustainability and the related issue of national ownership need to be viewed first against the specific background pertaining to each region where programmes are implemented, and second according to the type of intervention.

Projects implemented in South and Central Somalia have suffered from a very fragile security situation, the resumption and intensification of conflict and the very hostile attitude of certain de facto authorities such as Al Shabaab. There have been experiences in the past of investments in infrastructure and equipment being totally lost and capacity development programmes ending with the disbandment of beneficiary organizations and services. There is no strong evidence to show that the ongoing capacity development activities, most of which imply the exclusive financial responsibility of external actors, will result in increased national ownership and long-term sustainability. The interventions that seem to have had longer-term results concern mainly the rehabilitation of productive infrastructure benefiting a community directly. Work undertaken in the past in the Middle and Lower Shebelle regions is often quoted as an example of sustainable results.

By contrast, activities aimed at institutional development, support to civilian police and access to justice undertaken in the two northern regions offer more signs of national ownership. This corresponds to a level of stability, effective government presence across the territory and improved governance that can support interventions of a development nature.

Finally, there is evidence that in all regions programmes that put emphasis on local participation and ownership as well as tangible benefits for the people are more successful. Such is the case so far for some interventions under income generation and job creation schemes, the local governance programme and some activities concerning internally displaced persons.

4.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP

4.6.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

It is generally recognized that the three regions that constituted the Republic of Somalia up to 1991 have evolved differently. Although the integrity of Somalia as a single State and territory is systematically reaffirmed by the African Union and the Security Council, the reality is that the three parts of Somalia today present features that justify differentiated approaches in the assessment of needs and programme design. From a situation of active conflict to an emerging state of development, the differences are important and need to be accompanied by a pragmatic and realistic approach. During the period under review, UNDP planning cycles were short and workplans were developed on an annual basis, and often times, consultation has been limited to internal UNDP Nairobi-based staff and partners. While UNDP cannot develop region-based separate country programmes for presentation to its Executive Board, workplans and actual implementation would benefit from an approach reflecting the specificities of each region and from more intensive discussions with authorities directly concerned.

Throughout the period examined, UNDP responded promptly to unforeseen requirements to assist the political process (e.g., logistical support for the establishment of the Federal Parliament in Baidoa and Mogadishu, for the National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu and for the Djibouti Conference) or to provide administrative support functions on behalf of donors (payment of salaries and stipends, organizing

the travel of parliamentarians for sessions of that body, etc.). This, however, was done in a role of ‘service provider’ more than as mandated development interventions.

In a situation as volatile as the one in Somalia, an organization such as UNDP needs to show a high degree of nimbleness and adaptability coupled with a strong capacity to analyse developments and draw strategic and operational consequences. UNDP is often perceived as weak for its capacity to obtain reliable information, to analyse developments and to adjust its programmes and approaches accordingly. The UNTP foresaw three different scenarios ranging from ‘a best case scenario’ to a ‘most likely’ one and then to a ‘worst case’ scenario. The situation in South and Central Somalia gradually evolved towards the worst-case scenario. UNDP responded mainly by adapting its operational modus operandi through refinements in the remote management formula or the adoption of additional risk management procedures. It did not, however, question the continued validity of strategic programmatic choices and modified little in the contents of programmes.

Several NGOs and independent observers have noted that UNDP often limits itself to its traditional partners and to its own staff to develop knowledge about the Somali situation. They consider that UNDP would benefit from more interaction with independent observers such as broad-based human rights NGOs, journalists, and academics as well as from information gathered more systematically through existing Somali websites.

For the preparation of its next country programme, the country office has been using conflict analysis methods with support from BCPR. This will no doubt improve the capacity of the organization to be responsive to the Somali context. Previous programmes did not systematically use such methods.

4.6.2 PROMOTING UN VALUES

UNDP, as a lead development organization of the UN system, is expected to promote certain values that are embraced by the UN system:

A human rights-based approach: The promotion of human rights and the incorporation of that concern in the design and implementation of programmes are now a central element of the global UNDP approach. In Somalia, the design of projects in the past did not often emphasize the inclusion of human rights as a central concern. This has changed in recent years, in part as the result of criticisms about violations of human rights by police forces. Corrective action has been taken over the last two years to reintroduce more forcefully elements of protection of human rights. The training curriculum used in police academies now includes aspects of human rights and this training has become a condition for eligibility to receive stipends paid through UNDP. Advocacy programmes under the HIV/AIDS programme also promote the respect of the rights of victims.

Gender equality: UNDP global policies put emphasis on gender equality as one of the key elements in programming. UNDP programmes need to make women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.⁸²

UNDP has supported authorities in different regions of Somalia in taking forward the gender agenda. A national gender policy has been developed by the Government of Somaliland in 2009 and gender focal points are being set up in each ministry. In Puntland, UNDP has supported the development of a gender policy and a gender strategic plan.

⁸² UNDP Somalia. ‘Gender Training and Strategy Formulation’, Hargeisa, Garowe, and Nairobi, 21 July – 10 August 2007.

Too often, gender issues in programming are seen as quotas to be achieved in terms of women beneficiaries (30 percent in most projects). While this is a positive step and gives a concrete measure in the short run, a more nuanced and holistic understanding of gender in programming has yet to emerge. In specific terms, the following gaps were identified in programme documents and reports: (a) situations are not analysed using gender disaggregated data on poverty, access to services, the effects of violence, HIV/AIDS nor does the analysis show how gender relations at the household, family and community levels play out in terms of decision-making or control of resources; and (b) the monitoring tools and reports don't indicate any specific thrust on tracking how UNDP-supported programmes are affecting the gender relations at both household and community levels.

For the past two years, the country office has more forcefully pursued the streamlining of gender equality in both programming and office management. The Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) provides a good example of an in-depth analysis of the gender inequality situation. The JPLG project has a component which aims at increasing the participation of women in local councils. The Galkayo council now has six women members whereas previously they had none.⁸³

Other examples of good practice can be found in several projects. In planning for its next country programme, UNDP has foreseen a specific outcome on gender. It has also recruited a gender adviser for six months to work with programme officers and relevant authorities and help the office develop its own gender strategy.

The ADR noted that the UNDP Somalia management has recently nominated a focal point for gender in the country office. It is understood that similar focal points have also been nominated in field sub-offices, although it was apparent from

discussions in Hargeisa and Garowe that the capacity of these focal points to take forward gender issues remains limited. Experience in other countries has persistently shown that the presence of fully dedicated staff resources rather than just focal points leads to more effective streamlining of cross-cutting issues such as gender.

South-South cooperation: This is a strong point in the programme almost by default, as most of the capacity-building programmes have to rely on training in neighbouring countries. There is nonetheless a quasi absence of a regional approach and of systematic cooperation and cross-fertilization between UNDP offices in the region. A notable exception is the HIV/AIDS programme that benefited from a regional project⁸⁴ developed by the Regional Bureau for Arab States. In governance programmes, and particularly for its project helping with the drafting of a new Constitution, UNDP has been using regional expertise in an efficient manner.

4.6.3 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF UNDP IN SOMALIA

Through its long presence in Somalia, UNDP has developed a strong capacity to maintain dialogue with both authorities and communities for which the organization remains a credible interlocutor. Donors also consider UNDP as an important element of the international response to Somalia.

UNDP has provided appreciated support to the Joint Needs Assessment leading to the formulation of the RDP and produced some useful basic documents, such as the study on remittances and the role of the diaspora, and the 2007 Progress Report on MDGs. UNDP Somalia is currently working on a new National Human Development Report. The office's advocacy role on development issues has been valuable but could be further strengthened.

⁸³ 'Gender Audit Process/Consultancy Report', United Nations Country Team for Somalia (UNCT), January 2010.

⁸⁴ The HIV/AIDS Regional Programme for Arab States (HARPAS).

The following activities represented comparatively strong areas of intervention on which future programmes of UNDP can build:

- Activities in support of institution building, particularly in the areas of public finance and civil service reform
- Support to increased access to justice and the cooperation with faculties of law in all regions
- Community development initiatives developing a participatory and inclusive approach such as the local governance and community safety programmes
- Effective advocacy support in HIV/AIDS through religious leaders and persons living with HIV/AIDS
- Although few in number, activities to support private sector initiatives (meat exporters, chambers of commerce, etc.) have generally yielded positive results.

4.6.4 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPORT TO COORDINATION

UNDP maintains relationships with the authorities at the federal level and in Puntland and Somaliland. In each case, the ministry responsible for planning is the main partner and relations are also established with line ministries. At the community level, UNDP has provided support to local authorities and has often helped communities form local councils for the management of programmes. Consultations with authorities occur on the occasion of the presentation by UNDP of annual workplans, on the occasion of ‘outcome meetings’ or for special exercises such as the ongoing preparation for the next country programme. Authorities have made clear to the ADR team that, although they

value the existing consultation processes, they would appreciate more intensive interface with the country office management in order to have a clearer picture of long-term commitments and improve both the predictability of programmes and the transparency of financial operations. In both Puntland and Somaliland, authorities feel that the UNDP sub-offices could play a more efficient role if more authority and responsibility were delegated to them.

Relations with several donors are based on multi-year partnership agreements⁸⁵ concerning both the governance and the rule of law and security programmes. A number of donors express the opinion, however, that UNDP reports are lacking in quality, being poor on financial information and concerned mainly with listing outputs. There is also a perception among donor partners that UNDP does not share enough its risk management analysis and the problems encountered in implementation. They would appreciate a more transparent and forthcoming relationship. As donors also operate from Nairobi, they feel a strong need for more intensive sharing of information on operations taking place in Somalia. UNDP instituted ‘breakfast meetings’ with donors every Wednesday to serve as an informal information-sharing forum, with no specific agenda. The ‘breakfasts’ have now been transformed into bi-weekly ‘coffee meetings’ at the UNDP office, serving the same purpose and appreciated by the donor community.

UNDP Somalia has developed partnerships with non-traditional emerging donors. The League of Arab States contributed \$1 million to the UNDP project to promote the export of chilled meat and the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development participated in implementation.⁸⁶ On the basis of a global Memorandum of Understanding between the Zayed Foundation⁸⁷

⁸⁵ UNDP has signed multiyear strategic partnership agreements with the EC, Denmark, DFID, Norway, Sweden and USAID. Internally, the country office signed such a partnership agreement with BCPR. However, in terms of financing, EC is the only donor that provides multiyear financing. Others rely on annualized financing.

⁸⁶ See section chapter 4, section 4.3.

⁸⁷ The Zayed Foundation is a charitable and humanitarian organization established in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in August 1992.

and UNDP, signed in 2003, the UNDP Somalia programme was also able to secure a contribution of nearly \$1 million to implement water supply projects in 2007 and 2008.

At the broader level, the international community created in 2006 a forum called the ‘Coordination of International Support to Somalia’⁸⁸ (see section 2.2.2) together with a Somali Support Secretariat (SSS). Over the years, UNDP has provided support to both the SACB and the SSS, through UNOPS.

Relations between UNDP and NGOs and CSOs are intense in the Somali context. Support for civil society is often advocated as a strategy that can promote peacebuilding by acting as potential countervailing force to the power of predatory militia and weak government structures.⁸⁹ It is argued that by working with civil society, the international aid system can support fragile or failed States in moving towards peace and development.

The international aid system has focused strongly on the modern CSOs, particularly NGOs, to act as conduits for external assistance. Many of the projects implemented under the UNDP direct execution mode are in fact contracted to NGOs and CSOs. Under the remote management mechanism, other NGOs or commercial firms act as independent monitors on behalf of UNDP. In such a context, NGOs and CSOs have often been considered as contractors more than partners and capacity-building efforts have been geared towards training in methods and procedures enabling them to be efficient implementing agencies. In so doing, UNDP and other organizations and agencies have tended to

create organizations lacking downward accountability, dependent on external support and not addressing the wider roles for civil society⁹⁰ as an interface between the State and individuals. This highlights a lack of transparency and communication between those carrying out the projects and those being assisted, resulting in perceptions of certain groups being more like businesses rather than social assistance bodies.⁹¹

UNDP is an active member of the UNCT and of its thematic groups. The two joint programmes (local governance and internally displaced persons) created recently are good examples of innovative mechanisms promoted through the UNCT. UNDP Somalia provides valuable support to the Office of the Resident Coordinator and assumes administrative responsibility for a number of other common services on a cost-sharing basis. Given the importance of humanitarian issues in the portfolio of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and his additional responsibilities as UN Designated Official for security, the incumbent has much less time to devote to his role as Resident Representative of UNDP. The division of labour between the Resident Representative and the Country Director provides a model of efficiency in such management set-ups.

Important tensions have developed in recent years between the development and the humanitarian wings of the UN. Several organizations and groups have perceived UNDP as playing a political role and as having taken sides in the ongoing conflict as a result of its role in providing support to the TFG and to its law and order institutions on behalf of major donors. These organizations, both NGOs and UN agencies, have felt that their

⁸⁸ It replaced an earlier forum called the ‘Somalia Aid Coordination Body’ (SACB), which existed between 1993 and 2005.

⁸⁹ Paul Harvey, ‘Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the Answer?’, Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper 60, 1998.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ This issue was extensively debated in the Somali Civil Society Symposium, held in Hargeisa, in February 2003, which brought together some 300 civil society activists and organizers from all over Somalia and Somaliland. The report can be found at: <http://somali-civilsociety.org/templates/oxfamtemp/downloads/conference.pdf>.

association with UNDP tainted the necessary neutrality and independence of humanitarian action and even implied additional security risks for their staff. Most observers consider that the Resident Representative of UNDP, in his dual capacity as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, was in a particularly difficult situation but the understanding of respective positions has been improved over the years and tensions have been reduced. UNDP has also started addressing its image problem and diversifying its activities in favour of more community-based development work. In parallel, UNDP Somalia developed a communication strategy⁹² in March 2009. The strategy is designed to better inform partners and media about the totality of UNDP activities, including the less visible ones addressing governance, access to justice and community support. The application of the strategy has so far been more reactive than proactive and has concentrated mainly on the media, neglecting tools such as the UNDP website that needs urgent overhaul and the publication of periodical information bulletins.

4.7 SUPPORT FROM UNDP HEADQUARTERS AND GLOBAL NETWORKS

The ADR noted that interaction between the UNDP Somalia country office and the various support hubs within the global UNDP set-up have not been sufficient, with the exception of BCPR. The partnership agreement signed between UNDP Somalia and BCPR resulted in additional resources and technical support to enhance the quality of programmes.

The ADR team was informed that the UNDP senior managers assigned to the Somalia office over the years have often considered Somalia so much as a special case that they did not seem to have felt the necessity to seek support from within UNDP in a systematic way. In the same

way, offers of support have not always been forthcoming. Visits by staff of the Regional Bureau for Arab States have in the past been rather infrequent. In recent years, however, there has been more interaction, with two visits by staff from the Regional Bureau and support provided by the UNDP Regional Service Centre in Cairo, in particular for the HIV/AIDS programme.

In general, guidance from UNDP headquarters for exceptional operating environments such as the one in Somalia is inadequate. There is no specific official guidance, for example, for operations undertaken under a formula of remote management or for notions such as the ‘provider of last resort’ which affect programmes implemented in Somalia. In addition, there are no effective corporate mechanisms that could foster exchange of lessons and good practices on exceptional cases among country offices affected by similar challenges such as the offices for Iraq and Somalia.

The complex UN set-up for support to Somalia has not been helpful in promoting UN-wide discussion, exchange of ideas and deployment of support for UNDP Somalia. Somalia belongs geographically to the African continent and is a member of the African Union. It is also a member of the League of Arab States. Some UN organizations have included Somalia as part of their African regional set-up. UNDP for its part ensures the coverage from New York through the Regional Bureau for Arab States with a regional support office located in Cairo. This puts the UNDP Somalia country office in an awkward, and at times disadvantaged, position vis-à-vis other UN organizations for participation in events such as regional meetings and discussions among the UN agencies and the Regional Directors.

⁹² ‘External Communication Strategy – 2009-2010’, UNDP Country Office, 12 March 2009.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

UNDP has been pushed – and has allowed itself to be pushed – into assuming responsibility for certain tasks and services that have reduced the credibility of the organization as a neutral and impartial development agent. This has resulted in a loss of ‘development space’.

A considerable portion of UNDP expenditure has concerned the provision of administrative and logistical support for either the political process or for a fragile federal government and its institutions. Some interventions have steered controversy and the result was that UNDP has been increasingly perceived as a political actor and as an organization taking sides in a raging conflict. This has compromised UNDP credibility as a neutral and independent player in taking forward a pro-poor development agenda and has been detrimental to UNDP capacity to assume a strong leadership for development issues related to Somalia.

UNDP Somalia has strived to address this image-related challenge and has succeeded, to some extent, in attenuating the tensions with the humanitarian community. It has also attempted to diversify its portfolio in favour of more pro-poor and MDG support activities. The organization continues, however, to suffer from a crippling image deficit.

Understandably, UNDP is committed vis-à-vis some donors to pursue the activities that have brought its perception problem. The organization cannot simply walk out of existing commitments without finding alternative mechanisms. UNDP will need to find means, however, to develop exit strategies that would enable the organization, with support from donors, to gradually

concentrate more of its resources and energy on core mandate activities. UNPOS, for example, is currently exploring a commercial alternative for paying stipends to police officers in Mogadishu. This could present an occasion for UNDP to develop an exit strategy for that particular activity.

The term ‘dealing with a virtual Somalia’ is often used to describe a situation where most of the international community handles all interventions related to Somalia – whether of a political, humanitarian or developmental nature – from the comfortable distance provided by operational bases in Nairobi. Working from a distance or applying ‘remote management’ to a situation such as the one in Somalia means not only reduced access, but also more importantly reduced information, a more limited capacity of analysis and an increased exposure to operational risks regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency and accountability.

Over the years, UNDP Somalia has devised a number of means and mechanisms that have allowed UNDP to continue part of its operations through a remote management formula. The approach had to be intensified with the evacuation of most staff at the end of 2008. Apart from Iraq, there are few examples of the UN, particularly its development wing, operating with such an approach and clear institutional guidance from UNDP headquarters has not been forthcoming.

Remote management has allowed UNDP to continue programmes in an extremely difficult security environment. Most donors welcomed this possibility to have even an imperfect conduit for providing assistance and perhaps a convenient means of transferring operational risks to an international organization. UNDP itself

often welcomed the additional income that the formula provided. However, UNDP has not fully analysed the financial cost of delivering assistance in a situation such as the one in Somalia and has not been able to initiate a completely transparent dialogue with donors about such costs and risks.

Similarly, it has not sufficiently analysed risks associated with the quality of deliverables or the consequences for the image of UNDP. UNDP is exposed to the type of allegations that have recently been made by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia⁹³ about food aid management.

UNDP is generally perceived as displaying a weak capacity to analyse the Somali context and apply in a comprehensive manner conflict analysis and risk management methods.

Conflict analysis methods have been emphasized in the formulation of the next country programme, a clear indication of progress in the right direction. On the other hand, for risk management, the focus so far has been almost exclusively on operational risks during implementation as opposed to the institutional risks involved in making strategic decisions about whether or not to enter into new areas of activity.

The sources of information of UNDP Somalia are considered limited, based mainly on staff and implementing partners and often neglecting independent sources such as human rights NGOs, academics and the websites flourishing in Somalia and among the diaspora.

The UNDP contribution to development results has varied considerably depending on the region where activities were implemented. This regional diversity is not sufficiently reflected in programming instruments and, often times, UNDP corporate instruments are not suitable for programming in Somalia.

The various parts of the former Somali Republic have evolved in a very different manner since the breakdown of the State in 1991. South and Central Somalia has immense difficulties emerging from a protracted conflict situation and still faces a severe humanitarian crisis. Somaliland has engaged in a process of secession while Puntland has declared itself an autonomous region. In these two northern areas, conditions of stability and improved governance allow for genuine development support to take place. While it is fully understood that UNDP cannot develop separate programme documents, workplans and other implementing instruments could adopt a pragmatic approach and reflect more adequately the reality and diversity of the country.

A number of operational issues have impaired the effectiveness and efficiency of programmes and require remedial action on the part of either the UNDP Somalia country office or UNDP headquarters.

The ADR noted the following points as the major current operational constraints:

1. The three main programmes of UNDP Somalia, namely Governance, ROLS, and RSL, have until recently worked independently of each other, with little interaction between them. This ‘silo’ approach has often meant missing opportunities for leveraging complementarity between these programmes. The country office is taking action to redress that situation;
2. More frequent and direct interaction between programme staff in Nairobi and sub-offices as well as counterparts would facilitate better understanding of results intended and help in course correction during implementation of projects. Field staff members feel isolated, and consider infrequent and short visits from the Nairobi-based staff inadequate for substantive programmatic discussions as well as for learning and exchange of ideas. Likewise,

⁹³ ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)’, (S/2010/91).

counterparts find long gaps between visits by Nairobi-based staff unhelpful in resolving operational problems and in taking prompt decisions.

3. In some of the projects visited by the team, the quality of design and delivery has been extremely poor, raising questions about (a) the insufficiency of adequate expertise in-house; (b) the effectiveness of monitoring and ability to take course correction measures; (c) the rigour of assessment of strengths and weaknesses of implementing partners and monitoring contractors; and (d) the culture of accountability in the UNDP office. As already acknowledged by the UNDP Somalia country office, the weakness of the monitoring and evaluation function must be addressed and some concrete actions have already been initiated.
4. Gender mainstreaming was weak in most projects although, in recent months, UNDP has consciously begun to emphasize gender in its programming, and has identified a focal point in the country office to provide leadership on gender. Experience in other countries, however, clearly shows that the focal point approach is not sufficient and that best practices are developed when full-time attention and expertise are devoted to the issue.
5. In the difficult operating environment such as encountered in Somalia, policy and operational guidance provided by UNDP headquarters was often insufficient or untimely. To date, active support to UNDP Somalia has been largely limited to BCPR. UNDP at the corporate level has not developed comprehensive guidelines for issues affecting operations in a conflict environment, for example on 'remote management' approaches. No clear guidance exists on the stated role of UNDP as a 'provider of last resort', a notion that has considerably influenced the country programme in Somalia. In addition, cross-fertilization between offices in different parts of the world dealing with

similar operational environments is not systematically encouraged.

Despite some of the challenges – both internal and external to UNDP - UNDP Somalia continues to enjoy a privileged position in Somalia based on its long-term presence in the country, on trust it has established with authorities and donors as well as on results achieved over the years in many areas of intervention.

UNDP Somalia has strived to improve its dialogue with both the authorities and donors in a spirit of openness and transparency. UNDP has developed comparative advantages in many areas of interventions and should be in a position to build on such expertise.

UNDP has also initiated a process of change that should transform the institutional culture by emphasizing more cohesion and synergy between programmes, a results-based management as well as the mainstreaming of a rights-based approach. The ADR team strongly endorses these recent efforts and approach, and would argue that more intensive support from UNDP headquarters and understanding from international and national partners will be helpful in enabling the country office to manage a comprehensive change process. Some of these changes have to go beyond introducing or changing systems and procedures, and will involve changes in institutional culture of the office.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS OF A STRATEGIC NATURE

Recommendation 1: UNDP Somalia needs to re-anchor its country programme to areas which build on its core competence and are central to its mandate. It should work towards finding an alternative 'provider' or mechanism to take over activities related to providing services to political processes or for simple administrative functions which are not central to its mandate.

Recommendation 2: The next country programme for Somalia should strike an appropriate balance between interventions in support of building the capacity of government institutions and initiatives to help address, in the short and medium term, the chronic development needs of the vulnerable groups of the population, with a view to achieving progress towards MDGs, including on pressing issues related to environment.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Somalia needs to reassert overall leadership on development issues within the UN community and ensure that development needs of the Somali population and support for achievement of MDGs receive increasing attention from authorities as well as development agencies, NGOs and the donor community.

Recommendation 4: In line with the decision to present for approval a five-year cycle for the 2011-2015 country programme, UNDP Somalia should develop three region-specific five-year operational workplans in full consultation with relevant partners. This should be accompanied by a system of annual participatory reviews in order to increase ownership of the planning process and to address issues of predictability and transparency in UNDP planning and budgeting processes.

Recommendation 5: UNDP Somalia needs to engage with a wider range of actors, including independent observers, researchers, academics and civil society in order to sharpen its analysis and understanding of the complex context of its operating environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN OPERATIONAL NATURE

Recommendation 6: UNDP Somalia needs to ensure greater coherence within and between programmes and establish mechanisms that promote coherence, complementarity and synergy as key elements of the institutional culture.

Recommendation 7: UNDP Somalia should increase the presence of Nairobi-based staff in the field by making full use of existing possibilities, including slots, and increase interaction with Somali counterparts by using proximity temporary proximity hubs easily accessible for the authorities with the aim of ensuring timely decision-making and resolution of problems.

Recommendation 8: UNDP Somalia should pursue a conscious strategy to enhance the quality of programme planning and the delivery of results and financial resources by:

- Securing necessary technical inputs in design/implementation and monitoring processes
- Mainstreaming a results-oriented culture through monitoring and evaluation by ensuring that all programme staff are trained in monitoring and evaluation, seeking the necessary monitoring and evaluation technical expertise, and ensuring adequate institutional arrangements and incentives
- Undertaking a review of existing programme management capacity and taking corrective actions to enhance quality and ensure good financial management
- Undertaking a systematic capacity assessment of implementing partners and monitoring contractors to ensure that they are capable of delivering to quality standards.

Recommendation 9: UNDP Somalia needs to develop a gender strategy and implementation framework. There is a need for dedicated staff resources to ensure that the necessary structures, systems and institutional culture are in place to promote gender mainstreaming.

RECOMMENDATION FOR UNDP HEADQUARTERS

Recommendation 10: UNDP headquarters needs to provide more active and timely support to UNDP Somalia, to develop guidance for offices operating in conflict environments with restricted

access and to facilitate sharing of knowledge and best practices between offices operating in similar environments around the world. Additional guidance would be needed *inter alia* on the application

of the notion of ‘provider of last resort’ and on operations run through remote management, including quality programming and monitoring and evaluation of related interventions.

Annex 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE⁹⁴

1. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country programme evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions to development results at the country level. ADRs are carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.⁹⁵ The overall goals of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

In particular, the Evaluation Office plans to conduct an ADR in Somalia during 2009-2010. The ADR will contribute to a new country programme, which will be prepared by the concerned country office and national stakeholders for submission to the UNDP Executive Board in September 2010.

2. BACKGROUND

Almost two decades after the collapse of the State, Somalia continues to be a war-torn region,

fraught by internal divisions and human security conditions. The long-standing political instability and absence of fully operational authority in Somalia have negatively affected human development. The Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for Somalia, led by the UN and World Bank with Somali partners in 2005-2006, found that insecurity deters investment and prevents service provision. Despite high remittance inflows to Somalia, poverty is widespread; in 2002 about 43 percent were estimated to live on less than \$1/day. Somalia is unlikely to reach any of the Millennium Development Goals.⁹⁶

The JNA led to the development of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a five-year national plan for Somalia, which serves as a main basis for support by the international community. The RDP is built around three overall goals: deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance; investing in people through improved social services; and creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce poverty. The UN system in Somalia has taken the RDP as the underlying donor-supported Somali national development plan for 2007-2011, and developed a UN Transitional Plan, which outlines the elements of the RDP that the UN will work towards during 2008 and 2009. The current UNDP country programme (2008-2009, extended through 2010) is intended to support the implementation of the RDP, as well as the latest UNTP (2008-2009).

The UNDP country programme 2008-2009 has three focus areas: Governance and Reconciliation (Governance); Rule of Law and Security (ROLS);

⁹⁴ This Terms of References has been updated as a result of the scoping mission carried out by the ADR team from 8 to 12 February 2010.

⁹⁵ <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>

⁹⁶ UNDP Country Programme Document 2008-2009.

and Early Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods (RSL). The programme seeks to address human security and support democratic governance in all regions and provide targeted assistance to early recovery in accessible areas, supporting the transition from humanitarian to recovery assistance where possible, and balancing upstream and downstream interventions by increased focus on community livelihoods recovery in partnership with civil society and the private sector. In addition, the UNDP Somalia programme has smaller components focusing on human development-related issues, supported by the Human Development and Economic Unit since 2007 and HIV/AIDS, mainly financed from the Global Fund resources to support institutional capacity development of relevant coordinating authorities.

The lack of sustained security and the volatile situation has had implications for UNDP operations in Somalia over the period under review. Until 2006, UNDP was able to operate in all three zones of the country (South and Central, Somaliland and Puntland), with a strong presence through its regional sub-offices. However, during 2006 the security situation began to deteriorate across Somalia, and UNDP presence has been diminished as the security phases increase throughout the country.

There is a wide variation in the political, economic and development situation across Somalia. In comparison to South and Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland have been experiencing relative stability and have succeeded in establishing nascent, if yet weakly capacitated, government institutions. However, there remain concerns for international aid and development workers in these zones.

In South and Central Somalia, instability continues. Following the ousting of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from Mogadishu and South and Central Somalia at the end of 2006, the efforts by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to establish itself in Mogadishu have been limiting. The TFG continues to face armed

resistance. The African Union (AU) AMISOM peacekeeping mission, deployed since March 2007, has not been able to mobilize troop numbers in line with earlier pledges, and the frequency of fighting in the Mogadishu area has risen.

As the programme cycle comes to an end, the ADR presents an opportunity to the UNDP Somalia country office, as well as its partners to take stock of what has and has not worked and use the evaluation information in the design of the new country programme. In February 2010 the ADR team completed the scoping mission, following the evaluability assessment mission carried out by the Evaluation Office. The Terms of Reference reflects the findings of the scoping mission.

3. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the Somalia ADR include:

- To provide an independent assessment of the progress or lack thereof towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDP programming documents. Where appropriate, the ADR will also highlight unexpected outcomes (positive or negative) and missed opportunities
- To provide an analysis of how UNDP has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context
- To present key findings, draw key lessons, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options for the management to make adjustments in the current strategy and next country programme.

The ADR will review the UNDP experience in Somalia and its contribution to the solution of human security and development challenges. The evaluation will cover the period from 2005 to 2009/2010, including the ongoing country programme (2008-2009, extended through 2010), as well as the past country programme

(2007-2008)⁹⁷ and assistance strategy and note by the Administrator on assistance to Somalia (2005-2006). Although it is likely that greater emphasis will be placed on more recent interventions (due to better availability of data, etc.) efforts will be made to examine the development and implementation of UNDP programmes since the start of the period.

The overall methodology will be consistent with the ADR Guidelines prepared by the EO (dated January 2009) and the latest draft ADR Methods Manual (to be finalized late in 2009). However, given the unique situation of Somalia (e.g., a wide variation in the situation across Somalia and lack of sustained security and frequent changes in the conditions in which UNDP operates), the customization and definition of the evaluation criteria and questions have been carefully carried out during the scoping mission. The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio and activities during the period under review, specifically examining the UNDP contribution to national efforts towards development results across the country. It will assess key results, specifically outcomes – anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative, intentional and unintentional – and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources.

The evaluation has two main components, the analysis of development outcomes and the strategic positioning of UNDP.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The assessment of the development outcomes will entail a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio of the previous and ongoing programme cycles (2005-2009/2010). This includes an assessment of development results achieved and the contribution of UNDP in terms of key interventions; progress in achieving

outcomes for the ongoing country programme; factors influencing results (UNDP positioning and capacities, partnerships, policy support); and achievements/progress and contribution of UNDP in practice areas (both in policy and advocacy); analysing the cross-cutting linkages and their relationship to MDGs, the RDP and the UNTPs for Somalia. The analysis of development results will provide indications of challenges and strategies for future interventions. Besides using the available information, the evaluation will document and analyse achievements against intended outcomes and linkages between activities, outputs and outcomes. The evaluation will qualify the UNDP contribution to outcomes with a reasonable degree of plausibility. A core set of criteria related to the design, management and implementation of its interventions in the country, and their respective key evaluation questions⁹⁸ will include the following (examples):

- **Effectiveness:** Did the UNDP programme accomplish its intended objectives and planned results? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programme? What are the unexpected results it yielded? Did the programme contain innovative activities or approaches? Should it continue in the same direction or should its main tenets be reviewed for the new cycle? What could be done to ensure a more efficient use of resources in the country and zone context?
- **Efficiency:** How well did UNDP use its resources (human and financial) in achieving intended results? What could be done to ensure a more efficient use of resources in the various regions of the country?
- **Sustainability:** Are the benefits of the UNDP contribution sustainable? Are there measures put in place to ensure that the development results achieved through the UNDP contribution will be sustainable? Are the benefits of UNDP interventions sustained

⁹⁷ This programme covered only 2007 as it was replaced by a new CPD following the formulation in 2007 of the Recovery and Development Programme and the UNTP.

⁹⁸ Key questions and sub-questions were identified during the scoping mission in February 2010. The sub-questions can be found in the Evaluation Matrix, Annex 2 of the inception report prepared by the evaluation team.

and owned by national stakeholders after the intervention is completed?

The evaluation will also consider the influence of administrative and programme management constraints affecting the programme and specifically the UNDP contribution (including issues related to the relevance and effectiveness of the monitoring and evaluation system). If during the initial analysis these are considered important, they will be included in the scope of the evaluation.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING

The evaluation will assess the strategic positioning of UNDP both from the perspective of organization and the development priorities in the country, to the extent possible, as identified in existing documentation and interviews, taking into consideration complex security, political and socio-economic conditions of Somalia. This will entail: (i) a systematic analysis of place and niche of UNDP within the development and policy space in Somalia; (ii) the strategies used by UNDP Somalia to strengthen the position of UNDP in the development space and create a position for the organization in its core practice/results areas, as stipulated in the corporate plans; (iii) from the perspective of the development results for the country, the ADR will evaluate the policy support and advocacy initiatives of the UNDP programme vis-à-vis other stakeholders. In addition, the ADR will analyse a core set of criteria related to the strategic positioning of UNDP:

- **Strategic relevance and responsiveness:** Did UNDP apply the right strategy within the specific political, economic, security and social context of the country and regions? How did the organization respond to Somali needs and the pursuit of MDGs? What were the missed opportunities in UNDP programming?

- **Comparative advantage:** What have been the comparative advantages of UNDP in Somalia? Was the UNDP strategy designed to maximize the use of its corporate and comparative strengths? How has UNDP leveraged partnerships within the UN system as well as with national partners and the international community at large?
- **Promoting UN values:** Did UNDP activities promote the core values of the UN and its own corporate values (gender, South-South cooperation and rights-based approach)?

It should be noted that special efforts will be made to examine whether cross-cutting issues such as partnership and credibility/image/perception of UNDP have affected the UNDP contribution to development results, as well as its contribution to UN enhanced coherence and coordination in programming in Somalia. Within the context of partnerships with the UN system and overall UN coordination, the specific issue of the development of joint programmes will be highlighted.

4. EVALUATION METHODS AND APPROACHES

DATA COLLECTION

The ADR will normally use a multiple method approach that could include desk reviews, group and individual interviews (at headquarters and the country office) and project/field visits. The appropriate set of methods would vary depending on country context. Based on the findings of the evaluability assessment and the scoping mission,⁹⁹ during week 3 of the main data collection mission, the ADR team will visit Hargeisa, Somaliland and Garowe, Puntland to interview UNDP staff, authorities, implementing partners and beneficiaries. Based on a set of selection criterion (shown below), projects for in-depth examination have been selected during the scoping mission. The list of these selected projects or major initiatives is provided in Annex 3 of the inception report.

⁹⁹ The scoping mission is described in section 5, on the evaluation process.

- The balance between thematic areas of the programme
- Representative of outcomes detailed in the CPD
- The balance between upstream and downstream interventions
- The geographical coverage of the project
- The evaluability of the project
- The possibility of accessing the ultimate beneficiaries for data collection
- The possibility to see gender mainstreaming at work
- Projects with large budgets
- Other considerations as indicated in the relevant column of the table.

VALIDATION

The evaluation team will use a variety of methods to ensure that the data is valid, including triangulation. During the last week of the main data collection mission, the team will compare recorded data through interviews and group meetings, and document review summaries and analyse them based on the framework established in the Evaluation Matrix (Annex 2 of the inception report). The Evaluation Office task manager will be present to ensure the systematic analysis of evidence base during that week before the ADR team presents findings and emerging conclusions and recommendations at the stakeholder meeting.

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

While adhering to the principles of conflict-sensitive evaluation and ethics in carrying out the evaluation, a strong participatory approach to the extent possible, involving a broad range of stakeholders, will be pursued. The identification of the stakeholders, including government representatives of ministries/agencies, civil society organizations, private sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries will

take place during the scoping mission. To facilitate this approach, all ADRs include a process of stakeholder mapping that would include both UNDP direct partners as well as stakeholders who do not work directly with UNDP.

5. EVALUATION PROCESS

The ADR process will also follow the ADR Guidelines, according to which the process can be divided in three phases, each including several steps.

PHASE 1: PREPARATION

- **Desk review** – Initially carried out by the Evaluation Office (identification, collection and mapping of relevant documentation and other data) and continued by the evaluation team. This includes general development-related documentation relating to the specific country as well as a comprehensive overview of the UNDP programme over the period being examined.
- **Stakeholder mapping** – A basic mapping of stakeholders relevant to the evaluation in the country carried out at the country level (this includes partners based in Nairobi). These may include ‘movers and shakers’ in the national context, who may or may not have direct relationships with the UNDP programme. The mapping exercise also indicates the relationships between different sets of stakeholders.
- **Inception meetings** – Discussions at UNDP headquarters with the EO (process and methodology), the RBAS (context and county programme) as well as with other relevant bureaux (including the Bureau for Development Policy and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, relevant UN departments, and others as appropriate, including UN missions).
- **Evaluability assessment mission** – Due to the unique situation of the Somali programme (e.g., its new programme being presented to

the Executive Board in September 2010, hence a compressed time to conduct the ADR, uncertainty regarding the appropriateness in applying the ADR approach and methods to the Somalia programme, etc.), The Evaluation Office task manager will conduct a one-week evaluability assessment, which serves as the basis for determining the conduct of the evaluation.

- **Scoping mission** – A mission to Nairobi by the independent evaluation team and Evaluation Office task manager in order to:
 - Identify and collect further documentation
 - Validate the mapping of the country programmes
 - Get key stakeholder perspectives on key issues that should be examined
 - Address logistical issues related to the main mission, including timing
 - Identify the appropriate set of data collection and analysis methods
 - Address management issues related to the rest of the evaluation process including division of labour among the team members.
 - Ensure that the country office and key stakeholders understand the ADR objectives, methodology and process, as a follow-up to the initial mission conducted by the EO.

At the end of the scoping mission, an inception report is developed to spell out the design of the evaluation.

PHASE 2: CONDUCTING ADR AND DRAFTING THE EVALUATION REPORT

- **Main ADR mission** - The mission of three weeks is conducted by the independent evaluation team and focuses on data collection and validation. The team will visit significant project/field sites in Somaliland and Puntland, as identified in the scoping mission and the mission will be concluded

by one week of data analysis by the team, and also a stakeholder meeting (see below).

- **Stakeholder meeting** – At the end of the main ADR mission, there will be a meeting with the key national stakeholders to present the emerging results of the evaluation and discuss emerging conclusions and possible areas of recommendations. The main purpose of the meeting is to enhance ownership of the evaluation and to ensure the relevance and realism of emerging recommendations. It may be necessary to incorporate some significant comments in proceeding to draft the report by the team leader.
- **Reporting** – The information collected is analysed in the draft ADR report by the evaluation team within three weeks after the departure of the team from the country.
- **Review:** The draft is subject to: (a) factual corrections and views on interpretation by the UNDP country office and RBAS; (b) a technical review by the Evaluation Office; and (c) a review by an external reviewer. The Evaluation Office will prepare an audit trail to show how these comments were taken into account. The team leader in close cooperation with the EO task manager shall finalize the ADR report based on these final reviews.
- **Publishing and dissemination:** After the comments from ADR stakeholders have been incorporated in the draft, the Evaluation Office will publish the ADR as an independent evaluation report. The ADR report and brief will be widely distributed in both hard and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to the UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new CPD. It will be widely distributed in Somalia and at UNDP headquarters and copies will be sent to evaluation outfits of other international organizations as well as to evaluation societies and research institutions in the region. Furthermore, the evaluation report and the management response will be published on UNDP publicly available web-based database, the

Evaluation Resource Centre (erc.undp.org), as well as on the UNDP website (www.undp.org/evaluation).

PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP

- **Management response:** As stipulated in the UNDP evaluation policy, the Somalia country office is responsible for preparing a management response to the ADR with support and oversight from the regional bureau. As a unit exercising oversight, the Regional Bureau will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.

The time frame and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

6. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNDP EVALUATION OFFICE

The UNDP Evaluation Office task manager will manage the evaluation and ensure coordination and liaison with RBAS, other concerned units at headquarters level and the Somalia country office management. The Evaluation Office will also contract a research assistant to facilitate the initial desk review and a programme assistant to support logistical and administrative matters. The Evaluation Office will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR. They will include costs related to participation of the team leader, international and national consultants, as well as the preliminary research and the issuance of the final ADR report. The Evaluation Office in principle will cover the cost of the evaluation.

Activity	Estimated Date
Collection and mapping of documentation by the research assistant	Nov/Dec 2009 – Jan 2010
Evaluability Assessment to Nairobi office	December 2009
Desk Review by the evaluation team	Jan-February 2010
Briefing in New York	Early-February 2010
Scoping Mission to Nairobi office	Mid-February 2010
Inception report	February 2010
Main ADR mission to Nairobi/Somalia and stakeholder workshop	March 1- 30, 2010
Submission of first draft report	Late April 2010
Comments from EO and advisory panel	Mid-May 2010
Factual corrections from CO, RB, relevant stakeholders	June 2010
Lessons learning and debriefing event for HQ-based bureaus in NY	June 2010
Issuance of final report	July 2010

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The team is constituted of three consultants, supported by the Evaluation Office task manager and the research assistant:

- Consultant team leader, with overall responsibility for providing guidance and leadership, and in coordinating the draft and final report
- Two consultant team specialists – international and regional, who will provide the expertise in the core subject areas of the evaluation, and be responsible for drafting key parts of the report.

The team leader must have a demonstrated capacity in strategic thinking and policy advice and in the evaluation of complex programmes in the field, particularly in conflict-affected situations. All team members should have in-depth knowledge of complex issues in Somalia.

All team members need to have experiences in conducting complex programme evaluations and understand conflict-sensitive evaluation methods, knowledge of Somalia and the region and substantive knowledge of one or two of the focus areas of the UNDP programme in Somalia. A regional Nairobi-based team member is expected to facilitate preparations for the main mission, including liaising with the Somalia country office to ensure that the office has arranged meetings and provided required documentation.

The evaluation team will be supported by a research assistant based in the Evaluation Office in New York. The task manager of the Evaluation Office will support the team in designing the evaluation, will participate in the scoping mission and provide ongoing feedback for quality assurance during the preparation of the inception report and the final report. The Evaluation Office task manager might participate in the last part of the main mission during the data analysis stage and the stakeholder workshop.

The evaluation team will orient its work by United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)

norms and standards for evaluation and will adhere to the ethical guidelines and the Code of Conduct.¹⁰⁰

THE SOMALIA COUNTRY OFFICE

The country office takes a lead role in organizing dialogue and stakeholder meetings on the findings and recommendations, supports the evaluation team in liaison with the key partners, and makes available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP activities in the country. The office is also requested to provide additional logistical support to the evaluation team, as required, including making arrangements for interviews and field visits, and providing security-related support. To safeguard the independence of the evaluation, interviews with informants will be conducted in the absence of the Somalia personnel. The country office will contribute support in kind (for example, office space for the evaluation team) but the Evaluation Office will cover local transportation costs.

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs from the evaluation team are:

- An inception report
- A presentation at the stakeholder workshop
- A comprehensive final report on the Somalia ADR (maximum 50 pages plus annexes)
- A two-page evaluation brief.

The team leader of the evaluation team is responsible for putting the report together. The Evaluation Office has the ultimate responsibility to ensure the quality of the report. The evaluation team members are required to participate in relevant missions to New York and/or Nairobi and provide necessary inputs to the drafting of the report during the evaluation process, as defined by the team leader during the scoping phase.

¹⁰⁰ The UN Evaluation Group Guidelines (UNEG), *Norms for Evaluation in the UN System and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System* (April 2005).

8. DURATION

The evaluation team will be engaged in this exercise over the period between 25 January and 30 2010 on a part-time basis, although most of the work is concentrated around the months of February and March, when the team members are expected to be in the field on a full-time basis. Payments will be linked to the delivery of satisfactory outputs, approved by the Evaluation Office task manager.

Annex 2

EVALUATION MATRIX

Criteria/Sub-criteria	Main questions to be addressed by the ADR	Data collection methods and data sources
ASSESSMENT BY THEMATIC AREA		
A.1 RELEVANCE	How relevant are UNDP programmes to the priority needs of the country and the Somali people? Did UNDP apply the right strategy within the specific political, economic, security and social context of the areas where it works? To what extent has UNDP been able to balance immediate and long-term development needs?	
A.1a Relevance of the objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are UNDP activities aligned with the strategies of the country? Are they consistent with human development needs in that area (whether mentioned in strategies or not)? 	Interviews and group meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key senior UN and UNDP officials Key representatives of authorities Key representatives of donors and the international community Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers Document reviews and analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> RDP, UNTP, CDPs, annual work plans, data from Atlas
A.1b Relevance of the approaches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are UNDP approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework relevant to achieve planned outcomes? Do they follow known good practices? 	
A.2 EFFECTIVENESS	Did UNDP programme accomplish its intended objectives and planned results? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programme? What are the unexpected results it yielded? Did the programme contain innovative activities or approaches? Should it continue in the same direction or should its main tenets be reviewed for the new cycle?	
A.2a Progress toward achievement of outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the programme implementation contribute to progress towards the stated outcome? Or at least did it set dynamic processes and changes that move towards the long-term outcomes? 	Document reviews and analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP and donor evaluation documents ROAR, monitoring reports, RC annual reports Review of existing baseline data UNTP mid-term review RDP, UNTP, CDPs
A.2b Outreach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How broad are outcomes (e.g. local community, district, region, national)? 	
A.2c Poverty depth/equity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Who are the main beneficiaries (poor, non-poor, disadvantaged groups)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project document, monitoring reports Field visits Maps showing UN/UNDP activities in Somalia
A.3 EFFICIENCY	How well did UNDP use its resources (human and financial) in achieving intended results? What could be done to ensure a more efficient use of resources in the various regions of the country?	
A.3a Managerial efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the programmes been implemented within deadlines, costs estimates? Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues? Has there been adequate monitoring and evaluation despite the security situation? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ROAR Work plans and minutes of Outcome Boards/Steering committees Identify major (+30%) gaps in funding Document the notion of 'remote control' Monitoring reports Evaluation Plan for the CO

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Criteria/Sub-criteria		Main questions to be addressed by the ADR	Data collection methods and data sources
A.3b Programmatic efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Was there any identified synergy between UNDP interventions that contributed to reducing costs while supporting results? •Were the UNDP resources focused to achieve outcomes identified in CPDs? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Project documents, reports and evaluations -Coordination mechanisms between programmes and projects -Field visits -Interviews with UNDP management, staff, partners, and national counterparts 	
A.4 SUSTAINABILITY	Are the benefits of UNDP's contribution sustainable? Are there measures put in place to ensure the development results achieved through UNDP contribution will be sustainable? Are the benefits of UNDP interventions sustained and owned by national stakeholders after the intervention is completed?		
A.4a Design for sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Were interventions designed to have sustainable results given the identifiable risks and did they include an exit strategy? Quality of designs, conceptual models? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews and group meetings -Key senior UN and UNDP officials -Key representatives of authorities -Key representatives of donors and the international community 	
A.4b Issues at implementation and corrective measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •What issues emerged during implementation as a threat to sustainability? •What were the corrective measures that were adopted? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers Document Review -Project documents, reports and evaluations -Existence/absence of outcome indicators and monitoring of indicators -Risk management approach in project management/risk management log -Changes in work plans -Field visits 	
A.4c Up-scaling of pilot initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •If there was testing of pilot initiatives, was a plan for up-scaling of such initiative, if successful, being prepared? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Project documents 	
ASSESSMENT OF UNDP STRATEGIC POSITION			
B.1 STRATEGIC RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS	Did UNDP apply the right strategy within the specific political, economic, security and social context of the country and regions? How did UNDP respond to Somali needs and the pursuit of MDG? What were the missed opportunities in UNDP programming?		

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Criteria/Sub-criteria		Main questions to be addressed by the ADR	Data collection methods and data sources
B.1a Relevance against the challenges and priorities of Somalia	• Did UNDP address the development challenges and priorities of Somalia?		Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of authorities - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers
B.1b Facilitating implementation of national strategies and policies	• Did the UNDP programme facilitate the implementation of national and regional development strategies and policies and provide adequate support to authorities?		Document review and analysis - Priorities as defined in the RDP and existing regional development plans - Yearly CAPs (2005-2010) - Vulnerability assessments of various agencies - Food Security and Nutritional Survey (FSANU) - Monitoring reports of Institution Development Projects and ROAR - Visits to two regional capitals
B.1c Relevance of UNDP operational approaches	• Is there balance between upstream and downstream initiatives? Balance between capital and regional/local level interventions? Adequacy of resources?		- Project documents - Funding gaps (under CPD 2008-2010) - Balance between components of programmes in expenditure over the period
B.1d Responsiveness to changes in context	• How did UNDP anticipate and respond to significant changes in the national development, political and security context and in the international environment? Did UNDP have an adequate mechanism to respond to significant changes, in particular in crisis and emergencies? • How did the notion of 'provider of last resort' affect UNDP programmes?		- Identification of major crisis points such as renewed fighting, staff security, etc and changes in the political context - reports of the Secretary-General, ICG and other observers, media - Staff interviews - identification of standard corporate instruments (e.g. recruitment and procurement procedure, 'fast track') and their suitability for the situation of Somalia
B.1e Balance between short-term responsiveness and long-term development objectives	• How are the short-term requests for assistance by the authorities and the international community balanced against long term development needs?		- Balance between programme areas - Analysis of programmes in terms of internal coherence and complementarities with other UN or bilateral interventions - Analysis of activities undertaken at the request of the UN Mission and donors and those inherited from UNOSOM.
B.2 ASSESSING HOW UNDP EXPLOITED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES	What have been the comparative advantages of UNDP in Somalia? Was the UNDP strategy designed to maximize the use of its corporate and comparative strengths? How has UNDP leveraged partnerships within the UN system as well as with national partners and the international community at large?		

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Criteria/Sub-criteria	Main questions to be addressed by the ADR	Data collection methods and data sources
B.2a Comparative strengths of UNDP in Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the corporate comparative strengths of UNDP relevant to the situation in Somalia? • Was the UNDP strategy designed to maximize the use of its comparative strengths? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Statement of corporate comparative strengths and corporate focus areas viewed against CPD - CPD Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of authorities - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers
B.2b Assisting Government to use external partnerships and South-South cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did UNDP use its network to bring about opportunities for South-South exchanges and cooperation? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project documents - ROAR - RC reports Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of authorities - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers
B.2c Partnership within the UN and with associated funds and programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did UNDP help exploit comparative advantages of associated funds (UNV, UNIFEM, UNCDF), e.g. in specific technical matter? • Has there been strategic and programmatic coordination with other UN agencies and with international financial institutions? • What have been the mechanisms of consultation and coordination with UNPOS? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project documents - ROAR - RC reports - Reports of the Secretary-General - Functioning of the UNCT and role of UNDP Interviews and group meetings - Senior UNPOS officials - UNV, UNIFEM, UNCDF officials
B.2d Partnerships and coordination with non-UN partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What has been UNDP's contribution to coordination among donors? • What have been the mechanisms for coordination and consultations with the civil society, including the NGOs and the private sector? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination structure in CISS and SSS - Role of UNDP in Working Groups under SSS - NGO consortium - Field visits Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Key civil society members

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Criteria/Sub-criteria		Main questions to be addressed by the ADR	Data collection methods and data sources
B.3 PROMOTION OF UN VALUES		Did UNDP activities promote the core values of the UN and its own corporate values?	
B.3a Assisting in the attainment of MDGs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the UN system, and UNDP in particular, effectively supporting the promotion of the MDG and the monitoring of achievements? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MDG progress report (2009) - World Bank - Activities of HDEU and MDG Officer Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of authorities - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers 	
B.3b Contribution to gender equity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which the UNDP programme is designed to appropriately incorporate in each outcome area contributions to the attainment of gender equality? • The extent to which UNDP supported positive changes in terms of gender equality and whether there were any unintended effects? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project documents - UNCT gender audit (2010) - Training activities for staff - ROAR - Gender priority matrix - UNCT thematic group on gender 	
B.3c Addressing equity issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the UNDP programme take into account the plight and needs of vulnerable or disadvantaged to promote social equity? Did the programmes emphasise a human rights based approach? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNTP and CPDs - ROAR - Progress reports and evaluations - Field visits 	
B.3.d Credibility of UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is UNDP considered capable of providing leadership and contributing to substantive and high-level policy dialogue on human development issues in the country, particularly on potentially sensitive topics? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-UNDP evaluation reports - Perceptions by partners - UNDP's Partners Surveys (select questions complemented by interviews. Interviews and group meetings - Key senior UN and UNDP officials - Key representatives of authorities - Key representatives of donors and the international community - Select members of the Somali civil society and independent observers 	

Annex 3

LIST OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES VISITED IN SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND (16-23 MARCH 2010)

SOMALILAND:

1. Access road project outside Hargeisa*
2. Contour bunds, watershed management project, 45 kms outside Hargeisa*
3. Three 'Berkads'¹⁰³ outside Hargeisa*
4. University of Hargeisa: re-training for judges and prosecutors, legal aid clinic, observatory on violence
5. Civil Service Commission and Civil Service Institute in Hargeisa
6. Financial Management Team, Ministry of Finance

PUNTLAND:

7. Municipal Market in Garowe*
8. Municipal Market in Gardo*
9. Legal aid clinic in Garowe
10. Soil Erosion Gabions outside Gardo
11. Gardo Police Training School
12. Gardo Prison

* Indicates sites where direct project beneficiaries could be interviewed.

¹⁰¹ Shallow open wells which conserve run-off water during rainy seasons for use during dry seasons – a common practice in Somalia and parts of Ethiopia.

Annex 4

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (TFG)

Abdullahi Sheikh Ali, Minister of State for Planning and International Cooperation
Elmi Ahmed Duale, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Somalia to the United Nations, New York
Kader, Member of the Police Advisory Committee (by telephone)

AUTHORITIES IN PUNTLAND

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Ali Mohamed Alnihusa, Director General, Security/AVR
Mohamed Sabe Hassan, Director General, DDR
Burhan H. Husein, Director, Rural Development
James Hasan Hussein, Local Governance Department
Abdirisak Issa Hussein, PMAC Manager
Mohamed Omar, Acting Director General
Alsalem Dawod Yusuf, Director of Planning

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Abdulkadir A. Hashi, Minister of State
Mohamed Ali Ismail, Acting Director General

MINISTRY OF WOMEN DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY AFFAIRS

Abdirisag Dahir Ali, Consultant Gender
Halim Ali Biyod, Gender Affairs Coordinator
Abdirizak Hassan Farah, Consultant

Mariam Omar Hajji, Focal Point Girls Leadership

ZamZam Mohamed Saroge, Consultant

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Abdulkadir Ahmed, Chief Justice

GAROWE DISTRICT COUNCIL

Abdirashid Issa Abdi, Consultant Social Services
Abdulcadir Abdullahi, Consultant
Abdulazis N. Elmi, Mayor
A. Farah Mohamed, Member of Council

AUTHORITIES IN SOMALILAND

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

Adan Elmi Ahmed, Director
Ahmed Dayr Caydild, Director General
Ablib Hassan Filfil, Minister
Abdi Halim M. Mussa, Vice Minister

MINISTRY OF FAMILY AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Fatima Sudi Hassan, Minister
Alrahman Mohamed Mal, Director General

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

Ahmed Hassan Farah, Auditor General
Ahmed Daud Gedi, Director General
Mohamed Kasim Hashi, Budget Adviser
Omar Ibrahim Hussein, Senior Economist, Fiscal Policy Reform Management

Hassan Jans, Fiscal Policy Officer
Hassan Mohamed Mead, Director,
Municipality Auditing
Ahmed Awabdi Shair, Vice Minister

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Hassan Dimbil, Senior Adviser, Civilian Police
Abshir Abdillahi Hassan, Consultant, Small Arms Control
Mohamed Ibrahim Muse, National Coordinator, Small Arms Control
Mohamed Sagadi, Commissioner of Police

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING, COORDINATION AND RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Ahmed Hashi Abdi, Vice Minister
Ahmed Dalal Farah, Institutional Development and Public Sector Reform Expert, Macroeconomic Management Office
Kaltaru S. Hassan, Gender Expert

MINISTRY OF PASTORAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

Juma Mohamed Abdi, Director General
Ahmed Dirie Ehmi, Director, Range and Pastoral Development
Abdikarim Aden Omar, Director, Forests Department

OTHER OFFICIALS

Omar H. Said Abdulahi, Director General, Civil Service Commission
Mohamed Abdurahman, Civil Service Institute
Mohamed Haupe, Director, Municipality of Hargeisa
Abdirahiman Ismail Hussein, Chairman, Civil Service Commission
Hersi Abdillahi Ismail, Finance Officer, Civil Service Institute

Ahmed Juma, Adviser ICT, Office of the President
Mohamed Mihek, Director, Civil Service Institute

SOMALI CIVIL SOCIETY

GAROWE

Abdulkadir, Dean, Faculty of Public Administration, Puntland State University
Said Aden Elmi, Administrator, Puntland State University
Yusuf Hajnour, Director, Legal Aid Centre
Mohamed Hamid, Director and President, Puntland State University
Romano Salama, Institutional Development, Kaalo/Puntland State University
Mohamed Said Sameer, Professor, Puntland State University
Mohamed Yusuf, Dean, Faculty of Law, Puntland State University

HARGEISA

Mah Abdullah, Engineer, Somali Consultants Association
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- Mohamed Hassan, Focal Person, Somali
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- Abdullahi Dirie Jama, Secretary General,
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- A. Ibrahim Khalif, Observatory of Violence
- Ahmed Abdi Kijandhe,
Executive Director, HEAL
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- Jamal Samata, Somali Consultants Association

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- Idhow Nor Abdi, Health and Nutrition Officer,
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EMBASSIES AND BILATERAL AGENCIES IN NAIROBI

- Stefano A. Dejak, Ambassador to the TFG,
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- Faisa Abdi Loyaan, Conflict Advisor, CARE
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Annex 5

MAIN DOCUMENTS CONSULTED*

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* Project documents, reports and financial tables, as well as numerous briefing notes and internal working documents provided by the UNDP country office are not listed.

Annex 6

SOMALIA SUPPORT STRUCTURES AT HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD OFFICES

