GOVERNING COUNCIL
Thirtieth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York
on Wednesday, 8 June 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. SLIM (Tunisia)

CONTENTS

Policy review: measures to mobilize increased resources for UNDP on an increasingly predictable, continuous and assured basis (continued):

General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

POLICY REVIEW: MEASURES TO MOBILIZE INCREASED RESOURCES FOR UNDP ON AN INCREASINGLY PREDICTABLE, CONTINUOUS AND ASSURED BASIS (continued)


General debate (continued)

1. Mr. DORJI (Bhutan) said that UNDP's unique role as central co-ordinating body for multilateral technical assistance to developing countries had to be strengthened. The effectiveness of multilateral technical co-operation itself had been seriously questioned in recent years - as had been acknowledged in the deliberations of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole - and he wished to cite a few examples of successful UNDP programmes in his country to prove its invaluable effectiveness in the developing countries.

2. UNDP programmes were an integral part of Bhutan's development plans. They included a major 1,500-hectare irrigation project, several significant forest resource utilization and management projects, a major mechanized road construction project - especially vital in a mountainous and land-locked country like Bhutan - projects to train primary and secondary school-teachers, and crucial vocational training projects that had begun to equip hundreds of Bhutanese to build the nation's capability in almost all fields.

3. At a time when developing countries were in dire need of external assistance, the marked decline in UNDP assistance had forced them to curtail their planned activities drastically, thus seriously impeding their development. The effect was devastating in the least developed and smaller recipient countries.

4. The Intersessional Committee had considered both the short-term and the long-term financing of UNDP. It had appealed for additional contributions to alleviate the critical short-term deficits, and Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland had already responded nobly. Bhutan urged others, especially developed countries, to do likewise. Despite the current world-wide economic crisis, it should be possible to provide UNDP with a reasonable level of resources, one that would show a real annual growth and meet most, if not all, of the 1982-1986 development cycle targets. It was noteworthy that most of the countries that had managed not only to maintain their annual voluntary contributions but to increase them by 14 per cent or more were developing countries. A number of developing countries had also increased their cost-sharing contributions in their determination to make UNDP and its programmes a success.

5. With regard to the long-term financing of UNDP, a set of recommendations for placing it on a sound footing had to be made. The Intersessional Committee had examined a number of options but had not recommended substantive changes for fear of violating the 1970 Consensus, with its emphasis on voluntary contributions and universal participation. It had, however, stressed that UNDP should move towards a system of multi-year pledging in order to guarantee assistance on a predictable, continuous and assured basis. Countries for which multi-year pledging posed parliamentary difficulties should at least be able to make indicative pledges subject to reconfirmation in subsequent years.
6. In the Intersessional Committee his delegation had supported in principle the establishment of a small evaluation unit under the authority of the Administrator, even though it had had reservations about establishing it - at an estimated cost of $600,000 for 1984-1985 - at a time when UNDP was facing serious funding problems. In the belief that evaluation was one of the means to more effective management, Bhutan hoped that the unit would make for a better understanding of UNDP and benefit both donor and recipient countries and, more importantly, that it would build up confidence among donors in UNDP's usefulness and effectiveness.

7. Despite its feeling that a change of forum was not the solution to programming problems, Bhutan had not objected in the Intersessional Committee to setting up a programme committee on a trial basis, since certain members of the Council had so strongly favoured its establishment. The programme committee's mandate must, however, be clearly defined to prevent it from being merely another level of the bureaucracy.

8. His delegation was pleased to note the steps taken by the Administrator with regard to programme implementation and programme planning. UNDP was to be congratulated on moving towards cost-effectiveness and sound financial management, promoting national project execution and reducing the cost of professional project personnel. In general, qualified national and local experts and United Nations Volunteers should be recruited for project execution whenever possible, and recipient countries should be offered opportunities to take a hand in building their own capabilities; similarly, innovative schemes by which recipient Governments provided qualified experts for national projects should be encouraged.

9. With regard to the limits and scope of technical assistance, he said that the 1970 Consensus had clearly stated that UNDP assistance had to be sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of recipient countries and that country programmes should be meaningfully related to national development objectives. An unduly rigid definition of technical assistance would fail to serve the needs of the least developed countries, and it was to be hoped that the Administration's appraisal of the use of programme resources would take into account the specific circumstances confronting those and other recipient countries that were heavily dependent on UNDP assistance.

10. UNDP had an important role to play in implementing the Substantial New Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1980s. UNDP had been helpful in organizing consultative aid meetings. The round-table meeting for the least developed countries in Asia and the Pacific had been held in May and had provided a valuable opportunity to discuss with aid partners national development plans and policies and requirements for external assistance. While firm financial commitments would have been desirable, the obvious readiness of the aid partners to assist that group of least developed countries had been encouraging. It was disheartening, on the other hand, to note the decline in contributions to the United Nations Capital Development Fund, the Special Measures Fund for the Least Developed Countries and the United Nations Volunteers, which did not augur well for the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action; those were the
only funds geared exclusively to the least developed countries, and donor countries should acknowledge their prime importance by pledging increased contributions to them.

11. In conclusion, he said that the recommendations of the Intersessional Committee were steps in the right direction and should be considered favourably by the Council.

12. Mr. SKLYAROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation attached great importance to UNDP's technical assistance to countries in support of their economic and social development. Democratic socio-economic change could not, however, be viewed in isolation from the struggle to achieve peace and halt the arms race. The UNDP Administrator had observed that the amount of money spent on armaments worldwide in the course of a single day would suffice to meet UNDP's needs for an entire year. UNDP must therefore vigorously support the call for an end to the arms race and genuine disarmament.

13. Further progress in international economic co-operation was also closely bound up with the need to resolve acute contemporary political and social problems. While considerable material and human resources might be mobilized for development, without normalization of the international situation, democratization of the whole machinery of international economic relations and effective disarmament, decisive changes could not be made which would overcome the economic backwardness of most developing countries.

14. The current economic situation of the developing countries was a cause of deep concern. Those countries' $700 billion foreign debt to Western countries, and the inability of many of them to pay even the interest on that debt, spoke for themselves. The Soviet Union was categorically opposed to the policy of those Western countries which tried to use international economic co-operation, particularly multilateral technical assistance, as part of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at heightening tension in the world, suppressing national liberation movements and binding the economies of developing countries even more closely to the Western market-economy system.

15. Turning to the work of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole, he said that his delegation's initial doubts as to its usefulness had been confirmed. The Committee had achieved only one clear result, when an absolute majority of its members had reiterated their adherence to the fundamental principles of UNDP and to the 1970 Consensus. In no other aspect of the Committee's work had genuine consensus been achieved, and the Committee's final decisions had been adopted in haste, without sufficient time to consider documents thoroughly. His delegation's position on individual questions had been set forth in the Committee and remained unchanged. The outcome of the Committee's work was reflected in the unsatisfactory situation with regard to documentation and the confusion in the preparations for the current session of the Council. Moreover, his delegation had received no answer to its question as to how much the preparations for, and the holding of the Committee's three sessions had cost UNDP.
16. His delegation continued to believe that, in order to improve UNDP's work and the effectiveness of its assistance to developing countries, close attention must be paid to improving its mechanisms, its relations with executing agencies and its project implementation. Many programmes and projects took an unduly long time to implement or even to become operational. There was imbalance and even dishonesty in UNDP's relations with the executing agencies, a trend towards partiality in the choice of agencies, a lack of clear criteria for the payment of services and even cases of activities implemented for political reasons. Those situations were not a figment of his delegation's imagination: they were documented by evidence available in United Nations reports and the press.

17. In those circumstances, he felt bound to remind the Council that, as early as 1969, Sir Robert Jackson had concluded, in the Capacity Study of UNDP, that unless the Programme overcame shortcomings of that kind and became a more effective and economical international organization, it would gradually lose its impact in the United Nations technical assistance system, its funds would diminish and its place would be taken by financial organizations of the World Bank type. In that connection, his delegation again noted the negative impact on the provision of technical assistance to developing countries of growing ties between United Nations technical assistance, including UNDP assistance, and the activities of the World Bank and other similar monopoly capital financial organizations. After all, it was the World Bank, transnational corporations and private monopoly leaders that were responsible for the huge external debt of the developing countries and for the implementation of neo-colonialist policies towards them.

18. The Soviet Union continued to attach importance to UNDP as a means of implementing resolution 32/197 and similarly progressive General Assembly decisions. It remained willing to co-operate with UNDP, and it was to that end and in order to help the UNDP Administration to use Soviet contributions effectively that it had proposed the creation of special funds to train personnel from developing countries - an activity which had been recognized as a priority in all United Nations forums.

19. The Soviet position with regard to the form and volume of contributions remained unchanged: the best expression of economic and technical assistance to developing countries was services, supplies and the training of personnel. The monetary expression was simply a symbol of such assistance and a means of evaluating and planning it. The Soviet Union would continue to provide assistance in the form that it considered acceptable for itself and that, incidentally, had proved its effectiveness and usefulness to the developing countries concerned. The transformation of United Nations technical assistance channels into business opportunities for private firms and certain countries' imposition of specific forms of participation in the Programme for business purposes were incompatible with the principles of voluntary contribution and universality of the 1970 Consensus and might even turn UNDP into a completely new organization, forcing many countries to reconsider their approach to it.
20. Mr. VRAALSEN (Observer for Norway) said that the severe resource crisis in UNDP in 1982 had created greater awareness of the difficulties facing the Programme: the next step was for donors and recipients alike to translate their words of understanding and support into practical measures. The recommendations of the Intersessional Committee, though modest, could pave the way for future common efforts to preserve UNDP activities at an adequate level.

21. In the view of his Government, UNDPs central funding and co-ordinating role in international technical co-operation was essential. In addition to the impact of the decline in contributions, the decrease of UNDP general resources relative to those of other technical assistance programmes and funds might even more seriously undermine its raison d'être. Care should be taken not to establish new funds or operational guidelines that would erode UNDP's co-ordinating role by making it only one of several channels for technical assistance.

22. Consequently, the decline in contributions had to be halted. In the difficult short-term situation, Norway had been in a position to make a special contribution, and it urged all members to maintain and increase their contributions to UNDP so that the burden would be shared more equitably among donor countries. The United States contribution, a comparatively large one, was a welcome development as were the special contributions by Canada, Sweden and Switzerland.

23. The Intersessional Committee had made some constructive recommendations that should be endorsed by the Governing Council. Of particular interest was the proposal for further consideration of a three-year rolling system of pledges and programme implementation, since that approach would put UNDP resources on a more predictable, continuous and assured basis and make for better planning. It would also be worth while to pursue the idea of establishing a programme committee. In addition, Norway wholeheartedly supported the proposal to establish an evaluation unit, preferably one reporting directly to the Governing Council.

24. The network of UNDP field offices constituted the backbone of the Programme as well as its face to the outside world, and in general the UNDP personnel in the field met the high standards expected of them. The Norwegian Development Agency got in touch with the UNDP field office whenever it planned bilateral assistance programmes in a country, and Norway urged other donors to rely on the field offices for co-ordination purposes. UNDP's recently established co-operation with the World Bank was to be welcomed; UNDP's world-wide field presence was a great asset and should make it superfluous for the Bank to develop a similar network. It might also be useful to look into ways of strengthening UNDP's relations with the regional development banks.

25. Norway took the position of principle that contributions to UNDP should be unconditional and untied. Similarly, contracts under UNDP should be awarded on the basis of open and fair competition. Norway did not feel that it was getting a fair share of United Nations contracts, even though a number of Norwegian firms competed successfully in the international commercial market. UNDP should make use of deliveries from smaller industrialized countries and developing countries whenever their companies were competitive, and it should use its influence with executing agencies to ensure openness in the United Nations procurement system.
26. Just as the special funds such as the United Nations Capital Development Fund and the Special Measures Fund should always co-ordinate their activities with those of UNDP, so UNDP should never use the activities of the special funds as an excuse for disregarding in its own Programme the objectives and purposes served by those funds. It had not been expected, for instance, that the activities of the small Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women would be deemed to obviate the need for activities relating to women under general UNDP programmes, and his Government felt that it should have been possible for UNDP to fund from its general resources the preparatory phase of a project on promotion and support for women's participation in the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Since that had not happened, Norway had decided to support the project financially itself, and it urged other countries and multilateral agencies to do so as well. Moreover, in order to focus adequately on the essential need to integrate women into the development process, UNDP should regularly include the role of women in development as a separate item in its agenda.

27. In conclusion, he said it was important for UNDP to take due account of possible negative environmental consequences of any of its development activities at the earliest possible stage of decision-making.

28. Mr. BUENO (Brazil) observed that UNDP was the main catalyst for technical co-operation among developing countries. Together with other organizations of the United Nations development system and international agencies, however, it should assume a greater share of the responsibility for TCDC. International organizations and the developed countries should be encouraged to finance TCDC from their regular budgets in order to diversify sources of technical co-operation and to add to UNDP's clearly insufficient budget.

29. Having participated actively in the three sessions of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole, his delegation welcomed the fact that the principles of the 1970 Consensus had been and would continue to be the very foundation of UNDP. The Programme's role and structure must never deviate from those principles.

30. His delegation shared the Administrator's concern regarding the reduction in voluntary contributions to the Programme and its impact on the availability of resources, the level of which had remained static in 1982. Owing to the shortage of hard-core resources, his Government was establishing alternative mechanisms to support technical co-operation activities, including a special project established within UNDP to which it was allocating $300,000 annually. It also allocated substantial resources in local currency for bilateral TCDC activities and, from its IPP, covered the cost of using Brazilian technical institutions for such activities. Co-operation received from UNDP continued to have a multiplier effect, as institutions which had received multilateral co-operation began to engage in horizontal technical co-operation, enabling Brazil's national technical co-operation programmes to pass on the technology so acquired to other developing countries. That contributed to the overall improvement of national skills and to the development of indigenous technologies adapted to countries' individual needs.
31. At the bilateral level, Brazil had been promoting horizontal co-operation with Latin American and African countries in a variety of areas, including the training of human resources. There were currently over 8,000 students from developing countries enrolled in graduate and specialization courses in Brazil, and expenditures on the undergraduate fellowship programme amounted to approximately $40 million a year. Starting in 1983, Brazil was offering 312 high-level scholarships in engineering, medicine and agricultural sciences at a total cost of over $2 million. Given the shortage of resources, its technical co-operation programmes were oriented primarily towards countries with similar geographic conditions that could assimilate new knowledge more readily. Were the United Nations development system and developed countries to come to accept the idea of trilateral co-operation more widely and to offer resources to students from developing countries wishing to be trained in Brazil, that programme could be enlarged.

32. The idea of trilateral technical co-operation also applied to project implementation. His Government was willing to examine the possibility of mobilizing its internal resources to co-finance specific projects with any country or group of countries that so desired. Its co-financing implied the participation of Brazilian institutions in all areas of the project concerned.

33. Brazil had adopted an innovative approach to technical co-operation among developing countries. For instance, negotiations had recently taken place between the Brazilian and Angolan Governments and UNIDO on the three-way implementation and financing of a project to rehabilitate, modernize and expand Angola's food industry. The most difficult obstacle had been the fact that UNIDO had no mechanism flexible enough to absorb the participation of a second developing country, namely Brazil.

34. His Government believed that Council decision 80/30 provided an adequate framework to cope with the need to maintain the level of programmed technical co-operation. Instead of creating new mechanisms, the Council should implement those already in existence. Had all donor countries increased their contributions as recommended in decision 80/30, the IPFs of developing countries would not have had to be reduced. At the sessions of the Intersessional Committee, his delegation had voiced serious doubts as to whether a system based on proposals to replace the existing voluntary funding mechanism by a replenishment system such as those used by the international financial institutions would in fact increase resources. He therefore welcomed the Committee's proposal that countries should voluntarily endeavour to maintain the real value of their contributions, in keeping with the basic principles of the 1970 Consensus. His delegation would agree to any measure that would enable IPFs to be re-established at the level foreseen at the beginning of the current programming cycle.

35. His delegation firmly believed that the role of the Governing Council should be reinforced and that one of its main functions was to examine and approve country programmes. It endorsed the concept of UNDP, embodied in the 1970 Consensus, as the central funding and co-ordinating agency for the technical co-operation efforts
of the United Nations system for development. In order for there to be understanding and improved relations among all countries, UNDP must be sustained by the entire international community and its effectiveness preserved as the operational multilateral mechanism through which all countries could benefit from policies defined and decided upon by the Council.

36. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Philippines) said that it was regrettable that owing to administrative problems there had been a delay in the distribution of the important documentation prepared for the current session.

37. The financial situation of UNDP had become even bleaker since the previous session. As a result of the decision taken after the most recent pledging conference to reduce programme delivery to 55 per cent of IPFs, the implementation of 15 projects in his country had immediately been deferred and the number of ongoing projects would be reduced from 39 in 1982 to 16 in 1984. The impact on the Philippines' economic programme as a whole was expected to be substantial.

38. It had become clear at the sessions of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole that one of the primary reasons for the decline in the volume of contributions to the Programme was the severe economic recession confronting the international community, which had meant that the traditional donor countries had been forced to review their priorities at a time when the developing countries' problems were becoming more acute. However, his delegation believed that the conclusions reached by the Intersessional Committee (DP/1983/5, chap. V) should be reconsidered, since there were currently indications that economic recovery might be under way. He noted that the recent economic summit meeting of the developed market-economy countries at Williamsburg had underlined the importance of increasing assistance to developing countries.

39. The conclusions of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole concerning the short-term financing of UNDP were disappointing. Since the purpose of the proposed supplementary financing effort had been to keep certain ongoing projects afloat, he wished the Administrator to inform the Council whether the failure to raise all the required funds would jeopardize the projects in question. It might be useful for delegations to reconsider their positions regarding the short-term financing effort in the light of the current brighter economic prospects. His delegation would be interested in taking part in informal consultations for that purpose.

40. The conclusions of the Intersessional Committee concerning the Programme's longer-term financing should also be re-examined. He assumed that the fact that the Committee had been unable to agree on the establishment of a multi-year pledging system was due in part to uncertainties in the international economy. His delegation supported the relevant conclusions as an interim measure but believed that the question should be kept under review so that more appropriate procedures could be established in due course.

41. His delegation endorsed the conclusions of the Intersessional Committee on ways of strengthening the role of the Governing Council and participating
Governments in programme planning and programme review and the Administrator's decision to establish a small central evaluation unit, initially to be financed out of savings in the current budget.

42. The recipient countries still had faith in UNDP, and his Government continued to believe in the basic principles set forth in the 1970 Consensus. It was important that recipients of UNDP resources should continue to have primary responsibility for setting their development priorities and deciding what projects they needed. His delegation saw the merits of evaluating programme effectiveness for the benefit of donors but urged representatives of donor countries to visit UNDP-assisted projects in the field. Furthermore, although the campaign to provide the international media with information was an important exercise, the most effective way of enhancing the image of UNDP would be for recipients and donors alike to demonstrate that they were committed to the Programme.

43. In his delegations's view, the policy of "over-programming" should be reinstated, since actual expenditures invariably fell short of programmed expenditure and over-programming ensured the continued execution of programmes when the initial funding began to run out. His delegation also supported the policy of allowing field missions automatically to carry over to succeeding years any unexpended balances of annual budgets. It was opposed, on the other hand, to the imposition of arbitrary ceilings on the equipment component of UNDP assistance to specific projects, since certain projects required sophisticated and costly training and research equipment. A greater volume of UNDP assistance should be made available for the detailed preparation of projects requiring sophisticated equipment. His delegation supported the TCDC programme, which should be backed by the international community through UNDP.

44. His Government was disquieted by the reduction in aid flows, particularly official development assistance, and the recent trend for such assistance not to be channelled through UNDP. The basic operating principles of UNDP were still sound. Moreover, since technical assistance should not be subject to political considerations and should be provided on a multilateral and multisectoral basis that would foster self-reliance, his delegation urged donor countries to re-examine their assistance programmes and revert to providing most of their technical co-operation components through UNDP. The measures taken to mobilize resources for UNDP on an increasingly predictable, continuous and assured basis must be pursued, and hard choices would have to be made. For the developing countries, the road to economic recovery would be long and difficult, and the international community must therefore make a swift and appropriate response to their concerns through the available channels for international co-operation, such as UNDP.

45. **Mr. MITESA** (Zambia) said that, while the developing countries still had faith in UNDP, they feared that the provision of assistance through the Programme was, owing to political considerations, becoming less attractive to most major donor countries.
46. Zambia still believed in the role of UNDP in the field of technical assistance and had benefited greatly from UNDP activities. On gaining independence in 1964, his country had had to face fundamental problems arising from the fact that it had a lopsided economy and no national expertise to call on or resources to attract foreign expertise to assist in development planning. UNDP alone had provided and continued to provide assistance in that field. Since 1964 UNDP and other United Nations specialized agencies had provided support for 141 fully or partially implemented projects. A number of ongoing projects in various key sectors were receiving UNDP support, and until recently his Government had hoped that UNDP would be in a position to support further projects. A number of agricultural projects, to which his Government attached great importance, had been cancelled.

47. The proliferation of funds outside UNDP eroded the Programme's role. Since funds-in-trust did not normally bring about an overall increase in development resources but merely compartmentalized them, his delegation believed that they should be resorted to only in exceptional cases. It was important for the Council to find ways of strengthening the role of UNDP as the central development funding organization in the United Nations system. The three sessions of the Intersessional Committee of the Whole represented a step towards serious consideration of the problem of the lack of resources, but the outcome of those sessions reflected the inability of Member States to adjust to prevailing circumstances. It was to be hoped that Member States would eventually be able to accept some of the measures suggested by the Administrator to the Committee. His delegation supported the Administrator's efforts and believed that the proposals he had put forward concerning the strategy for short-term and long-term resource mobilization for UNDP, including institutional adjustments in the area of managing UNDP activities, contained valuable elements. Provided that the fundamental principle of the universality of UNDP and the 1970 Consensus were safeguarded and the alternatives proposed resulted in a greater volume of resources being available to UNDP, those alternatives should continue to be considered on a priority basis. The report of the Intersessional Committee (DP/1983/5) provided a basis for future development of the issues discussed at its sessions.

48. His delegation expressed its gratitude to the countries that had responded generously to the appeal made by the Administrator for additional resources, and to the countries that had raised their overall contributions. As matters stood, it had to be accepted that only the system of voluntary contributions commanded wide support, and a special effort was necessary to make that system work.

49. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Observer for the Latin American Economic System) said that in 1975 25 Latin American States had assembled at Panama to develop a permanent system for intraregional co-ordination, consultation and co-operation in Latin America based on the principles of the equality, sovereignty and independence of States and on solidarity, and to foster Latin American co-operation for the establishment, development, adaptation and exchange of scientific and technological information, together with improved development of human, educational, scientific and cultural resources. That Latin American effort had later manifested itself in the region's solidarity in support of the new international economic order and in co-operative...
action at the regional level. SELA was probably the most innovative experiment undertaken by developing countries in regional co-operation, both in its concept and in its operational methods.

50. Practical action by SELA, whether in progress or planned, would in time strengthen Latin America's international negotiating position. At a time when the economies of the developed countries were in recession, Latin American countries, like the other developing countries, urgently needed to find ways to minimize the short-term negative effects of that crisis and to devise a global economic strategy that would reduce their external vulnerability and bring about sustained, equitable and independent economic and social development, thereby benefiting the entire international community.

51. Studies by SELA and other Latin American organizations pointed to a single course of action to that end: the strengthening of the Latin American countries' co-operation and economic integration and improvement of the system of consultation and co-ordination among the countries of the region in the economic and social fields. Only in that way could the region achieve self-sustained and independent development, realize its full potential, optimize the use of its human and natural resources and achieve autonomy in scientific and technological know-how and financing. SELA had nothing but praise for the assistance of UNDP in that undertaking. He stressed the urgent need for that support to be continued, since it was not only the most important medium for the affirmation of the value of Latin American co-operation within SELA, but also the System's sole source of external financing.

52. Since the establishment of SELA, co-operation between it and UNDP had resulted, inter alia, in the establishment of action committees and permanent bodies for intra-regional co-operation. The action committees in turn, had generated a series of projects for regional co-operation as a basis for the construction of a system that would help to achieve the Latin American objectives of economic and social development. SELA was accordingly concerned at the reduction in UNDP's financial resources. Any reduction in the flow of those resources to SELA would undoubtedly seriously hamper the activities currently being carried out by it.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.