



**Executive Board of the  
United Nations Development  
Programme and of the  
United Nations Population Fund**

Distr.: General  
13 July 2001

Original: English

**Second regular session 2001**

10-14 September, New York

Item 5 of the provisional agenda

**Country cooperation frameworks and related matters**

**Country review report for the Democratic People's Republic  
of Korea\***

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\* The present report contains a summary of the findings of the review. The full text is available in the language of submission from the Executive Board secretariat.



## Introduction

1. The first country cooperation framework (CCF) for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea lasted from 1997 to 1999 but was extended by one year to the end of 2000. A review mission took place from 18 July to 5 August 2000, consisting of a government representative, a representative from UNDP headquarters and a consultant acting as team leader. The views and interpretations of this study are those of the mission and should not be attributed to UNDP, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or to any other organization, as the content of this study does not imply their official policy or endorsement.
2. The main purpose of the country review was to assess performance at the country level in the implementation of the first CCF, identify constraints and bottlenecks, provide an assessment of results, and make forward-looking recommendations for the preparation of the next CCF.

### I. National context

3. An industrialized country, the development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the last 10 years has been seriously challenged. The break up of the Soviet Union and the disruption of historical trade relations meant that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could no longer rely on key inputs such as petroleum at preferential prices. Natural disasters in 1994-1997 further aggravated the situation, as did a changing global environment that increasingly requires access to international standards and norms, new technologies, information systems and financial markets not available to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
4. The country has responded to these challenges with determination and increasing flexibility while preserving intact its insistence on self-reliance and methods of central planning. The food situation remains precarious, with harvests of less than 4 million tons of rice and maize in recent years as compared to 5.5 million tons in the late 1980s. The country currently receives large-scale external humanitarian food aid.
5. The energy and transportation sectors are experiencing serious challenges. Energy limitations in particular continue to have a ripple effect throughout the economy, including industry and agriculture. The economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is one of the most energy intensive in the developing world, and available capacity is severely constrained by lack of fuel (e.g., coal shortages due to flooding and inability to purchase petroleum due to foreign exchange constraints), lack of water for hydroelectric plants as a result of below average rainfall, and delays in the construction of nuclear reactors by the Korean Energy Development Organization.
6. The ultimate constraint, however, is a lack of investment funds. The Government needs to increase its capacity to respond to the demands of capital markets and foreign investors through the preparation of appropriate programmes, strategies and plans; development of the capacity to analyse and implement projects; and greater awareness of international standards and norms.

### II. The first country cooperation framework

7. The first CCF (1997-1999) was prepared on the basis of an UNDP advisory note and was approved by the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board in July 1997. The programme focused on three thematic areas: agricultural rehabilitation and food security; economic cooperation and foreign trade; and environment and natural resources management. Agricultural rehabilitation and food security was to be given first priority among the three subprogrammes because of the need to cope with recent natural disasters and the pressing need for rehabilitation of agriculture and its infrastructure.
8. Implementation of the first CCF proceeded largely as planned, with disbursements of \$11.6 million from the UNDP core budget, some \$2.0 million higher than anticipated in 1997 due to higher funding from target resource assignment from the core (TRAC) 3 resources. However, the mobilization of non-core resources lagged behind

Targeted at \$7.7 million, actual non-core disbursements were only \$1.1 million because expected contributions to agricultural rehabilitation and food security trust funds did not materialize. The breakdown of projects by theme was:

Thematic area	Number of projects with core funding, 1997-2000
Agricultural rehabilitation and food security	16
Economic cooperation and foreign trade	6
Environment and natural resources management	10

### III. Programme performance

#### A. Agriculture rehabilitation and food security

9. UNDP began providing post-disaster agricultural rehabilitation assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1996 with its support for the agricultural relief and rehabilitation programme. Based on the success of this assistance, UNDP and the Government decided to embark on a new programme focusing on agricultural relief and environmental protection (AREP). Under this programme, a three-phase strategy was envisaged: (a) short-term emergency assistance; (b) sustained rehabilitation and donor interventions; and (c) preparation of a framework for long-term development.

##### *Findings*

10. The review mission found that the UNDP office had reacted appropriately in supporting the Government's rehabilitation efforts in the agricultural and food security sector, especially as regards the institutional support provided to the AREP process, both by funding needed sectoral studies and by establishing an institutional framework of support (round-table meetings and an agricultural subcommittee). Participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a partner in the internationally attended round-table meetings has been a signal breakthrough that has set the stage for a process of opening that continues to unfold. It also represents a model for a programme approach in other sectors. This is the first time the Government has agreed to such meetings of external donors in this area, and UNDP and the Government worked closely on their organization.

11. One of the main successes of the programme has been that it represented the first time that a programme approach to country assistance was carried out. This entailed the preparation of a thematic sector review (agricultural rehabilitation) with international participation, establishment of a government programme (the AREP) based on the review, and donor support of the Government's programme through projects and capacity-building activities. In addition, AREP facilitated the Government's participation in the series of round-table meetings (AREP I and II) coordinated by UNDP to prepare a support strategy.

12. The overall approach was effective in developing a rehabilitation strategy and in securing funding from donors. UNDP established an agricultural rehabilitation and food security project unit responsible for UNDP projects that contribute to the Government's AREP. Located within the UNDP country office, this project unit designs projects and assists in their implementation. The programme has strengthened the Government's capacity to communicate with the international community through round-table meetings and other coordination and programming devices. Although limited, knowledge has been transferred from individual project interventions (e.g., dike construction, double cropping, seed technology and salt iodination) to other areas as well.

13. However, it is noted that most of the projects under this thematic area have had an equipment budget of well over 50 per cent, the provision of which is not within the mandate of UNDP. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, there have been no tripartite review meetings in any of the UNDP projects being carried out under the AREP, and none of them established a steering committee. There has not been an evaluation of any of the UNDP-funded AREP projects completed during the term of the CCF since most individual projects were below \$1 million.

*Recommendations*

14. The Government should consider incorporating into its rehabilitation programme a greater development focus to establish lessons learned and to promote systematic experimentation and capacity building at key agricultural institutions in order to improve the sustainability of the projects and to encourage replication of project innovations.
15. UNDP should continue to support the AREP process institutionally through its agricultural subcommittee and should make renewed efforts to involve the Government directly.
16. It is recommended to make greater use of available evaluation mechanisms and to undertake a cluster evaluation of all agricultural rehabilitation and food security projects at the earliest possible time.
17. All recent assistance from external donors has been motivated by the country's emergency situation, focusing initially on immediate emergency relief and then on agricultural rehabilitation. There is broad agreement, however, that such programmes cannot address food deficiencies in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a sustainable manner. Even with investment in the industrial sector to provide fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, as well as improvements in the transport and energy sector, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will depend for the balance of its food and agricultural input needs on export earnings from other sectors, mainly industry. This is also the finding of the 1999 United Nations strategy paper for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which calls for a three-track approach that includes the continuation of humanitarian assistance; continuation of the AREP round-table process, focusing on rehabilitation while providing an exit strategy for humanitarian assistance; and parallel capacity building, including training on market economies, transition issues, enterprise management and banking among others.

**B. Economic cooperation and foreign trade**

18. In the early 1990s, the need for increased foreign exchange earnings led to decisions to encourage exports and to attract foreign investors. The Government established the Rajin free economic and trade zone and sought to establish capacity to deal with international trade. In support of these priorities, the UNDP country office with assistance by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) prepared the International Economic Cooperation Programme with three components:
  - (a) Supporting investment promotion and the free economic and trade zone, including establishment of the Rajin Business Institute, with UNIDO acting as the implementing agency.
  - (b) Strengthening export capacity of the garment sector through pilot assistance to two garment factories and the Institute of Garment Technology, with implementation through the ITC.
  - (c) Strengthening the capacity of the Research Institute for External Economies through capacity building and equipment support, with implementation through the ITC.

*Findings*

19. All three elements of the international economic cooperation programme had some degree of success, although their ultimate contribution to export growth was limited. Investment promotion activities raised awareness of the economic zone and contributed to investments in the zone but country capacity for investment promotion remains limited.
20. A more effective approach could have been developed during implementation if an international programme coordinator had been in place as planned and if steering and oversight had been stronger. Innovation was directed

mainly towards technical improvements, such as computers, machinery, training and study tours, but did not address other key ingredients to achieving institutional success. Operational sustainability is mostly assured in the sense that the Government provides budgets for operations and staff. Women have been given insufficient attention, both at the design stage and in implementation. In one group of 47 study tour/training participants, not a single one was a woman. In the female-dominated garment sector, only 9 of 33 participants were women.

#### *Recommendations*

21. The Government should use the lessons learned from the International Economic Cooperation Programme (and other similar projects) in preparing a programme to strengthen industry and export trade.

22. The traditional strength and comparative advantage of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in the industrial sector. Industry provides essential inputs to the agricultural sector (e.g., fertilizer and pest control) and is the only sector capable of generating needed foreign exchange earnings. The Government attaches importance to the industrial sector, yet industry suffers from excess capacity as a result of a lack of energy. The immediate priorities therefore relate to energy as one of the preconditions for a fuller utilization of industrial capacity.

### **C. Environment and natural resources management**

23. The environment and natural resources management thematic area was designed to accommodate at least three different subthemes: (a) the energy sector, represented by carry-over projects from the early 1990s; (b) wastewater treatment and air pollution, represented by a project formulated prior to the CCF but with an implementation period roughly concurrent with it; and (c) global environmental concerns related to biodiversity and climate change funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), with UNDP cost sharing, designed around the obligations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a signatory to international environmental agreements and the country's inability to meet those obligations without assistance

24. Energy became a top priority in the early 1990s after the loss of traditional suppliers. The country's energy deficit was aggravated by the nature of its production, which relied on outdated equipment and energy-intensive designs typical of its former Socialist trading partners.

#### *Findings*

25. Given the diversity of the sub-areas and approaches followed, results and impacts provide a variety of lessons. Only the GEF interventions followed a programme approach. Most projects included large equipment and subcontract components. Improvements were made in equipment, computer software and know-how, but little additional capacity building was undertaken.

26. Several of the projects designed to reduce pollution were also intended simultaneously to raise income for the establishments concerned. Some of the results were highly positive and suggest that some of the pilot interventions were also economically feasible.

#### *Recommendations*

27. The Government should consider follow-up actions in the form of a national plan and strategy on energy efficiency.

28. The Government should consider expanding its GEF experience to other environmental concerns by preparing a programme, including a national assessment, strategy and action plan, dealing with land rehabilitation, reforestation and firewood.

29. Increasingly, the energy sector has become the key constraint on the economy, limiting production in all other sectors, both directly and indirectly. Yet improving the situation is not merely a matter of raising productive

capacity. It is recommended that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prepare a comprehensive sector analysis that considers a wide scope of relevant actions. In the environmental sector, it is recommended that the Government continue on its path of preparing enabling frameworks followed by project implementation.

#### **IV. UNDP support to the United Nations**

30. The programme cycles of UNICEF and UNDP have been harmonized beginning in 2001. Since the current UNFPA programme, initially covering the period 1998-2001, is likely to be extended by two years from the original period up to 2003, the possibility exists of synchronizing its next programme cycle with those of UNDP and UNICEF as well.

31. The United Nations agencies have judged that conditions are not yet appropriate to develop a Common Country Assessment (CCA) and a United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). However, the United Nations agencies are in common agreement on the overall humanitarian and recovery strategy for the country. This is evidenced by the country team's production in 1999 of the United Nations strategy paper, around which the United Nations agencies have built their complementary programmes. Consequently, there are many examples of inter-agency collaborative projects.

32. The UNDP Resident Representative is also the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, which facilitates close inter-agency collaboration. Coordination among United Nations agencies and among United Nations agencies and international NGOs is conducted through a weekly inter-agency meeting chaired by the United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. All United Nations agencies and NGOs working in the country regularly attend the meeting.

33. UNDP provides a range of support services to United Nations agencies not resident in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which includes significant services to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and support to resident United Nations agencies that do not have their own local administrative capacity, such as FAO and WHO.

#### **V. Programme management and operation**

##### **A. Management**

34. All United Nations agencies have as their formal coordinating counterpart in the Government the National Coordinating Committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except on environmental matters, where coordination is through the National Coordinating Committee for the Environment, which is also in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

35. Out of 44 projects with active budgets during 1997-1999, 18 were carried out through national execution. The principal executing partners have been the Ministry of Trade (the General Bureau for Cooperation with International Organizations) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee). The General Bureau for Cooperation with International Organizations was created at a time when sector ministries were not yet ready to execute their own projects. The Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee was created following the natural disasters of the mid-1990s. All nationally executed UNDP agricultural rehabilitation projects are executed through the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and access to the Ministry of Agriculture remains indirect.

##### *Findings*

36. In theory, nationally executed projects operate with a national project coordinator at the executing agency and national project directors at the implementing agency. There are often several national project directors for a project, one for each institution receiving assistance under the same project. The national project director typically is also the director of the counterpart institution being assisted, which means the person responsible for

providing assistance is the same as the person representing the institution that receives assistance. Such a mixture of roles is likely to reduce the quality of monitoring and advice.

37. Execution capacity at the General Bureau for Cooperation with International Organizations and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee is still not fully developed and the UNDP country office assumes a number of execution services through project staff seconded to the office.

38. Project implementation is highly decentralized. Projects, other than agricultural projects, often have a number of national project directors, one at each intervention site. There is no upstream national project director, however, for dialogue with the relevant line ministries. As a result, relations with line ministries are limited and constrain the achievement of project results.

39. The national executing agencies themselves also suffer from a lack of capacity, despite many years of experience and UNDP interventions. National execution audits for 1998 and 1999 noted significant deficiencies, and the audits themselves were below standard. As a result of some of these weaknesses, the country office has taken on a backstopping role by providing support in recruitment, procurement, subcontracts and financial administration and management.

40. Most projects have no permanent presence at any site. However in the case of the agricultural programme, UNDP has established an AREP project unit located at the UNDP country office. The country office has assumed functions that should be provided either by the project or by the executing agency, such as recruitment of experts, procurement of services and equipment, issuance of subcontracts, and financial management. The country office does not charge for most of these services; conversely, the project does not charge the country office for certain services it provides, e.g., use of vehicles.

41. Many of these arrangements can be explained by unique features of the country's system of cooperation. International long-term experts cannot easily be located within the ministries or organizations that implement externally assisted programmes. Country office and national project national staff cannot be hired on the open market but are allocated by the two national executing agencies, while retaining their affiliation with their respective line ministries. Hence, it is difficult for national staff to separate their roles and responsibilities.

#### *Recommendations*

42. The Government should permit projects to have greater access to beneficiary institutions in the form of dialogue, to be located within the institution and to make greater use of international coordinators.

43. Projects should adhere to project steering requirements, including tripartite meetings and steering committee meetings, and use them as an opportunity to improve project effectiveness.

44. Project direct support in the form of equipment budgets should remain within guideline values unless: (a) the budget can be justified in terms of its contribution to the innovative core of the project; and (b) the expenditures can be shown to be replicable elsewhere without UNDP support. Direct support expenditures should be justified in terms of their contribution to institutional capacity building rather than technological innovation.

45. Projects, including those in agriculture, should be designed principally for the purpose of innovation rather than rehabilitation as such and should permit an upstream dialogue that assures that innovative experience and capacity are replicated elsewhere.

### **B. Programme approach**

46. The first CCF was designed in close cooperation with the Government. However, there was not a convincing logical framework in terms of problems and needs, UNDP strengths and focal areas, programme objectives and implementation strategy.

47. The adoption of a programme approach was hampered by the lack of government programmes at the outset. However, a programme approach was successfully developed as part of CCF implementation in at least two areas,

biodiversity and agricultural rehabilitation and food security, in which the Government prepared the AREP with UNDP assistance.

*Recommendation*

48. The Government is encouraged to use a programme approach to mobilize both international and UNDP assistance.

**C. National execution**

*Findings*

49. The capacity for national execution continues to be weak, and national execution audits for 1998 and 1999 noted significant deficiencies. This is despite considerable spending over a period of 10 years on a \$1 million national execution capacity support project. The audits themselves were below standard quality. Issues concerning capacities for national execution will continue to be an important factor in achieving the success of any UNDP programme activities.

*Recommendations*

50. In order to strengthen national execution capacity, it is recommended that:

(a) UNDP consult with the Government to hire international auditors to work with national experts.

(b) Audit results be used to establish a plan for national execution capacity building, taking into account the national execution requirements of the CCF in the future and the needs of the agencies involved in national execution.

**D. Monitoring and evaluation**

*Findings*

51. Monitoring is not sufficiently output- and results-oriented. Checks and balances throughout the entire process of design, project acceptance and implementation are limited.

52. While project monitoring systems are in place, they could be strengthened through an increased focus on results rather than inputs. The country office has prepared annual progress reports, a country programme management plan, a strategic results framework, and a results-oriented annual report for 1999. Since some of these are new instruments, one would expect that with time they would become less descriptive and provide more analysis concerning the results achieved.

53. Insufficient use is made of project steering mechanisms, particularly in the agricultural sector where lack of tripartite review meetings and steering committee meetings comes on top of limited direct dialogue with the Ministry of Agriculture.

*Recommendations*

54. UNDP should make greater use of independent appraisals for projects.

55. It is recommended that future capacity-building projects either include a preparatory project phase to establish baseline information or include a strong institutional review linked to conditionalities, including reporting to the steering committee.

56. Tripartite meetings should be held at least once annually for all projects. In addition, steering committees should be established, with at least twice annual meetings during the first year. An inception meeting should be held at the start of each project.



57. Project clusters should be designed with a long-term international adviser to supply critical analysis, and evaluations should precede each decision point.

## **E. UNDP office management and operations**

### *Findings*

58. A significant number of staff with country office core functions (as well as some vehicles used at the country office) are paid out of project funds. On the other hand, the country office provides numerous services (including space) to projects and executing agencies.

59. All national staff (both at the general service and professional levels) are seconded from the Government. UNDP reimburses the Government for their salaries. Staff do not have UNDP contracts. Therefore, there are no UNDP staff performance reviews, and there is no salary component related to performance. UNDP has few options in its staff selection. (This system is the same for all United Nations agencies in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.)

60. Based on standard work indicators (1999 disbursements of \$2.9 million; an average of 125 vouchers processed per month), the country office is overstaffed. This is true even when allowing for services provided to projects, NGOs and donors. It also remains true considering limitations of some staff in terms of job skills, a lack of UNDP control over staff turnover and attendance, and other limitations, such as lack of Internet connectivity.

### *Recommendations*

61. It is recommended to downsize the country office in line with workload and to reconfigure the office into a programme unit (three programme officers and two programme assistants), a programme support unit (two staff), and an operations unit (nine staff, including drivers and cleaners), all supported from the UNDP core budget. The number of deputy representatives should be reduced from two to one.

62. To promote accountability and transparency of the country office, it is recommended to:

- (a) Separate projects from country office operations in terms of functions, staff and finance.
- (b) Offer country office services to projects or executing agencies for a fee.
- (c) Move project units from the UNDP building to the premises of the beneficiary agency.

63. It is recommended to make greater use of available training resources and innovative means of on-the-job training such as twinning, mentoring, and the use of staff from other UNDP offices for training purposes.

64. The mission recommends greater transparency through cost centre accounting and service pricing, subject to the need for minimal bureaucracy in line with the special situation of donor organizations in the country and the mutual nature of much of their support services.

## **VI. Principal findings and recommendations**

### *General findings*

65. The mission was impressed with the level of goodwill and trust that UNDP enjoys with the Government. This trust has been substantially furthered by UNDP actions during the period of the first CCF, including, in particular, UNDP support for AREP.

66. Because of the Government's concern with emergency rehabilitation, the overall design and implementation of the CCF had little relation to the strategic results framework of UNDP, including its focal areas or objectives. Owing to the emergency situation and government priorities, project development activities have focused largely on agricultural rehabilitation and food security. The other thematic areas did not prepare significant new projects, with the exception of two GEF projects and a few special initiatives.

67. Much of the project innovation has been through the introduction of new technologies rather than institutional or policy innovations closer to UNDP strengths and interests. Impact, while beneficial, was often limited to the immediate site and target group involved.

68. Institutional reviews at the start of the project were designed to compensate for a lack of prior information on institutional capacity and needs. However, the implementation of these reviews, by international experts, was sometimes weak and badly monitored both by the international implementing agency and the beneficiary institution in the country. The design of most projects suffers from insufficient attention to institutional capacity building, replicability and sustainability. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the institutional situation and specific capacity limitations of counterpart institutions are usually not known at the start of a project. This may call for greater use of a preparatory phase to understand better the problems to be addressed.

69. For project training and study tours, there needs to be more follow-up on the effectiveness and use of the training, the extent to which staff turnover impedes its use, and the need for further training.

70. The direct assistance component of the CCF has been overdesigned (even accounting for the country's shortage of foreign exchange) and is almost certainly higher than in virtually any other country. In many projects, equipment accounts for 50-80 per cent of the total budget and is rarely below 30-40 per cent.

#### *Recommendations*

71. The Government is encouraged to seek limited UNDP resources mainly for technical assistance rather than for equipment support.

72. To assure impacts beyond direct project beneficiaries, the Government is encouraged to use all projects for a direct dialogue with relevant line ministries and institutions.

73. The Government is encouraged to permit experimentation with cost-recovery mechanisms, particularly when they involve services of clearly defined demand.

74. The Government is encouraged to seek projects that operate both at local and central levels so that local projects can demonstrate innovative approaches and central-level projects can serve to evaluate and secure mechanisms for replication.

75. It is recommended that all projects aim to broaden their impact beyond the immediate beneficiaries through upstream dialogue and capacity building, design of follow-up, and explicit analysis of possibilities for replicability and sustainability.

76. It is recommended to prepare follow-up studies on training to encourage continued donor assistance.

77. UNDP has a potential role to play in assisting the Government in obtaining access to donors and in preparing the stage for the arrival of larger multilateral and bilateral financial institutions. There are at least three types of assistance needed if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes to make full use of these potential donor resources:

(a) Support for programme preparation. Currently, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea often first identifies projects for which it needs assistance and presents them to donors, using a "shopping list" approach. Instead, it is proposed that UNDP assist the Government in the preparation of sector strategies, plans of action, project concept studies and facilitation of round-table discussions, similar to the AREP and GEF processes already put in place.

(b) Capacity building for development absorption. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has opened discussions with several countries and multilateral institutions that eventually may lead to increased development assistance. UNDP can provide its good services in raising the country's capacity for the absorption of this assistance. This may include dialogue and training of high officials and intermediate-level staff in areas

such as the principles of project analysis, international institutions and procedures, and capacity development in development cooperation and project execution.

(c) Support for pilot institutional capacity building. Past UNDP assistance has often been long on supplying equipment and short on providing institutional support, which has limited impact, replicability and sustainability of results. The mission suggests that the Government give institutional capacity building another try.

#### *Future CCF*

78. It is recommended that the Government use UNDP assistance to establish the capacity for future resource mobilization efforts. This should follow a three-pronged approach of support to: (a) government programme development; (b) absorption of development assistance; and (c) innovative projects with upstream linkages.

79. Projects should be examined in terms of their potential for "soft" technical assistance (institutional capacity building and training) and their "hard" financial assistance requirements (equipment and technology) so as to enable them use each appropriately in resource mobilization efforts with international donors.

80. It is recommended that the thematic areas in the second CCF be better aligned with the focal areas of the strategic results framework. Recommended thematic areas include programming and capacity building for human development, environment and natural resource management, and, possibly, food security.

81. The mission recommends that sector programming be limited to two priority sectors, including, most likely, the energy sector and, possibly, industry. These sector priorities should be reflected not in separate CCF thematic areas but under the broader focal areas suggested above.

82. The next CCF should aim to strengthen country capacity to absorb development assistance.

## Annex

## Financial summary

Country: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

CCF period: 1997-2000

Period covered by the country review: 1997-1999

	<i>Amount assigned for the CCF<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Amount planned for the period under review</i>	<i>Estimated expenditure for the period under review</i>
<i>Regular resources</i>			
(Thousands of US dollars)			
Estimated IPF carry-over	3,231	3,231	3,231
TRAC 1.1.1 and TRAC 1.1.2 (66.7 per cent of TRAC 1.1.1)	6,653	4,990	3,858
TRAC 1.1.3	5,000	4,764	4,764
Other resources	-	-	-
SPPD/STS	907	680	378
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>15,791</b>	<b>13,665</b>	<b>12,231</b>
<i>Other resources</i>			
(Thousands of US dollars)			
Government cost-sharing	-	-	-
Third party cost-sharing	115	810	490
Sustainable development funds			
GEF	2,700	1,203	453
Montreal Protocol	207	-	-
Funds, trust funds and other			
UNIFEM	-	150	150
UNV	104	-	-
AREP	5,200	-	-
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>8,326</b>	<b>2,163</b>	<b>1,093</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>24,117</b>	<b>15,828</b>	<b>13,324</b>

<sup>a</sup> Prorated for the period under review.<sup>b</sup> Prorated for the period under review.

Abbreviations: AREP = Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection; GEF = Global Environmental Facility; IPF = indicative planning figure; MP = Montreal Protocol; SPPD = support for policy and programme development; STS = support for technical services; TRAC = target for resource assignment from the core; UNIFEM = United Nations Development Fund for Women; UNV = United Nations Volunteers.