Chapter 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

The efficiency with which UNDP programmes are implemented depends partly on issues involving the UNDP country offices as well as how programmes are administered and financed by the governments concerned. Following an overview of country programme budgets and delivery, this chapter looks at the management and administration of the programme. This is followed by a review of the operational efficiency of UNDP country offices. A concluding section deals with accountability and performance measurement.

5.1 MANAGEMENT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

5.1.1 IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

National execution (NEX) has become the norm in all Arab region NCCs in the second programming cycle, except in Libya, where none of the projects were implemented under this modality (see Figure 2). It was only in 2006, under the latest programming cycle, that six of the seven new projects in Libya were implemented under NEX. There has been a significant and sustained move away from agency execution towards NEX between the first and second programming cycles in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, there was some back-sliding, but close to three quarters of projects were executed under NEX in the second programming cycle.

While national execution has become the norm for all new projects in Arab region NCCs, its application differs considerably. In Bahrain, the country office is heavily involved in implementation on behalf of national project partners, while, in

Figure 2. Projects Executed under National Execution

■ First programming cycle   ■ Second programming cycle

Kuwait, country office involvement is far more limited. It is unclear how the NEX modality will be applied in Libya. In an NCC, the government not only pays project overhead of three percent, but also the full cost of the country office. For this reason, there is government expectation in some NCCs—as noted in the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia NSPRs—that UNDP should do much of the project management work.

5.1.2 COUNTRY PROGRAMME BUDGETS AND DELIVERY

Examination of budgets and delivery in the country programmes of all five NCCs in the last two programming cycles (as well as in 2005 and 2006) invites some interesting observations:

- UNDP has a policy of requiring a minimum delivery of $10 million per programming cycle to justify a country presence. Yet several indicators suggest that this policy is not strictly adhered to. Saudi Arabia, with average annual deliveries of $6 million–$7 million, has been consistently well above the minimum threshold. The Kuwait country programme was probably below the benchmark in the first cycle, but was well above it in the second with annual levels above $4 million. Delivery in Libya has been hovering very close to the minimum benchmark levels in the last two programming cycles. The Bahrain country programme, with a delivery of $6 million in the first cycle and $5 million in the first four years of the second cycle (2003 to 2006), was below the $10 million benchmark. The pressure to raise and meet delivery levels is a major issue in Bahrain and Libya, but is also present to lesser degrees in other Arab region NCCs.

- As mentioned, the Bahrain country programme had indicative allocations and budgets below the benchmark. And though the country office gives emphasis in its discussions with government authorities on the importance of expanding the country programme, UNDP formally accepted levels below that threshold in the last cycle. In Libya, there is also an overriding emphasis on the importance of delivery. However, the evaluation team observes that, as a practical matter, compli-

ance to the principle of minimum threshold so far has not had any perceptible influence on maintaining a UNDP country presence in the NCCs in the Arab region. When country offices have been closed—in Qatar and Oman—this was for reasons unrelated to the size, composition or delivery levels of the country programmes.

In Bahrain, the implementation responsibilities of country office staff are time-consuming, and staff members believe they are far too involved in implementation. On the other hand, beneficiaries responding to the NSPR expected UNDP to undertake these tasks and consider them to be a UNDP obligation as part of the cost-sharing service fee. Such views were corroborated in interviews by the evaluation team. The pressure to meet delivery targets appears to be one reason UNDP has not questioned its role in implementation, since local capabilities for project implementation are weak. The country office informed the evaluation team that the procedures followed in Bahrain are allowed in the new UNDP Results Management Guide, but represent an usually heavy involvement in supporting implementation. How the national execution modality is implemented in Libya may also be influenced by the need to meet delivery levels. Meeting delivery targets is also a factor in country office involvement in project implementation in other NCCs in the Arab region, albeit a less important one.

5.1.3 COUNTRY PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK

The administration of the programme reviewed below involves not only issues of efficiency (timeliness, etc.) but also project selection, affecting the relevance and responsiveness of projects to national priorities reviewed in Chapter Four.

Table 7 summarizes the administration and financing mechanisms in the five NCCs. It shows differences between the countries that have a considerable impact on the selection of projects in terms of their alignment to national priorities as well as in the efficiency with which projects are implemented. In all NCCs, agreement on the country programme includes a government

Table 7. Selection and Administration of Projects in Arab Region NCCs				
	Central ministry*		**Administration and finance****	**Monitoring and evaluation by UNDP**
	Programming	**Project approval*****		
Bahrain	None	Yes	Tripartite†	Minimal
Kuwait	Yes	Yes	Tripartite†	None
Libya	Planned	Yes	Two parties‡	Requested
Saudi Arabia	None	Yes	Two parties‡	Requested and planned
United Arab Emirates	None	None	Two parties‡	None
Ideal approach	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Two Parties‡**	**Yes**

*   Ministry of Finance, Planning or Foreign Affairs (Saudi Arabia)   †   Central ministry, beneficiary and UNDP
**   Mainly approval of contracts and expenditures   ‡   Beneficiary and UNDP
*** Signature of project document

allocation for that cycle. But only in Kuwait is this followed by an annual allocation of funds in the budget of the Ministry of Planning. Central ministries approve projects in Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya (beginning in 2007) and Saudi Arabia, but not in the UAE. Approval of contracts and expenditures is also required from central ministries in Bahrain and Kuwait but not in the other countries. This will not be required in Libya under the system now being established. Finally, there is no regular mechanism for UNDP to report to the government on the progress of projects beyond their financial aspects or in evaluating them in any NCCs; the few UNDP country programme reviews and project evaluations that are undertaken are discussed with the concerned governments.

The above mechanisms have several implications:

■ First, the lack of an annual programming mechanism within which projects are approved

makes the alignment to national priorities difficult. However, project approvals by central ministries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia) can overcome this constraint with a strong programming mechanism.

■ Second, when the UNDP programme is part of the budget of a central ministry, as in Bahrain and Kuwait and as is now proposed in Libya, a UNDP project from the point of view of the beneficiary government agency is a source of additional resources that are 'free'. In this framework, while the programme is 'demand-driven', it is not 'market driven'. Because the beneficiary does not pay for UNDP services (compared to using, say, a private firm) the demand favours UNDP projects.[30] This is not the case in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, where programmes are both demand-driven and market-driven.

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30 This incentive structure also prevails in non-NCC countries where projects represent extra-budgetary resources for the recipient. In non-NCC countries, however, UNDP may have more influence in the formulation of the country programme and the design of projects because it, rather than a central ministry, is the ultimate financier. In conclusion, the modalities of implementation in the Bahrain and Kuwait programmes are comparable to non-NCC countries concerning the financial incentives for the recipient. But they are more onerous with respect to the procurement and disbursement aspects because of the involvement of a central ministry.

- Third, the involvement of a central ministry in approving contracts and expenditures after 'signing-off' on a project, as in Bahrain and Kuwait, makes implementation of UNDP projects more onerous than it needs to be, even though UNDP projects may still be simpler to administer than national development projects.

The compatibility of national execution with government requirements is an issue that was brought to the attention of the evaluation team in Bahrain and Kuwait. It may also become an issue in Libya once implementation under national execution is under way. National execution in Kuwait[31] is guided by current country office 'Guidelines' (August 2002). Administrative and financial procedures underlying the UNDP country programme are not well understood by either the Technical Cooperation Unit of the Ministry of Planning or beneficiaries. As a result, there are issues of clarity and consistency with government financial requirements. Frequent changes in staff, both in UNDP and the Ministry of Planning have not helped, since NEX manuals were changed or re-interpreted. The manuals are now being revised to clearly spell out the

obligations and roles of all parties. Some training has been provided in Bahrain and will be provided in Kuwait once the revised Guidelines are issued. Training could considerably hasten implementation and is desirable, especially in Libya where the NEX modality has only been recently initiated. Regular training programmes for all counterparts are also desirable, at least in Bahrain, Kuwait and Libya.

5.2 UNDP'S OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY

5.2.1 COUNTRY OFFICE FINANCES

The cash position of the UAE was affected by extraordinary costs in 2005. Despite the move of the country office and the change of rental payment in arrears to payment in advance, annual expenditures and income in 2006 returned to a balanced position. Table 8 shows an unusually low level of cost-recovery in Libya, compared to delivery levels in all other Arab region NCCs. In Libya, cost-recovery is only 0.23 percent of delivery, compared to 2-3 percent in other countries. It also shows that the UAE has an unusually high level of agency service reimbursement (increasing to $77,415 in 2006) due largely to the influx of

Table 8. Country Office Finances (Annual Average 2004–2006, US$)					
	Bahrain	**Kuwait**	**Libya**	**Saudi Arabia**	**United Arab Emirates**
Annual government local office contribution	695,840	687,300	658,118	1,628,460	927,094
UNDP programme cost-recovery	33,722	76,497	6,007	159,401	81,175
Agency service reimbursement	8,617	13,553	8,419	10,502	48,811
Total income	738,179	777,350	672,544	1,798,363	1,057,080
Administrative expenditures	637,678	806,024	538,172	1,917,470	1,157,548
Income minus expenditures (+/–)	**100,501**	**–28,674**	**134,372**	**–119,107**	**–100,468**

31 The involvement of the country office in Kuwait under national execution is less extensive than that of Bahrain, where the country office normally prepares the progress reports of the implementing agencies.

UN agencies into Dubai and related activity in support of regional emergencies.

5.2.2 MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

Several staffing issues were raised with respect to country offices in NCCs.[32] One was the frequent rotation in Resident Coordinators/ Resident Representatives, especially in Kuwait, which has had three country office heads since mid-2000, including the current one. This has negatively affected the continuity and consistency of the country programme—a weakness highlighted by respondents to the NSPR. Also of concern were Deputy Resident Representatives, for which new positions were approved and incumbents appointed in Kuwait (2006) and Libya (2007); a Deputy Resident Representative position was approved for the UAE in 2007. In all cases, Deputy Resident Representatives have been given the primary responsibility for managing the country programmes. Bahrain, whose delivery levels and workload (number of ongoing projects) are lower than all other four NCCs (Table 9), is now the only country without a Deputy Resident Representative.

Table 9 also shows the number of staff involved in country programmes. Relating these to various measures of workload[33] reveals some interesting comparisons. Bahrain has the lowest number of projects per staff because of the unusually close involvement of the country office in implementation. It also has the lowest delivery per staff—$185,000 or one half that of Libya and one quarter that of Kuwait. Conversely, Kuwait has a high workload (projects per staff) and the highest delivery per staff of any Arab region NCC, suggesting that an increase in staff may be justified—the more so if

Table 9. Staff Workloads					
	Bahrain	**Kuwait**	**Libya**	**Saudi Arabia**	**United Arab Emirates**
Average annual delivery in second programming cycle	$1,240,000	$4,230,000	$2,590,000	$6,440,000	$3,020,000
Number of ongoing projects	10	17	16	30	17
Number of programme staff *	5	4	5	8	4
Number of programme staff, including Deputy Resident Representatives and Resident Representatives**	5.5	5.5	7.5	9.5	5.5
Ratios					
Projects per programme staff	1.82	3.09	2.13	3.16	3.09
Delivery per programme staff	$225,455	$769,091	$345,333	$677,895	$549,091
Government local office contribution (share of delivery)	56%	16%	25%	25%	31%
Government local office contribution per project (US$)	69,584	40,429	41,132	54,282	54,535

* Programme analysts, associates and assistants. Excludes media specialists in Saudi Arabia.
** All countries except Bahrain have a Deputy Resident Representative. All of a deputy's time is assumed to be used for the country programme, unlike that of the Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative, who typically spends only half of his or her time on programming activities.

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32 Details on the financing, staffing and organization of the country offices are contained in the respective country reports, together with pertinent country-specific analyses and recommendations.

33 Programme staff are also involved in activities not related to country programmes that are time consuming. The above analysis assumes that such activities absorb more or less an equivalent amount of time across country offices.

UNDP's activities under the 2007-2011 country programme document were to be expanded. High workloads lead staff to focus on what is urgent rather than what is important but time-consuming, such as building relationships and offering on-site assistance. The comparatively low level of the government's local office contribution in Kuwait (compared to the number of projects and delivery levels) suggests that an increase in this contribution to finance staff increases would also be warranted.

A self-assessment of actual and optimal time use was filled out by country office staff in Bahrain, Libya and Saudi Arabia. While this was an impressionistic rather than rigorous survey, its results were remarkably consistent. In all three country offices, staff were unanimous in believing that too much time was spent on implementation, which detracts from time available to engage in more upstream activities related to advocacy, regional programmes and resource mobilization for the country concerned and other countries. These findings also suggest that the staff from these country offices would generally welcome greater involvement in the substance of project work. This need for such substantive involvement was strongly expressed by government counterparts as well as the respondents to all three NSPRs. This assessment is shared by the evaluation team for all Arab region NCCs.

5.3 AVAILABILITY AND USE OF CORPORATE AND REGIONAL SUPPORT

To the country offices, the NCCs do not appear to be a priority for UNDP headquarters. No senior UNDP staff visited Saudi Arabia or Libya[34] in recent years, even though senior management from other UN agencies regularly visit all the NCCs in the region. Country office staff suggest there may be a misconception that these are rich countries and therefore do not need UNDP support. Furthermore, the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States is preoccupied with crisis countries, such as the Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan. Although clearly high-income, NCCs face specific challenges in terms of human development, including gender equality, care for the environment and democratic governance, which may not be top government priorities but nonetheless warrant UNDP's attention.

Subregional Resource Facility for the Arab States. UNDP's Subregional Resource Facility (SURF) for the Arab States, based in Beirut, has contributed to work carried out under UNDP trust funds, regional programmes and country programmes. Experience with the facility among NCCs is generally positive (though Bahrain and the UAE voiced some reservations about timeliness and the suitability of consultants for the countries). Gender and governance were two areas singled out where the quality of the expertise provided by the SURF was particularly effective. The facility also provided good support in the environment sector in Libya. Improvements in its services are nevertheless warranted and include the need to deepen its information base on consultants to cover their experience (for example, with a rating system) and to broaden the nationality base. The SURF portal was also found to be very useful. Although the resource facility is often the first port of call for consultants, there are other options, including UNDP's knowledge networks, UN agencies, personal contacts and Internet databases.

Regional programmes. The major regional programmes in the Arab States are the *Arab Human Development Reports;* Centre for Arab Women Training and Research (CAWTAR); Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR); Information and Communications Technology for Development in the Arab Region (ICTDAR); and the HIV/AIDS Regional Programme in the Arab States (HARPAS).

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34 Specifically, no high-level visit to Libya by Regional Bureau for Arab States management occurred in the past four years in the tenure of the current Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative. The Africa Bureau was invited to send a mission to explore possibilities for aid coordination and assistance with institutions prepared to channel substantial amounts of aid to Africa, but the mission was never carried out.

All of these programmes provide important opportunities for advocacy in sensitive areas and for launching related national projects. But participation has been limited in all five NCCs, with the notable exception of HARPAS, in which all NCCs were actively involved. No projects fully funded by the governments (with the exception of one in Bahrain) deal with AIDS because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject in Arab culture. Nevertheless, UNDP was able to use the vehicle of the regional programme to open a dialogue that addressed the medical, statistical, public relations, social and religious dimensions of this topic in all the NCCs. This included Saudi Arabia, among the most conservative of the Arab region NCCs. Through the *Arab Human Development Reports,* UNDP strongly supports advocacy for the achievement of human development and the Millennium Development Goals. Production of global and regional *Human Development Reports*, in particular the 2004 *Arab Human Development Report,* offered an opportunity to disseminate the knowledge contained in them but also to produce a variety of national reports. The global and regional reports also generated a context for engaging UNDP in examining these issues, thus effectively furthering the human development agenda.

In the case of regional programmes other than HARPAS, country office involvement was either passive and limited or totally absent. This can be ascribed to a variety of factors. For example, some regional programmes are not seen by UNDP headquarters to be directly relevant to NCCs. Moreover, there is a tendency by headquarters to deal directly with the governments concerned rather than through the country office. Bahrain was formally involved in the other regional programmes in a passive and limited way; Kuwait and Libya had brief and passive involvements with CATWAR as did the UAE. Bahrain has been involved in ICTDAR and only the UAE and Bahrain were involved in POGAR.

There are several reasons for this limited participation. The country office is not involved in the design of regional programmes, which therefore may not reflect the needs of NCCs. A common view among country office staff is that UNDP considers NCC participation in these programmes of low priority on account of their wealth and the limited resources of regional programmes. Also, governments are often not aware they exist and the country office plays a passive role in implementation. There have even been instances in which regional programmes planned in-country events without informing the local UNDP country office or the Resident Coordinator. Funding is also an issue since many organizations have liquidity problems that may prevent their participation. And governments are sometimes reluctant to fund participation of their nationals 'on principle', notwithstanding the small amounts involved. Finally, the support of the Subregional Resource Facility is critical and was important in the success of HARPAS. Regional programmes could be used to much greater effect to promote activities in sensitive areas. The highly successful experience with HARPAS, elaborated in Chapter 3, clearly shows there were significant lost opportunities as a result of the non- or limited involvement of NCCs in other regional programmes—especially in ICTDAR, since most NCCs had e-governance projects.

Subregional programmes. Different NCCs participate in regional and subregional events. But there is limited evidence of informal subregional programmes whose design and implementation is coordinated across the Gulf countries or with Libya in the same way as regional programmes. There is the potential for subregional cooperation in addressing interconnected issues (such as the environment) or common problems (such as stimulating employment creation through the private sector, adapting education to the needs of a global economy or promoting democratic governance and gender equality). But, in practice, this potential has not been realized, even though Resident Representatives in the Arab States region meet at least once a year and also within regional clusters. In addition, the country offices

of Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (which are all member of the Gulf Cooperation Council) meet more regularly to discuss common issues and to identify opportunities for cooperation. (Libya is oriented more towards Africa than the Arab States of the Gulf). There is good coordination among the group, with country offices sending staff to other UNDP offices to conduct training or exchange experiences. There has also been replication of good ideas and interventions between the various country offices. Kuwait's adoption of the junior professional officer scheme, following the lead of Saudi Arabia, is one example. But all these interactions have yet to result in even informal subregional programmes, which would require close government coordination and funding.

Trust funds. All country offices have had access to UNDP's Thematic Trust Funds and have generally used this opportunity for accessing additional funds for innovative projects. Kuwait has been the exception, and the country office has not been able to access these resources. Of these funds, the Thematic Trust Fund for Democratic Governance has been most successfully used, followed by the Thematic Trust Fund for Gender. None of the Arab region NCCs implemented projects financed by the remaining trust funds (which finance energy, poverty reduction and information and communications technology projects).

5.4 ACCOUNTABILITY AND MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE

The accountability framework in UNDP's results-based management system is not oriented to programme countries. The main accountability focus in the country is primarily financial: that is, with UNDP being accountable for the resources it uses but not for project results. In NCCs, financial accountability as well as accountability for project effectiveness is particularly important since governments fund the programmes. The idea of 'mutual accountability' (donors being accountable to recipients and vice versa) is a cornerstone of the international community's Harmonization and Alignment Agenda and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. A new UNDP evaluation policy requires all countries to attach an evaluation plan to the country programme document. However, in an NCC context, government endorsement of evaluations is necessary since it provides funding for them.

There are very few project evaluations in Bahrain (the country office provided three, which had been undertaken in the last ten years) and no outcome evaluations.[35] There have been only three project evaluations in Saudi Arabia[36] over the period being examined. And in Kuwait, Libya and the UAE, no evaluation plans were found in UNDP's Evaluation Resource Centre (http://erc.undp.org/); nor were any project evaluations found in any of the three countries except for the Date Palm Research and Development Project in the UAE. A number of people in UNDP and the governments interviewed noted that there is no culture of evaluation in the NCC governments. Government officials interviewed for the NSPR in Saudi Arabia noted that, for their projects, in no case was an independent third-party evaluation intended. Moreover, there was a clear wish for 'privacy' on the part of government institutions. Another contributing factor is the fact that evaluations are almost never included in project costs, and separate government approval is required to fund evaluations.

Country programme reviews (independent or semi-independent) are done more frequently, but

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35 It should be noted that some Arab region NCC country offices are planning project and outcome evaluations in the near future, but at the time of writing there are very few completed.

36 One of the core functions of a newly established unit in the country office is to support performance measurement, results reporting and evaluation—although focus is on UNDP corporate mechanisms and on auditing rather than evaluation. As such, accountability is focused on UNDP and not government.

not systematically or always in a fashion that is timely enough to draw lessons for the next programming cycle. Two country programme reviews were done in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only one in Bahrain (in 2000) and none in Libya. The quality of these reviews also varies considerably.

Strong requests were made by the central ministries of all NCCs visited by the evaluation team (except the UAE, which has a decentralized system) for UNDP to provide regular reports on project results, in addition to financial results, and to monitor and evaluate projects so that lessons could be drawn for future projects. This was particularly true in Saudi Arabia and Libya. In Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested an annual programme review to monitor progress and assess what can be learned

from ongoing projects. The UNDP country office has taken initial steps to develop a framework that would allow for such a review. In Libya, the Planning Ministry took a similarly strong view in the context of its new programming and monitoring role. These same points were made by the Ministry of Planning in Kuwait and the Ministry of Finance in Bahrain.

The UN, including UNDP, must remain transparent and accountable not only for the funds with which it is entrusted, but also for results achieved. However, there is no accountability framework that articulates the relative responsibilities of UNDP and the government in the context of an NCC. Is the accountability of UNDP different in the case of NCCs than in non-NCC countries since governments pay for UNDP services and may therefore be entitled to

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Box 9. Implementation of UNDP Country Programmes: Summary Of Key Findings

DELIVERY

- UNDP's minimum benchmark policy is not strictly adhered to. Bahrain's delivery in both the cycles being examined was below the threshold. Even the delivery planned in the country programme was below the threshold. In Kuwait, it is also likely that the threshold was not met in the first programming cycle. No country offices were closed, however, because of shortfalls in delivery.

- The pressure to reach the minimum delivery threshold is one reason large projects that are not closely aligned to UNDP's mandate and national priorities were included in the country programmes of several NCCs. Without such projects, delivery in Libya and the UAE would have been below the benchmark.

- Meeting delivery targets encourages country office staff, especially in Bahrain, to be more involved in the administrative aspects of implementation than should be necessary under national execution or than they would like. Government counterparts expect UNDP to undertake this work as a quid pro quo for the cost-sharing fees they pay.

COUNTRY PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK

- The lack of annual programming mechanisms in all NCCs is not conducive to the selection of projects that are closely aligned to national priorities.

- Including UNDP-supported projects in the budgets of central ministries, as in Bahrain and Kuwait, provides a distorted incentive for the beneficiary to use UNDP projects.

- Central ministry approval of contracts and expenditures, in addition to project approval, as in Bahrain and Kuwait, makes implementation of UNDP-supported projects more onerous than it needs to be.

- There are problems with government understanding of national execution and insufficient training for all government counterparts, at least in Bahrain, Kuwait and Libya.

UNDP OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY

- **Efficiency of UNDP:** The country offices are too heavily involved in implementation, primarily because of government perception that this is UNDP's responsibility, but also, in some countries, to meet delivery targets.

- **Support:** The Subregional Resource Facility for the Arab States provides adequate support in its practice areas. The quality of consultants is of key importance, particularly in NCCs where the government can afford to contract private sector organizations. Participation in regional programmes was limited mostly to HARPAS and could be strengthened.

- There is no framework that defines the mutual accountabilities of UNDP and the government or programmes to monitor the progress of project content. Evaluations have been very limited.

have more of a say in the type, frequency and content of reports from UNDP? For example, should the government or UNDP determine when evaluations are undertaken, covering which projects and by whom (UNDP or an independent contractor)? And who should manage these evaluations? There was a noticeable lack of clarity in answering such questions in all the NCCs. In the absence of general guidelines from UNDP headquarters on these issues, an understanding needs to be reached with the governments concerned. Agreements are needed on standard reporting and evaluation requirements as well as providing timely financial reports. Common reporting formats, frequency and responsibilities all need to be agreed upon with the governments concerned within annual programmes. Progress needs to be reviewed and outstanding issues clarified, preferably on a quarterly basis.

Box 9 summarizes the findings related to the implementation of UNDP country programmes.