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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>BOMCA</td>
<td>Border Management and Control project</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Jamoat Resource Centre</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRGF</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRDP</td>
<td>Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNTOP</td>
<td>United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTO</td>
<td>United Tajik Opposition</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Executive summary

The United Nations and the international community have played an important role in achieving greater human security in Tajikistan. Open conflict of the type seen during the civil war has been eliminated, but while democratic processes and institutions have been used to bring about stability, the authorities have manipulated them skillfully to attain their political goals and legal means have been used to eliminate most opposition. Democratic institutions have been systematically subverted in the interest of stability. The international community has not used the Security Council mandate to insist on the further development of democratic institutions as a stable Tajikistan is in the geopolitical interests of most international partners.

The UNDP programme has supported both the international community’s effort and the United Nations Peace-building Support Office. Indeed, its programme has been centred on post-conflict recovery and peace-building since the start of the war in 1992. Consistent with the international community’s phased approach, the UNDP programme has reflected a transition from immediate post-conflict relief and stabilization (particularly the reintegration of combatants into their local communities) to a more recent focus on the potential future causes of internal friction (the lack of economic opportunities, the need for strengthening essential institutional capacities especially for the rule of law, the management of sub-regional transit, and preventing the collapse of essential services). This has largely been driven by the peace process as defined in the agreement and by the flow of donor resources.

Despite very limited core resources, UNDP has managed to mobilize enough resources to make itself an important player in the establishment of some of the most key institutions for post conflict recovery. It has undertaken a programme that has been at the centre of many of the most critical responses to the conflict, be it in the areas of, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, area-based development, rule of law or the promotion of public administration reform.

UNDP’s dependence on non-core resources to perform its responsibilities within a common United Nations peace-building mandate has had a profound effect on the way in which these programmes have been undertaken and on the prioritization of programmes, activities and outcomes. At times this has reduced the level of efficiency and effectiveness, as sufficient funds were not available to ensure adequate programme capacity. It has also at times resulted in a focus on activities that are not centred on peace-building such as HIV/AIDS (despite low incidence), the environment and the mitigation of natural disasters. The UNDP has also performed a service function, providing a reliable and politically acceptable vehicle for managing funds for some programmes of the international community such as border management.

Tajikistan has a long way to go to establish institutions that even vaguely resemble a liberal democratic system of governance. Yet, with the attainment of stability there are clear signs of donor fatigue and the UNDP is finding it increasingly difficult to find the required non-core resources to develop essential institutions and to continue work at the rural level to promote sustainable livelihoods.

While both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have deemed the Government’s macroeconomic management to be sound, the vast majority of the population is
able to survive largely because of remittances from the Russian Federation and other CIS countries. Educational and health services have deteriorated, and a failure to accelerate human development or a disruption of the flow of remittances is most likely to be the cause of future instability. Recognizing this, UNDP has shifted its attention to using the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as a basis for promoting accelerated human development. While this has provoked a lot of controversy because of the considerable funding shortfall in meeting the MDG targets, it has also served as an effective means of making development efforts both human development and human security oriented.

As found in most of the other case studies, UNDP has yet to systematically establish outcome-based monitoring systems that would enable truly results-based management. Changes in financial management systems also rendered the review of historical trends in the structure of the programme difficult.
1. Introduction

This country case study constitutes an integral part of the Evaluation of UNDP Activities in Conflict Affected Countries undertaken by Mary Kaldor, Carrol Faubert and Rajeev Pillay on behalf of the Evaluation Office of UNDP. Tajikistan was assessed by Rajeev Pillay with the assistance of Mr. Parviz Mullojanov, a senior National Consultant recruited specifically for the Tajikistan country case study, over a period of 10 work days1 applying the same general methodology that was jointly developed by the evaluation team and pilot tested in Afghanistan. Outcome monitoring mechanisms are not in place to enable a fully outcome-based evaluation of the programme. Nevertheless, using a more qualitative approach including secondary sources, interviews and output data, a reasonably sound, if rapid, assessment of the programme was possible.

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1 See Annex I for the mission schedule.
2. Has human security improved?

2.1 Achieving stability and physical human security
Physical human security has improved considerably since Tajikistan’s early post-independence power struggle and civil war (1992-1997) between Russian-backed Soviet-style parties on the one hand and democratic and Islamic forces under the banner of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) on the other. Regional divisions, exacerbated during the Soviet period to enhance Soviet control, exploded into armed conflict soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as competing groups vied for economic and political spoils. The war was particularly brutal, with summary executions and the mutilation of victims shockingly common. The paramilitary groups that fought on behalf of the established power structures that had benefited during the Soviet period against those seeking economic and political change were particularly vicious. Prolonged fighting claimed 40,000 lives and brutal ethnic purges by the government generated about 500,000 refugees, many of whom fled to the ethnically Tajik areas of northern Afghanistan. In addition, opposition leaders who represent various Islamic, democratic, and other movements have been forced into exile and their parties or movements banned.

While open armed conflict is no longer a significant threat to human security², other potential threats to physical security have emerged. High levels of criminal and political violence and corruption in the judiciary and in law enforcement negatively affect human physical security. Heavily armed clan-based factions compete to control markets and narcotics trafficking, and terrorism remains a threat. Incidents since 2000 include three separate assassinations of Tajik politicians, a marketplace bombing, and a suicide bombing in 2001, although the narcotics traffickers appear to have reached agreement since then and reports of incidents are down. Moreover, while their numbers have been greatly reduced and several of their leaders were killed during the most recent war in Afghanistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan guerillas, seeking to overthrow Uzbek President Islam Karimov, have been accused of operating from Tajikistan. Over the past four years, the President has moved to eliminate the opposition mainly through charges of corruption and effective, if cynical, use of the courts, most of which are beholden to the Executive and the President in particular.

Judges of the Supreme Court constitute the judiciary in Tajikistan and are appointed by the President. The meagre operational budgets of the courts are provided either from the Republican or local budgets. Judges, like all state officials, are paid less than the minimum required for their subsistence and are susceptible to offers of extra compensation. Local municipal authorities that are often implicated in the cases brought before the judges provide court security. Independence of the judiciary is hard to imagine under the circumstances – even if the judges concerned wish to maintain their integrity.

The civil police are underpaid and sometimes not paid at all. They survive largely through extortion and bribery and most common people view them as a source of harassment and support for criminality rather than as a source of public protection. In the past, Russian troops bolstered the regime and allowed Russia greater influence. In 2005, however, the arrangement with Russian troops in the border areas was abolished, and poorly equipped, poorly paid and untrained Tajik forces have replaced them. Tajikistan is now a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (formerly Shanghai Five), a regional group including Kazakhstan, the

² This was the consensus opinion of all of the national and international observers and partners of UNDP interviewed.
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, China, Russia and Uzbekistan. Even so, border disputes are ongoing with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

2.1.1 The road to political stability circumvents democratization

Since coming to power in the elections of December 1992, President Emomali Rahmanov has skillfully eliminated potential political opponents both from within his own party and from the opposition. In 2000, Rahmonov concluded implementation of the 1997 government-UTO peace accords. The new Tajik government, once dominated by leaders from the northern Khojand region, is now largely controlled by representatives of the Kulab region. President Rahmonov was re-elected in November 1999 amid charges of election rigging from international observers of the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Rahmonov’s term expires in 2006, although a widely criticized June 2003 constitutional referendum permits him to rule until 2020, subject to re-election.

Open conflict of the type seen during the civil war has ended, but at the expense of the growth of liberal democracy; while democratic processes and institutions have been used to bring about stability, the authorities have been manipulating them skillfully to attain their own political goals. More recently these institutions have also been used to eliminate the opposition and to consolidate the President’s control. This has been done by passing favourable legislation and by effectively using the courts to selectively convict opposition leaders of corruption.

Tajikistan drew international praise when it abolished exit visa requirements in August 2002, but freedom of assembly and the press is frequently restricted. It is alleged that journalists and members of opposition groups (especially banned Islamic movements such as Hizb ul Tahrir – Party of Liberation) have been harassed and imprisoned. In the post 9/11 period this has not been strongly challenged by the international community as some of the banned groups advocate the overthrow of Central Asia’s governments in favour of an Islamic caliphate, albeit – at least according to their public statements – by peaceful means. Nevertheless, Tajikistan is the only Central Asian republic with Islamic opposition representatives (from the Islamic Renaissance Party) in the legislature.

Flawed parliamentary elections also marred Tajikistan’s rights record in 2005. The OSCE declared that the February 2005 polls for the lower house of parliament failed to meet international standards, citing the detention of key political leaders, government domination of the campaign process, and restrictions on independent media. OSCE monitors concluded that the counting process was “poor” or “very poor” at 54 percent of the polling stations visited. Nevertheless, polling was peaceful and there was a measure of choice among candidates. Also, despite restrictions on independent media, the OSCE determined that state media was “reasonably balanced” in the run-up to elections.

Within five days of the first round of voting, four opposition parties announced that they would not recognize the results of the election, but their protest did not have a significant impact on domestic or international policies.

The events in Andijan (Uzbekistan), Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 have all had an effect on the political dynamic in Tajikistan; the Government has become increasingly concerned about foreign sponsorship of civil society groups. On 14 April 2005, the Tajik Foreign Ministry announced that foreign embassies and aid organizations would have to report their contacts with

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local political and civic activists to the Government and give advance notice of any meetings with local activists. The Government has jailed opposition leaders and journalists on tenuous charges. Ongoing state involvement has led to the closure of key print and broadcast outlets.

There is now a political stalemate in Tajikistan. The Government, which was initially a coalition on which the peace agreement was built, has seen a shift in the balance of power through legal actions and reshuffles to officials who are overwhelmingly from the Kulab region with a core group from Dangara, the hometown of the President. This faction has a regional constituency that supports the Government and generally benefits from the asset-sharing system currently in place. The Kulyabis believe that they have fought and won a difficult war, and are entitled to political power and the perks that go with it. They also believe that there is no reason why they should give up any of their power; indeed, many ordinary Kulyabis in this faction feel that if they relinquish any power, they will lose a lot. The leaders in the Government are generally the hard-liners from Kulab who have no inclination to share power. Conversely, the opposition has been politically and militarily neutralized. The opposition has no real financial backing or foreign support; they are able to settle in Afghanistan or Iran, but are not ‘backed’ by these or any other countries.

2.1.2 Amnesty, the courts and the elimination of political opposition

The Government has used a variety of legal devices to consolidate its power. Promises of amnesty from prosecution for war crimes and other human rights violations and the resulting prospect of entry into the legitimate political process and participation in the spoils of liberalization have been used cynically to achieve stability by eliminating illegal armed groups and militias whose presence were a threat. Opposition forces have disintegrated and no longer pose a threat to central power. Amnesty has not, however, succeeded in reintegrating opposition fighters and supporters.

During the civil war, the Government issued a series of amnesty decrees to bring the guerrillas and warlords on board politically. Most decrees were ignored and fighting continued unabated. The first amnesty decree recognized by the UTO and even drafted with its participation was issued in 1997. The majority of members of the Commission of National Reconciliation approved this decree during its first meeting in September 1997 in Moscow. Opposition leaders were granted amnesty as long they had not committed “serious crimes”, the legal interpretation of which was later applied liberally to imprison opposition leaders once they had given up their arms. Law enforcement officials reactivated criminal cases against major UTO figures, adding new accusations for good measure. According to the opposition, many hundred former UTO members were arrested on non-political charges serious enough to circumvent the amnesty provision.

The next major amnesty decree was adopted by the Tajik Parliament on 14 May 1999. The idea was to issue an amnesty for all UTO fighters based on a list presented by the opposition. All UTO fighters were requested to submit their names, as only those on the list would be eligible for amnesty. Because of a lack of trust in the Government, many senior members refused. Nevertheless, some 5,000 names were submitted. Most were newcomers who had joined the opposition on the eve of the peace agreement.

Responsibility for implementing the amnesty was given to the General Public Prosecutor’s Office. Complicated procedures were developed; each UTO fighter was obliged to visit the local prosecutor’s office and submit a written confession of crimes he had committed during the conflict. The prosecutors were obliged to try the cases and if they were deemed “not
serious”, the person could receive the certificate of amnesty. According to opposition sources, only a few hundred⁴ of 5,000 former UTO fighters received the certificate. Many UTO fighters on the list did not receive amnesty either because they did not receive the requisite clearances or because they did not visit the prosecutor’s office, given the terms of accession to amnesty. Since then, a large number of those on the list have been arrested or forced to flee the country. The remainder live in fear that their files may be used at a later date to arrest them. Many of those not on the list have been arrested and others have fled the country.

Mid-level civilian opposition activists have suffered even more as they were not subject to any amnesty agreement. As a result, they were prevented from running for political office, making it even easier for the Government to open cases against them. Charges could be for relatively minor infringements. In 2005, one of the deputies of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) Chairman, Ashon Shamsiddin, was arrested on charges of “…illegal crossing of the Tajik-Afghan border in 1992.” The IRP issued a protest letter stressing that many thousands of Tajik citizens had crossed the border to take refuge in Afghanistan during the civil war and as a former UTO member he must be entitled to amnesty. The Public Prosecutor’s Office issued a response stating he was not eligible for amnesty as he was not on the list of 5000. Mr. Kosim Rakhimov, another prominent IRP activist, is faced with several charges, each of which is enough to jail him. None of the accusations are political, but include charges of liaison with an underage girl, illegal exchange of currency and bigamy. Other prominent leaders’ bodyguards and relatives have been arrested or have fled the country despite having received the amnesty certificate.

Opposition politicians and former mujahideen who fled the country because they feared arrest have created their own associations. Many are in the Russian Federation. The Russian Government has on occasion deported those who have been politically active to Tajikistan. As a result, most of the associations remain dormant. A sudden change in the economic or social situation in Tajikistan or in Russia could potentially cause a resurgence of these groups, but this is highly unlikely.

2.1.3 Perceptions of the public

The general public is weary of conflict and is struggling to make ends meet. Consultations with individuals and civil society groups by the evaluation team suggest that the population is resigned to the loss of real democracy in favour of stability and physical security. In the absence of economic opportunities at home, the average citizen is heavily dependent on remittances from migrant workers. The public is therefore politically risk-averse and appears not to present a real danger to the Government, although the status quo is delicate. It is generally felt that as long as the flow of remittances from migrant workers in Russia continues, support for political opposition in the streets is likely to remain dormant among an adult population that still has traumatic memories of the years of civil war.

Results from 76 focus groups involving 682 people across Tajikistan⁵ show that civilians in Tajikistan feel considerably more secure now than in 1992–1993, but security levels are still not as high as in Soviet times. In the focus groups, civilians indicated that commanders and weapons were no longer vital sources of power. Money, government positions and relatives were perceived as more important.

⁴ The IRP figure is about 300 (based on interviews).
A public opinion poll conducted in Tajikistan by the International Foundation for Election Systems prior to the February 2005 election found that:

- Satisfaction with the general situation has improved markedly since 1996
- A majority has a positive assessment of the economy, and expects better times to come
- A majority prefers a state-controlled economy, but support for a market system has increased significantly since 1996
- Corruption and quality of water supply are major exceptions to a general satisfaction with the current situation
- Only a minority is interested in politics, and that minority has decreased further since 1996
- There is strong support for democracy, and a strong belief that Tajikistan is a democracy
- Democracy is most associated with freedom of action and speech, and is not closely associated with freedom of press, economic prosperity, or freedom of movement
- 79 percent of the population believes that elections matter and are important, up from 39 percent in 1996
- There is a very positive view of Russia, and a very negative view of Uzbekistan. Both are believed to have a strong influence on events in Tajikistan, though the public is split on the extent to which this influence is either positive or negative
- Islamic extremists are seen as a significant threat, namely Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The study noted that the Tajik Government is still enjoying a ‘honeymoon’ period precipitated by the end of the civil war. The regime enjoys a very high degree of tolerance because people are so happy to be done with the fighting. The study also noted that the Islamic parties in Tajikistan are not very visible, but are doing a very good job of attracting young people who are generally disaffected and face high levels of unemployment.

Irregular and harsh police practices often make civilians in Tajikistan feel insecure. There is little trust in law enforcement. Civilians often retain weapons for personal use because they lack confidence in police protection. Unreformed institutions such as the Ministry of Security (the secret police) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (the national police force) have on the one hand helped the Tajik Government establish the necessary level of law and order, but on the other hand, elements in these law enforcement institutions continue to worsen the human security of many Tajik citizens. As a result, police practices often constitute a greater worry for civilians than proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons. Reform of law enforcement is urgently required. Long-term developmental challenges related to governance, human rights and poverty appear to be increasing significantly. Moreover, the potential criminalization of Tajik state and society as a result of large-scale drug transit through Tajikistan is undoubtedly also a factor in worsening the human security situation, although for the moment agreements between the major players have resulted in a truce and common understanding of each group’s limits. As a result, clashes have been relatively infrequent.

In 2005 a harsh sentence handed down to Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, one of the leaders of the secular opposition, did not provoke protests. While control exercised by the state authorities undoubtedly played a part in this, the fact that the Government has presided over a strong economic recovery has raised public confidence.

Progress on major infrastructural projects has also helped to boost public optimism. In January 2006 President Rahmonov called for work to be accelerated on the hydroelectric power stations of Roghun and Sangtuda-1 (both are projects of the Russian company Unified Energy System, and are nearing completion), and Sangtuda-2 (this project was recently inaugurated, and

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has an anticipated completion date of 2009-2010; US $180 million of the cost will be provided by Iran, and US $40 million by Tajikistan). He likewise highlighted the need to complete construction of the Anzob tunnel (financed by Iran, the work has been undertaken by the Iranian Sober company), also the Shahriston tunnel (financing is being discussed with Chinese construction companies) and Shar-Shar tunnel. When finished, these projects will greatly improve all-year-round road access among different parts of the country.

2.3 Economic security

2.3.1: General economic trends
On the surface, macroeconomic trends in Tajikistan look very positive. Since the peace agreement in 1997, GDP has grown consistently from 1.7 percent in 1997 to 10.6 percent in 2004, and overall economic indicators look good despite a slight decline to 6.1 percent GDP growth in 2005. GDP growth in recent years has been due primarily to gains in light manufacturing and the fast-growing services sector, particularly trade and other market services. This follows the movement towards broader-based growth – beyond cotton and aluminum – in 2003. While cotton production is estimated to have expanded by 4 percent, aided by favourable weather conditions, the agriculture sector nevertheless remains hampered by structural constraints such as limited access to inputs and inadequate marketing and credit systems, as well as a deteriorating irrigation system and obsolete agricultural machinery. Growing domestic demand as a result of remittances has also driven growth.

The country’s large external debt, virtually non-existent at the time of independence (due to fiscal transfers from Moscow), complicates fiscal and economic management. Almost the entire Government investment budget is financed by official development assistance (ODA). The Government had long adhered to ceilings on new borrowing that were agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund. International financial institutions have been impressed by Tajikistan’s macroeconomic performance and by the progress made in such areas as poverty reduction and public spending management. In recognition of these achievements, between December 2005 and January 2006, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank approved 100 percent relief on Tajikistan’s outstanding debt.

Through restrictive monetary policies, inflation has dropped from 17.1 percent in 2003 to just over 6 percent. With the repeal of 30 percent duty on remittances, more people used banking channels to send funds from abroad and flows through formal banking channels reached US $300 million in 2004 (about 15 percent of GDP).

7 State Statistical Committee figures.
Despite high global oil prices and a decline in cotton prices, the current account deficit in 2004 was kept at US $46 million or 2.3 percent of GDP (1.3 percent in 2003) due to the larger inflow of workers’ remittances. The overall balance-of-payments position was in surplus; preliminary data indicate that foreign exchange reserves were US $192.9 million at end-2004, the equivalent of 2.2 months of imports. With higher import prices and a drop in cotton export prices, the trade deficit is estimated to have risen to US $290 million or 14.5 percent of GDP in 2004 from US $204 million in 2003.

Through rationalized tax and fiscal policies, the budget, excluding the externally financed public investment programme, has been kept in surplus. In exchange for a space-monitoring centre, the Russian Federation in 2004 wrote off US $250 million of the total debt of US $300 million owed by Tajikistan. Debt-restructuring negotiations with bilateral creditors reduced external public debt from US $1 billion or 66.3 percent of GDP at end-2003 to US $822 million or 41.1 percent of GDP at end-2004. The improved external debt outlook allowed the limit on the ODA-financed public investment programme to be raised from 3 percent to 4 percent of GDP.

The Government has been pursuing an economic and financial reform programme supported by the International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) over the past two years. The fiscal reform measures initiated in 2003 were consolidated in 2004 through a new tax and customs code compliant with the requirements of WTO, which was passed by Parliament for implementation effective 1 January 2005. Moreover, the Tajik Aluminum Smelter and Barki Tajik (the state power company) are now required to make full tax payments. Based on a new tariff policy, also beginning on 1 January 2005, a mechanism of quarterly adjustments will be implemented to raise power prices over the next few years to cost-recovery levels and to maintain gas tariffs at their real end-2003 (cost-recovery) level. These moves represent an attempt to make the energy sector self-sufficient, addressing the issue of large arrears (mainly in power) that amounted to about 20 percent of GDP at end-2003. Subsidies introduced in 2003 mitigate the impact of energy price increases on the poorest 20 percent of the population.

The Government is seeking to integrate the economy with foreign markets, particularly through regional cooperation with neighbouring countries. In this regard, a recent agreement with the Russian Federation will generate a substantial investment in the energy sector while Iran is to invest in the Sangtuda hydropower plant and the Anzob tunnel in the north. A new road between Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China, laid in 2004, will facilitate better trade with that country. The Government has also sought to establish power, transport and trade links with Afghanistan. In preparation for accession to WTO, the Government has developed a domestic and external trade regime with reduced tariffs. Having implemented a WTO-compatible tax code, it also plans to bring relevant laws into line with WTO requirements.

2.3.2: Trends in employment and job security
Despite all of the positive economic indicators, the economic security of the majority of the population hangs by a thin thread; the thread of remittances that continue to flow into the country from citizens living and working abroad.

Depending on the underlying assumptions, remittances fall within a range of US $400 million to US $1 billion a year, or 20 percent to 50 percent of GDP. Considering only remittances through formal banking channels, net foreign exchange inflows from remittances are

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comparable in magnitude to the net inflows from trade; they are five times the externally-financed public investment programme, and ten times higher than foreign direct investment and any other private inflows. The balance of payments records of remittances made through the banking system increased almost tenfold in 2001-2004. This was a result of improved confidence in the banking system and the elimination at end-2001 of a 30 percent tax on international transfers allowing transfers of foreign exchange through Tajik banks without opening a current account.

The role of labour migration and remittances in Tajikistan’s development in recent years has been substantial (20 percent of GDP in 2005). Annual labour migration increased steadily in the 1990s and peaked in 1999. According to the International Monetary Fund, over 90 percent of migrants who left Tajikistan after the civil war did so to seek job opportunities, higher income and improved living standards. With a trend towards economic stabilization in recent years, labour migration has moderated, although its annual levels remain high.

Most individual households – especially in rural areas – are dependent on male relatives working primarily in the Russian Federation for their survival. Most of those employed abroad receive relatively low wages, so average remittances are sufficient only to run individual households, invest in personal housing, improve access to health care or education and basic consumption, but rarely constitute sufficient capital for productive domestic investment by individual entrepreneurs; 69 percent of individual remittances are below US $500 per year and 99 percent are less than US $5,000 per year.

Despite reforms, Government officials still function in a command and control framework, failing to create an enabling environment for private enterprise. In the shift to a market economy, bureaucratic hurdles, complex tax codes, lack of capital, and strong vested interests have hindered the development of small and medium enterprises. In addition, the Government’s emphasis on large-scale industrial projects has slowed the impetus for development of small private sector enterprises that have significant employment potential. The investment climate needs to be improved, including by strengthening the banking sector.

Strong growth, policy reforms and a favourable economic environment are said to have led to a sustained reduction in poverty from 82 percent in 1999 to 64 percent in 2003, based on a daily US $2.15 per capita purchasing power parity expenditure poverty line. Per capita nominal GDP is estimated to have grown from US $236 in 2003 to US $269 in 2004, but this is still way below US $1 a day. Significant regional differences in poverty persist. Moreover, inequality has worsened and is higher in Tajikistan than in other low-income countries in central Asia.

Those engaged in cotton farming – the largest source of employment and the core of the agriculture sector – account for three quarters of all farmers and over 70 percent of female employment. Yet cotton farming suffers from restrictive financial practices (contract, seasonal farming), low productivity, official intervention in farm decisions, monopoles of farming inputs and financial services, pricing mechanisms unsustainable at the farm gate level and generally poor marketing (most privatized gins do not have any farmer shareholders, and export channels are controlled by the local authorities or by powerful businessmen who finance the agriculture campaigns). Reflecting this, cotton farm debt owed to banks and investors is estimated to have increased from US $180 million at end-2003 to US $230 million at end-2004, and US $320 million in early 2006 as falling cotton prices over the year exacerbated structural weaknesses.

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9 According to government statistics, some 92 percent of migrants from Tajikistan are in the Russian Federation.
10 Derived from Table in Kireyev, Alexei, p. 10.
Civil service reform that began in 2003 has raised public sector wages and reduced staff numbers in phases. In continuation of this initiative, a major structural reform of public administration consonant with the transition to a market economy was approved in 2004. Key ministries will be restructured and streamlined. Departments are to be grouped according to function, and non-core functions are to be eliminated. As part of the PRGF programme, there will be an upfront reduction of 3 to 5 percent in staff positions to accommodate substantial public sector wage increases geared to structural changes in agency operations that enhance productivity. These higher wages are intended to boost worker performance and improve the quality of recruits. This scheme has been approved by Parliament and will be implemented in five rayons (districts).

Monetary policy in 2004 was designed to reduce inflation by improving liquidity management. Operations in the foreign exchange market helped keep the exchange rate stable. Under the PRGF agreement, the National Bank of Tajikistan has stopped providing credit to the banking sector (except for true lending of last resort) and it is to pay no dividends. Both policies aim to ensure better control over growth in reserve money. To assist commercial banks in their operations, the central bank is to help develop mechanisms for inter-bank lending. An innovation for 2005 is the Ministry of Finance’s plan to issue and auction short-term treasury securities.

Reforms in the agriculture sector have been slow. The enormous cotton debt that has accumulated requires cotton farms to repay US $65 million credit annually before the start of the new season. Building on an initiative in 2004, the Government, with donors, developed a two-track comprehensive solution to the farm debt problem: measures to address debt reduction and the introduction of more competition in marketing, and the elimination of intervention in producer decisions related to cotton production. However, the debt resolution strategy is undermined by the fact that the so-called Independent Commission set up to drive it is mainly constituted of members of the Government who are deeply involved in the cotton business.

All land is currently state-owned and land-use rights are awarded in the form of lifelong tenure and passed on through inheritance. However, these rights are not negotiable and therefore the land market remains a shadow market. Women’s access to land is crucial for advancing gender equality and is especially important for the large number of female-headed households that have resulted from labour migration and the effects of war. Food purchases consume up to 70 percent of poor households’ income, curtailing access to such services as health care and education. Food security at the household level is linked to institutional, physical and transportation infrastructures; the management and use of water resources; agriculture; and access to markets. Close to two thirds of the population lives in poverty and one third of the workforce (630,000 adults) migrates to other countries for economic reasons every year. Local authorities’ influence on land use and agricultural production, low salaries, poor nutrition and deteriorating health standards are mutually reinforcing.

### 2.3.3 Access to health and education

In the health and education sectors, Tajikistan has been faced with the dual challenge of emerging from the post-Soviet period without fiscal equalization transfers to cover public health and education expenditures and the economic and physical devastation wrought by civil war, coupled with a population growth rate estimated at 2.5 percent in 2005. The Government is spending more on the social sector, especially education and health, through the 2005 and 2006 national budgets passed by Parliament and the medium-term budget framework. This increase is partly financed through a reallocation of spending from non-core social services and savings in interest payments resulting from debt write-offs. The Government will also continue efforts to improve local service...
delivery and the quality of public services by strengthening local government capacity and by fostering a favourable investment climate for developing the private sector.

Nevertheless, the state of health care and education in Tajikistan is poor. Tajikistan formerly ranked with upper-middle-income countries in terms of major health indicators. Today it struggles with high infant, under-five and maternal mortality rates, chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies in large parts of the population, a high level of malaria cases, and an increasing prevalence of tuberculosis, measles and other diseases¹¹.

Following the June 2003 referendum, health care services are no longer free, further reducing the accessibility of services. Accurate statistics on the incidence of different diseases are hard to come by and most private estimates differ substantially from official Government figures. Institutional weaknesses in the health care system have grown since Independence and the civil war. Major causes of infant and child deaths are infectious diseases, acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition. These are linked to inadequate peri-natal care, which contributes to low birth weight and congenital abnormality¹². The infant mortality rate may also be influenced by low birth and death registration. Only 45 percent of children under six months of age are officially registered, denying children their right to an identity and limiting their access to education and other services.

Less than 50 percent of the rural population has access to a piped water system. Large parts of the water supply system are unsafe, unreliable and inefficient due to lack of maintenance. Water-related diseases are common. In addition to improving service provision in the water sector, water tariffs should be reconsidered and the public needs to be educated on more responsible use of this precious resource.

Although greater commitment by the Government and donors is re-energizing the education system, a projected 50 percent increase in the number of school-age children by 2015 will further swell the already stretched education sector. Falling school quality and attendance, rising drug use and the lack of knowledge regarding the risks of sexually transmitted infections, especially HIV/AIDS¹³, pose real threats to the country’s future. The poor physical condition of most schools, inadequate training of teachers, outdated curricula and a shortage of teaching materials are among the many challenges faced in the sector.

¹² Ibid.
¹³ According to UNAIDS, the Government still estimates the incidence of HIV infection to be less than 1 percent of the population, but there is no doubt that with cross-border travel, human trafficking and the drugs trade in Central Asia, it constitutes a real threat.
3. Contribution of the international community to the improvement of human security (since 2000)

The collective international community, through the Security Council resolution and the creation of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Tajikistan in 1998, has played a significant role in the country’s return to stability. The international community’s major contribution has been financial support for the United Nations in the process of negotiation, demobilization, reintegration and reconstruction, as well as its political influence on the process.

In addition to the United Nations, there are four major external players in the political and economic life of Tajikistan:

1. The Russian Federation, with its long-standing economic and political ties, its military role and its economic influence as a source of demand for labour from Tajikistan, is undoubtedly still the most influential external actor. Even though it has a reduced military role in manning the country’s borders, it remains a potent force.
2. Post 9/11, the role of the United States has increased dramatically in Afghanistan and in Central Asia, where it has set up military bases and reactivated its economic interests and ties.
3. Because of intricate cross-border ethnic, economic and geographic ties, Afghanistan has played an important role as a haven for fighters, as a source for the drug trade and as a destination for refugees.
4. Also because of ethnic and historical economic ties, Uzbekistan and the other countries of Central Asia have also played an important role.

Although there are now clear signs of donor fatigue developing as priorities proliferate elsewhere, ODA in general has, in the past, played an important role – particularly as a supplement for the country’s development budget since the peace agreement in 1997. Total ODA in 2000 amounted to US $124.7 million in current US dollars, or about 13 percent of GDP, and grew to US $240 million in 2004. Donors have provided support to the demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, the elections, the police, the judiciary, border management, mine clearance, some infrastructure rehabilitation (especially reticulated water supply systems and sanitation) and public administration reform. In other words, in accordance with the spirit of the peace agreement, the donors have strongly supported the effort to return Tajikistan to stability and to control extremist elements in the country. Yet relatively little has been allocated for the generation of jobs or for creating access to opportunities. Private sector investment and growth has also lagged in this respect. Donors also underwrote an extensive debt write-off based on the effective implementation of structural changes as certified by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the hope that this would lead to a reallocation of budgetary resources to essential services and the social sector.

For all of the major players involved, stability in Tajikistan has been more important than the growth of democratic institutions. In the post-Soviet environment, Russia has sought to maintain its political and economic influence and ties, for which stabilization has been an

14 The Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan in 1992, successfully completing its mandate on 15 May 2000. It was replaced by the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building which has been extended on an annual basis ever since.
15 World Bank statistics.
essential prerequisite. Contracts for large infrastructural schemes including hydroelectric power plants have gone to private Russian companies with the financial support of the Russian Government, and Russian troops until relatively recently were relied upon to provide protection from cross-border infiltration. Russia has also played an important role in the Security Council with respect to Tajikistan.

Post 9/11, Central Asia has taken on added geopolitical importance for both the United States and for the other members of NATO. The United States has placed military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and as a result, the presence of groups opposed to the Uzbek Government in Tajikistan and their links to Afghanistan and both Al Qaeda and warlords have been of considerable concern. Restricting cross-border infiltration of groups on the terrorist list, and stability in Tajikistan have therefore become increasingly important.

The international community has, as a result, placed a high premium on rapidly attaining stability in Tajikistan. To this extent, the international community’s objectives have coincided with those of the Government. Intervention in the way amnesty was implemented was therefore out of the question despite all of its implications. ODA was used to fund those elements of the peace agreement that would reduce the level of conflict irrespective of their influence on the prospects for pluralism and democracy in Tajikistan. As a result, the international community has been very successful in supporting the attainment of stability in the short term. The weakness of legislative institutions, of institutions associated with the judiciary and the rule of law, and of institutions pertaining to the delivery of essential services remain latent threats to long-term peace.
4. Contribution of UNDP to the improvement of human security

4.1 Overview of UNDP’s programme

4.1.1 Relevance
The United Nations has played an important role in Tajikistan since the late 1990s. It has been a controversial presence at times, being accused of turning a blind eye to the looting of some towns and villages during the last months of the civil war and even of providing cover for the perpetrators. On the whole, however, the role played by the United Nations has been an important and effective one; it played an extremely important role during the peace negotiations by providing its good offices, mediating between the parties, providing hands-on advice to both sides and serving as an impartial observer.

The role of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office and its relationship with the rest of the United Nations system and UNDP in particular was evaluated in 2001. The evaluation found that although there was relatively little official guidance from the Security Council on the relative mandates of the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General and that of the Resident Coordinator, a relatively good modus vivendi had been established and the UNDP had used its programme to support the peace-building process to the maximum degree possible.

Indeed, throughout the period in question, the UNDP has moulded its programme to support the overall peace process, but its strategy and approach have been heavily influenced by the availability of non-core funding as UNDP’s TRAC resources in Tajikistan are extremely limited. This has meant that UNDP has had to:

1) Follow a phased approach consistent with the funding available from donors.
2) Forgo a coherent broad-based programme strategy in favour of projects and programmes that are relevant to the transition process while at the same time hold out prospects for third party funding.
3) Design projects or programmes that cover outcomes and activities that exceed the resources immediately available.
4) Adjust activities, project coverage and expected outcomes based on the availability of non-core contributions.
5) Maintain programme personnel costs and overheads at a level attractive to donors irrespective of actual monitoring and management needs.
6) Reduce project personnel as the availability of funds has begun to decline, even reducing staffing to levels that are in the opinion of the evaluators below the minimum critical mass required for programmes of their type.

Consistent with the international community’s phased approach (and as a result the availability of non-core resources), the UNDP programme has reflected a transition from immediate post-conflict relief and stabilization (particularly the reintegration of combatants into their local communities) to a focus on the potential future causes of internal friction (the lack of economic opportunities, the need to strengthen essential institutional capacities especially for the

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rule of law, the management of sub-regional transit and preventing the collapse of essential services). This has largely been driven by the peace process as defined in the agreement and by the flow of donor resources. The latter has influenced UNDP’s priorities as much as any broader strategy for UNDP in Tajikistan. It should be noted, however, that with the exception of more recent activities, UNDP’s programme activities have all been in support of the spirit and general priorities of the of the peace process as defined in Security Council Resolutions.

Indeed the UNDP is, in terms of its own resources and budgetary allocation, not a particularly large player in Tajikistan. Nevertheless, because of the important legitimizing role that UNDP can play as a lead agency within the United Nations, its role in the post-conflict process of peace-building has in fact been considerable and the donor community has channelled resources several times greater in volume than UNDP’s own core funds through UNDP for activities of importance or of relevance to the peace process.

The UNDP programme of assistance in Tajikistan has not focused only on peace-building. UNDP also continued to support activities in other areas of relevance to its global mandate where third party or special trust fund resources were available. UNDP’s second country cooperation framework for Tajikistan has therefore focused on three broad programme areas that cover both activities central to peace building as well as those (such as environmental protection) that are at best peripheral to the peace process:

1. Governance and capacity building
2. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and development
3. Environmental protection and sustainable natural resources management

The current UNDP programme was based on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2005-2009 and is built on four interlinked themes:

1. Transforming livelihoods: increasing agricultural productivity, food security and economic opportunities, especially for women and vulnerable groups.
2. Redistributing responsibilities: increasing the responsiveness and accountability of decision-making structures, including the justice system.
3. Reversing declines: strengthening capacity to prevent and reduce infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, and increasing the number of communities cleared of mine-related hazards.
4. Overcoming mountains: improving the response to and management of natural resources and reducing the number of persons killed or affected by them.

The UNDP office has also recently launched a very controversial initiative to make Tajikistan a pilot case for the promotion of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to which Tajikistan is a signatory. UNDP has raised the issue of the MDGs to the level of the Deputy Secretary-General’s office and mobilized Professor Jeffrey Sachs from Columbia University – the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Millennium Goals – in support of a high level process to define the resource requirements for the attainment of the MDGs. The latter effort has been justified by the country office on the grounds that it would address the next set of issues that could lay the foundation of future conflict.

Looked at differently, the UNDP has sought to be relevant through:

i) The provision of services – particularly the management of funds on behalf of donors (e.g. the Border Management and Control project – BOMCA).
ii) The development of capacity in areas of crucial importance to the peace process.

iii) The advocacy of issues that it considers important to long-term conflict prevention and development (MDGs, National Development Strategy and anti-corruption).

iv) The implementation of activities and programmes within its mandate for which funding is available beyond TRAC (HIV/AIDS, reporting on global Conventions).

4.1.2 Effectiveness

Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme and the Communities Programme

Reflecting the international community’s phased approach to post-conflict recovery, UNDP’s community-based initiative began as the Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) under the execution of the United Nations Office for Project Services. The programme worked in communities to which some 4,000 ex-combatants had returned following the civil war. It is estimated that water supply programmes (through the digging of wells, installation of pumping systems and the construction of reticulated pipelines) provided over one million inhabitants with access to safe drinking water. Assistance under the RRDP was largely in the form of one-off relief grants. This programme has subsequently been transformed into UNDP’s directly executed Communities Programme.

The RRDP and Communities Programmes have jointly resulted in the rehabilitation of most of the health care facilities in the areas they have covered, the repair of educational facilities, and the rehabilitation of water supply systems.

The Communities Programme has followed elements of the area-based programme approach adopted by UNDP in many post-conflict situations and in decentralization programmes in Nepal, Kyrgyzstan and parts of the Ferghana Valley. Central to the programme is the organization and training of Jamoat (sub-district) Development Committees, now known as Jamoat Resource Centres (JRCs), to give more attention to community development and advocacy, community-based organizations that are elected locally and that identify priorities for local development.

There are a total of 100 JRCs in all five areas of Tajikistan, namely Soughd, Kulab, Sahrituz, Rasht valley and Zeravshan valley. The projects themselves are a source of employment with about 700 people employed in JRCs, about 30 percent of whom are women.

JRCs are equipped by UNDP with very basic office equipment and furniture in premises allocated by the local government. UNDP trains the members in project management, planning and accounting, and JRCs are allocated grants to establish a revolving fund to dispense micro loans to community members. These credits, of varying duration, are repaid at viable market rates (i.e. not at the usurious rates of some private lenders, but at rates that promote the stability of the revolving funds and enable them to grow). Loans are provided to both individuals and to solidarity groups as is the case in the Grameen system adopted in southern Kyrgyzstan and under the CARERE programme in Cambodia. Individual loans emphasize employing two or three community members in agriculture and services.

Loans to solidarity groups are provided without collateral for 4 to 10 members for the same period, the same amount and for the same activity, and count on the solidarity of group members for repayment. The interest rate charged is competitive, but generally varies from 1.5 percent to 3 percent per month, depending on the activity being financed. Loans are provided
mainly for agricultural activities, services and trading. Repayment rates have been high as community pressure is significant because revolving funds are jointly owned and managed by elected members. A minority of loans have been rescheduled, but remain active. Repayment periods are of one year and in a few instances two years, rendering the level of risk to the borrower quite high. The recovery rate since 2001 has been 99.8 percent with a delinquency rate of 18 percent.

Almost 45,000 households involving 200,000 members have received loans from revolving funds. Of the total number of beneficiaries, 35 percent were women. The total portfolio increased from US $2.2 million to US $3.0 million over five years, reflecting the reinvestment of income.

In the Kulab region visited, emphasis was placed on both the wide distribution of loans to members of the community as well as on second time loan provision so those who repaid loans on time and were successful with their ventures could receive further loans. According to the JRC ledgers, all of the revolving funds have actually grown in real terms due to income received as a result of the high interest rates, which though high, were perceived to be affordable in comparison with those offered by other sources of microfinance. All the JRCs visited had high school graduates as members and some also had university graduates. A cursory glance would suggest that records are kept systematically and are open for inspection by community members. Regular reports are provided to the community during periodic JRC meetings.

A variety of enterprises have been set up with such loans, ranging from small agricultural farms to service providers such as pharmacies, seamstresses and hairdressing salons. Eligibility criteria are not clear, but discussions revealed that no special effort was being made to give preference to the least well off, even though the UNDP Communities Programme regulations require preference to be given to this group. Both men and women participate in the JRCs and both men and women have been beneficiaries of credits. In the Jamoats visited, large numbers of men had gone to Russia as migrant labour and opportunities provided to women thorough the business loans were an important boost.

Income received from the revolving fund is also used for community development grants for rehabilitation of village infrastructure such as schools, medical posts, roads and bridges.
Matching funds are mobilized from community inhabitants in cash and in kind, including direct participation. In almost all the JRCs this has served to contain dependency on foreign and external assistance.

JRCs are also allocated lump sum grants – mainly for infrastructure rehabilitation priorities – that have to be matched with contributions from the community itself and sometimes by funds from the local government budget. Lump sum grants are of about US $15,000-30,000. Infrastructure projects are implemented by local firms and UNDP tender procedures are followed and appear to be fully transparent. Both local firms as well as those from outside the region can bid and the tenders are openly advertised. Prior to implementation and formulation of the projects, JRCs and UNDP jointly identify priorities of the villages. During meetings in communities both JRC members and UNDP project personnel conduct a detailed process for the prioritization of needs. Priorities are then clustered for funding. It is not clear whether the programme undertook an economic analysis of projects prior to their formulation and implementation. A large percentage of the projects were water-related; either reticulated household water supply or irrigation schemes. Household water is pumped to standpipes that serve multiple households.

Many of the projects identified are old ones and the project had been asked to assist with their rehabilitation. Most of these projects needed extensive rehabilitation due to lack of proper maintenance. Some were in need of a complete overhaul. While assistance from the project has helped to revive and rehabilitate some of these projects, systemic problems with access to funds for managing the infrastructure have not been addressed. The Government has not been allocating sufficient resources for maintaining the existing infrastructure and is actually using donor funding to substitute for its own lack of resources.

While some components of large projects have been rehabilitated, these schemes have not been completely overhauled due to lack of project funds. For example, only part of the Muminabad Irrigation Water Pumping Station could be rehabilitated with the available funds, so only 350 hectares of the potential 700 hectares is being irrigated\(^{17}\). As the scheme is only functioning at half capacity, all the project benefits have not been fully realized.

Transfer of large infrastructure projects upon their rehabilitation is complicated by the fact that different parts of the scheme belong to different government institutions. The community does not have the capacity to maintain larger infrastructure projects and the financial responsibility remains diffuse among different agencies. Prior to the start of infrastructure rehabilitation, the UNDP now makes it a practice to understand the ownership of facilities.

The economic viability of projects also needs to be appraised before they are embarked upon. In addition, the capacity of programme staff to undertake such analyses on behalf of the JRCs needs to be developed, as this is not a skill that was common during the Soviet period.

Programme outcomes are not being monitored by the programme staff due to a shortage of staff and funds required for intensive monitoring and follow-up. Indeed, the programme cannot provide any data on the actual increase in agricultural yields resulting from the irrigation schemes supported by UNDP, although anecdotal discussions with local communities would suggest that in the instances visited, yields have increased several fold from a very low starting point. This is

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as a result of both increased intensity of production and an increase in the number of crops per year.

**Rule of law and accountability**

UNDP established a Legal Education Centre to support the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Support was also provided to the Presidential Working Group on the drafting of new legislation for local governance and self-government institutions in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan was one of the first CIS countries to adopt an anti-corruption law. UNDP initiated the Working Group on Anti-Corruption to promote discussion among donors, information sharing, coordination and identification of entry points for tackling corruption. UNDP has funded a nationwide survey of corruption in Tajikistan managed by the Office of the President. The results of the survey were still in draft form at the time of the evaluation mission. However, they were already disputed by the Prosecutor General, who was appointed by the President as the point person on corruption. The Prosecutor General claims that his own surveys show very different facts. The UNDP has also funded and equipped the Prosecutor General’s Office in anticipation that a more comprehensive programme will be launched to address corruption. This seems somewhat unlikely, however. Furthermore, the risks of such a programme are high, particularly as allegations of corruption and the courts have been used to eliminate political opposition to the President rather than as a more legitimate means of addressing widespread and growing corruption.

Any anti-corruption strategy in a country such as Tajikistan has to walk a fine line between independence from the Government while at the same time ensuring that the Government does not hinder its work. Efforts must be made to remove opportunities for corruption in the form of bureaucratic rules and regulations through the establishment of independent watchdogs and institutions and by enforcing the laws in an objective, fair and systematic manner. For any such programme to be successful, UNDP will have to ally with other critical members of the international community as well as deeply root their intervention in local social islands of change and use local leaders or ‘everyday heroes’ so that pressure can be brought to bear at the appropriate juncture. Failure to do so is likely to result in limited impact.

*Tajikistan Mine Action Cell*
UNDP supported the Government in establishing the Tajikistan Mine Action Cell in 2003. The Cell is responsible for policy development, strategic planning, priority identification and coordination of mine action activities. These activities include mine-risk education conducted by the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, and mine-clearance operations being implemented by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action for the OSCE, with staff provided by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. UNDP contributed advice and assistance on fulfilling the Government’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti personnel mines, and on destruction of its anti personnel mine stockpile. The Government estimates that, subject to a continued satisfactory donor response, 19 mined areas affecting communities in the Central Region and Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, could be cleared by 2008. The team established by UNDP to help develop national capacity appears to be highly efficient and very media-aware, publicizing the problem of mines extensively. Training in management is provided by the project and the programme has served as a channel for donor funds. Reporting under the programme is also quite sound. However, the programme has not yet succeeded in reducing the number of mine-related fatalities (see chart above) as additional mines have been laid, particularly in the border areas as the borders have been closed for much of the past few years. It is not clear what criteria are used to prioritize the mine clearance.

Border Management Programme for Central Asia
A regional programme managed by UNDP from Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, BOMCA straddles the Central Asian countries that surround the Fergana Valley, and is a highly political intervention that is intended to train and equip border forces to replace the Russian troops who were withdrawn from border areas by mutual agreement. UNDP essentially provides a service function, serving as a channel for funds from the European Economic Community (EEC) and equipping depots, offices and units of the border forces. Most of the technical advice and capacity building is provided directly by the donor countries themselves. Indeed the model applied is one of ‘Integrated Border Management’, which is the standard applied in Europe. Such a model involves coordination and collaboration between:

- Border force (passports, visas, infantry troops)
- Customs service
- Drugs control agency
- Police force of the Ministry of Interior
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Ministry of Transportation
- Ministry of Agriculture and Department of Quarantine
- The Ministry of National Security (intelligence services)
The International Organization on Migration serves as the Secretariat for an International Coordination Committee and the programme has adopted the Tajik-Afghan border as a pilot. The programme covers two-thirds of the Tajik-Afghan border, while one third is covered by the United States. The latter provides its support independently of the EEC/UNDP BOMCA programme.

The Tajik border force remains undermanned despite an increase from 8,000 to 15,000 personnel since 1997. The border forces are very poorly paid and equipped; non-commissioned soldiers earn about US $1 per month while junior officers receive only about US $10 per month. Senior officers receive about US $30 per month. Donors are considering direct budget support to the Government for the payment of border guards.

Some 700 members of the border force were said to have been trained at four different training centres under the BOMCA project during the six months preceding the evaluation mission.

The area along the Afghan border visited showed few signs of the presence of border forces. Some equipment purchased by the project was in evidence. It would be appropriate to undertake a full audit of this programme, which is actually managed under UNDP’s regional programme. Donors have expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the programme, but the EEC has indicated that it is dissatisfied with the relatively low prominence accorded to the fact that the programme is funded by them; donor visibility is likely to become a problem if it is not addressed soon as the programme has strong political overtones.

The effectiveness of the programme is witnessed in increased movement across official border crossings, increased customs dues, improved cross-border markets (evidence of cross-border trade) and increased drug seizures. It is unclear what the record has been on the latter.

Disaster management and mitigation
Natural disasters, especially earthquakes and flash floods, occur frequently in Tajikistan. While not directly conflict related, UNDP initiated disaster management activities that identified key areas for capacity building and coordination to strengthen disaster prevention and mitigation. Disaster mitigation was not a high priority in Tajikistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which somewhat slowed progress. Nonetheless, two pilot projects demonstrated the positive results that can be achieved when disaster mitigation is complemented by sustainable development.

The UNDP programme of cooperation began in 2000 in connection with the prevention and mitigation of the effects of flooding. UNDP’s technical support (US $20,000) enabled the mobilization of some US $4 million from the World Bank for a project on the reduction of risk from the destruction of dams (as a result of earthquakes).

UNDP and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs helped the Ministry of Emergency Affairs establish a Rapid Reaction Team with the purpose of coordinating the operational response to emergencies during and after disasters. The team appears to have proven its operational effectiveness during the floods in 2004.

UNDP also helped establish an information centre on disasters in the Ministry and a website for the Ministry. Six out of 37 modules of a national disaster training manual were prepared with UNDP assistance.
UNDP has also served as a channel and a link between the Ministry of Emergency Affairs and the donor community. Staff in the Ministry of Emergency Affairs that are directly involved with the UNDP project are paid salary supplements. While this has enabled them to devote their full attention to the Ministry’s work, it has also developed a degree of dependency that will negatively affect long-term sustainability.

Environmental protection
UNDP has supported a slew of projects that have involved support for:
- Preparation of a National Environmental Action Programme.
- Preparation of 50 pilot projects within the framework of the National Environmental Action Plan.
- Conducting a conference on trans-border water resources.
- Three national conventions on desertification, climate change and biodiversity.
- Preparation of national legislation reflecting Tajikistan’s commitment to nine different international conventions on the environment.
- A Global Environment Fund project in support of the phasing out of chloro-fluorocarbons and other ozone depleting substances.
- Reporting in connection with several environmental conventions.
- Preparation of a plan with funding from the Global Environment Fund for the protection of biodiversity in the country.
- Preparation of the first national report on biodiversity.

None of these programmes are directly related to long-term peace-building. Nor have they been implemented with an eye to their implications for potential conflict in the country. Rather, they are in line with UNDP’s global mandate and are largely in response to the fact that there are existing non-core funds available to UNDP for the purpose; helping Tajikistan access such resources and the overheads derived for UNDP are the two principal driving forces. It is not clear how much priority the government actually provides to environmental programmes.

HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS activities are also a function of UNDP’s global mandate and the availability of funds, rather than a focus on post-conflict peace-building.

UNDP was the principal recipient of Tajikistan’s first grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Two of the grant’s primary aims are to strengthen the capacities of the Government and civil society, and to provide medical supplies, including for testing. The implementation of the grant is based on the assumption that beneath the country’s still relatively low infection rate looms the threat of a broader HIV/AIDS emergency, and that an even greater investment must be made in building Government capacity to enable it to become the principal recipient of future grants. There are reasons to believe that such a threat looms as a result of the drug trade and increasing intravenous drug use, extensive migration of labour and signs of an increase in human trafficking.

Millennium Development Goals, National Development Strategy, the regional human development report and anti-corruption programme
Corruption is an increasingly severe problem in Tajikistan and is in some ways a reflection of both the numerous rules and regulations that have been inherited from Soviet times as well as the insufficiency of government salaries and the lack of alternative employment opportunities. In order to draw attention to the issue and to initiate a process of reforms to combat corruption, the UNDP office has launched a programme to study the dimensions of corruption in government
institutions. The study has launched country-wide opinion surveys and has looked into the financial accountability of Parliament. It has also looked into the possibility of establishing an ombudsman function.

As the UNDP anti-corruption programme is in its very early stages, its effectiveness is difficult to judge. There are a number of inherent risks involved in the process as allegations of corruption have been used by the President’s Office as much to eliminate political opposition as to stamp out rent-seeking. The coordinator for the study is based in the President’s Office. A plan for addressing corruption can be developed once the report has been launched.

Both the regional human development report and the Millennium Development Goal initiative are conflict-neutral in that they do not analyse the current situation or future recommendations from the perspective of their potential influence on the level of conflict. Nevertheless, most observers of the peace process in Tajikistan now agree that the risk of conflict has shifted from the control over assets and resources through regional and ethnic groupings to one of access to essential services and employment opportunities. Tajikistan’s commitment to the MDGs constitutes a viable if hugely ambitious window to address these issues from a resource perspective.

The MDG initiative has perhaps stimulated the greatest controversy to date. The early stages, which led to an attention grabbing launch with the participation of the Deputy Secretary-General and the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Millennium Goals, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, were criticized for not being sufficiently thought through and for not having sufficiently involved donors.

In practice, the MDG launch at the United Nations Headquarters in New York was just the beginning of the process that has continued to unfold in Tajikistan. The Government has enthusiastically taken ownership of the process and has established working groups in which all key donors have been invited to participate either as full members or as observers. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the financial estimates that accompanied the process have demonstrated a shortfall of US $13 billion over the period 2006 – 2015 based on current budget projections and ODA flows. This has clearly alarmed donors. They made it clear that they provided virtually all of the national investment budget and were deeply concerned that the MDG initiative would be used to place additional pressure on them to raise their commitments to Tajikistan at a time when many were actually preparing to reduce their involvement. Donors were also concerned because the MDG and National Development Strategy (NDS) processes overlap with the PRSP process of the World Bank, which the donor community had supported for the best part of two years. No doubt also the potential financing burden imposed by an accelerated development to meet MDGs also puts pressure on the debt sustainability ratios worked out between the Government, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The value added of the MDG exercise is that the shortfall (currently estimated at 60 percent) can be reduced either by increasing ODA or through a programme of structural and fiscal reforms. The MDG Needs Assessment and the NDS overview actually call for both structural/policy reforms and increase in financing (public, private and ODA), with emphasis on scaling up domestic resources and improving public expenditure management. It is this part of the dialogue that needs to be addressed rapidly and in some depth. It is not clear that UNDP is providing the sort of intellectual, policy input that can influence such a discussion, and the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund have taken a relatively detached approach, participating only minimally in the MDG exercise. UNDP has placed one
expert in charge of the process and that person’s input appears to be mainly process oriented\textsuperscript{18}. (At the time of the evaluation, the UNDP support team was actually composed of one international and five national experts. The process also involved many other United Nations agencies such as FAO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNTOP, UNISDR, etc.) Ideally, a fairly large team of high-level experts should be put together to generate issues papers to support critical discussions and help participants in the various working groups define policy options. This is easier said than done (the author is not talking about a 12-month process, but rather a much longer and donor-driven one, opposite to the NDS principles as well as to the PRSP key principles), as it would require a fresh, critical look at a range of policies and institutions and would probably require experts with considerable comparative experience not just from outside Tajikistan, but also from the CIS.

For the moment, several of the macroeconomic projections made by the Government have been questioned by the World Bank and depend on the growth of revenue from key industries such as aluminium and cotton, and also on tax enforcement in addition to any structural changes that may be introduced. (The Government received World Bank /International Monetary Fund and other Donor Council’s consolidated comments on the NDS draft and there is no such critical comment on the three macroeconomic scenarios in the NDS drafts.)

\subsection*{4.1.3 Efficiency and sustainability}
Sustainability has been a problem under most of UNDP’s community-based programmes. The rehabilitation of reticulated water supply systems, for instance, has suffered from the lack of a recurrent budget for their maintenance and management. There are also frequent issues relating to the fact that responsibility for their maintenance is divided up between different government agencies. As a result, maintenance problems abound and there has been an under-utilization of capacity as parts of systems installed have failed to operate. Government funding mechanisms at the local level are complex with responsibility distributed among a variety of units, and constitute a systemic problem that UNDP should use its influence to help reform. At the very least UNDP needs to negotiate access to funding on a case-by-case basis to ensure that individual schemes are sustainable. As a fallback, the UNDP has resorted to the collection of user fees. Funds are often more readily forthcoming from the communities themselves than from the government for the maintenance of infrastructure that the former see to be essential; furthermore, the JRCs have significant support and influence over the communities they represent. Nevertheless, these funds have rarely been sufficient for major repairs and are unlikely to be sufficient for larger infrastructure projects.

The Communities Programme has, as a matter of policy (set by UNDP Tajikistan), sought to maintain its administrative budget at 18 percent of the total programme budget, the rationale being that this is the rough proportion of UNDP’s administrative budget worldwide. It should also be noted that there is a critical mass of staff required to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the programme. Community-based programmes call for daily visits by animators to Jamoats. They require frequent advice to JRCs on their priorities and the review and monitoring of activities. For the rehabilitation of reticulated water supply systems, for instance, the engineer would need to spend sufficient time to ensure review plans and specifications, verify materials and monitor standards in implementation. Current staffing is probably below the critical mass required as funding has declined with reduced donor interest in Tajikistan. Indeed, as the

\textsuperscript{18} Since the country visit of the evaluation team, one additional expert has been hired for improving dialogue with donors. UNDP staff has since been involved in finalizing 13 Sectoral Policy Papers as well as the NDS drafts, making sure however that their inputs are really understood and accepted by the Government and then incorporated in the drafts.
overall programme budget has declined, the staff complement of the project has been downsized
to maintain ratios intact. As a result, while the existing staff is clearly working very hard,
monitoring and site visits are below the required frequency.

Programme plans for the Communities Programme are based on the desired results and
funding is only subsequently sought and mobilized. This has two effects: i) expectations are
raised; and ii) when funds are not available, shortcuts are sought and standards are sometimes
compromised as project staff attempt to make the best of what little they have. This is mainly
because UNDP in Tajikistan has a very small core budget and the vast majority of the resources it
uses under its programme are voluntary, earmarked resources that are mobilized from other
donors locally. They are, as a consequence, relatively difficult to rely upon.

Low salaries are also an endemic problem in ministries and all Government-associated
institutions. On average, salaries would have to be increased between five- and ten-fold in order
to enable Government officials to meet their basic monthly needs. This would require either a
massive increase of the wage bill at the expense of other components of the budget, or a massive
downsizeing of the civil service, both of which are politically impractical. The National Budget
grew from around US $160 million in 1999 to US $420 million in 2005. The wage bill rose from
about 2 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP, and in 2005 constituted about 25 percent of the total
budget, an already high proportion. In 1999, per capita income stood at US $310 and in 2005 it
had risen only as high as US $350. The result is that donors have paid salary supplements and/or
created project implementation units in order to ensure results under their programmes; these are
the very same mistakes that have long skewed priorities and undermined long-term development
and sustainability in favour of short-term results for the past 20 years in Africa, creating
dependency in its wake. As international interest in Tajikistan declines and with it, the level of
ODA, the sustainability of programmes and capacity development will become increasing
problems.

The BOMCA project has created a facility that is artificial. It has relatively little
government commitment, it has been allocated a woefully inadequate operational budget, and
salaries are patently insufficient to ensure the commitment of border force personnel at any level.
In the absence of EEC funding through UNDP, it is unlikely that the border force will
demonstrate much added capacity to perform its functions.
5. Management and partnerships

5.1 Relationship between UNDP and UNTOP
The relationship between UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in Tajikistan has been evaluated before. The United Nations presence in Tajikistan has gone from that of a peacekeeping mission at the level of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to a Peacebuilding Support Office under a Representative of the Secretary-General. The relationship and role of UNDP vis-à-vis the United Nations operation has therefore varied over time, moving as it also did from an immediate humanitarian phase, through a phase involving the consolidation of power and stability and finally to the establishment and strengthening of institutions of critical importance to peace. During the first two stages, the United Nations/DPA role was particularly important. Since then the role of the United Nations Country Team and the Resident Coordinator has grown and the Resident Coordinator is now de facto in the lead.

The function of the Representative of the Secretary General in some ways overlaps with that of the Resident Coordinator. Both are at a D-2 level and both have system-wide functions. The lack of guidance from Headquarters on the respective roles of the two institutions has left the relationship open to interpretation at the country level. At the peak of the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP) mission, there was some friction between UNTOP staff and the staff of UNDP and other agencies as UNTOP personnel attempted to move beyond an observer role and implement small projects. In turn, requests to UNDP for small projects in response to needs perceived by UNTOP – mostly in the area of reconciliation or training of staff in government units of importance to the peace process – often fell on deaf ears because UNDP’s core funds were already committed. Despite this, the relationship between the principals of both missions appears to have been relatively good and UNDP has attempted to reorient its programme in support of the peace-building effort as described above.

Formal and informal meetings between the Representative of the Secretary General and the Resident Coordinator have continued throughout, and from a policy standpoint, the positions of UNTOP and UNDP have been generally aligned. The Representative of the Secretary General chairs coordination meetings of the United Nations Country Team in the absence of the Resident Coordinator and is the first choice for Resident Coordinator ad interim (a.i.) when the Resident Coordinator is away. As the prominence of the peace-building function has begun to decline, UNDP has emerged more clearly as the lead agency; although it is not explicit, the UNDP has taken over the lead agency function for the past three years. This transition has seen a move towards greater focus on the long-term development requirements of a lasting peace (focus on the NDS and MDGs).

5.2 Relationship with the World Bank
The relationship between the UNDP and the World Bank in Tajikistan is a complex one. Because of the role that the United Nations has played in Tajikistan and the overarching Security Council mandate, the World Bank has been forced to treat the UNDP seriously despite the miniscule size of its core budget.

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19 Although the mission was unable to review a copy, it was informed that UNTOP was in the process of drafting a note of guidance to UNDP in the event that UNTOP is phased out by the Security Council.
The complexity of the relationship arises from their respective roles – the UNDP’s role in the coordination of development assistance and the World Bank’s role in the debt negotiations. The World Bank has championed the PRSP process as the central instrument for the coordination of development and ODA in Tajikistan and most donors – including UNDP – have followed the process closely. Another factor is the importance of the World Bank’s discussions on debt in the context of ongoing consideration on the part of some donors of providing direct budget support to the Government in the form of Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs).

The introduction of the NDS and the MDG process have clearly complicated the process of coordinating development assistance by: i) shifting the focus to a demand-driven rather than a supply-driven approach; ii) changing the time frame; and iii) dramatically changing the development targets and with them the resource requirements and projections. The donors have tended to be less comfortable with the MDG approach because of the perceived lack of participation at the very outset of the process and particularly because of its resource implications. The Government on the other hand appears to have taken full ownership and is running all of the MDG working groups, rendering it difficult for the World Bank and donors to resist.

Discussions with the World Bank suggest that both the PRSP and the MDG processes could be reconciled and that a partnership between the World Bank and UNDP on both processes – especially to generate the necessary structural changes – would be a particularly powerful one. However, this will require continued in-depth policy dialogue between the two institutions both in Tajikistan and at Headquarters before it can take full effect.

5.3 Relationship with other donors

While it is a relatively large player, managing some US $13 million per year out of a total ODA flow of US $190 million per year, the UNDP is heavily dependent on earmarked funding from donors for its programme in Tajikistan.

As a result, some donors view the UNDP as just another subcontractor. Indeed, the EEC/European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) representative in Tajikistan was very blunt in this regard, comparing UNDP to its non-governmental organization (NGO) subcontractors; the only distinction being one of scale, with UNDP better suited to implement large-scale contracts. It was however noted that UNDP overheads were high (3 percent) and that this made them less competitive\(^20\). The EEC/ECHO also bluntly noted that in the absence of sufficient credit being

\(^{20}\) Such an argument is not a particularly correct one, as most NGOs have far higher overhead costs that are embedded throughout their project budgets.
given to the donor under projects sub-contracted to UNDP, the EEC would be forced to withdraw its funding.

Other donors viewed the UNDP as competition for their own NGOs in thematic areas of priority. The Swiss, who have funded UNDP on an exceptional basis on the Communities Programme, felt obliged to undertake an independent, external review of UNDP’s activities rather than to participate in UNDP’s own independent evaluation.

The Department for International Development and a few other donors, on the other hand, viewed UNDP’s role very much in conjunction with the broader political mandate of the United Nations. As a result, collaboration with UNDP was seen very much within the framework of overall political stabilization and peace-building in Tajikistan.

5.4 Relationship with civil society
Civil society has had relatively little room to grow in Tajikistan. The events in neighbouring countries have resulted in further crackdowns on civil society through the use of legal tools; NGOs have been required to re-register and this has proven an effective means of reducing their numbers.

As with other countries in the CIS, the distinctions between NGOs, civil society organizations, mass organizations and private companies are blurred. Although UNDP has worked with women’s groups, the total number of civil society institutions that it is in contact with is limited. Yet civil society organizations need to be sufficiently developed if democracy is to take root in Tajikistan.

It is recommended that UNDP should begin a regular substantive dialogue with civil society organizations, selecting a variety of them including those that are principally focused on advocacy. Delivery of programmes through them should only be a secondary objective.

5.5 Programme execution
During much of the relief and reconstruction phase of the late 1990s, the United Nations Office for Project Services was the principal execution agency for UNDP programmes. Throughout the last programming cycle, Direct Execution has been the principal modality used. This shift has been largely for cost reasons and because the programme has over time moved from a focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction to a focus on capacity building and institutional reform.

Programme capacity to manage Direct Execution has been boosted in the country office and the process appears to be relatively smooth and transparent. This is borne out in audit reports.

5.6 Coordination
There are three principal forums for coordination of assistance in Tajikistan:

- The Principal’s Group for Donors, a relatively informal but confidential meeting that takes place on a monthly basis; initially sponsored and chaired by the Resident Coordinator, it now involves rotation of the chairmanship.
- Group for Coordination of the MDGs, which involves several sub-groups and is led by the Government.
- UN Country Team meetings.

The MDG initiative has, as discussed above, resulted in pressure being placed on the donors. There is a degree of resistance that has resulted in calls for more substance-oriented, thematic working group meetings among donors to coordinate and manage thematic issues in a more detailed manner than in the Principal’s Group, which is oriented to broad policy management.

While the principals consulted were very positive in their assessment of the Principal’s Group and the role that the Resident Coordinator has played in it, there was considerable dissatisfaction at the middle management and working levels. The World Bank has sought to fill that gap by convening thematic working groups on a sectoral basis with discussions structured around substantive issues. There is some talk of having the working groups feed into the Principal’s Group meetings.

Another more telling example of this sentiment was the instigation of a Donor Coordination Council by the World Bank. This Council convenes more regularly than the Principal’s Group and seems to focus more on an operational level as opposed to the advocacy and political levels of the Principal’s Group. Even though the demarcation of roles between the two is de facto understood, the establishment of this platform does complicate the processes of ODA coordination.
6. Lessons learned

1. The United Nations/DPA and the UNDP can and have played an effective and complementary role in the political stabilization and institutional transformation of Tajikistan. However, when it comes to ensuring that this takes place in a manner that encourages democratic pluralism, greater clarity of policy is required and the organization should be prepared to apply pressure in conjunction with key member states. Increased core funding would increase UNDP’s independence and leverage to drive such changes.

2. The United Nations and DPA need to work closely to define the structural reforms necessary and the capacity that needs to be developed in order to ensure long-term peace-building. As has been the case in Tajikistan, UNDP’s programmes need to be almost completely reoriented in order to meet peace-building goals.

3. Partnerships with both the United Nations and the World Bank are particularly important in the management of the type of changes required to ensure long-term peace-building and development. Both need to be cultivated and nurtured.

4. UNDP needs to be provided with significant and reliable resources in order to enable it to effectively fulfil its mandate in conflict-affected countries such as Tajikistan where its TRAC is severely limited.

5. While it is clear that the UNDP is at a considerable disadvantage when it is attempting to deploy programmes with such limited core resources, it needs to be very realistic about the level of expertise and capacity that is required to credibly implement important and ambitious initiatives.

6. Community-based area development programmes have once again proven to be an excellent means for post-conflict reintegration and participatory development. The critical mass of expertise required to implement such programmes should not be underestimated and staffing needs to be maintained at a minimum critical level in order to ensure that acceptable standards are maintained while developing capacity of civil society organizations.

7. In the context of Tajikistan and other countries of the CIS, expertise that provides an added economic perspective to UNDP’s programmes would be valuable. Economists with experience in market-based systems could be productively combined with the strong national ownership characteristic of UNDP programmes. Without this, the tendency is to continue with the old ways of operating, reducing the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of programmes. Senior resident economists for the Country Team would enhance dialogue with donors and UNDP’s in-country influence on partners such as the Bretton Woods Institutions.

8. Fundamental institutional changes and reforms that are essential in countries that have experienced structural conflicts require very fundamental policy reforms if they are to be sustainable. Generating such fundamental policy reforms is rarely possible with groups that have consolidated power following a protracted period of conflict. These reforms need to be addressed as early as possible and need to be addressed jointly with all of UNDP’s key partners including the United Nations/DPA, Bretton Woods Institutions, bilateral and other multilateral organizations.
9. UNDP must have a close policy dialogue with civil society institutions in any post-conflict country in which it operates. Such dialogue is essential to understanding the real effects of policies on people and on society as a whole. The UNDP should also use its ‘downstream programmes’ such as its Communities Programme in Tajikistan to inform its ‘upstream’ policy development and reform programmes as the former can be effective means for determining priorities and fine-tuning approaches. Within the UNDP office itself, there needs to be a dynamic exchange of ideas and experience with programmes across thematic units to ensure that this necessary cross-fertilization takes place.

Coordination is a complex and difficult process. Substantive issues need to be used as the basis for coordination in order for it to be meaningful. Support units working with the Resident Coordinator should be equipped to generate issues in consultation with the UN Country Team around which coordination can take place.
Annex I: List of Persons Consulted

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Mr. Sukhbrob Khoshmukhamedov  Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP  
Mr. William Lawrence  Chief Technical Adviser, Tajikistan Mine Action Cell  
Mr. Ahad Mahmudov  Programme Manager, UNDP Communities Programme  
Mr. Massoudbek Narzibekov  National Programme Analyst, UNDP  
Mr. Karl Nilsson  Communications Officer, UNDP  
Mr. William Paton  United Nations Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP  
Mr. Steven Yardley  Coordinator, BOMCA/CADAP

**Political parties**

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Mr. Mirhuseyn Nazriyev  Chairman, Socialist Party of Tajikistan  
Mr. Sayeed Abdullo Nuri  Chairman, Islamic Revival Party  
Mr. Amir Qaraqulov  Chairman, Agrarian Party of Tajikistan  
Mr. Shodi Shabdolov  Chairman, Communist Party of Tajikistan  
Mr. Rahmatullo Zoirov  Chairman, Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan

**International NGOs**

International Crisis Group

**National NGOs**

Committee on Religious Issues  
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Gender and Development  
Human Rights Information Centre  
Tradition and Modernity  
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