

United Nations Development Programme  
Evaluation office



## Case Study Guatemala

**EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES**

# HUMAN SECURITY

*By Rajeev Pillay*

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## Acronyms

CEH	Commission for Historical Clarification
CIREFCA	International Conference on Central American Refugees
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
OAS	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## Executive summary

Although there was no formal guidance for collaboration between the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the relationship between the two has been exceedingly close and UNDP was intimately involved in all phases of the peace process including the actual negotiation process in both a substantive and service function. Unlike many of the other peace agreements studied, the one in Guatemala was notable because it incorporated important structural, institutional changes that were intended to broaden democratic participation, reduce the influence of the armed forces and the business élite in governance, end egregious violations and install a culture of human rights, bring satisfactory closure to past wrongs and return the country to sustainable development. UNDP has been a central player in Guatemala despite its own lack of core resources to deliver on its mandate. The organization was involved in supporting the peace dialogue, facilitating the demobilization of armed forces and the return of refugees, and assisting in the process of reconciliation and the reform of institutions of central importance to the peace process.

MINUGUA and UNDP opened a wide array of ‘Dialogue Tables’ that brought together the Government, military, guerrillas, political parties, church, indigenous groups, civil society organizations and the private sector to work on the various sub-agreements of the peace process. In close partnership with UNDP, MINUGUA also launched several temporary institutions geared to the resolution of the conflict (e.g. the peace commission and the land fund). The success of these forums and institutions has been considerable, but, in some instances, incomplete.

The peace process facilitated by the international community through the United Nations has brought about national consensus on the underlying causes of the conflict as well as the extent of the massacres and other violations of human rights that took place. The peace process has not, however, altogether ended the influence of the groups that have controlled the fate of the country since the 1920s, and neither has it achieved real consensus on the solutions that need to be applied.

Individuals and groups are now generally able to express their views in private and in public, and expectations of the people have been raised, although in real terms access to opportunities for sections of the population that were traditionally excluded has been slow to follow. There is now a gap between expectations versus actual opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and access to essential services. This gap has led to the migration of labour abroad.

Open conflict has ended and rebel forces were either successfully integrated into the armed forces or demobilized. However, threats of politically motivated violence continue against those who dare to either further investigate the underlying powers or speak out against them – even though the tolerance of criticism is far greater than ever in the past.

Well over 95 percent of resources delivered by UNDP in Guatemala were non-core and a large proportion came from the Government. While the credibility and trust that UNDP has established with successive Governments and with opposition and civil society groups has afforded it significant leeway in programme focus and in the allocation and utilization of resources, dependence on Government cost sharing has led to the criticism that UNDP is too close to the authorities. With the end of the Security Council mandate, UNDP’s leverage to ensure commitment to institutional reform has also declined.

UNDP's dependence on cost-sharing has hampered smooth implementation as programmes have been launched without full funding, and activities have at times come to a halt pending the receipt of additional contributions.

Programme monitoring needs to be strengthened both from a technical perspective and also to ensure that it is more outcome based. This is not unlike the situation with UNDP in virtually all countries; there is no independent, stand-alone capacity to monitor programme outcomes and impact over an extended period of time.

National ownership of UNDP's programmes appears sound and sustainability has been largely provided for with sufficient integration into the national budget. However, it was also noted that political commitment appeared to be lacking for the implementation of some of the key structural reforms associated with the peace process and their sustainability has been placed in question due to insufficient fund allocation to institutions such as the civilian controlled police force.

The Guatemala peace process is perhaps the oldest among the case studies examined. Many of the technical and design shortcomings have been reviewed in the past and the lessons learned applied in other countries. The UNDP programme has also experimented with programmes that are highly relevant to countries emerging from conflict and can serve as models elsewhere. Its programme of exhumations, truth commissions and clarification of the past as a tool for long-term reconciliation is an interesting model that could be replicated with some adaptation to local conditions elsewhere in the world.

The UNDP has been relatively successful in its coordination functions and some of the available system-wide tools such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework have been used quite successfully for joint post-conflict programming by the United Nations system. UNDP's close relationship with MINUGUA has enhanced its relationship with the World Bank and the programme has managed significant volumes of funds derived from World Bank loans to the Government.

# 1. Introduction

This country case study constitutes an integral part of the Evaluation of UNDP Activities in Conflict Affected Countries undertaken by Mary Kaldor, Carrol Faubert and Rajeev Pillay on behalf of the Evaluation Office of UNDP. Guatemala was assessed by Rajeev Pillay and Andrea Calvaruso (the national consultant recruited specifically for Guatemala) over a period of one work week<sup>1</sup> applying the same methodology that was jointly developed by the evaluation team and pilot tested in Afghanistan. Outcome monitoring mechanisms are not in place to enable a fully outcome-based evaluation of the programme. Nevertheless, using a more qualitative approach including secondary sources, interviews and output data, a reasonably sound, if rapid, assessment of the programme was possible.

Guatemala differs considerably from the other case studies in this evaluation in that:

- The internationally recognized peace process (1996-2000) ended before the start of the evaluation period of 2000-2005<sup>2</sup>.
- The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) operation, coming as early as it did, preceded the integrated mission model.
- There were several weaknesses in programme design, such as in reintegration programmes, which were corrected in other countries that came on stream later.
- Human rights violations were placed very much at the centre of the peace process.
- The formal peace agreement included provisions for structural reforms intended to effect institutional changes, many of which were rights-based even though the United Nations Country Team was not formally integrated into the Security Council response.
- MINUGUA was accorded an institutional strengthening as well as a verification mandate.
- With the exception of the Mobile Military Police, which was responsible for operations in rural areas and was disbanded as an integral part of the peace agreement, the peace process involved the demobilization of only one party to the talks<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex I for the mission schedule.

<sup>2</sup> See Annex II for a chronology of key events. In order to do justice to UNDP's programmes, the evaluation had to, at least in part, encompass the period 1994-2005.

<sup>3</sup> The Mobile Military Police were disbanded in accordance with Paragraph 62 of the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. Officials and specialists in the armed forces were also given the option of voluntary retirement in order to reduce their numbers.

## 2. Has human security improved since 2000?

### 2.1 The conflict in Guatemala

The conflict in Guatemala is complex, but has its roots in the growth of large agricultural business interests that were controlled by a wealthy minority elite and resulted in the expropriation of land from indigenous people for intensive use and cultivation. Large farms, used for coffee and sugar cultivation and extensive livestock breeding were created mainly because the ownership by indigenous people was never recognized. The original inhabitants were largely forced to become seasonal labourers in a legal environment that did not afford them basic workers rights. The 1960s saw the growth of a leftist, Socialist political movement that led to confrontation between indigenous people, students and the Church with the authorities, and was followed by widespread massacres of villagers in rural areas. An armed movement under the umbrella of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) sprung up and led to a civil war with the emptying of villages and the continued massacre of their inhabitants. Successive governments and the armed forces were controlled by those with strong business interests and in the cold war environment of the time, were backed by the United States, which had strong business interests throughout Central America. Civil society groups were subjected to widespread persecution and intimidation.

The end of the Cold war, coupled with a guerrilla war of attrition in the rural areas of Guatemala and the widespread publicity generated by civil society groups that created international pressure resulted in a move towards peace led by a small group of Nordic countries (principally the Norwegians) and the United Nations. Strong support for the existing powers from the United States resulted in a peace agreement that enabled the elite of Guatemala to retain their important role in key state institutions despite a range of institutional reforms that are discussed in more detail below. The peace agreement led to the disarmament of the URNG and its integration into the armed forces of Guatemala and into the population. The political wing of URNG entered the mainstream of Guatemalan politics and its members have run for office and held senior positions in Government as well as the National Assembly.

Despite all this, clandestine armed groups, both within the official armed forces and outside it, have helped preserve the interests of a small minority even in post-conflict Guatemala<sup>4</sup>. Illegal armed groups – small bands of heavily armed men who commit or threaten to commit violent criminal acts – have been a feature of post-conflict Guatemala. The clandestine groups, a legacy of three decades of war, act at the behest of members of an inter-connected set of powerful Guatemalans who oversee and profit from a variety of illegal activities that they carry out with little fear of arrest or prosecution. These illegal activities often involve the improper exercise of influence in the state – skimming at customs, bribery and kickbacks, for example – and include connections to drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Along with their influence in the state bureaucracy, the hidden powers have relationships with most of the political parties and actors in Guatemala. They exercised that influence during the Portillo administration, and have continued to do so to this day. The hidden powers protect themselves from prosecution through their political connections, through corruption, and when necessary through intimidation and violence. Their activities have undermined the justice system and perpetuated a climate of citizen

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<sup>4</sup> See: Peacock, Susan C. and Adrian Beltran, 'Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala: Illegal Armed Groups and The Forces Behind Them', Washington Office on Latin America, Washington DC, 2003.

insecurity, which in turn has created fertile ground for the further spread of corruption, drug trafficking and organized crime. Amnesty International's February 2002 report, entitled 'Guatemala's Lethal Legacy: Past Impunity and Renewed Human Rights Violations', labels Guatemala a Corporate Mafia State, defined as an "... 'unholy alliance' between traditional sectors of the oligarchy, some new entrepreneurs, police and military, and common criminals." The report describes how hidden powers collude to control lucrative, illegal activities, "...including drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, car theft rings, the adoption racket, kidnapping for ransom, illegal logging and other proscribed use of state protected lands...(and) conspire to ensure monopoly control of legal industries such as the oil industry..."

## **2.2 Public perceptions and rising expectations**

Individuals and groups are now generally able to express their views in private and in public, which is perhaps the most significant break with the past. Based on the range of interviews conducted, it can be said that public dialogue, much of it catalysed and facilitated by UNDP programmes, has resulted in groups across the economic, social and ethnic spectrum having similar analyses of the key socio-economic and political problems faced by the country. Where opinions differ is on solutions and the desired end state of a reform process launched by the peace agreement.

Virtually all those met agreed that the nature of the peace agreement created a situation where:

- Vestiges of the old power structures remained in control either behind the scenes or formally. Although most of those directly responsible for the worst human rights violations have recently been eased into the background, the economic 'oligarchy' that has been the driving force for economic growth in Guatemala continues to hold significant positions of power despite the rise of new groups during the Portillo Government. The links between big business, Government and a somewhat weakened military remain strong. Indeed, it is a general perception that the existing powers and the Government were the victors in the conflict and that the peace process supported by the international community resulted in the perpetuation of the same groups in key positions of authority.
- Opposition political parties are fragmented and relatively weak, and once demobilization took place, they have not been in a position to apply real leverage.
- There is a lack of political will among those who are really in authority to instate incisive structural reforms – particularly of those institutions central to maintaining power.
- There has been an apportionment of ministries or of key positions within ministries between those who have traditionally held power in Guatemala and the other parties. 'Social portfolios' (i.e. those less critical to national security) have been placed in the hands of opposition parties or liberal technocrats, while the ministries perceived to be of real power (Defence, Interior, Attorney General, etc.) are squarely in the hands of the old guard.
- This has resulted in a public perception (rightly or wrongly) very clearly expressed by those interviewed that the Government is fragmented and that the ministries are not held together by a coherent strategy or long-term programme.
- Social portfolios are not adequately funded and to a large extent the 'Patto Fiscal' (i.e. the country's fiscal policy agreement) remains unfulfilled and has not translated into significant improvements in the social sector – particularly in the more remote areas of the country.
- There is a perception that political parties remain weak and do not provide viable alternative programmes. Indigenous groups and minorities interviewed all acknowledged an increase in

openness and dialogue, but were resigned to the fact that individuals of indigenous or minority extraction in Government do not really represent their interests.

- Repression, mostly in the form of intimidation through threats or acts of physical violence, continues with impunity, although certainly not in the same systematic manner witnessed before implementation of the peace accords. Those who monitor and expose corruption, human rights violations or other contraventions of the peace agreements receive death threats.
- The nature of conflict has changed. The absence of job opportunities and weaknesses in the security sector and judiciary, including the possible collusion of officials in the security sector in some instances, have resulted in the proliferation of organized crime associated with the drugs and weapons trade, gangs (*marras*) and a general decline in law and order. Indeed, over the past four years the incidence of violent crime has increased to a point where physical security has become a dominant concern among ordinary citizens.
- The most serious forms of criminality have a regional or trans-border dimension, with criminal organizations taking on an international character and membership.
- Corruption and collusion in criminality on the part of the civil police is viewed as a severe problem and the average citizen is loath to turn to the police for protection.

Indigenous groups are now very aware of their human and economic rights and rights as citizens of the state. They are also now even more aware of how these rights were denied them in the past. This has resulted in a significant rise in expectations that has not been matched with action on the part of the Government or international community; this is a potential flashpoint for the future if conditions continue to deteriorate.

The press has greater freedom now than in the past, although they are also subject to anonymous threats of physical violence. As a result, the press operates with a degree of self-censorship in order to continue to cover news events and analyse political developments.


A nationwide poll undertaken by Vox Latina for Prensa Libre in the first week of January 2006<sup>5</sup> found deep scepticism about the political process; 89.7 percent of women and 85.1 percent of men said that politicians had not put forward any convincing arguments or platforms. Perhaps buoyed by recent events in Venezuela and Bolivia, 66.3 percent believe that a President of indigenous extraction could be voted into power at the next election. 79.9 percent believe that members of parliament are poorly qualified for their jobs. 70.4 percent had a negative view of the Government and 6.9 percent had no opinion on the subject. With respect to law and order, 77.9 percent had a negative view of the national civil police and 62.4 percent thought the courts were functioning poorly. 43.1 percent of those polled had a negative view of the Attorney General's office while 11.9 percent claimed to have no view on the subject. On the other hand, individuals who had a role in the most violent years of conflict, such as Efraim Rios Montt, were found to have a following of just under 30 percent, whereas the human rights reformist Rigoberta Menchu received a positive assessment from just under 70 percent of those polled.

In cases where groups or individuals have attempted to employ legal measures to address some of the fundamental problems of society such as those pertaining to human rights, the apportionment of blame for past wrongs, the redistribution of productive assets or the exercise of civilian controls over the armed forces, they have been faced with anonymous death threats.

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<sup>5</sup> Prensa Libre Dominical, Guatemala, 15 de enero de 2006. A total of 1,260 citizens over the age of 18 were polled nationwide between 29 December 2005 and 9 January 2006. The study is said to have a margin of error of +/- 4.3 percent.

Some of these threats have been acted upon, though there has been no proof, resulting in continued impunity.



### 2.3 Physical security

Based on statistics of violent deaths and the incidence of violent events, the nature of conflict in Guatemala has, in the past years, largely shifted away from repression of potential political opposition to violence fuelled by the severe lack of economic and social opportunities for large sections of the population and by externally derived influences.

Guatemala's population was estimated at 14.7 million in July 2005. According to figures provided to the mission from the Human Rights Ombudsman's office and the UNDP project staff, there has been a net annual increase in violent crimes<sup>6</sup> since 2001. Homicides alone have increased from 3,230 in 2001 to 5,388 in 2005, a 65 percent increase in five years. The total number of violent deaths of women amounted to 1,989 between 2000 and 2005 and rose by 57 percent between 2002 and 2004, increasing further to 518 cases in 2005. Apparently, only rapes have declined in number since the signing of the peace accords. However, it is not clear if this drop is due to a lack of confidence in the police force and a subsequent decline in the reporting of cases.

Much of the crime is associated with violent, organized gangs including the *marras* – the trans-national gangs that originated among the disaffected youth in the expatriate Guatemalan communities of Los Angeles, Miami and elsewhere in the United States. Having grown dramatically, these gangs expanded their reach and returned to Guatemala, essentially taking over entire towns or districts in the larger municipalities and cities. Guatemala has also become an increasingly important trans-shipment point for drugs and weapons. The national police and other authorities are generally understood to be involved. As with other countries, this rise in crime and the perception of involvement of the authorities, coupled with a rise in expectations and a failure to deliver on those expectations are likely to be the cause of conflict and the breakdown of institutions if they are not addressed in a sustained and meaningful manner.

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<sup>6</sup> Violent crimes are said to include homicides, injurious harm, rape and domestic violence.

## **2.4 Economic security**

Guatemala has one of the lowest real taxation rates in Latin America (nine percent of GDP). Rapid increases in the cost of living have rendered it difficult for the average Guatemalan to survive and 56 percent of the population were said to be living below the poverty line in 2005. The basic basket of goods used by the Government to estimate the cost of living rose above Q2,765 per month in 2005, while the minimum wage amounted to Q1,440 per month in the non-agricultural sector and Q1,408 in the agricultural sector.

Underemployment and unemployment have become serious problems; while official figures show unemployment (including underemployment) at only 3.2 percent, the estimated figure rises to 30 percent. The severe structural changes that took place during the first half of the last century resulted in most indigenous and other small farmers having their properties expropriated in favour of large agricultural businesses (especially sugar and coffee). As a result of this, the number of people working as seasonal labourers in a relatively unregulated labour market is high. Social security is said to cover just 25 percent of those in need.

The illiteracy rate is at 22.3 percent of the population, and 33.4 percent have not completed primary education. Only 6.4 percent of the population has completed secondary education and only 1.9 percent have university degrees.

Of the 1,481 registered labour unions, only 742 are active. Workers who are members of trade unions account for just 3 percent of GDP.

## **2.5 Food security**

The lack of employment opportunities has reduced food security. The Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that 21 percent of Central America's population suffered from malnutrition in 2001. The number of malnourished people in Guatemala rose from 1.4 million to 2.9 million between 1992 and 2001<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> En Guatemala: El caso mas dramatico de America Latina. Informpress Centroamericana, 27 de octubre de 2004, No. 1582.

### **3. Contribution of the international community to the improvement of human security (since 2000)**

#### **3.1 Nature of the conflict and the innovative peace process**

The conflict in Guatemala was one of violent repression in order to maintain the control of a small group of people over the productive assets of the country. The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) registered 42,275 victims, including men, women and children. Of these, 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance. Eighty-three percent of fully identified victims were Mayan and 17 percent were Ladino<sup>8</sup>. Combining this data with the results of other studies of political violence in Guatemala, the CEH estimated that the number of persons killed or who disappeared was over 200,000. State forces and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93 percent of the violations documented by the CEH, including 92 percent of the arbitrary executions and 91 percent of forced disappearances. Victims included men, women and children of all social strata: workers, professionals, church members, politicians, peasants, students and academics; in ethnic terms, the vast majority were Mayans.

The CEH also concluded:

“...the structure and nature of economic, cultural and social relations in Guatemala are marked by profound exclusion, antagonism and conflict. The proclamation of independence in 1821, an event prompted by the country’s elite, saw the creation of an authoritarian State which excluded the majority of the population, was racist in its precepts and practises, and served to protect the economic interests of the privileged minority.”

The Guatemalan political configuration has its roots in an economic structure characterized by the concentration of productive wealth in the hands of a minority. The State gradually evolved as an instrument for the protection of this structure, guaranteeing the continuation of exclusion and injustice. The CEH concluded that the incapacity of the State to respond to legitimate social demands and claims led to the creation of an intricate repressive apparatus that replaced the judicial action of the courts, usurping their functions and prerogatives. An illegal and underground punitive system was established, managed and directed by military intelligence. The system was used as the State’s main form of social control throughout the internal armed confrontation and operated with the direct or indirect collaboration of dominant economic and political sectors. The country’s judicial system, due “...either to induced or deliberate ineffectiveness...” failed to guarantee the application of the law, tolerating, and even facilitating, violence. The judicial branch contributed to worsening social conflicts at various times in Guatemala’s history. Impunity permeated the country and sheltered and protected the repressive State. Likewise, although of a different nature, the responsibility and participation of economically powerful groups, political parties, universities and churches, as well as other sectors of civil society, were also catalogued.

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<sup>8</sup> Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and Recommendations., Guatemala City, February 1999, <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html>.

In an environment in which the State has played a pivotal role in the conflict and in which the opposition parties have remained fragmented and weak, the international community, with the United Nations at the forefront, has played a very important role in the peace process. The comprehensive peace agreement signed between the Government and the URNG was quite unique for its time in that it incorporated key structural and institutional changes in an attempt to address the structural causes of conflict. It consisted of several separate, inter-related components, each of which were signed in 1994 and include:

- Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights
- Agreement on the Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict
- Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer
- Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples
- Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation Conducted on 6 May 1996 Between the Presidential Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
- Agreement on Strengthening Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society
- Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire
- Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime
- Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
- Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace

The peace process supported by the international community ended the conflict between the Government and the rebel movement. Physical security from organized massacres and ethnic cleansing has improved and some of the most controversial armed units have been disbanded (the Mobile Military Police). Indeed, such events no longer take place. The disarmament and integration of the UNRG forces and militia into the Government's armed forces has, however, given the impression to some of the traditional oligarchy that the existing powers and the Government were the winners in the conflict, and as a result, the less powerful positions in Government were accorded to minority and opposition groups. These positions, many of which were expressly created as a result of the peace agreement, are insufficiently funded and there seems to be no political will to implement the structural changes. The potential for mobilizing the state for conflict in the future therefore continues to exist.

The peace process has not been accompanied by sufficient attention to the creation of employment opportunities and equitable growth, while the expectations of indigenous groups and other formerly excluded groups have risen. Indeed, many have a broad understanding of their rights that they believe include a right to jobs, health, education and services. There is also an expectation of agrarian reform and the redistribution of assets. Failure to deliver on these expectations has already reinforced the extensive disparities that exist within the country and resulted in a rise in criminality and general physical insecurity (see the discussion above). It is estimated that 50 percent of land is not registered and the issue of agrarian reform has hardly been addressed. Failure to address the expectations of the majority of the people is likely to lead to increased political instability. Conditions exist for this to lead to peaceful political change, but because many of the structural, institutional changes have not fully taken root, equal potential exists for the instability to be managed through more repressive measures; there are as yet no guarantees that arms will not be used systematically as a means of resolving conflict.

### 3.2 Problems of central importance to the conflict that remain unresolved

While there are other areas of the peace process that have not been fully institutionalized (such as the establishment of civilian control over the police and intelligence services), two areas have shown the least progress: land reforms and the fiscal pact. Both are areas that could ensure progress towards meeting the heightened expectations of the population.

Land reforms, which were an integral part of the peace accords, have scarcely progressed and are in deadlock. There are three principal categories of land disputes in Guatemala, many of which have multiple causes and are in a legal limbo:

- ***Disputes over competing property rights (and perceptions of property rights)*** These represent approximately 64 percent of the active disputes, and include all disputes where property rights and perceptions of property rights between one or more claimants are in conflict. These rights may be grounded in land titles, private documents of any type, use or possession of land, historically grounded land claims, or government legislation (e.g., environmentally protected areas). These disputes may be between individuals, between communities, or between individuals and communities, and the state is often involved in some way. Many of these disputes are historically based.
- ***Occupation of property legally owned by another*** These account for approximately 16 percent of the total active disputes. Many of these disputes involve relatively recent strategic land occupation by organized landless *campesino* (peasant) groups in order to attract the attention of the State and private landowners to their land claims. Many of the land occupations were by peasant communities that had lost their livelihoods and/or access to land as a result of the global crash in coffee prices (i.e. the peasants have been released from a long-standing labour and living relationship with a private coffee producing landowner). Strategic occupations by organized *campesino* groups are the disputes most commonly associated with forced state evictions, a number of which turned violent.
- ***Boundary disputes*** Approximately 14 percent of the disputes cover property boundary disputes between private individuals and/or between communities, as well as more formal border disputes either between townships or departments. Many of these disputes are historically grounded, although some are of more recent origin. Boundary disputes with long-standing histories that are between indigenous communities – whether deemed disputes between communities, *per se*, or between townships – have been associated with significant violence.

The concept of the fiscal pact lies in the notion that the use of the national budget and the collection of revenue need to be more accountable, transparent and responsive to the socio-economic needs of the population. The United Nations system (UNDP, MINUGUA and the United Nations Office for Project Services) funded and supported the work of the preparatory commission, the supporting studies undertaken, and the participation of civil society organizations. UNDP funded technical assistance in the preparation of background studies and the payment of salaries of the lead actors in the process (including the Coordinator, Mr. Juan Alberto Fuentes). UNDP also funded a public information programme to publicize the contents of the negotiations and subsequent agreements. The fiscal pact set revenue and budgetary targets and was intended to raise the relative proportion of the budget devoted to the social sector. A variety of actors were involved in the discussions, including Government, civil society, the Church and the private sector. The fiscal pact that was elaborated was reviewed and endorsed by both the executive and legislative branches of government and was formally signed. It has, however, remained largely unfulfilled.

## 4. Contribution of UNDP to the improvement of human security

### 4.1 The relevance of UNDP's programme

It would be difficult to imagine how the UNDP office could have made its programme more relevant to the situation in Guatemala during the post-conflict period. UNDP has been a central player in Guatemala despite its own lack of core resources to deliver on its mandate. The organization was involved in supporting the peace dialogue, facilitating the demobilization of armed forces and the return of refugees, and assisting in the process of reconciliation and the reform of institutions of central importance to the peace process.

Many viewed the presence of MINUGUA, with its observer and verification functions, as a guarantee against continued human rights violations. Working closely with UNDP, it opened a wide array of 'Dialogue Tables' that brought together the Government, military, guerrillas, political parties, the Church, indigenous groups, civil society organizations and the private sector to work on the various sub-agreements of the peace process. In close partnership with UNDP, MINUGUA also launched several temporary institutions geared to the resolution of the conflict (e.g. the peace commission and the land fund). The success of these forums and institutions has been considerable, but, in some instances, incomplete.

Prior to the peace agreement, UNDP oriented most of its support to uprooted populations on a sub-regional basis under the CIREFCA (International Conference on Central American Refugees) and Development Program for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Returnees in Central America (PRODERE) processes.<sup>9</sup> As the peace process in Guatemala began to take shape and was implemented, UNDP's programme was almost completely re-oriented to address the broad peace-building goals of the international community in Guatemala.

The central relevance of UNDP's activities to each of the main sub-agreements that constitute the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are illustrated in the table below.

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>		
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (1994)	Support to the Human Rights Ombudsman	Since MINUGUA's closure in 2004, UNDP has been supporting and strengthening Thematic & Regional Offices, especially around improving research capacity to address issues relating to transitional justice, multiculturalism, and victims of human rights violations. It has monitored and followed-up with the recommendations of the Peace Accords & Truth Commissions concerning human rights violations
	Support to the Public Prosecutor's Office	Institutional strengthening through Information Control System that included (i) developing research capacity for Penal Investigation and Criminal Persecution; (ii) improving institutional structure and human resources issues to enhance professional performance standards; and (iii) promoting efficiency

<sup>9</sup> The PRODERE programme in Guatemala is part of a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency UN programme for displaced persons, refugees and returnees in Central America, launched in 1990 by the Government of Italy.

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>			
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>	
		of Judicial Prosecutors through appropriate reviews and establishment of incentives for their career development	
	Reform and support to the judiciary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint MINUGUA/UNDP unit</li> <li>• Petit Committee (Donors, UNHCHR, UNDP)</li> <li>• National Commission for the Strengthening of Judicial Sector</li> <li>• Analyses &amp; proposals for public policies for modernization &amp; strengthening</li> <li>• Inter sectoral dialogue</li> <li>• Judges of Peace</li> <li>• Alternative methods for conflict resolution</li> <li>• Speeding up non penal processes</li> </ul>	
	Strengthening of civilian national police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New Civil Police model</li> <li>• Career structure. Police academy. Crime and violence prevention. Gender. Community policing. Multiethnicity in the police force. Human rights assistance to victims. Children and adolescents. Statistical register. Disciplinary regime and internal control policies.</li> </ul>	
	Facilitation of process for definition of military doctrine (2002-2005)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WTS (Oracle) methodology for elaboration of democratic security policy proposals.</li> <li>• Multi-sectoral dialogue process on defence policy</li> <li>• Strengthening civil-military interrelation and interaction for policy definition and application</li> </ul>	
Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict (1994)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CIREFCA (1989-94)</li> <li>• PRODERE (1990-95)</li> <li>• PDHL (1995-96)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definition of public policies on uprooted populations</li> <li>• Social &amp; economic development and human rights in resettlement areas</li> <li>• Support to the creation of the Governmental Special Commission for Attention to Refugees (CEAR)</li> </ul>	
	Support to the establishment of the Technical Commission for Implementation of the Agreement on Uprooted Populations (CTEAR), 1995-2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to nomination process</li> <li>• Support to Technical Secretary</li> <li>• Representation of international community, with EU and Mexico</li> <li>• Work strategy definition</li> <li>• Facilitation of trust and consensus building</li> <li>• Conflict resolution</li> </ul>	
	Support to the study and selection of land for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaboration with Government bodies (FORELAP, CEAR, FONAPAZ, MAGA), IOM and UNCHS-Habitat for land compensation &amp; titles, urban centre design and urbanization.</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of dedicated trust fund (1997-2005)</li> <li>• Support to project identification, formulation and execution (1995-2006)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donor coordination and channelling of funds for pre-investment, health services, agro-forestry, resettlement, water &amp; sanitation, road construction &amp; rehabilitation, personal documentation</li> </ul>	
	Support/facilitation of specific projects (1998-2001) targeting displaced persons (PRADIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated health care</li> <li>• Micro-grants for productive development</li> <li>• Community participation &amp; organization</li> <li>• Attention to civilians (displaced), URNG and military disabled</li> </ul>	
	Coordination of interagency group on uprooted and demobilized populations (1997-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination &amp; technical secretariat</li> <li>• Support to definition of reintegration policies</li> <li>• Sustainability through governmental regular programmes &amp; funds.</li> <li>• Advisory services to NGOs</li> </ul>	
	Establishment of the	Support to the Truth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interrelation CSO &amp; Government for design of</li> </ul>

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>		
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer (1994)	Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>reparation programme</li> <li>• Design of strategy for international community</li> <li>• Specific inter-sectoral Dialogue Table on Defence Policy formulated a new military doctrine in a participatory manner, based on the spirit of Peace Agreements</li> <li>• Construction of law proposals on new military doctrine (through the projects POLSEDE 'Towards a Democratic Security Policy' &amp; POLSEC 'Towards a Citizen Security Policy')</li> <li>• Inter-sectoral dialogue on compliance with the Accord on Indigenous Peoples' Identity &amp; Rights; participatory formulation of proposals</li> </ul>
	Dignifying and psychosocial attention to war victims, (DIGAP), 2001-2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to SCO &amp; Health Ministry (National Mental Health Programme) in attention to victims: dignifying victims through exhumation, identification and dignified inhumation. Counselling: break out of silence, reduction of fear and trauma healing. Creating basic conditions for improving individual and collective functioning: human and community development and participation.</li> <li>• Civil society organization &amp; State interrelation and interaction: trust and consensus building for interaction &amp; collaboration</li> </ul>
	Process of institutional compensation to victims, NRP (2004-06)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transition of activities supported by DIGAP to National Reparation Programme – NRP</li> <li>• Technical assistance for economic compensation; search for disappeared children; exhumations; counselling; and victim registration</li> </ul>
Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1995)	Definition of public policies on indigenous peoples, Q'Anil (1997-2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conceptual definitions framework</li> <li>• Participatory definition process</li> <li>• Multiculturalism.</li> </ul>
	Support to National Programme for Popular Traditional & Alternative Medicine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health sector reform based on equity &amp; multiculturalism</li> <li>• Social participation</li> <li>• Human resource development</li> <li>• Revalidation of indigenous knowledge</li> </ul>
	Strengthening of the Office of Indigenous Women of the Indigenous Defender, DEMI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integral accompaniment and attention to human rights issues: social, psychological, juridical attention at local level</li> <li>• Interfamilial violence</li> </ul>
	Strengthening of Penal Public Defender Institute (IDPP) and training of Indigenous Defenders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation &amp; strengthening of IDPP</li> <li>• Judicial pluralism alliance</li> <li>• Public Indigenous Defender Offices</li> <li>• Application and coexistence of traditional &amp; institutional forms of justice</li> </ul>
Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation (1996)	MINUGUA/UNDP Joint Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of agrarian situation &amp; jurisdiction</li> <li>• Creation and functioning of Presidential Unit for (land) conflicts resolution (UPRECO)</li> </ul>
	National cadastral system, institutional response to land conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>50% of land remains unregistered</li> <li>• Design and functioning of a national cadastral system</li> <li>• Judicial investigation</li> <li>• National, departmental and municipal training</li> <li>• Community mobilization.</li> <li>• Mapping, legalization of ownership</li> <li>• Women's access to land ownership</li> <li>• Land conflicts resolution and mediation bodies</li> </ul>

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>		
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>
		(UPRECO & CONTIERRA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elaboration of Law of Registry of cadastre</li> <li>• Social communication</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inter-sectoral Dialogue Tables on socio-economic and rural development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participatory proposal formulation for development with equality between indigenous subsistence farmers and business oligarchs</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of the Fiscal Pact process (1999-2003)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of civil society organization participation in formulation and negotiation</li> <li>• Creation and strengthening of Fiscal Pact Commission</li> <li>• Analyses and design of proposals for public policy reform</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extension of health services for rural population in extreme poverty</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizational strengthening of Ministry of Health, Guatemalan Institute of Social Security, public hospitals and private health services providers</li> <li>• Increase productivity &amp; quality of services</li> <li>• Creation of 58 centres for nutrition &amp; 20 units in hospitals</li> <li>• Improve access for women &amp; children</li> </ul>
Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening of civilian national police</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Career structure, police academy</li> <li>• Crime and violence prevention, community policing</li> <li>• Multi-ethnicity in the police force</li> <li>• Assistance to victims of mistreatment by police</li> <li>• Children and adolescents</li> <li>• Information systems</li> <li>• Discipline and internal controls</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening the Ministry of Interior</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research on citizens security, helping to produce policy papers on gender, security and judicial system, human rights, criminal investigation</li> <li>• Institutional framework</li> <li>• Security advisory council</li> <li>• Facilitated the development of an arms and munitions control policy</li> <li>• Support to civilian intelligence &amp; information analyses</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security of the President &amp; Vice-President</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support in the design &amp; strengthening of Presidential Secretary for Administrative Affairs &amp; Security</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic Analyses Secretariat</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to the redefinition of operations</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Judicial</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of career improvement</li> <li>• Establishment of Public Defenders Office</li> <li>• Facilitation of formulation of the Penal Code</li> <li>• Access to justice system</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to social participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthening civil society organizations in their capacity and incidence on Peace Accords implementation</li> <li>• Strengthening of community and grass root organizations in their capacity to participate in decision-making bodies (local development councils)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to women's participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to the establishment and strengthening of the Presidential Secretary for Women's affairs</li> <li>• Support to the strengthening of women's organizations and committees</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to the deactivation &amp; reintegration of the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic compensation (partially)</li> <li>• Technical training &amp; traineeships</li> </ul>

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>		
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>
	Military Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kits for productive reintegration</li> <li>• Reference system in Ministry of Labour in-country offices</li> </ul>
Definitive Ceasefire (1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• URNG demobilization &amp; preparation of camps and supplies (1997)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of negotiation, coordination &amp; organization</li> <li>• Construction of camps</li> <li>• Access, infrastructure, supplies, transport</li> <li>• Return of URNG external structures</li> <li>• Rehabilitation &amp; transition to definitive incorporation</li> </ul>
Constitutional Reform and the Electoral Regime (1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigation on electoral participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyses on electoral participation and recommendations for improvements to electoral regime</li> </ul>
Basis for the Legal Integration of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity – URNG – (1996)	Participation and support to relevant peace commissions (CAL, CEI, ECO and CSI), 1997- 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitate consensus on Cooperation Matrix (1996), assigning roles for donors &amp; multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Facilitate decision making on delegation of representation in Peace Commissions</li> <li>• Represent SNU and donors in CAL, CEI, ECO &amp; CSI</li> <li>• Coordinate information sharing with IC (including donors) and channel funds for URNG demobilization and incorporation</li> <li>• Facilitate trust and consensus building within peace commissions</li> <li>• Assist in formulating incorporation programmes and technical proposals for initial and definitive incorporation</li> <li>• Work strategies for land and resettlement issues</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to demobilization of Military Police; retirement packages, training and economic reintegration (1997-1998)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic compensation (partially)</li> <li>• Technical training &amp; traineeships</li> <li>• Kits for productive reintegration</li> <li>• Reference system in Ministry of Labour in-country offices.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to political insertion of UNRG (1997-1998)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repatriation of political actors</li> <li>• Participation in peace commissions</li> <li>• Legal advisory services</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reintegration of individual members of URNG (1997-2005)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal documentation, education, productive training and reinsertion, gender, legal assistance, housing and health programmes</li> <li>• Sensitization &amp; dissemination</li> <li>• Family reunification</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Productive reinsertion and health services to disabled persons, PRADIS, (1998-2001).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integral health attention</li> <li>• Micro-grants for productive development</li> <li>• Community participation &amp; organization</li> <li>• Attention to civilians (displaced), URNG and Military disabled</li> </ul>
A Firm and Lasting Peace (1996)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitator of encounters of political actors. (1994-...)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of consultative process on contents of Peace Agreements among political actors, military, private sector, political parties, religious leaders and NGOs</li> <li>• Negotiation table</li> <li>• Facilitation of participation of SNU agencies &amp; projects in Mexico (1994)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitator of coordination of international community (1994-2005)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Periodical meetings to share information, create &amp; maintain coordinated strategy</li> <li>• Feasibility on demobilization</li> <li>• First projects for the integration of uprooted &amp;</li> </ul>

<b>MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT</b>		
<b>Sub-Agreement</b>	<b>UNDP Response</b>	<b>Activities Involved</b>
		demobilized populations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supplier of technical assistance in the negotiation process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to the Peace Commission (COPAZ), negotiation table and United Nations moderator</li> <li>• Draft Peace Accords chronogram</li> <li>• Definition of United Nations Mission Model</li> <li>• Demobilization process planning</li> <li>• Facilitation proposal orientation &amp; integration by Civil Society Assembly &amp; State University</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promoter and facilitator of strengthening of civil society organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO's Directory (1997-1998)</li> <li>• Grants for institutional strengthening (Peace Agreement, Human Rights &amp; Justice), 1998-1999</li> <li>• Participation of civil society organizations – PROFED-PASOC: reconciliation, justice, human rights, indigenous rights, social auditing, transparency (2000-2006)</li> <li>• Inter-sectoral dialogue for analyses and proposals for public policies</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for the Peace Secretariat, the peace commissions and the Dialogue Tables including the National Peace Accord Commission (1997-2006)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional strengthening through information system on compliance of Peace Agreement.</li> <li>• Technical capacity for strategic analysis</li> <li>• Strategic inter-government coordination</li> <li>• Resource mobilization (through Consultative Group)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TA for Consultative Group Meetings focused on peace (1997, 1998, 2003)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination of international community</li> <li>• Organization and facilitation with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)</li> <li>• Report on progress compliance &amp; non-compliance peace agreement</li> <li>• Resources mobilization &amp; management</li> <li>• Keeping the Peace Agreement on the agenda of the international community &amp; Government</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of processes aimed at defining public agendas related to peace: the National Shared Agenda with political parties (2002-2003)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiparty dialogue and consensus building</li> <li>• Minimum agenda for peace, development and democracy. Themes: importance of Peace Agreement, democratic citizens security, tax collection, public investment in education superior to Peace Agreement.</li> <li>• Trust generation between and inside party structures</li> <li>• Ideological definition</li> <li>• Party &amp; Governmental programmes</li> <li>• Strengthening party structure at national, departmental and municipal levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific analysis and proposals in the national human development reports (especially 2003)</li> </ul>	All together the specific analyses and proposals support the compliance of two Agreements: 1) Social & Economic Aspects of the Agrarian Situation; 2) Identity & Rights of Indigenous Peoples
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to the definition of public policy related to the peace agenda (1997-2005)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education, decentralization, rural development, indigenous peoples and multiculturalism, citizens' security, defence, reinsertion of uprooted populations, fiscal pact</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitation of participation of the private sector (1998-2000)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guatemala Vision (scenarios based on Peace Agreement) was co-financed by the private sector (1997-1999)</li> <li>• Peace industries – identification of initiatives for productive agro forestry development</li> <li>• Ecotourism in reinsertion areas</li> <li>• Definition of guidelines for rural development policies – Rural Cabinet with cooperation of private</li> </ul>

MOST SIGNIFICANT UNDP PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF COMPONENTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT		
Sub-Agreement	UNDP Response	Activities Involved
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reconciliation activities in the conflict prone zones, ARZOC (1998-2000)</li> </ul>	sectors & small rural enterprises <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification of risk of conflicts</li> <li>Conflict reduction model</li> <li>Participation in common projects that reconcile and solve problems in communities or between communities (water, sanitation, roads, productive projects) in collaboration with local &amp; national governments, NGOs &amp; the international community</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reconstitution of the social fabric; Community Development for Peace, DECOPAZ (1998-2001)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Post-PRODERE, IADB funded. Umbrella programme with undefined project activities</li> <li>Strengthening communities' organizational capacity</li> <li>Identification of community projects</li> <li>Strengthening negotiation capacity of communities with public institutions for project financing</li> <li>Socio-economic infrastructure: education, health, roads, bridges, etc.</li> </ul>

UNDP has in general terms performed the following functions in the context of the peace agreement in Guatemala:

- **Creation of spaces for dialogue:** 'Tables' or forums for dialogue are a recurring theme of UNDP's programme, whereby UNDP has provided the umbrella for groundbreaking dialogue between opposing groups and around issues that were of central importance to the conflict for almost a decade. This has been possible because of UNDP's perceived independence and its role within the United Nations system. UNDP's presence also probably provided added reassurance for the participation of minority indigenous groups.
- **Facilitation of peace processes:** UNDP has served as a conduit for resources and technical expertise that enables key actors from multiple parties to participate actively in the peace process. UNDP has provided direct operational support to MINUGUA in this regard.
- **Advocacy:** Numerous UNDP publications, workshops and other forums have enabled UNDP to continue to support national civil society organizations in the advocacy for inclusion, human rights, minority rights, women and other causes that are central to a lasting peace.
- **Capacity building:** UNDP assistance has been delivered with relatively little international expertise. However, by providing the means for national entities to function, it has helped build national capacity.
- **Coordination:** UNDP has helped coordinating the activities of the United Nations Country Team.

In agreement with the Washington 2002 Consultative Group's recommendations, between August 2002 and May 2004, six Dialogue Tables were conducted under the auspices of the UNDP, UNESCO and the Organization of American States (OAS). These six commissions (called Mesas Intersectoriales de Diálogo) were:

- Peace, culture and reconciliation
- Defence policy
- Indigenous people
- Rural development
- Economic development
- Human rights, justice and security

These forums generated discussion on medium and long-term policies for long-term peace and the construction of national unity within a state based on the rule of law, inclusiveness, good governance, multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, multiple languages, and equity. They brought together civil society actors, the military and Government for a discussion of policies that would complement the peace process. Some 300 organizations and some 800 persons who represented the state, private sector, labour unions, cooperatives, peasants, political parties, universities, think tanks, human rights organizations and the international community were involved. The content and the nature of the discussion in each Dialogue Table was determined by the participants and as a result generated a wide array of policy proposals of varying degrees of practicability. The main recommendations of the Dialogue Tables were collected on a CD entitled 'Documents Produced by the Inter-sectoral Dialogue Tables' and presented to the Government. The Government has continued the dialogue on a number of these issues under its own leadership. The concrete outcomes of these Dialogue Tables have not been monitored; funds were channelled through UNDP from the Governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland for the purpose. Funds were also contributed by USAID.

## **4.2 Programme effectiveness**

The following are merely highlights of some of the most important programmes implemented by UNDP in Guatemala during the period 1996-2005.

### **4.2.1 Human rights and clarification of the past**

This is another area in which UNDP's programme in Guatemala has been particularly innovative and constitutes a break with past practice.

The 36-year Guatemalan armed conflict ended on 31 December 1996 when the Government signed a peace accord with the URNG insurgents. Part of the accords directed the United Nations to organize a Commission for Historical Clarification or CEH (similar to what in other countries has been called a truth commission).

UNDP's support of the CEH in the immediate post-war period was perhaps the first project of its kind by UNDP. UNDP's role was largely one of providing analytical support and funding the Secretariat and facilities of the Commission. The work of the CEH enabled the wrongs of the past – human rights violations against communities by members of the armed forces – to be brought to light in legal forums to which the public and civil society organizations of the wronged parties had access. In addition to dealing with egregious violations of human rights by individuals in the armed forces, the Commission also facilitated documentation of violations and a better understanding of the magnitude of what had occurred. It also possibly defused instability that may have arisen as a result of negative findings or the imprisonment of important figures from the conflict.

UNDP has followed this assistance with a wide-ranging project to reconcile victims of the conflict with their past and to facilitate a process of reconciliation. UNDP's assistance involves:

- Exhumation of victims
- Identification and registration of the victims
- Burial of registered victims
- Group psychosocial counselling and confrontation with the past
- Training in life skills
- Training in aspects of human rights

- Developing civil society institutions that are able to manage the lasting effects of the conflict

The UNDP has also assisted with negotiations between victims and the State for the distribution of financial compensation for wrongful deaths.

This programme has been relatively successful. Victims from entire communities have been brought to centres of the DIGAP project for extended periods of psychosocial counselling and training before being returned to their homes. The target beneficiaries include both displaced people and those who never left their homes. Project beneficiaries interviewed expressed great satisfaction with the programme, indicating that the programme had helped them come to terms with their loss and return to a normal existence. If there is any negative side to the programme, it is that those trained have become aware of their rights, but despite the growth in their expectations, relatively little has been done by the Government to improve their situations upon their return; in the long run this can lead to dissatisfaction and renewed conflict.

#### **4.2.2 Reintegration of war-affected populations**

The reintegration of war-affected populations in Guatemala has been a massive undertaking that has been repeatedly evaluated. UNDP was involved from the very outset, first in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and later on its own. UNDP's assistance to the reintegration process was considered groundbreaking for several reasons:

- It involved a sub-regional approach, with UNDP working with refugee groups and internally displaced persons across Central America and Mexico.
- It focused heavily on community mobilization and organization. Indeed, the principal emphasis was on the organization of refugees to manage their own destinies upon their return.
- The training and organization of refugees was provided for in the refugee camps right from the very outset.
- 'Organization' entailed ensuring that minority groups and women were fully integrated into decision-making.
- Communities were empowered to negotiate their return with authorities. They were empowered to identify land that they wished to settle on and negotiate with specific institutions established to manage the sale and transfer of property. Communities purchased land with their own funds and with subsidies from the Government.
- Camp communities moved with their organizations to their new settlement areas where they set up cooperatives to manage their enclaves. The Government and donors provided small grants for infrastructure and for other priorities identified by the returnee groups.

The settlement visited by the mission appeared to be quite successful, but also demonstrated some serious problems. Some were due to poor design and others were a factor of the dynamics that minority groups face on a regular basis.

Resettled groups did not return to their place of origin. Members of the community visited had their original land and homes confiscated and were no longer able to return home. The group, therefore, did not have any real connection with the area or the communities they returned to. Plots of land varied considerably depending on the ability of the community to negotiate with landowners and to convince the FONDTIERRA (NGO defending the minorities?) of their need. Land titles and other documents regularizing asset ownership and residency of returnees have tended to take a long time to arrange for reasons that are unclear.

Settlement area schemes were provided with some extension services and technical advice using national NGOs under sub-contract and some United Nations agencies. It is apparent that visits by UNDP project personnel based in Guatemala City and by country office staff are

relatively infrequent despite the need for continued attention. The resources needed for backstopping and supporting area development schemes of this type need to be reassessed realistically by UNDP – not just in Guatemala, but globally.

The settlement projects were established as enclaves; assistance was not provided to surrounding communities. This undoubtedly created some resentment. Those who had returned from the camps were also in many ways better organized and educated than the peasants in neighbouring towns and villages. Each integrated area development scheme had its own school, primary health care centre and other services. The area development scheme visited by the mission did in fact allow neighbouring village children to attend the scheme's school in order to maintain good relations.

In the settlement visited, the quality of land was high, but the settlement was far away from the markets and the community was not provided with any means to overcome this constraint. They had negotiated with middlemen to transport their goods to market, thereby losing a large percentage of their potential profit margin, and rendering production less than profitable. The cooperative in the area scheme had been provided with a large loan to purchase the land on which it was established and had managed to pay off the loan. It was nevertheless clear that the area development cooperative was quite deep in debt and would be repaying their other loans for a considerable period of time. Needs clarification as suggested by the editor

The greatest success of the programme appears to be the capacity developed among refugee groups to manage their own affairs. Much of the credit for this must go to UNDP for the workshops and training provided by UNDP project personnel in the refugee camps. The office of the cooperative and the committee established to manage the affairs of the group were clearly highly organized and able to effectively manage the facilities on the settlement project.

#### **4.2.3 The rule of law and civilian control over the armed forces**

UNDP has been involved in activities that were groundbreaking in that they involved working in sensitive areas involving the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and police.

One of the Dialogue Tables sponsored by the UNDP was on Defence Policy, based on a call for a participatory process that included social, political, cultural, economic and indigenous organizations as well as governmental and defence representatives. The SNU and OAS helped facilitate and stimulate this broad participation. This Table, led by the Defence Ministry, enabled the clear and transparent discussion of a series of issues and led to the publication and public presentation of the 'Libro de Defensa' (Defence Statutes). Through this process, a new military doctrine was formulated by common consent and among other things, it reinforced civilian control over internal matters and ensured that the military would be focused on dealing with external threats.

Under MINUGUA, the Spanish Government, through the Spanish Guardia Civil, supported the strengthening of the civil police, rigidly transposing a Spanish model that had a relatively low level of transparency and involvement of the communities in policing. UNDP took over support to the civilian police from MINUGUA and has helped reform the police force, attempting to develop a model of policing adapted to conditions in the country. The new model has reinforced civilian control, strengthened criminal investigation, improved human rights policies and improved policies with respect to children and youth. The project has also served to introduce community policing methods with a view to crime prevention and systematized police information systems, and has instated new disciplinary control mechanisms. Capacity of the

police force remains low, however. The force, for instance, does not have access to reliable forensic facilities, rendering criminal investigation very difficult.

The project has faced several problems; the police force, with a current total of 19,000 officers and 1,000 in the penitentiary system<sup>10</sup>, has gone through extensive downsizing that compounded problems of morale within the force and led to complaints of insufficient capacity. Although the peace agreement called for an increase in the budget of the police force, the budget has not increased in real terms since 1999. The police also face widespread accusations of corruption. The press and many of those interviewed spoke of collusion between organized crime and the police at a time when crime has soared to epidemic proportions in several urban areas. The response capacity of the police is said to be low and there is insufficient coordination between the police and the public prosecutor's office. Community policing is another major weakness, with a lack of trust between the police and local communities. UNDP has facilitated dialogue between civil society groups and the police force by sponsoring spaces for dialogue, but the perceptions of police misbehaviour appear too widespread for such dialogue to have significant impact.

There are some suggestions that UNDP's name and by extension that of the Human Rights Ombudsman who is supported by UNDP, have been used without permission by the police when conducting raids that may have stretched the limits of the law. Strengthening the police force is essential for the rule of law and long-term peace, but the Government must exercise significant political will if UNDP's programme of assistance is to be successful.

UNDP provided support to a small arms control project. It provided technical assistance in the preparation of draft legislation and regulations, and helped train customs and border police. It also provided support to the National Disarmament Commission in 2004, which worked on policies for the eradication of illegal weapons caches. One of the principal problems faced at the present time is that a majority of the illegally held weapons now fall outside the framework of the political process; most are in the hands of criminals – the *marras* and organized crime.

UNDP also assisted the Ministry of Interior with research on citizens' security, helping to produce policy papers on gender, security and judicial systems, human rights and criminal investigation. Working with MINUGUA, the UNDP was also involved with the decision to bring intelligence under civil control and place it within the Ministry of Interior. However, this reform has not really been successful, as the Ministry has not been provided with an additional budget for the intelligence unit. Efforts to build its capacity and to institutionalize it cannot therefore have any lasting impact. UNDP also helped establish a security advisory council under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, and has also facilitated the development of an arms and munitions control policy.

#### **4.2.4 Lasting peace and development**

Through the various forums that it has supported, UNDP has advocated and supported analytical and policy work on issues that must be addressed to ensure a lasting peace in Guatemala. The national human development report, often a source of considerable controversy, has been prepared by Guatemalan intellectuals and academics under UNDP's umbrella, and dialogue around the launch of each edition has led to policy change. The human development reports have, over time addressed the following issues:

- 1998: sustainable human development

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<sup>10</sup> Figures provided obtained in interview with the Deputy Minister of Interior.

- 1999: rural development and agrarian reform
- 2000: exclusion
- 2001: development financing
- 2002: women and health
- 2003: long-term peace-building
- 2005: multiculturalism and ethnicity

The 2003 human development report was particularly interesting and controversial as it presented an agenda for peace-building with clearly elaborated policy recommendations in four strategic policy areas: citizens' security, human rights, the economy and poverty alleviation, and policies for the social sectors. The extent to which the national human development report has actually generated change varies, but there is no doubt that it has influenced policy debate in the country.

UNDP has also sought to lay the basis for future structural changes. For instance, it has assisted the Government in the creation of a cadastral database. While this database has helped with the administrative aspect of the problem, the UNDP project has not been able to address the fundamental policy aspects of the issue.

### **4.3 Efficiency**

National experts and consultants, or those from the region, have implemented the majority of UNDP's programmes, presumably with a view to maximizing national ownership and cost efficiency. The quality of the consultants has been high, though experience-sharing from other regions of the world may at times have been useful. Most expatriate personnel have been recruited on projects with third party donor funding for reasons related to the source of the funding received. Costs have therefore been relatively contained and commensurate with results.

Complaints about delays and inefficiencies in processing payments, procurement and other administrative functions abound. This is not unlike other country offices visited and therefore it is likely to be more a systemic, UNDP-wide problem than one particular to the Guatemala country office. There is no doubt that there is a need to streamline and simplify UNDP's procedures in order to speed them up without negatively affecting accountability.

### **4.4 Sustainability**

Sustainability has been addressed relatively effectively under the majority of UNDP's programmes. In the community-based programmes, UNDP has addressed sustainability primarily through community-based organization and the development of management capacity, enabling the communities to become relatively self-sufficient, or at least to be in a position to initiate activities and pursue funding from a variety of sources on their own. The DIGAP programme has several activities that are essentially designed as one-off efforts, be it support for the painting of murals in a town centre, or support for handicrafts events; the focus has thus primarily been on encouraging and supporting community organization. Other programmes, such as the Dialogue Tables, have also been one-off efforts with broader spin-off benefits. The sustainability of some of the area-based schemes are questionable – not so much because of UNDP's support, but because of more technical issues such as the land allocated, distances from markets, the availability of essential services, etc. UNDP should probably have taken a more active, hands-on role in the selection of sites and in the land negotiation process. However, it is also noted that these negotiations were extremely sensitive and would have required the devotion of considerable staff for the inspection and evaluation of sites, provision of legal support, etc., which was probably not viable.

Some of the structural changes provided for in the peace agreements present special problems of sustainability. New units, such as the department for civilian police, are underfunded in the national budget (in some cases, they have had to draw on the existing budgets of other units within the same ministry). There is a need for an organization such as UNDP to take a stand on such issues and to draw attention to them. Indeed, UNDP's involvement serves to legitimize the Government's policy with respect to new institutions that are created in name but are not provided with the means to perform.

## 5. Management and partnerships

The UNDP office in Guatemala has a relatively flat structure and is dominated by national staff, many of whom have considerable seniority and have distinguished careers in their own right. UNDP Guatemala is also distinct in that it has, at critical moments, had Resident Coordinators/Resident Representatives who were drawn from outside the system. While this has meant that operations have had to be managed by the Deputy Resident Representative, the Resident Coordinator has been freed up to play a political role, which has been crucial in placing UNDP at the centre of all principal events in Guatemala during the past decade.

### 5.1 Relationship between UNDP and MINUGUA and the post-MINUGUA transition

At its zenith, MINUGUA consisted of about 200 staff spread across the country. The relationship between MINUGUA and UNDP was a complex one, and the closeness with which they worked belied a series of tensions that were, on the whole, managed better than in many other countries. The principal sources of tension included:

- a. The inherent political content of many of the programmes within UNDP's mandate (e.g. governance, reintegration, etc.) and their implications for the work of MINUGUA.
- b. The nature of the peace agreement, which included several institutional and structural reform elements that were inherently developmental and tended to draw MINUGUA into the sphere of development policy and capacity building.
- c. The tendency of individual MINUGUA staff to move beyond their observer, verification function into a hands-on operational role, thereby competing with other United Nations agencies and UNDP in particular (by virtue of its mandate) for donor funds.
- d. UNDP's need for visibility in order for it to continue to bring in resources and no doubt also the organization's resulting willingness to be more accommodating to Government and donor wishes.
- e. The perennial problem of leadership of the United Nations system within-country and its impact on inter-personal relations between the Resident Coordinator and the Representative of the Secretary-General.

MINUGUA was fielded before the Secretary-General's reforms of 1997 that formally introduced the concept of the United Nations Country Team and before integrated offices came into being. MINUGUA's relationship with UNDP was thus subject to the type of vagueness inherent in earlier generations of peacekeeping/peace-building operations. Considering this, the relationship between UNDP and MINUGUA was very good and the two presented a united, coordinated front to both national and international partners. Indeed, the substantive partnership has been quite effective.

MINUGUA was established through the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/267 of 28 September 1994. The military observer, good offices/mediation and verification functions of MINUGUA were fully funded through its assessed budget. The budget did not, however, include support for the structural and institutional changes required in the implementation of the peace accords. UNDP sought to fill the gap through resource mobilization from bilateral donors and

from the Government itself and it initiated (and continues to initiate) programmes designed to address most of the key components of the accords. Despite this, MINUGUA staff took it upon themselves to adopt a direct, operational function in the strengthening of institutional capacity and sought grant funding from bilateral sources in order to enable it to directly implement programmes. This placed MINUGUA in direct competition with the United Nations Country Team, especially UNDP, for resources.

Further, the six-monthly renewal of MINUGUA's mandate and budget never allowed for MINUGUA to adequately take on some of the structural underpinnings of the peace agreement in a realistic manner as the achievement of intended results would require a medium- to longer-term effort.

UNDP was viewed by MINUGUA as being too close to the Government. At times when MINUGUA was forced to exert pressure on the Government, this was viewed as problematic. Lack of clarity in functions and leadership roles between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations system is also said to have led to friction between MINUGUA and UNDP, although this was not apparent to those outside the United Nations system.

MINUGUA was phased out at the end of 2004, marking the end of United Nations verification and the beginning of a new phase of the peace process in which national actors assumed full responsibility for monitoring and promoting peace accords implementation. There was no systematic transition of functions to UNDP or any other international organization, though two ex-MINUGUA staff continued as staff of the UNDP office.

The transition of MINUGUA was viewed as a transfer of several key functions to national institutions (such as the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Attorney General's office). However, the capacity of many of these institutions remains weak and the political will to strengthen them is lacking. Such institutions are often under-funded and without external support, they would probably be increasingly marginalized as the intended reforms have not fully taken root. UNDP's programmes have therefore continued to support them in order to try and build their capacity.

Upon completion of the Security Council Mandate for Guatemala, UNDP and the United Nations Country Team have not been in a position to exert pressure on the Government to deepen the structural and democratic reforms that remain incomplete or insufficiently institutionalized. UNDP's dependence on Government cost sharing, which constituted 68 percent of the total delivery from 2000 to 2005<sup>11</sup>, further reduces its ability to take strong and independent positions. Coupled with the higher expectations of change created among rural and indigenous groups as a result of the peace process on the one hand, and the perception among the old guard that the process has enabled them to retain the reigns of power on the other, political problems should perhaps be foreseen for the future.

Partnerships have been an important feature of UNDP's programmes in Guatemala and partnerships have been used for the purpose of:

- ***Mobilizing financial resources:*** UNDP has built partnerships with the Inter American Development Bank, World Bank, Government and several bilateral donors in order to

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<sup>11</sup> This figure includes both Government cost-sharing and funds from international financial institutions' loans to the Government that are managed and monitored by UNDP. Together, US \$199,394,162 of a total of US \$291,275,221 has been delivered during the period.

mobilize resources for programmes that it has managed in direct support of the peace process.

- **Advocacy:** UNDP has partnered with national NGOs and with the press to publicize work being carried out in support of the peace process and to publicize recommendations of its advocacy tools such as the national human development report.
- **Maximizing national ownership:** UNDP has worked to maximize national ownership through its work with civil society organizations and national NGOs in the implementation of (especially community-based) programmes
- **Mobilizing specialized expertise:** For example, UNDP has drawn on the Food and Agriculture Organization in the implementation of some of its activities under the reintegration programme and in cadastral reform and registration.

Acquiring political leverage. Close partnership with MINUGUA, bilateral entities involved in negotiation of peace accords have contributed to the ability of UNDP to leverage structural changes.

## 5.2 Relationship with the World Bank

UNDP's close integration with the broader United Nations operation in the country and its good relationship with the Government led the World Bank to seek UNDP's close collaboration and management services in:

- Areas in which political concerns and considerations are very important, such as programmes for strengthening the judiciary and other areas of governance that are of high priority for a return to sustainable development and a return to lending.
- Areas requiring a labour-intensive approach in the absence of sufficient national capacity, such as community-based development, procurement, micro-credit, etc.
- Areas in which activities have to be undertaken in close consultation with political and military forces other than those of the Government.

The World Bank and UNDP have also collaborated very closely in cases where the Resident Representative has undertaken very explicitly political activities or functions. In all instances, the collaboration has been in areas that lie at the limits of the restrictions contained in the World Bank's Letters of Agreement, that have been viewed as essential for achieving stability by both organizations, and that require sufficient monitoring and management capacity on the ground. More importantly, the Government has insisted that UNDP be involved in the management of programmes that are in most cases undertaken using World Bank loans so as to guarantee timely delivery and accountability. Collaboration has been most effective where UNDP has brought an easily perceived concrete factor to the table, be it financial (either from its core resources or from a channelled through it by a third party), or a concrete leadership mandate in the recovery or peace-building process, or an explicit relationship of trust with the Government or other national parties or entities.

## 5.3 Civil society organizations

Despite its close links with Government, and because of its extensive involvement in the peace process, UNDP has served as an important bridge between civil society and the Government, and the partnership between UNDP and civil society organizations has been both extensive and a central feature of UNDP's involvement in Guatemala. Beginning with CIREFCA and PRODERE, the UNDP was instrumental in channelling funds and providing support for community mobilization and organization into groups that were in a position to influence Government events, and to assist groups that had traditionally been excluded from economic and political processes.

Throughout the peace process and its implementation, the UNDP umbrella and funding has strengthened the role of indigenous organizations and other civil society groups in both


#### **5.4 Coordination**

The United Nations Country Team has, in general, been closely coordinated. Guatemala was a pilot country for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the team has coordinated around specific issues such as the Millennium Development Goals and the national human development report.

The United Nations Security Council mandate uniquely positioned UNDP to support coordination of the international community. This took place in substantive terms around the various Dialogue Tables and special institutions created for the peace process. Indeed, the strength of the coordination mechanisms supported by UNDP in Guatemala was that they were based on substantive, operational mechanisms that led in policy development. Management of donor resources has also facilitated UNDP's coordination function in substantive areas, although critics would say that this has also made UNDP more susceptible to the vagaries of individual bilateral agency policies. These coordination and operational mechanisms, in turn, fed into the World Bank-led Consultative Group for broader macroeconomic review and for the coordination of resources. In the post-peace period, the Office of the Vice President has been designated as the focal point for the coordination of assistance, but there is a feeling that the UNDP is not doing enough to lead the substantive dialogue for coordination around thematic issues. This concern was expressed both by donors and by the Office of the President. At the time of the mission, the problem was compounded by the fact that a Resident Coordinator had not been fielded for three months following the departure of the incumbent and the Acting Resident Coordinator was not in a position to take the lead in the range of thematic areas required. The UNDP country office continues to provide a Secretariat for the coordination function performed by the Acting Resident Coordinator who is currently the Food and Agriculture Organization Representative in Guatemala.

#### **5.5 Funding of UNDP programmes**


The profile of UNDP funding in Guatemala presents a particular dilemma. UNDP has been heavily dependent on third party funding and Government cost-sharing. Non-core resources have amounted to US \$286.4 million, or 98 percent of total resources delivered during the period 2000-2005. Core TRAC 1, 2 and 3 resources amounted to just under US \$5 million. UNDP was extremely dependent on earmarked resources for the implementation of its mandate. Thus, UNDP does not have adequate core resources to implement its mandate in the face of the special needs faced by the country in the post-conflict period. This has, as in many other countries, rendered UNDP's programmes susceptible to differences in policies and approaches of different donors.



Government cost-sharing and funds derived through Government from international financial institutions' loans amounted to US \$95 million and US \$104 million respectively, totalling US \$199,394,162 or 68 percent of all resources channelled through the UNDP. This has major implications for UNDP. Although not explicitly manifest, UNDP's dependence on Government cost-sharing in a country such as Guatemala severely hampers the organization's ability to demonstrate its independence from the Government and to pressure the Government to undertake the structural reforms so essential to a lasting peace. Beyond providing the legitimacy of a United Nations umbrella and perhaps assurances of greater accountability in the case of international financial institutions-derived funds, it not clear what value added UNDP provides if most of the technical expertise delivered under these programmes in national.

Delivery has grown steadily since 2000, suggesting that the attractiveness of UNDP as a conduit for funding was not tied to MINUGUA's presence but rather had to do with a perception of the importance of the sectors that UNDP was involved in as well as a perception of the relative

**Figure 2: Programme Delivery/US Dollars**



importance of UNDP's role and relevance in the country.

On the downside, UNDP's dependence on cost-sharing has negatively affected the smooth implementation of programmes as they have been launched without full funding, and have at times come to a halt pending the receipt of additional contributions.

## 6. Lessons learned

1. The peace process has successfully ended large-scale state repression.
2. A heavy emphasis on dialogue in UNDP programmes has succeeded in generating widespread consensus on the causes, dimensions and responsibility for the conflict.
3. While considerable progress has been made, the international community has not, however, been successful in making lasting structural changes of the type that can transform the power structures in Guatemala.
4. UNDP can play a very central role in the peace process where there is a Security Council mandate and where the peace agreement seeks to address the structural causes of conflict.
5. The type of observer/verification mandate provided to MINUGUA was, in itself, insufficient to ensure lasting structural change. The partnership with UNDP was therefore a particularly useful and important one.
6. Member states should consider bringing UNDP explicitly into the equation in similar cases, as many of the structural reforms required fall directly within its development mandate in the areas of governance, human development and poverty alleviation.
7. Addressing the structural causes of conflict cannot be handled as a checklist of achievements. Reforms have to take full root and be institutionalized. This requires both time and pressure to overcome prevailing power structures and to ensure lasting change.
8. Security Council mandates provide the required teeth to enable pressure to be exerted.
9. The inadequacy of UNDP core resources, coupled with the failure to include assessed contributions to address the developmental/structural issues, severely reduces UNDP's ability to influence the perspective of entrenched parties. This requires UNDP to form other partnerships within the international community in order to exert positive pressure for change.
10. The growth of expectations resulting from a peace process centred on dialogue and the inculcation of human rights needs to be addressed through development programmes geared to economic inclusion and creating access to economic opportunities.
11. A failure to address developmental inequities and the lack of opportunities is rapidly laying the foundation for new instability and needs to be reversed to prevent a regression to armed conflict of a different type.
12. Guatemala provides several interesting models of programmes in areas that are of particular importance. Some, such as the community-based reintegration programmes, have been adapted for use in other conflict-affected countries such as Cambodia and Afghanistan (CARERE and the PEACE programme). Others, such as work that is being done on exhumation and psycho-social rehabilitation of communities and clarification of past human rights violations as an integral part of a programme of reconciliation, constitutes an interesting precedent for UNDP that deserves in-depth evaluation and could serve as a basis for managing conflict in other parts of the world. The use of an extensive array of Dialogue Tables to address structural factors of central importance to the conflict is another precedent that could be used by the international community in other major conflicts.

13. The relationship between UNDP and the World Bank is particularly effective in cases such as Guatemala where UNDP is playing an inherently political role derived from its role as the Coordinator of the United Nation's Operational Activities, and where the political umbrella provided by UNDP provides value added to the work of the World Bank. The Guatemala office has also developed a manual for operationalizing its project level work with the World Bank and this could be used by other UNDP offices as well.
14. The UNDP needs to re-assess the resources needed for monitoring and management of community-based programmes if it is to ensure quality control.
15. UNDP has been very successful in community mobilization and organization in its reintegration programmes and this has constituted a large part of its success. However, it needs to ensure that the communities are provided with sufficient means to make a living thereafter; more effort needs to be put into downstream projects.
16. UNDP's involvement in community-based reintegration programmes constitutes an under-utilized source for the development of new policies and the verification of old ones. The UNDP should focus more on using its involvement at the grass roots level to support national policy development for long-term peace and stability.
17. Assistance to returning populations should also provide for surrounding communities in order to ensure that localized conflicts are avoided.

# **Annex I: Human security statistics**

(Statistics collated by LSE students)

# Annex II: Chronology of events during the armed confrontation in Guatemala (1962-1996)

(Reproduced from 'Guatemala, Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification', Conclusions and Recommendations)

## Annexes

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996				
Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency <sup>1</sup>
<p><b>1958-63</b></p> <p>General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes</p> <p>Elected</p> <p>1956 Constitution in force</p>	<p>Populist and anti-communist discourse.</p> <p>Limited opening for new social organisations.</p> <p>Integration of the country to the Central American Common Market.</p> <p>Collaboration with the USA to invade Cuba.</p> <p>Government overwhelmed by accusations of corruption.</p> <p>1962: military cabinet established.</p>	<p>Arrests, kidnappings, executions, military tribunals.</p> <p>1963-67: Army develops intelligence apparatus and mechanisms of social control for the rural area:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Military commissioners, network of control and information on insurgent groups.</li> <li>2. Number of army troops doubles.</li> <li>3. Operating area of the Ambulatory Military Police is extended to include all rural areas.</li> <li>4. Militarization of the Police.</li> <li>5. Establishment of Army Civic Action programmes.</li> </ol> <p>1965: First massacre of civilians in the eastern region of Guatemala.</p> <p>1966: Case of the "28", massive forced disappearance of members of PGT and MR-13.</p>	<p>1962: Days of protest in March and April, social mobilisation against the Government, led by the student movement, provokes a political crisis for the Government of Ydigoras.</p> <p>Ebb in the movement after the repression of the protests. Some activists join the insurgent movement.</p> <p>Influx of foreign clergy possessing a missionary, anti-communist, reformist vision. Many of them, impacted by the poverty in the communities and subsequently influenced by the Second Vatican Council, took on the church's new social doctrine, working with a preferential option for the poor.</p>	<p>1962: Insurgent group MR-13 initiates military activity, persecution obliges them to retreat to Guatemala city to re-organise.</p> <p>December 1962: three small guerrilla groups unite with the PGT to establish the first FAR: Marco Antonio Yon Sosa is named commander-in-chief. Three focal points: Mico Mountains, Izabal; Granadilla, Zacapa; Sierra de las Minas, Zacapa (Guerrilla Front Edgar Ibarra, FGEI), Luis Turcios Lima, commander.</p> <p>1964: Split of the first FAR.</p> <p>1965: Second FAR is established with FGEI and PGT, distanced from MR-13.</p> <p>1966: A conciliatory, unilateral, pre-election cease-fire; support for Julio César Méndez Montenegro's election campaign.</p> <p>1966: The FAR kidnap three high State officials to pressure for the release of the "28".</p>
<p><b>1963-66</b></p> <p>Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia</p> <p>Coup d'état and Constitution abolished</p> <p>Fundamental Government Charter</p>	<p>National Security Doctrine.</p> <p>The militarization of the State developed as an institutional project of the Army.</p> <p>Infrastructure projects and industrialisation within the framework of the Central American Common Market.</p> <p>1965: Constituent Assembly promulgates the new Constitution.</p> <p>1966: Elections.</p>	<p>1963-67: Army develops intelligence apparatus and mechanisms of social control for the rural area:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Military commissioners, network of control and information on insurgent groups.</li> <li>2. Number of army troops doubles.</li> <li>3. Operating area of the Ambulatory Military Police is extended to include all rural areas.</li> <li>4. Militarization of the Police.</li> <li>5. Establishment of Army Civic Action programmes.</li> </ol> <p>1965: First massacre of civilians in the eastern region of Guatemala.</p> <p>1966: Case of the "28", massive forced disappearance of members of PGT and MR-13.</p>	<p>Catholic Action, organisation and public education in rural areas.</p> <p>Development of peasant leagues and co-operatives, growth of peasant organisations with salary and land demands.</p> <p>Since 1965, Maryknollers, Jesuits and other religious orders promote social awareness work with young people from the capital; creation of youth group, <i>Cráter</i>.</p>	<p>1964: Split of the first FAR.</p> <p>1965: Second FAR is established with FGEI and PGT, distanced from MR-13.</p> <p>1966: A conciliatory, unilateral, pre-election cease-fire; support for Julio César Méndez Montenegro's election campaign.</p> <p>1966: The FAR kidnap three high State officials to pressure for the release of the "28".</p>

<sup>1</sup> Insurgent organisations are:  
MR-13 (Revolutionary Movement November 13)  
PGT (Guatemala Workers Party)

FAR (Rebel Armed Forces)  
EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor)  
ORPA (Organisation of People in Arms)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996				
Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency
<p><b>1974-78</b></p> <p>General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud</p> <p>Elected</p> <p>1965 Constitution in force</p>	<p>General continuity of the model.</p> <p>Opening of broader political spaces permits growing social organisation.</p> <p>Greater impetus to agricultural land settlement projects in the north of Guatemala, especially in the Northern Transversal Strip.</p> <p>1976: Limited capacity to respond to the disaster provoked by the earthquake reveals weaknesses of the political model.</p>	<p>Civic Action of the Army.</p> <p>1974: Assassination of Huberto Alvarado, Secretary General of PGT.</p> <p>1976-78: Selective repression in the Ixil area and in Ixcán, as well as in Guatemala City and the south coast.</p> <p>1977: Assassination of Mario López Larrave, university professor and labour lawyer.</p> <p>1978: Assassination of Father Hermógenes López.</p> <p>1978: Massacre in Panzós, Alta Verapaz of q'eqchi' peasants who were making claims to land rights.</p>	<p>Indigenous movement takes shape. The first National Seminars are held, the National Indigenous Co-ordinator is created and the <i>Ixim</i> newsletter begins circulation.</p> <p>The rural co-operative movement grows, especially in Ixcán, Petén, Huehuetenango, the Central Highlands.</p> <p>1976: After the earthquake, reconstruction groups are allowed to form, giving rise to considerable organisational growth in rural and urban areas.</p> <p>1976: Creation of the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS), which in the coming years would include a wide range of organisations from the social movement.</p> <p>1976-80: Intensification of social mobilisation, promoted by trade unions, peasant groups, secondary school and university students, slum dwellers, teachers and grassroots Christian communities, in the face of the growing repression and the lack of response to their demands.</p> <p>1977: Miners from Ixtahuacán, Huehuetenango march to Guatemala City with labour demands; they join with trade unionists from the Pantaleón sugar mill and are met by 150,000 people in their support upon arriving in the capital.</p> <p>1977: Funeral of López Larrave is one of the first that turns into a protest demonstration.</p> <p>1978: The Peasant Unity Committee, CUC, is created, the largest peasant organisation of the country after the 1954 counterrevolution.</p>	<p>EGP establishes its base in Ixcán, the Ixil area, the South Coast Area and Guatemala City; its first military actions take place in 1975, with the killing of a military commissioner and Luis Arenas, an important large landowner in the Reina Zone.</p> <p>ORPA establishes its base in the Sierra Madre Mountain Range, Coastal Plain and Guatemala City.</p> <p>FAR focuses its activities on Guatemala City and the establishment of a guerrilla column in Petén.</p>

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996				
Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency
<p><b>1978-82</b></p> <p>General Romeo Lucas García</p> <p>Elected</p> <p>1965 Constitution in force</p>	<p>Continuation of the model.</p> <p>Populist discourse as well as discourse on the violence caused by the "two extremes," with the government making an effort to control them both.</p> <p>Public investment in large infrastructure projects, embroiled in corruption scandals.</p>	<p>1978-80: Intense selective repression leads to loss of leaders for social movement and opposition political parties, selective assassinations of community leaders in rural areas.</p> <p>1978: Assassination of Oliverio Castañeda de León, secretary general of the University Students Association (AEU).</p> <p>1979: Assassinations of Alberto Fuentes Mohr and Manuel Colom Argueta, opposition politicians and social democrat leaders.</p> <p>Repression intensifies against priests, pastoral workers and catechists of the Catholic Church.</p> <p>1980: Massacre at the Spanish embassy.</p> <p>1980: Massive forced disappearance of trade union leaders at the headquarters of CNT and then Emaús retreat centre.</p> <p>1981-82: Extensive counterinsurgency offensive begins: military operations aimed at dismantling insurgent structures in the capital and massive repression against civilians to destroy the social base of the guerrillas in rural areas.</p> <p>1981: Organisation of the PAC begins.</p>	<p>1978: Urban transport strike, massive protests for several weeks.</p> <p>Creation of the Democratic Front against Repression.</p> <p>1980: Strike of 70,000 agricultural workers on the plantations of the South coast area, led by CUC.</p> <p>1980: CNUS calls for the overthrow of the Government.</p> <p>1980: The diocese of Quiché is closed, due to the severe repression against it.</p> <p>1981-82: Social movement is articulated by the repression.</p>	<p>1979: ORPA's first military action.</p> <p>1979: PGT, FAR, EGP come together as a tripartite alliance and agree to activate all their forces.</p> <p>1980: Guerrilla operations intensify in Guatemala City and in the rural areas; including executions and armed propaganda.</p> <p>Assassination of Enrique Brol, important land owner in the Ixil region.</p> <p>Assassination of Alberto Hable, president of CACIF.</p> <p>1981: Maximum guerrilla activity in extensive areas of the country, including the occupation of municipal capitals, sabotage, road blockades, executions.</p> <p>Urban commando activity intensifies in Guatemala City, with attacks on police stations and extensive sabotage.</p> <p>1982: URNG is created.</p>

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996

Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency
<p><b>1982-83</b></p> <p>Military triumvirate, subsequently, general Efraín Ríos Montt becomes Head of State</p> <p>Coup d'état and Constitution abolished</p> <p>Fundamental Government Statute</p>	<p>Total militarization of public administration.</p> <p>Corporate model imposed with Council of State.</p> <p>Moralising discourse.</p> <p>Support of evangelical churches.</p> <p>Failed attempt at global tax reform, VAT implemented.</p>	<p>Preparation and implementation of the National Security and Development Plan.</p> <p>1982: Military plan <i>Victory 82</i>, massacres and scorched earth operations in communities in areas of confrontation; coverage of the PAC is extended.</p> <p>Courts of Special Jurisdiction.</p>	<p>Growth and expansion of evangelical sects.</p> <p>Massacres lead to large-scale displacements of people seeking refuge in Mexico, in the mountain areas of Guatemala, in Guatemala City and the south coast.</p>	<p>After the Army's 1982 offensive, the URNG retreats and concentrates on the areas where they originally established themselves.</p> <p>Adoption of a more defensive strategy aimed at wearing down the army.</p>
<p><b>1983-85</b></p> <p>General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores</p> <p>Coup d'état</p> <p>Fundamental Government Statute continues</p>	<p>Militarised resettlement of displaced population.</p> <p>Implementation of a military project for political transition.</p> <p>1984: National Constituent Assembly.</p> <p>1985: New Constitution approved which includes the creation of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Constitutional Court.</p> <p>1985: Elections are held to return to constitutional rule.</p>	<p>Military plan <i>Firmness 83</i> seeks to achieve control of civilians population and strengthen the PAC.</p> <p>Model villages and development poles are organised to relocate and control displaced members of the population.</p> <p>Subsequent campaign plans: <i>Institutional Re-encounter 84</i> and <i>National Stability 85</i>, with strong political emphasis on directing the transition process.</p> <p>Selective repression of leaders of trade unions, student and human rights groups.</p>	<p>Internally displaced groups organise themselves as Communities of Population in Resistance (CPR) in Ixcán, the Ixil area and Petén.</p> <p>Partial political opening permits some social organisation, the Mutual Support Group is established, new trade union organisations are created.</p>	<p>Re-grouping of forces, little military activity.</p> <p>Efforts to recover grassroots support in different areas.</p>

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996

Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency
<p><b>1986-90</b></p> <p>Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo</p> <p>Elected</p> <p>1985 Constitution in force</p>	<p>Promotion of a negotiated solution to the confrontation.</p> <p>1987: First Government-URNG conversation, in Spain.</p> <p>Political opening.</p> <p>1987-1989: Repeated coup attempts erode government's power.</p> <p>Creation of the National Reconciliation Commission, presided over by Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruño.</p> <p>Failed attempt at tax reform.</p> <p>Concertation policy for national problem solving.</p>	<p>National Stability Project, promoted by a sector of the Army, seeks new insertion of the Army into society.</p> <p>Military operations focus on and the ORPA and EGP guerrilla fronts the CPR.</p> <p>Selective repression of political and social activists.</p> <p>Efforts to maintain the central role of the Army in defining state policies.</p> <p>Process of Government - URNG rapprochement seen with reservation.</p> <p>Attempt to achieve URNG surrender through negotiation.</p> <p>Santiago Atitlán massacre; population demands that the Army withdraw its presence.</p>	<p>Social mobilisation focuses on land, the rights of the Mayan people, the return of refugees, the fight against impunity and for human rights.</p> <p>1989: 13 week teachers' strike supported by other state trade unions. About 70,000 workers walk out.</p> <p>1990-1991: URNG meetings with different sectors of civil society to promote the peace process.</p> <p>1990: The CPR become public.</p>	<p>1987-91: URNG increases its offensive capacity and deploys forces in new areas.</p> <p>1987-92: Participation in peace conversations and dialogue, essentially as a tactic to wear down the regime.</p> <p>Since 1989 attacks are aimed at the agro-exporting sector.</p>
<p><b>1991-93</b></p> <p>Jorge Serrano Elias</p> <p>Elected</p> <p>1985 Constitution in force</p>	<p>Dialogue with URNG continues.</p> <p>Corruption crisis in the Congress.</p> <p>1993: Serrano's auto-coup d'état provokes a constitutional crisis.</p>	<p>Basic continuation of previous period.</p>	<p>1992: New impetus to the Mayan movement, after Rigoberta Menchú Tum is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.</p> <p>1992: The 8 October Accords are signed between the Government and refugee representatives, defining the conditions for their collective return from Mexico.</p> <p>1993: With Serrano's auto-coup, the National Commission for Consensus is created to demand respect for the constitutional order; this brings together political parties, CACIF, trade unions, Mayan organisations and other sectors of the civil society.</p>	<p>Basic continuation of the previous period.</p>

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE ARMED CONFRONTATION IN GUATEMALA 1962-1996

Government	General Policies	Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice	Social Movement	Insurgency
<p><b>1993-95</b>                      Ramiro de León Carpio                      Appointed by the Congress                      1985 Constitution in force</p>	<p>1994: Global Accord on Human Rights is signed. MINUGUA is established</p> <p>Return to peace negotiations with the United Nations as moderator.</p> <p>1994: Accord signed for the establishment of the Commission for Historical Clarification.</p> <p>1995: Accord signed on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples.</p>	<p>Pressure on returnees and displaced persons continues.</p> <p>1995: Massacre of Xamán, a community of returnees.</p>	<p>1993: First collective return of refugees from Mexico, 20 January.</p> <p>1994: Assembly of the Civil Society formed with 13 sectors of civil society represented, to contribute proposals to the parties in the peace negotiations; CACIF decides not to participate.</p>	<p>1993: Recognition of negotiation as the only way out of the confrontation.</p>
<p><b>1996-</b>                      Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen                      Elected                      1985 Constitution 1985 in force</p>	<p>Strong impetus given to negotiation process.</p> <p>29 December 1996: Accord for Firm and Lasting Peace is signed.</p>			<p>October 1996: Crisis in the negotiation provoked by the kidnaping of Olga Novella by an ORPA unit.</p>

## Annex III: List of people consulted

Fecha/Hora	Evento/Tipo de Reunión y Participantes	Lugar de reunión y contactos
Domingo 22 de enero de 2006		
11:25	Llegada al país <b>Señor Rajeev Pillay. Vuelo TACA 573</b> Traslado al Hotel por el Señor Carlos Barrillas, conductor vehículo, PNUD	Alojamiento en <b>Hotel Princess</b> <b>13 Calle 7-65, Zona 9. Tel. 2334 4545</b> <b>Señorita Nancy Castillo y Señora Ana María Mena</b>
17:00 – 18:00	Bienvenida e intercambio inicial Fernando Masaya, PNUD, Coordinador del Área Relación Estado – Sociedad, Christina Elich, PNUD, Oficial de Programas de Paz y Reconciliación Andrea Calvaruso, Consultor Evaluación <b>Gretel de Ippisch, Traductora</b>	Hotel Princess 13 Calle 7-65, Zona 9 <b>Tel. 2334 4545</b>

Fecha/Hora	Evento/Tipo de Reunión y Participantes	Lugar de reunión y contactos
Lunes 23 de enero de 2006		
07:30 – 09:00	<b>Presentación general del rol y la contribución del PNUD al proceso de paz en Guatemala</b> Fernando Masaya y Christina Elich	Sala de Gerencia, 10º Nivel Oficinas PNUD Guatemala <b>Edificio Europlaza, 10 Nivel</b> 5 Avenida 5-55, Zona 14. Tel: 23843100
09:00 – 11:45	Intercambios de 45 min a 1 hora con asesores, coordinadores de áreas y oficiales de programa de PNUD Guatemala en los siguientes temas	
09:00 – 10:00	Reconciliación, desarraigo, desmovilización y reinserción Hans Peter Buvollen, Coordinador del Proyecto PASOC (Participación de la Sociedad Civil) Rosenda Camey, Oficial de Programa del Área Relación Estado – Sociedad Fernando Masaya, PNUD, Coordinador del Área Relación Estado – Sociedad,	
10:00 – 11:00	Christina Elich, PNUD, Oficial de Programas de Paz y Reconciliación	
11:00 – 11:45	Diálogo y Ciudadanía, Partidos Políticos, Congreso Ana Garita, Asesora Política Elena Diez, Asesora Diálogo Democrático Miguel Ángel Balcarcel, Asesor Diálogo Multipartidaria René Pointevin, Asesor en Democracia y Ciudadanía Juan Polo, Oficial de Programa y Asesor en Participación Ciudadana  Fortalecimiento y Modernización Institucional Ana María Mendez, Asesora en Justicia y DDHH Jorge Ruano, Coordinador Área Reforma y Modernización del Estado Wendy Cuellar, Oficial de Programas de Justicia y DDHH Jochem Mattern, Oficial de Programas de Seguridad Ciudadana	
12:00 – 13:00	Proyectos Seguridad Ciudadana Héctor Rosada, Consultor en Seguridad Iván García, Director Proyecto Seguridad Ciudadana y Prevención de la Violencia Leonardo Martínez, Consultor Internacional Proyecto Fortalecimiento Institucional de la Policía Nacional Civil Arturo Matute, Director Nacional Proyecto Control de Armas Pequeñas	Oficinas Proyecto POLSEC 7ª. Av. 12-11, Zona 9, Edificio Etisa – Plaza España Tel. 2332 3349 (Asistente: Dora Lucrecia Sierra de Gento )

13:30 – 14:30	<b>Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Diseño de la Secretaría de Asuntos Administrativos y de Seguridad de la Presidencia de la República y Disolución del Estado Mayor Presidencial.</b> Ricardo Marroquín, Secretario de la SAAS durante 2000-2004	Restaurante La Estancia Reforma Ave. La Reforma, 6-89, Zona 10 Tel. 2331 6607 2332 2310
15:00 – 16:00	<b>Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Ministerio de la Defensa</b> <b>General de Brigada Francisco Bermúdez</b> CANCELADO POR INCIDENTE EN CONGO	Ministerio de la Defensa Ave. La Reforma 1-45, Zona 10 Tel. 2360-9915 (Asistente: Ismenia del Val)
16:30 – 18:00	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Licenciado Julio Godoy, Vice-Ministro de Gobernación Señor Erwin Sperisen, Director de la Policía Nacional Civil	Ministerio de Gobernación 6ª. Avenida 4-64, Zona 4. Tel: 2361-5604 y 23615657, Asistente Magali Hernández
<b>Fecha/Hora</b>	<b>Evento/Tipo/Tema de Reunión y Participantes</b>	<b>Lugar de reunión y contactos</b>
Martes 24 de enero de 2006		
07:30 – 08:30	Desayuno con la Representante Residente a.i. PNUD Guatemala <b>Bárbara Pesce-Monteiro</b>	Sala gerencia PNUD EUROPLAZA. 10 Nivel
09:00 – 10:30	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Ministerio de Salud Dr. Jaime Gómez, Vice-Ministro de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social	6ª. Ave. 3-45, Zona 11 Escuela de Enfermería, 3er. Nivel Tel. 2440-6610 (Asistente: Claudia de Rocco)
11:30 – 12:30	<b>Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Ministerio de Educación</b> <b>Licda. Myriam Castañeda, Vice-Ministra Administrativa de Educación</b>	Ministerio de Educación 6a. Calle 1-87, zona 10 Tel. 2361 0817 (Asistente: Haydée de Gómez)
13:00 – 14:30		
15:00 – 16:00	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Procurador de DDHH Dr. Sergio Fernando Morales Alvarado	Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos 12 Av. 12-72, zona 1. Tel. 2230-0877 y 78 (Asistente: Dora Ramírez)
16:30 – 18:00	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Sector Privado María Silvia Pineda, Directora Responsabilidad Social de ASAZGUA	Café EUROPLAZA Planta Baja. (Contacto: Andrea Calvaruso)

<b>Fecha/Hora</b>	<b>Evento/Tipo/Tema de Reunión y Participantes</b>	<b>Lugar de reunión y contactos</b>
Miércoles 25 de enero de 2006		
07:30 – 09:00	Consulta en Grupo de Organizaciones Sociales: Seguridad Personal y DDHH <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto – 1</b>	Hotel Princess, Salón Liverpool (Contactos: Señorita Nancy Castillo y Señora Ana María Mena)
09:00 – 10:30	Consulta en Grupo de Organizaciones Sociales: Seguridad Económico, Alimentaria y Ambiental <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto - 2</b>	
10:30 – 12:00	Consulta en Grupo de Organizaciones Sociales: Seguridad en servicios de Salud y Educación <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto - 3</b>	
12:00 – 14:00	Almuerzo: Consulta en Grupo de Organizaciones Sociales: Seguridad Ciudadana <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto – 4</b>	
14:30 – 15:00	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Vice-Presidencia Arq. Eduardo Aguirre, Asesor del Vice-Presidente	Casa Presidencial. 6ª. Av. 4-18, Zona 1, Tel. 2239-0000, Ext. 2744. Asistente: Tallie Trachtenberg
15:00 – 16:30	Consulta en Grupo de Secretarías de la Presidencia: <b>SCEP, SEPAZ, COPREDEH, SAA</b> <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto - 5</b>	
16:30 – 18:00	Consulta en Grupo de instancias y consejos de Pueblos Indígenas: <b>DEMI, FODIGUA, ALMG, Consejo Asesor Pueblos Indígenas</b>	

	Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto - 5	
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Fecha/Hora	Evento/Tipo/Tema de Reunión y Participantes	Lugar de reunión y contactos
Jueves 26 de enero de 2006		
07:30 – 08:55	Consulta en Grupo de Representantes de Partidos Políticos y Diputados Listado de participante/invitados adjunto – 6	Hotel Princess, Salón Bristol (Contactos: Señorita Nancy Castillo y Señora Ana María Mena)
09:05 –10:30	Consulta Equipo País <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto CANCELADO</b>	Oficinas PNUD Guatemala, Sala Mam 11° Nivel <b>Edificio Europlaza, 10 Nivel</b> 5 Avenida 5-55, Zona 14. Tel: 23843100
10:30 – 12:30	Consulta Donantes <b>Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto – 7</b>	Oficinas PNUD Guatemala, Sala Gerencia 10° Nivel
13:00 – 14:30	Almuerzo: Consulta en Grupo de Representantes y Expertos del Sector de Justicia Listado de participantes/invitados adjunto – 8	Hotel Princess, Salón Bristol
15:00 – 16:15	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Ministerio Público Fiscal General de la Nación Lic. Juan Luis Florido	Ministerio Público. 8a. Av. 10-67, zona 1 T 2251 2140 y 2195. Asistente: Andrea Montenegro
16:30 – 17:30	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Liderazgo Político Independiente Gonzalo Marroquín, Director Prensa Libre	Oficinas Prensa Libre
18:00 – 19:00	Consulta Coordinador Residente a.i. y Representante FAO Ian McKenzie Cherrett	Oficina RC-UNDP
19:30 – 21:30	Cena Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: Independientes Ricardo Stein, Secretario Técnico SEPAZ 1997-1998, Director Fundación Soros Guatemala	Por definirse Andrea Calvaruso

Fecha/Hora	Evento/Tipo/Tema de Reunión y Participantes	Lugar de reunión y contactos
Viernes 27 de enero de 2006 –Viaje de Campo		
08:00 – 09:00	Salida de Guatemala a Chimaltenango	
09:00 –10:00	Visita al Diplomado en Salud Mental Comunitaria apoyado por el Proyecto DIGAP (Dignificación y Atención Psicosocial a sobrevivientes del enfrentamiento armado) <b>Mónica Pinzón, Coordinadora Diplomado. Ver ficha adjunta</b>	6a.Calle 4-70 zona 1 Quinta los Aposentos, Chimaltenango. Tel: 78391332 Mónica Pinzón Gerente DIGAP: Christina Elich
10:00 – 10:30	<b>Salida de Chimaltenango a San Juan Comalapa</b>	
10:30 – 11:30	Visita a la Coordinadora Juvenil de Comalapa apoyado por el proyecto PASOC (Participación de Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil) <b>Ver ficha adjunta</b>	Mural, entrada cabecera municipal, luego salita de reuniones/oficina Coordinadora Juvenil. Hector Chex, coordinador proyecto Mural (58517051) y Arnoldo Cumez (55263932). Coordinador PASOC: Hans Peter Buvollen (55550054)
11:30 – 13:30	<b>Salida de San Juan Comalapa a Panajachel, Sololá</b>	
13:30 – 18:00	Visita al Proyecto de Participación Ciudadana Ver ficha adjunta – Listado de participantes 9	Almuerzo y enseguida reunión en Hotel Cacique Inn. Calle del Embarcadero. Panajachel, Departamento de Sololá. Coordinadora PNUD/VNU Maria Cecilia López (54133066), Oficial de Programa, Juan Polo. Se

	pernoctará en Panajachel, Porta Hotel del Lago (77621555 al 60).
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Sábado 28 de enero de 2006 –Viaje de Campo		
11:30 – 13:00 13:45 – 16:00	Salida de Panajachel a Coteles Gasolinera Shell (regresar 100m hacia Escuintla) – Almuerzo (allí se juntan con Ing. Mario Tinti (54049423), Director del Proyecto Agroforestal, en un solo carro hacia la comunidad (1h.10m) Coteles a La Lupita	
16:00 – 17:30	Visita a la Comunidad La Lupita	
17:30 – 22:00	<b>La Lupita a Guatemala</b>	El Sr Rajeev Pillay regresa al Hotel Princess

Fecha/Hora	Evento/Tipo/Tema de Reunión y Participantes	Lugar de reunión y contactos
Lunes 30 de enero de 2006		
08:30 – 9:30	Consulta Equipo Oficina PNUD: Transición MINUGUA Ana Garita, Asesora Política PNUD, ex MINUGUA Hugo Cayzac, Asesor Social y Multiculturalidad, ex MINUGUA	Oficinas PNUD Guatemala, Sala Gerencia 10º Nivel
10:00 –11:15	Entrevista Individual Actores Nacionales Clave: SEGEPLAN, Contraparte Principal Licda. María Eugenia de Rodríguez, Directora Cooperación Internacional, Hugo Antonio Solares, Dirección Planificación Económico y Social Fredy Gómez, Director PES Lic. Rafael Díaz, Asesor CI	Oficinas de SEGEPLAN
11:30 – 13:00	Consulta Equipo Oficina PNUD: Desarrollo Humano Sostenible y Metas de Milenio Edelberto Torres Rivas, Asesor Informe Nacional Desarrollo Humano Lilian Marquez, Oficial de Programa DHS y MdM	Oficinas PNUD Guatemala, Sala Gerencia 10º Nivel
13:00 – 14:30	Reunión final PNUD	Por definir
14:30	Salida al Aeropuerto	VUELO TACA 572 Sale a las 17:15

### Listados de participantes en reuniones:

#### ONGs Seguridad Personal, DDHH, Género

Higinio Pú Cach	Defensoría Indígena Wajxaqib
Jorge Fernando Campo	Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo
Judith Erazo	Equipo de Estudios Comunitarios y Acción Psicosocial ECAP
Luis Obiols	Fundación Miran Mack
Fredy Peccerelli	Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala FAFG
Magdalena Sarat	CONAVIGUA

#### ONGs Seguridad Económica, Alimentaria, Ambiental

Carlos Balám	CONIC
Oscar Cabrera	CONIC
Juan José Chavez	ACPD
Rafael Maldonado	CALAS
José P. Mata	COS/CIIDH – Colectivo de Organizaciones Sociales



Sololá – Proyecto Fortalecimiento participación ciudadana

Carlos Aquilar	PNUD
Roberto Armijo	OIT-PNUD
Francisco Baquín	Municipalidad Sololá
José Paulino Boch Cajón	Policía Nacional Civil
Romeo Sacj Cumes	Sociedad Civil
Oscar de León	PMA-PNUD
Lourdes Escobedo	CONAP
Mayra L. España	Min. Educación
Ofelia Gharas	PNUD
Manuel Tioc Guachiac	Pueblo Kiché
Genaro Ixmucur	PNC
Carlos Izaguirre	OIT-PNUD
Marta Julia Julajuj	FORPAZ/PNUD
María Cecilia López	PNUD
Virginia López	Auditoria social
Ana Elsa Mancía	Vivamos Mejor
Alex Salazar Melgar	MAGA
Pedro Morales	CEDISRA
Martín Mutcar	Sociedad Civil
Manuel Reanda Pablo	Pueblo Tz'utujiles
Ana Gisela Pinzón	Multisectorial Mujeres
Rietti Seude Quí	FODIGUA
Marcelino Ajcabul Ramírez	Ministerio Educación DOE
Bryan Reyna	Vivamos Mejor
Cristian Rodríguez	Muni Sta. Catarina Pinula
Sucely Rodríguez	SOSEP
Julio Urroa Ruiz	Gobernación
Salvador Quiacain Sac	Sociedad Civil
Roberto López Sajxín	Municipalidad Santa Cat. Palopó
Fernando Salazar	CODEDE
Estela María Soch	SEPREM
Esteban Toc	Muni Sololá
María Isabel Wiu	Pueblo Mam
Francisco Tomás Yaxón	Sindicatos
José ...	SEGEPLAN

## **Annex IV: Select referentes**

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