POST-CONFLICT ASSISTANCE
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN THROUGH UNDP
IN KOSOVO AND EAST TIMOR
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UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
EVALUATION OFFICE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN
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From start to finish, the Evaluation Mission benefited from informative and accommodating interlocutors, readily available documentation and background information, well-chosen field visits and interviews, and the backbone of such undertakings, solid logistical and administrative support.

For this good fortune, the Evaluation Team Members and Observers together wish to thank all those who in Kosovo and East Timor were called away from their own concerns to attend to “yet another headquarters mission.” The staff of the UNDP and UNOPS offices in both places were especially solicited, and their forthcoming responses are acknowledged gratefully. The Evaluation Mission hopes that this report will be useful repayment for the time spent together reviewing past and ongoing efforts from an “outside” perspective.

For their support and contributions to the evaluation exercise, the Evaluation Mission is indebted to staff at UNDP and UNOPS Headquarters in New York, at the UNOPS office in Geneva, the offices of UNDP and UNOPS representatives in Tokyo, at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the UNDP offices in Belgrade and Jakarta, at the Japanese Embassies in Belgrade and Jakarta, and at the office of the Japanese representative in Dili.

Finally, the Evaluation Mission wishes to mark the innovative, collaborative nature of this evaluation by recognizing the UNDP Evaluation Office and the Evaluation Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, for so effectively initiating and then accompanying the evaluation exercise during its full, productive course.
FOCUS OF THE REPORT
This report focuses on the post-conflict assistance provided by the Government of Japan (GOJ) through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kosovo and East Timor. It is not a report on post-conflict assistance in general, or on overall post-conflict assistance in Kosovo and East Timor, nor on the post-conflict roles and assistance of the GOJ and UNDP, which went beyond the parts specifically under review. These broader roles and assistance are considered to the extent that they bear on the roles and assistance under review.

None of the nine projects that comprise this assistance are yet finished. In some cases they have barely started. The term “evaluation” as used in this report is, more accurately, an assessment of the usefulness of the assistance provided and yet to be provided, and of the ways in which that assistance might have been or might yet be more useful.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The report has five Parts and appended Attachments and Annexes. An Executive Summary covers salient aspects.

Part I introduces the evaluation and discusses its purpose, scope, the issues addressed, how it was conducted and the methodology used.

Part II describes the general post-conflict contexts in Kosovo and East Timor of the assistance under review, with particular attention to the aspects that have been directly relevant to that assistance. Part II also gives an overview of the GOJ assistance provided through UNDP for Kosovo and East Timor, and includes a summary of assistance provided by other donors in the same areas.

Part III describes four aspects of the Evaluation Team’s findings:
1. Characteristics of the post-conflict contexts in Kosovo and East Timor, and their implications for the assistance under review, as well as for the same kind of assistance in similar contexts in the future.
2. The relevance of the assistance.
3. Performance in the delivery of the assistance.
4. The success of the assistance.

Where pertinent, findings are followed by conclusions and recommendations to the GOJ, UNDP or the GOJ and UNDP together for future collaboration of the kind under review. In several instances, the reader is referred to the relevant “Lesson Learned” given in Part IV.

Part IV lists lessons learned with respect to certain findings.

Part V gives an overall conclusion along with a “Best Practice” scenario. Information directly related to the conduct of the evaluation is given in the Attachments. Supporting and background information along with a Terms of Reference is given in the Annex.
ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY

ACRONYMS

ADRA  Adventist Development and Relief Agency (NGO)
CAP   Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
CCA   Common Country Assessment
CFET  Consolidated Fund for East Timor
CPC   Crisis and Post-conflict Countries (UNDP)
DAC   Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
EBU   European Broadcasting Union
ETTA  East Timor Transitional Administration
ETIF  East Timor Implementation Facility (UNOPS)
EU    European Union
GOJ   Government of Japan
HEIK  Housing and Electrification in Kosovo (Project)
HSTF  Human Security Trust Fund
IAC   Interim Administrative Council (in East Timor)
INTERFET  International Force in East Timor
JAM   Joint Assessment Mission
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
KCA   Kosovo Common Assessment
KIM   Kosovo Independent Media (Project)
KFOR  Kosovo Force
MSA   Management Services Agreement
NC    National Council (in East Timor)
NCC   National Consultative Council (in Kosovo)
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA  Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ODA   Official Development Assistance
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMC   Project Coordination Committee (East Timor)
PMF   Project Management Facility (East Timor)
PMU   Project Management Unit (Kosovo)
PWC   Project Working Committee (East Timor)
The evaluation involved four independent consultants and several observers associated with the evaluation under the auspices of the two Evaluation Offices concerned. The four independent consultants are referred to as the Evaluation Team; the Evaluation Team together with the observers is referred to as the Evaluation Mission.

For ease of reading, “the Government of Japan” and “the United Nations Development Programme” are frequently abbreviated to “GOJ” and “UNDP” respectively. “GOJ/UNDP Projects (or Assistance)” is to be understood as “Projects (or Assistance) funded by the Government of Japan through UNDP.”

In this report, notably in Parts IV and V, “findings” are factual statements of the Evaluation Team based on empirical evidence. “Conclusions” are the Team’s judgements based on the findings. “Recommendations” are the Team’s proposals and suggestions for action derived mainly from the findings and conclusions; the Team’s professional experience also contributes to the recommendations where relevant. “Lessons learned” are derived from selected findings and conclusions on the assistance in this report that the Team feels would provide useful guidance on similar assistance and contexts in the future.¹

¹ The terminology conforms to the guidance provided in the UNDP handbook Results-Oriented Monitoring and Evaluating.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE EVALUATION

In January 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Japan (GOJ) requested that the UNDP Evaluation Office together with the Evaluation Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau undertake a joint evaluation of the nine projects for which the GOJ had contributed nearly US$65 million through UNDP for post-conflict rehabilitation in Kosovo and East Timor.

The GOJ has a policy of using evaluation to help formulate and implement effective and efficient ODA. In this case it sought to review the uses made in post-conflict situations of its Emergency Grant Aid, and of allocations from the GOJ-financed UN Human Security Trust Fund, and to gain insights for the on-going decision-making process on the ODA budget. In light of the value that UNDP also places on evaluation, UNDP responded positively to the proposal as GOJ funding supports a large proportion of UNDP programming in both Kosovo and East Timor. A review of the use made of such sizeable funding was especially timely given the current debate on strengthening the UN’s capacity to maintain peace in the wake of conflict and rebuild civil societies – and on UNDP’s role in these operations.

All the projects were concerned with rehabilitation of infrastructure in several different sectors: media, housing, electrification, education in Kosovo, and electrical power, water supply, irrigation, seaport facilities and roadways in East Timor. Though none of the projects was yet finished and several were yet to start, the evaluation was to assess progress to date, draw conclusions, make recommendations and derive lessons learned about post-conflict assistance in general, and with respect to the specific projects assessed.

The Evaluation Division and the UNDP Evaluation Office each engaged two consultants to form a four-person Evaluation Team, which, in the company of observers from the two entities, carried out the evaluation between 21 March and 16 April 2001. In New York, three days of desk study and interviews at UNDP Headquarters and briefings at UNOPS Headquarters (including a video-conference with UNOPS staff in Geneva), were followed by five days of field visits and interviews in Kosovo, seven days in East Timor, and three days at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP Office in Tokyo. Separate groups also held additional meetings in Belgrade, Jakarta, Tokyo and New York. In Kosovo and East Timor, the Evaluation Mission was briefed and accompanied by UNDP and/or UNOPS staff overseeing, monitoring or implementing...
the projects under review. Except in the case of one project in East Timor, all project sites were visited.

Five factors influenced the evaluation methodology: 1) concern for a professional and useful product that met the standards of the two sponsoring evaluation offices and also responded to practical concerns of those responsible for the still ongoing assistance; 2) the projects’ still early stages of implementation; 3) the lack of a common methodological precedent, inasmuch as the two evaluation entities had not worked together before; 4) a tight schedule limiting the time that participants in the Evaluation Mission could spend together; and 5) the broad and diverse readership expected for this report.

Special regard was given to the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the aid, and its place in the broader, coordinated frameworks of external post-conflict assistance to Kosovo and East Timor. These aspects were judged to be particularly indicative of the quality of the assistance and its delivery in the two places. In the interest of deriving lessons learned of a generic nature, the Evaluation Mission was especially attentive to similarities between the assistance provided in the two post-conflict situations – and between the post-conflict situations themselves.

THE CONFLICTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Kosovo

Tensions between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians over Kosovo have existed for centuries. Since 1913, Kosovo has been a part of Serbia, which in 1945 became one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity, who were in the majority, resisted what they perceived as repressive Serbian rule from the central Yugoslav government. This changed with the 1974 constitution, which recognized Kosovo as an autonomous province within Serbia. In the late 1980s a shift in power in Yugoslavia, and a rise in Serbian nationalism led to the revocation of the autonomy status and increasingly repressive Serbian policies and actions ensued.

In September 1998 the UN Security Council demanded a cease-fire and the start of political dialogue to avoid an impending human catastrophe in Kosovo. International efforts failed to stem the violence. In March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started an air campaign in Yugoslavia and against Serbian forces in Kosovo to exert pressure on the Yugoslav leadership – which by then was pursuing a policy of driving Kosovar Albanians from their homes. The air campaign ended in June 1999, after the Yugoslav leadership agreed to a set of conditions and pulled its forces out of Kosovo. NATO “Kosovo Force” (KFOR) troops occupied the entire province soon after.

Many scores of civilians were reported killed and injured in the conflict between March and June 1999. There were major population displacements – of Kosovo’s pre-conflict population of some two million persons, some eight hundred thousand persons left the province and some five hundred thousand were internally displaced. Housing and public buildings were extensively damaged, and all commercial, agricultural and public service activities severely disrupted. The consequences of the conflict exacerbated pre-existing difficulties. Kosovo had one of the region’s poorest economies, with high unemployment, low productivity, lack of investment and deteriorated infrastructure. It had experienced communist systems of planning and social ownership characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability. In the ten years that preceded the conflict, most Kosovars of non-Serb ethnicity were removed from or felt compelled to leave responsible positions, resulting in an ethnic Albanian workforce of limited technical and management ability.

In June 1999, a UN Security Council resolution placed Kosovo under overall UN authority. The UN Interim Administration in

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2 The project “Dili Water Supply System and Improvement” was not yet started; however the background to and preparations for the project were discussed with the Evaluation Mission.

3 80-90 per cent ethnic Albanian

4 including around 100,000 Serbian Kosovars
Kosovo (UNMIK) comprised four “pillars”, each the responsibility of a different organization: humanitarian affairs (UNHCR), civil administration (UN), reconstruction (EU) and institution building (OSCE). A NATO led “Kosovo Force” (KFOR) provided military security. The UNMIK recovery plan had four broad priorities, corresponding to the areas of responsibility of each of the four pillars: emergency and humanitarian support; stabilization of the administration; economic recovery and reconstruction; and establishment of democracy.

A UNDP office was established in August 1999. A UNDP Resident Representative was appointed in October 1999. He was also appointed UN Development Coordinator in March 2000. Since March 2000, the GOJ has maintained a small office in Pristina, staffed by personnel rotated from its embassy in Belgrade.

**East Timor**

In 1975, Portugal withdrew from East Timor, which it had controlled since the 18th Century. Indonesia took control of East Timor in 1976 – a heavy-handed occupation marked by violence. The UN still recognized Portugal as the administering power. In January 1999, the Indonesian President allowed the East Timorese to choose between special autonomy within Indonesia or transition to independence. In a “popular consultation” organized by the UN in August 1999, about 80 per cent of the voters rejected autonomy; this triggered widespread violence, largely from pro-Indonesian East Timorese militia. In September 1999, INTERFET, a multinational force mandated by the UN Security Council brought the violence under control.

During the two weeks of violence many were reported killed and some 75 per cent of the population was displaced, either internally or, for some 230,000 persons, to West Timor and elsewhere. About 70 per cent of homes, public buildings, utilities and physical infrastructure were destroyed. Government functions collapsed with the rapid departure of Indonesian authorities. The agricultural cycle was disrupted, imports stymied, commercial inventories, facilities and equipment ransacked, banks looted, and personnel and financial records wrecked. The 1999 GDP fell by 40-45 per cent from an already low level. There was a critical shortage of skilled personnel as Indonesians who left the country had occupied most technical positions.

The UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 25 October 1999 with responsibility for the administration of East Timor and full legislative and executive authority. As of March 2000, a UN force assumed INTERFET’s peacekeeping responsibilities.

In June 2000 an East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) was set up as a cabinet style structure, and was to oversee Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs, all headed by East Timorese; UNTAET kept the portfolios of Finance, Justice, Police, Emergency Services, Political Affairs and the Timor Sea. Elections were held at the end of August 2001, to be followed by the establishment of a formal constitution and hand-over by UNTAET to an independent Government of East Timor.

The UN launched a nine-month humanitarian relief operation along with INTERFET’s intervention. With respect to longer-term recovery, a meeting in Washington D.C. on 29 September 1999 between donors, the World Bank and UN Agencies, and East Timorese representatives, agreed on a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to East Timor so as to identify priority reconstruction objectives and estimate financing needs. The JAM visited East Timor in October/November 1999, adopting a framework of priority interventions in eight sectors. The findings of the JAM were presented at an International Donors’ conference for East Timor in Tokyo on 17 December 1999. As a result about $520 million was pledged over three years.

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5 Community Development, Education, Health, Agriculture, Infrastructure, Private Sector Support/Economic Management, Public Administration, Judiciary and Law Enforcement. For each sector, East Timorese technical experts were paired with international experts provided by five donor countries (including Japan), the European Commission, UN agencies (including UNDP), the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.

6 This included $351m for reconstruction through multilateral and bilateral sources, $156.7m in humanitarian assistance funding, and $15m in budgetary support for one year.
A UNDP Office was established in Dili in October 1999 and a Resident Representative was appointed in November; he was also appointed UN Development Coordinator in March 2000.

THE GOJ/UNDP PROJECTS

Kosovo

GOJ Emergency Grant Aid provided $14,500,000 for the following project through UNDP, to be implemented under a Management Services Agreement (MSA) with UNOPS:

Support to Kosovo Independent Media Project. The GOJ was approached by the OSCE through UNDP/UNOPS in late 1999 to support the development of Radio Television Kosovo (RTK) as an independent public media. An agreement of 10 May 2000 provided for: a terrestrial transmission system; studio equipment; and training for radio and television production and equipment maintenance.

The UNHSTF, funded by the GOJ, provided $19,998,000 for the following cost-sharing project to be executed by UNDP/UNOPS, with UNOPS as implementing agency:

Housing and Electrification in Kosovo. A UNDP reconstruction project was presented to a Japanese delegation in Kosovo in August 1999 to rebuild rural housing in selected areas of Peje, Skenderaj and Rahovec Districts, benefiting 700-1,000 households. An electrification component was later added to rehabilitate part of the electrification sector in the areas of Mitrovica and Skenderaj, benefiting some 4,000 customers. The project was signed in September 2000.

The GOJ-funded UNHSTF also provided $2,700,637 for the following “cost-sharing” project to be executed by the NGO, ADRA Japan:

School Rehabilitation in Kosovo. The project’s objectives were to improve basic school conditions and create safer learning environments for students at three primary schools and two high schools in the Prizren Region, thus benefiting some 2,500 students.

East Timor

GOJ Emergency Grant Aid provided $27,480,000 through UNDP to fund the implementation of six projects under an MSA with UNOPS. The projects addressed the rehabilitation of infrastructure that had been severely degraded by a combination of poor maintenance, damage, vandalism and heavy use linked to the conflict or post-conflict periods. These needs had been presented at a Donor Conference in Tokyo in December 1999 and the projects were formulated in JICA-sponsored study missions soon after. The agreements for all the projects were signed in July 2000. These projects, their planned duration and objectives were:

Dili Water Supply System and Improvement ($11,280,000 – 24 months). Increase access to safe drinking water to communities of Dili to benefit some 160,000 persons in Dili and surrounding areas.

Urgent Rehabilitation of the Dili-Ainaro-Cassa Road ($4,700,000 – 17 months). Improve access between communities and markets along the Dili-Ainaro-Cassa road (crossing East Timor coast to coast), to benefit some 240,000 people living in the districts concerned.

Irrigation Rehabilitation Project ($3,360,000 – 10 months). Rehabilitate a damaged irrigation system in the rural district of Manatuto to benefit the local communities.

Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas ($2,390,000 – 13 months). Restore 13 badly damaged power stations in rural areas to revive the local economy and improve social sector facilities to benefit the 13 rural communities in which the power stations will be revived.

Maintaining the Output Capacity of Comoro Power Station ($3,100,000 – 13 months). Overhaul and provide spare parts to maintain the main source of power for Dili, to benefit some 160,000 people living in and around Dili.

Urgent Rehabilitation Project of Restoration of Navigational Aids and Fender System at the Port of Dili ($2,650,000 – 10 months). Replace navigational aids and the fender system to make navigation of boats and ships at the

7 Within UNMIK, in charge of institution building and media development in Kosovo.
8 Funds transferred in October.
Dili Port safer, to benefit ETTA, the private sector, aid agencies, traders and the people of East Timor.

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Evaluation Team focused on selected aspects of: the characteristics of the post-conflict contexts in Kosovo and East Timor, and the implications of these characteristics with respect to the GOJ/UNDP assistance; the relevance of the assistance to priority needs; performance in delivering the aid; and the level of success in achieving the results intended for the assistance.

**The Post-Conflict Contexts**

The Evaluation Team found that a number of characteristics of the post-conflict contexts had affected all of the projects in some way. Weak baseline data and incomplete information on damage or needs meant revising premises, plans and budgets. Problems of security, logistics and availability of goods and services resulted in unexpected delays. These delays in turn increased costs as prices rose in economies artificially inflated by the international presence. When there were weaknesses in coordination among international organizations, or in continuity within international organizations because of the rate of staff turnover, then plans and interests conflicted, slowing implementation and complicating and raising the price of delivery.

In Kosovo and East Timor there were similar constraints that resulted from nascent or absent counterpart governments and administrations at all levels, from local to national. Technical and management skills fell short of need in both places, as ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and East Timorese had been largely restricted to undemanding responsibilities by, respectively, ethnic Serbs and Indonesians, now gone. Poverty and high unemployment had characterized both economies for years.

The evaluation recognized the importance of well-grounded pre-conflict and conflict-related research, and post-conflict data and information, and the need to develop this information base quickly and systematically. In terms of formulating and delivering the assistance successfully, the evaluation underscored the need for flexibility, speed and equity. Flexibility is needed so that the assistance can compensate quickly and appropriately for initial flaws in formulation and unexpected conditions and events affecting implementation subsequently. Speed is important so as to meet pressing needs quickly, respond to expectations and hasten recovery. Equity is needed to avoid fuelling pre-existing tensions or creating new tensions over who is to get what aid, where and when.

**Relevance**

The Evaluation Team found the projects in Kosovo and East Timor to be relevant to the priority needs of the affected populations. These needs had been systematically defined through a series of international assessments following the conflicts and presented at international fora. They had been further reviewed by Japanese officials and specialists and discussed in Kosovo and East Timor with staff of international organizations, including UNDP, with UN Mission staff acting for the national authority, and with national stakeholders when possible.

If successfully completed, the nine infrastructure projects will contribute significantly to the human security and development of the populations concerned, to the socio-economic well-being of their communities and to overall recovery of the affected societies. In Kosovo, rebuilt houses will provide homes for some 800 families, restored power distribution facilities will mean reliable electric power for dozens of communities, and rebuilt schools, better learning environments for several thousand students. In East Timor, restored irrigation will enable hundreds of families to grow food to eat and sell, reconstruction of a major road will make easy movement of people and goods from coast to coast possible, and restored generators in 13 of the largest rural communities will bring them electrical power for the first time in two years. In Dili, East Timor’s capital and main seaport, a
rebuilt water purification and distribution system will bring the benefits of clean water to tens of thousands of people, restored port facilities will aid maritime trade and travel, and a refurbished power facility will provide electricity to the municipality and to thousands of homes and businesses.

The Evaluation Team observed these activities and the results sought as being relevant to the missions and expertise of the GOJ and UNDP. The Charter for Japan’s ODA identifies infrastructure improvement as a priority form of assistance and a prerequisite to socio-economic development. The Medium-Term Policy on ODA underscores the concept of “human security” and asserts, “armed conflicts result in humanitarian crisis, which destroys the very foundations for human livelihood, and furthermore, devastate the fruit of years of development... (that) ... subsequent efforts in recovery and reconstruction demand tremendous investments of money and time... (and that) ... considering such a situation as a major threat to human security, Japan has placed priority on providing assistance to the victims of these violent events.” UNDP has summarized its role in crisis and post-conflict situations (CPC) as “addressing the development dimensions of these situations” and stated that UNDP’s value added in the CPC environment “stems from the same assumptions that apply to UNDP activities elsewhere: the trust that it enjoys from Governments, its multisectoral approach to promoting sustainable development, its emphasis on capacity building, its approach on coordination and, most importantly, its emphasis on promoting human development and poverty eradication.”

From this perspective of institutional missions and expertise, the Evaluation Team felt that, if anything, there was room and good reason for both the GOJ and – in particular – UNDP to realize their institutional missions and apply their expertise more fully. The point is made below that while short-term success is likely (i.e. the physical infrastructure successfully rehabilitated) the long-term success is more problematical given the paucity of financial, material and human resources to manage, maintain and operate the infrastructure. Hence it seems that had this been appreciated from the outset and acted on, the rehabilitation of the infrastructure would have taken on a broader dimension with greater impact on the developmental issues that the GOJ and UNDP seek and are competent to address.

The Evaluation Team therefore recommends:

To the GOJ and UNDP: Steps be taken – for example the development of internal concepts and guidelines – that will encourage and enable both institutions to approach the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure in a more holistic manner at the outset and engage them in broader developmental issues related to the maintenance, operation and use of the infrastructure, consonant with respective roles and objectives in CPC situations.

The Evaluation Team looked closely at the involvement of beneficiaries, as this is not only an ethical matter, since the assistance concerns them above all others, but also the best means of seeing to it that assistance indeed meets their needs. As the Team found, this is not easily done. In the immediate post-conflict period, potential beneficiaries may not have returned from conflict-induced displacement or, for various practical reasons, may not have known about or been associated with the assessment or formulation process. The Team’s conclusion was that all of the projects could have benefited from greater involvement in the identification and formulation phases, and that while all the projects showed commendably increasing involvement of beneficiaries during implementation, the increase was actually an answer to difficulties that arose because of insufficient involvement initially. The Team’s recommendation:

To UNDP and GOJ: Mechanisms and safeguards are needed in assessment, formulation and implementation of post-conflict assistance to ensure initial and repeated consultations with beneficiaries. The GOJ...
could benefit from more extensive use of national consultants. GOJ formulation missions – including those of JICA – should, as a matter of course and where appropriate, take advantage of UNDP’s institutional relationships and interaction with communities and civil society at all levels in a given country. Contractors should be required to rely more on nationals.

With respect to beneficiaries, the Evaluation Team also noted the quite considerable lapse of time that often exists between the first contact with international (and national) staff during the initial assessment and the actual delivery of assistance. In order to give early evidence of good intention and to build a collaborative relationship, the Team recommends the early provision of some form of initial assistance – such as the GOJ “Grassroots Assistance.”

Performance

Project Management

The Evaluation Team did not have the time, nor see a need, for a detailed project management review of HEIK or the six East Timor projects. Given the contexts, the Team felt that the projects were being managed professionally and competently and with appropriate mixes of creativity, flexibility and adherence to implementation parameters and objectives. However, as the KIM project in Kosovo had met with problems with respect to the terrestrial network component, this project was looked at more closely. In essence, weaknesses in international coordination within the media sector, and project-related roles and inputs that were insufficiently spelled out and committed to, led to unexpected, underlying difficulties not being identified and addressed in a timely and collective manner by the parties concerned. This had resulted in delays, cost increases and relational complications, none of which had been resolved at the time of the Team’s visit. In East Timor, the Team found that each of the six projects had also been confronted with unexpected underlying difficulties. But there they were identified in a timely and collective manner, and delays, costs and relational complications were being addressed effectively. The two contexts, and the projects involved were all quite different. Nevertheless, the Team felt that if the KIM project had benefited from five attributes of the East Timor Project, implementation could have been far more satisfactory. These five attributes were:

1. A two-committee mechanism (PCC/PWC) built into the management of each of the six projects, actively involving all stakeholders, including a GOJ representative.
2. Management Service Agreements that clearly showed the role, responsibilities and commitment of each party.
3. A GOJ representative, resident in East Timor, who was familiar with the projects and stakeholders, and an intermediary, who together facilitated any necessary donor review and decision-making.
4. A UNDP country office that had strengthened its project monitoring and backstopping capacity by two technicians (one national and one international civil engineer) for this purpose.
5. The early in-country presence and involvement of a suitably staffed UNOPS project management facility, known as the UNOPS East Timor Implementation Facility (ETIF). The Evaluation Team makes the following recommendations:

- To UNDP/GOJ: The two-committee (PCC/PWC) project implementation mechanism should be adopted as a standard element in UNDP/GOJ post-conflict assistance, with adaptations as needed. To the extent feasible a PCC/PWC should be used in implementing the balance of the KIM Project.
- To the GOJ: The long-term assignment of a GOJ official in geographical areas of GOJ/UNDP assistance is desirable; the active interaction of this official with a given project and its stakeholders should be encouraged.

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11 Project Coordination Committee and Project Working Committee.
12 It had been planned for the KIM Project to be supported from the start by the UNOPS Project Management Unit, which was also to support the HEIK Project. But the time required for the HEIK Project’s approval and fund-release processes meant that this Unit was not set up until well after the KIM Project was underway.
To UNDP and GOJ: The signatories to MSAs should include all parties concerned, including the national authority or acting national authority having overall responsibility for execution of the Project. The provisions in the East Timor MSAs on UNDP’s role and responsibilities in project monitoring, implementation and execution should be standard in future MSAs.

To UNDP: Country offices should ensure that they have the necessary personnel to provide the monitoring and backstopping needed. Offices need a means to fund increased capacity, if need be, and other project-related costs from the outset – for example by advance payment of a prospective project management fee – of easily accessing an existing fund, or a revolving fund that could be reimbursed later.

Timeliness
The Evaluation Team found that all nine projects had fallen behind their original schedules, mainly because of start-up delays, but also due to unforeseeable circumstances related to the post-conflict contexts and weather. New schedules had to be set in consultation with the GOJ as donor. The Team focused on the start-up delays, finding that the start of the HEIK Project in Kosovo, and all six projects in East Timor were slowed significantly by difficulties in obtaining project approvals and/or release of funds. The HEIK and Education projects in Kosovo were funded from Japanese contributions made to the UN Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF). The KIM Project in Kosovo and the six projects in East Timor were funded from GOJ Emergency Grant Aid.

For the HEIK Project, approval and funding took almost a year, measured from formulation of the first project document in November 1999 to the signing of the final project document in September 2000 and the receipt of funds in October 2000. The Team found that the process was prolonged partly by the successive decisions on execution and funding, partly by a lack of familiarity and understanding between UNDP and the UN Controller’s Office on respective concerns and procedures with respect to UNHSTF, and partly by a multi-point, sequential approval process for using UNHSTF funding. The latter sometimes involved repeated reviews by different parties at UNDP Headquarters, UN Headquarters, UNOPS Headquarters, the Japanese Mission in New York, UNMIK, UNDP Pristina, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. The delays in project approval and funding meant that the reconstruction of houses and restoration of electricity, due to start before winter 1999/2000 and finish before winter 2000/2001, had just started as the winter of 2000/2001 set in.

For the six East Timor projects, the identification, formulation and approval processes moved systematically from the time when the needs were first assessed by the JAM (November-December 1999), through the Japanese Government’s financial commitment at the Donor conference (December 2000), the JICA technical missions (March-June 2000), and the project finalization and approval stages, to signature of the six MSAs on 14 July 2000. Soon after, the GOJ confirmed the availability of the funds. Various factors, including internal procedural uncertainties at UNDP, delayed the request from UNDP for deposit of the contribution until the last week of September. The deposit was made in early October. This meant that cost-incurring project activities could not begin, and that activities without significant costs but with implied commitments, such as tendering and planning, began with no assurance of when those commitments could be met.

The Evaluation Team concluded that the approval and funding process for all but the KIM Project were unreasonably slow, given the predicaments of the intended beneficiaries and expected standards of international responsiveness. The delays were essentially bureaucratic and caused unnecessary difficulties for all concerned at the country level. The Team makes the following three recommendations:

To UNDP: Internal safeguards are needed for delivering post-conflict assistance on
schedule and within time frames consistent with the purpose of the assistance. In particular, project funds made available to UNDP should be secured and engaged promptly.

To UNDP: At UNDP Headquarters a central in-house function or facility should be established to develop a productive working relationship with the UN Controller’s Office. UNDP requests for UNHSTF funding should be channelled through this function/facility.

To the GOJ: Recognizing that the UNHSTF is intended to finance activities that include emergency and post-conflict assistance for which speed of response is important, a “fast-track” approval procedure needs to be developed with the UN Controller’s Office for approval of qualifying applications and disbursements while still respecting UN and GOJ regulations and conditions.

The Evaluation Team found that because of factors essentially related to post-conflict contexts, virtually all the projects in both Kosovo and East Timor have faced or are likely to face increases in cost beyond the budgeted amounts, or other changes affecting budgets. For example in Kosovo, the cost of materials and transport have risen some 10 per cent beyond those used two years previously to calculate the budget approved for the HEIK Project. And in East Timor, the costs of rehabilitating rural power generators have been affected because related power station and electricity distribution facilities are in poorer condition than initially estimated or have been degraded in the interim.

While solutions were – or are – being found to stay within budget, they have been made through budgetary reallocations that affected other aspects of the assistance (e.g. in HEIK substituting, wooden for concrete electricity poles); suspension of an activity (e.g. training in the KIM Project); or reduction of a benefit (e.g. less powerful generators in the rural power project). In time-consuming processes, changes needed to be reviewed with GOJ and approved by them and, in the case of UNHSTF funding, also with the UN Controller’s Office. The Evaluation Team understood that none of the project budgets provided for contingencies in the individual or overall funding envelopes.

In the interest of greater efficiency, the Evaluation Team recommends:

To the GOJ: In the case of Emergency Grant Aid funding, a set percentage (e.g. 10 per cent) over and above the budget of each project should be pooled into a combined contingency fund for all the projects funded from the same allocation. The contingency fund should be retained in Tokyo, and procedures established to enable quick and flexible decisions to draw on the fund in case of justifiable, unexpected costs linked to post-conflict contexts. In the case of funding from the UNHSTF, arrangements similar to those recommended for Emergency Grant Aid should be made with the UN Controller’s Office.

**Achieving Success**

The Evaluation Team found that most of the projects in Kosovo and East Timor will likely face severe to moderate sustainability problems. In some cases, project benefits could greatly diminish unless sustainability is assured. In both places, two similar pre-existing factors are behind these sustainability problems. One factor is the shortage of technical and management skills; the other is the lack of resources available to operate and maintain the infrastructure once it has been rehabilitated.

In the ten years preceding the Kosovo conflict, the Serbian regime had excluded the majority Albanian population from positions where they could acquire or exercise technical or management skills. In East Timor, Indonesian domination since 1975 – and Portuguese colonial rule before that – had similarly affected the East Timorese work force and public services. In both Kosovo and East Timor, physical infrastructure had been poorly maintained and in some cases recently destroyed and looted. In both places too, operating and maintenance costs had been borne by the state, or if paid by the beneficiaries, then heavily subsidized.

The Team found that the electrical component of the HEIK Project and the KIM Project in Kosovo, and the six projects in Kosovo were likely
to be affected by these realities. Emergency Grant Aid, the source of funds for all these projects with the exception of HEIK, typically provides only for the training strictly necessary to put the specified assistance in place and start up its basic operation. In virtually all cases, the projects did not themselves provide the means by which the infrastructure once rehabilitated could be maintained and operated – nor was it their purpose to do so. But in the context this presents a considerable challenge, which the Team felt should in future be recognized in advance and responded to either from within a given rehabilitation project or by means of parallel or complementary projects or assistance.

The Team’s recommendations in this respect were:

- To UNDP and GOJ: Where insufficient technical or management capacity is likely to undermine indigenous management, operation or maintenance of infrastructure, policies and measures supporting broad technical and management training are needed to complement infrastructure rehabilitation. UNDP and the GOJ should jointly develop guidelines and models for parallel capacity-building projects and mechanisms to accompany UNDP/GOJ infrastructure rehabilitation assistance. GOJ funding for such parallel projects might be favoured so as to reinforce complementarity in design, synchronisation in implementation and donor visibility.

- To UNDP and GOJ: Where the infrastructure concerned cannot be managed, operated or maintained for lack of financial and material resources, policies and means are needed to develop institutional and community capacities, understanding and agreement for cost-recovery and burden-sharing. UNDP and the GOJ should jointly develop guidelines and models by which GOJ/UNDP assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation can be accompanied by parallel cost-recovery or burden-sharing projects. A phased, “conditional” approach might be taken whereby costs are covered through the infrastructure project for a specific period, conditional to the subsequent engagement of cost-recovery or burden-sharing procedures developed through the parallel projects. GOJ funding for such parallel projects might be favoured so as to reinforce complementarity in design, synchronisation in implementation and donor visibility.

**OVERALL CONCLUSION**

Conditions fully warranted the financial and institutional commitments which the GOJ and UNDP made to rehabilitate infrastructure facilities destroyed, damaged or in disrepair in Kosovo and East Timor, affecting the human security of thousands and socio-economic development in dozens of communities.

Overall, the assistance under review in Kosovo and East Timor is relevant and effective, and is coordinated and integrated satisfactorily into the wider international post-conflict aid programmes. However, all of the rehabilitated infrastructure and related services (except for the HEIK Project’s housing component and School Rehabilitation in Kosovo) face difficulties with regard to long-term sustainability of operations and maintenance due to weaknesses in technical and management capacity, material and financial resources and cost-recovery and burden-sharing strategies.

Despite the urgency of the situations, each project’s start was delayed by unreasonably slow document clearance and/or funding procedures, and each has faced additional delays and/or complications due to the unforeseen circumstances characteristic of post-conflict situations. All projects underscore the need to build flexibility into the funding modalities and project cycles. Several projects showed sound project management and well-designed mechanisms involving all stakeholders. Sustained consultation with the beneficiaries will help to expedite them despite the circumstances mentioned above.

Though unfinished, experience to date with this GOJ/UNDP collaboration has been sufficiently broad and instructive to furnish a good basis for similar cooperation in the future. Clearly, there has been a convergence of comparative advantage and interest. The GOJ
has a strong record of proficient and sound assistance in infrastructure rehabilitation, while UNDP has a strong record of interacting productively with national and international entities at all levels and across the development spectrum. Both are committed to and interested in socio-economic recovery and peace building in post-conflict environments and lessons drawn from the experiences in Kosovo and East Timor should benefit future collaborations. The experience should also encourage both organizations to associate post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation with expertise and assistance in institution building, governance, human security and sustainability.

LESSONS LEARNED
The Evaluation Team derived eleven generic “lessons learned” from the experience of the nine projects in Kosovo and East Timor. These are prioritized and summarized as follows:

1. Post-Conflict Implications for Assistance. Post-conflict situations have special characteristics. For assistance in rehabilitation, recovery and peace building to be relevant, effective and sustainable, these characteristics must be taken into account at each stage of planning and implementation.

2. Starting Projects Expeditiously. The well being of affected populations, the credibility and possibly the viability of international assistance depend significantly on needs being met expeditiously. Institutionalized processes that reflect this urgency should be applied to the formulation and approval of rehabilitation projects, and to the transfer of the funds that allows them to start.

3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Infrastructure Projects. Infrastructure projects are likely to need capacity-building and cost-recovery components or complementary parallel projects.

4. Capitalizing on Infrastructure Rehabilitation. Post-conflict needs are likely to include rehabilitation of various types of physical infrastructure. This can bring large-scale benefits for human security and overall recovery. There is opportunity and need for donors to also address policies, institutions, cost-recovery schemes and governance issues related to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, and to capitalize on the “entry points” available to address yet broader developmental concerns.

5. Benefits of Structured, Collaborative Project Management. Structured project management mechanisms, involving all stakeholders around a given project can help offset complications surrounding project implementation in post-conflict situations; in cases of external funding, the donor representative is likely to facilitate donor review and approval of needed changes.

6. Clear, Fully Played Roles in Project Management. Roles in project management should be clearly specified and committed to; capacities to play these roles should be fully assured.

7. Insuring Beneficiary Involvement. Displacement and survival concerns linked to the past conflict can result in insufficient involvement of beneficiaries; proactive efforts are thus needed for consultations through all assistance phases.

8. Anticipating Increases to Project Cost. In post-conflict contexts, project costs are almost certain to rise for unpredictable reasons. There should be budgetary provision to cover them quickly by means of a contingency fund or budget line.

9. Maintaining Positive Rapport with Prospective Beneficiaries. Small amounts of interim aid to prospective beneficiaries of international assistance can help maintain a positive relationship between the time of initial international assessment and delivery.

10. Keeping Visibility Positive. The visibility of an assistance project goes well beyond flags, stickers and signs publicizing the sources of aid. Visibility can be “positive” or “negative” or both, depending on perceptions of a range of matters including the promptness, usefulness, success, and fairness of assistance.

11. Keeping People Informed About Post-Conflict Assistance. Timely, accurate progress updates on assistance are needed to reduce misunderstanding among prospective beneficiaries.

The prioritization (1 highest) is a rough estimate of lessons that might be overlooked, but if applied to similar future assistance, would have the most positive effect.
1. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION

The Government of Japan (GOJ) provided nearly US$65 million to UNDP to fund nine post-conflict rehabilitation projects for various types of infrastructure, with three projects in Kosovo and six in East Timor. All of the projects were initially defined within six months following installation of UN authority in each place: August 1999 for the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and September 1999 for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The projects are in various early stages of implementation except for one in Kosovo and two in East Timor that are still in planning stages.

GOJ funding supports a large proportion of UNDP programming in both Kosovo and East Timor. In both places, the United Nations’ unprecedented role in maintaining peace and rebuilding the foundations of civil society adds to the significance of UNDP’s programming. Recent and ongoing reviews and plans for strengthening the UN’s capacity in these functions, and more specifically UNDP’s role and responsibilities, further justify evaluation of UNDP’s use of such sizeable funding.

The GOJ documents uses of its Emergency Grant Aid, as well as allocations, through the UN Human Security Fund and multilateral modalities in post-conflict situations where national sovereignty has been suspended by decision of the international community, acting through the
The purpose of the evaluation was to review the results so far of GOJ post-conflict funding provided through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for specific projects in Kosovo and East Timor.

UN. (The GOJ’s internal regulations constrain direct assistance in such situations.) Overseas assistance by the GOJ routinely receives scrutiny within official budgetary cycles. To inform the decision-making process, the GOJ seeks insights as to the value of such assistance. The 1999 Annual Report on Japan’s ODA refers to evaluations as “having become an indispensable element of the process for the implementation of more effective and efficient ODA projects.”

This convergence of interests led UNDP to welcome the GOJ’s request in January 2001 for the UNDP Evaluation Office, together with the Evaluation Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau (MOFA), to conduct a joint evaluation of the post-conflict assistance funded by the GOJ through UNDP in Kosovo and East Timor.

2. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND ISSUES

The purpose of the evaluation was to review the results so far of GOJ post-conflict funding provided through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for specific projects in Kosovo and East Timor. Though none of the projects were finished and several had yet to begin, the evaluation was expected to assess progress to date, draw conclusions, make recommendations and derive lessons learned about post-conflict assistance in general, and with respect to the specific projects assessed. (See Annex for Terms of Reference.)

The products of the evaluation were to be articulated in such a way that appropriate recommendations and lessons learned could be channelled back to benefit the projects themselves or new programming cycles, and to help shape any planning now ongoing with respect to assistance from Japan, or from other donors in comparable situations in the future.

The evaluation covered the nine projects funded by the Government of Japan through UNDP, including circumstances and factors relating to how they were defined, funded and carried out, and with what results for stakeholders, notably the beneficiaries. It also gave some consideration to broader aspects that were relevant to the projects themselves and that could give a fuller understanding of the assistance in question. These aspects included: conditions in Kosovo and East Timor related and consequent to the recent violence, notably in respect of the sectors which the assistance addressed; the role and responsibilities of the United Nations in both places, with particular regard to rehabilitation and development; the nature of aid provided by donor governments in comparable areas, and the funding, coordination and implementation modalities, and strategies used.

In assessing the results so far, the main issues necessarily concerned: the post-conflict context (What characteristics, if any, affected the assistance in its different phases from inception to delivery?); relevance (Is the assistance meeting a priority need?); performance (Has the assistance been funded, planned and delivered in a timely and effective manner? Was it appropriate to the circumstances and beneficiaries?); success (In what ways and for what reasons should the assistance be considered successful or not? Will it be sustainable?). These issues were to be considered essentially within the sectors that the projects addressed. All the projects concerned rehabilitation of infrastructure in several different sectors: media, housing and electrification, education in Kosovo, and electrical power, water supply, irrigation, seaport facilities and roadways in East Timor.

Finally, where appropriate, cross-reference and linkages were to be made with other recent and relevant studies and evaluations, notably, Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations, Evaluation of the Relationship Between UNDP and UNOPS, and Evaluation of Direct Execution.
3. ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT

The Evaluation Offices of the Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, and UNDP commissioned the evaluation jointly. Each office engaged two independent consultants to form a four-person Evaluation Team, which, in the company of observers from the two offices, carried out the evaluation between 21 March and 16 April 2001. (See Attachment A for names of Evaluation Team members and Observers.)

In New York, three days of desk study and interviews at UNDP Headquarters and briefings at UNOPS Headquarters (including a video-conference with UNOPS staff in Geneva) were followed by five days of field visits and interviews in Kosovo, seven days in East Timor, and three days of discussions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UNDP Office in Tokyo. Smaller groups of Team Members and Observers held additional meetings in Belgrade, Jakarta, Tokyo and New York.

In both Kosovo and East Timor, the Evaluation Mission was briefed, guided and accompanied by UNDP and/or UNOPS staff overseeing, monitoring or implementing the projects under review. Representatives of the GOJ were consulted – in Belgrade with respect to Kosovo, and in Dili with respect to East Timor.16 Except for one case in East Timor, all project sites were visited. In addition to consultations with the accompanying UNDP and UNOPS staff, discussions and interviews were held in connection with each project with the concerned officials of the UN authority,17 and of Kosovar and East Timorese administrations at different levels, and with representative groups of beneficiaries. Discussions were also held with representatives of organizations and donor countries having particular interests in the projects under review. Informal end-of-visit debriefings were held in both Pristina and Dili. (See Attachment B for List of People Met.)

At every stage the Evaluation Mission was provided with relevant documentation – background to the evaluation proper, information on the post-conflict contexts in the places visited, and details of the projects under review at various stages from their origins through planning and implementation. (See Annex for List of Documents Consulted.)

A draft report was submitted to the two Evaluation Offices on 25 July 2001. The draft was circulated for review and comment to all concerned. The draft was then finalized and submitted as the final report in late autumn 2001.

4. METHODOLOGY

Five main factors influenced the evaluation methodology adopted by the Evaluation Team. First was the concern for a professional and useful product that meets the standards of the two sponsoring Evaluation Offices and responds to practical concerns of those responsible for the still ongoing assistance. Second was the fact that all of the projects were in early stages of implementation. Third was the novelty of the two sponsoring offices collaborating on an evaluation, and the consequent lack of a common methodological precedent to draw on. Fourth was a tight schedule, notably with respect to the time that participants in the Evaluation Mission actually spent together. Fifth was the broad and diverse readership anticipated for this report.

The methodology followed was straightforward and very much directed at the nine projects funded by the GOJ through UNDP. The collection of information and analysis focused essentially on: 1) the characteristics of post-conflict contexts that shaped and affected those projects; 2) the relevance of the projects with respect to needs in Kosovo and East Timor; 3) performance in formulating, funding, planning and managing the projects; and 4) the success of the projects so far.

Special regard was given to the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the aid, and to the extent to which it was part of broader,
coordinated frameworks of external post-conflict assistance to Kosovo and East Timor. These aspects were judged to be particularly indicative of the quality of the assistance and its delivery in the two places. In the interest of deriving lessons learned of a generic nature, the Evaluation Mission was especially attentive to similarities related to the assistance provided in the two post-conflict situations – and, of course, in the situations themselves. Distinct “themes” soon emerged and were followed throughout the field visits, for example “flexibility” with respect to funding, planning and implementation. Similarly, the Mission sought comparison between how similar problems were approached in the two places to see if an approach taken in one place might be usefully adopted in the other, for example the problem of keeping multiple in-country stakeholders involved, informed and coordinated with respect to project implementation.

As can be inferred from “conduct of the evaluation” above, information collection and analysis were carried out through a combination of reviews of documents, briefings and interviews – for the most part open-ended, though directed towards the foregoing focus areas and themes and approaches common to both Kosovo and East Timor. This was complemented by continuing dialogue with project-related staff that accompanied the Evaluation Mission in both places, on-going consultations within the Evaluation Mission, and cross checking findings with stakeholders and, when possible, the beneficiaries concerned. Periodic and more formal discussion within the Evaluation Mission, and de-briefings by the Evaluation Team itself in Pristina, Kosovo and Tokyo further refined the findings and the attendant conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned that are given in Parts 3, 4 and 5.
1. THE TWO CONFLICTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Kosovo

The Conflict and its Consequences

Tensions between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians over Kosovo have existed for centuries. Since 1913, Kosovo has been a part of Serbia, which in 1945 became one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovars of Albanian ethnicity, who were in the majority, resisted what they perceived as repressive Serbian rule from the central Yugoslav government. This changed with the 1974 constitution, which recognized Kosovo as an autonomous province within Serbia. In the late 1980s a shift in power in Yugoslavia, and a rise in Serbian nationalism, led to the revocation of the autonomy status and increasingly repressive Serbian policies and actions ensued.

In September 1998 the UN Security Council demanded a cease-fire and the start of political dialogue to avoid an impending human catastrophe in Kosovo. International efforts failed to stem the violence. In March 1999

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18 This section draws from information and text contained in "A Year and a Half in Kosovo, United Nations and European Support to Peace and Reconstruction," UNMIK, December 2000.
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started an air campaign in Yugoslavia and against Serbian forces in Kosovo to exert pressure on the Yugoslav leadership, which by then was pursuing a policy of driving Kosovar Albanians from their homes. The air campaign ended in June 1999, after the Yugoslav leadership agreed to a set of conditions and pulled its forces out of Kosovo. NATO “Kosovo Force” (KFOR) troops occupied the entire province soon after.

Many scores of civilians were reported killed and injured in the conflict between March and June 1999. There were major population displacements – of Kosovo’s pre-conflict population of some two million\(^19\), some eight hundred thousand persons left the province and some five hundred thousand\(^20\) were internally displaced. Housing and public buildings were extensively damaged and all commercial, agricultural and public service activities severely disrupted. The consequences of the conflict exacerbated pre-existing difficulties. Kosovo had had one of the region’s poorest economies, with high unemployment, low productivity, lack of investment, and deteriorated infrastructure. It had experienced communist systems of planning and social ownership characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability. In the ten years that preceded the conflict, most Kosovars of non-Serb ethnicity were removed from or felt compelled to leave responsible positions, resulting in an ethnic Albanian workforce of limited technical and management ability.

International Post-Conflict Actions, Roles and Mechanisms

In June 1999, a UN Security Council resolution placed Kosovo under overall UN authority. The UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) comprised four “pillars”, each the responsibility of a different organization: humanitarian affairs (UNHCR); civil administration (UN); reconstruction (EU); and institution building (OSCE). A NATO led “Kosovo Force” (KFOR) provided military security. The UNMIK recovery plan had four broad priorities, corresponding to the areas of responsibility of each of the four pillars: emergency and humanitarian support; stabilization of the administration; economic recovery and reconstruction; and establishment of democracy.

\(^{19}\) 80-90 per cent ethnic Albanian

\(^{20}\) including around 100,000 Serbian Kosovars.
A UNDP office was established in August 1999. A UNDP Resident Representative was appointed in October 1999. He was also appointed UN Development Coordinator in March 2000.

Since March 2000 the GOJ has maintained a small office in Pristina, staffed by personnel rotated from its embassy in Belgrade.

**East Timor**

The Conflict and its Consequences

Portugal occupied East Timor from the early 18th Century until October 1975. At that time a coup by East Timorese separatists precipitated a withdrawal that had been planned previously. There was then a brief period of strife between East Timorese factions, followed by a declaration of Independence. By early 1976, Indonesia had invaded East Timor and, claiming popular request, had declared it part of its territory. The UN rejected this action and continued to recognize Portugal as the administering power of East Timor as a “non-self governing territory.” The Indonesian occupation was heavy-handed and marked by violence involving East Timorese factions and the Indonesian authorities.

In January 1999, the Indonesian President agreed to let the East Timorese choose between autonomy within Indonesia or transition to independence. In a “popular consultation” on 30 August 1999, organized by the UN, about 99 per cent of eligible voters took part in the ballot, with nearly 80 per cent of them rejecting autonomy. The results triggered widespread violence largely at the hands of pro-Indonesian East Timorese militia. This was brought under control at the end of September by INTERFET.

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**EAST TIMOR**

- 80% of population vote for independence in August 1999 sparking widespread violence from pro-Indonesian militia
- 70% of physical infrastructure destroyed
- 75% of population displaced, many into West Timor
- GDP fell 40-45% from already low level
- Shortage of skilled Timorese
- UNTAET October 1999
- Japan Representative Office established in March 2000
- UNDP Office established in October 1999

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an Australian-led multinational force mandated by the UN Security Council.

The two weeks of violence were reported to have killed hundreds and injured many more. About 75 per cent of the population was displaced within East Timor as well as some 230,000 persons in West Timor and nearby islands. Nearly 70 per cent of homes, public buildings, utilities and infrastructure were damaged or destroyed. Government functions ceased with the rapid departure of Indonesian authorities. The agricultural cycle had been disrupted, commercial imports stymied, commercial inventories, facilities and equipment ransacked, banks looted and personnel and financial records wrecked. The violence and destruction worsened East Timor’s already distressed condition. It had been one of the poorest areas of South East Asia with 30 per cent of households living below the Indonesian poverty line.22 The 1999 GDP was estimated to have fallen by 40-45 per cent.

**International Post-Conflict Actions, Roles and Mechanisms**

The UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on 25 October 1999. Its mandate exceeded that of any previous UN mission as it had overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and full legislative and executive authority. It is responsible for security, law and order, the establishment of an effective administration, the provision of services and the co-ordination of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance. As of March 2000, a UN force assumed INTERFET’s peacekeeping responsibilities.

In December 1999, an UNTAET/East Timorese National Consultative Council (NCC) was established to enable East Timorese to participate in decision-making. In June 2000 an East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) cabinet structure was set up to oversee departments of Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs, all headed by East Timorese; UNTAET kept the portfolios of Finance, Justice, Police and Emergency Services, Political Affairs and the Timor Sea (oil/gas exploration and rights). In October 2000, a National Council (NC) of 36 East Timorese replaced the NCC. Elections were held at the end of August 2001, to be followed by the establishment of a formal constitution and hand-over by UNTAET to an independent Government of East Timor.

The UN launched a humanitarian relief operation23 along with INTERFET’s intervention. Based on estimates and rapid assessments, a consolidated interagency appeal (CAP) was issued on 27 October 1999 for nearly $200 million to fund 48 emergency and transitional projects through June 2000; some $160 million was received. With respect to longer term recovery, donor governments, the World Bank, UN Agencies and East Timorese representatives meeting in Washington D.C. on 29 September agreed to field a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The JAM visited East Timor in October/November 1999. The findings on medium- and long-term needs in eight sectors24 were presented at a conference in Tokyo on 17 December 1999 along with the needs identified in the CAP and budgetary support requirements. About $520 million25 was pledged for East Timor over three years26.

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22 Later estimates made in 1999 and 2000 suggested that up to 50 per cent of the population were then living below the internationally established criteria of $US1 a day. (*Building Blocks for a Nation – CCA for East Timor,* Nov 2000).
23 This was coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) until UNTAET was established. The operation, which involved some 40 organizations and for certain aspects lasted nine months, was intended to meet acute needs, stabilize at-risk populations, reintegrate displaced populations, enhance livelihood strategies, repair essential infrastructure and help re-establish key institutions essential for economic recovery and good governance.
24 Community Development, Education, Health, Agriculture, Infrastructure, Private Sector Support, Economic Management, Public Administration, Judiciary and Law Enforcement. For each sector East Timorese technical experts were paired with international experts provided by five donor countries (including Japan), the European Commission, UN agencies (including UNDP), the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.
25 This included $351.5m for reconstruction through multilateral and bilateral sources, $156.7m in humanitarian assistance funding, and $15m in budgetary support for one year.
26 This was in addition to the $700 million that was to be reserved annually for UNTAET from the UN assessed contribution budget. The Tokyo conference was later followed by a donor conference held in Lisbon in June 2000. UNTAET presented the first consolidated budget for East Timor for 2000-01. This budget entailed external financing of $430m over three years, including $380m for reconstruction, and nearly $50 million for budgetary support to bridge recurrent budget deficits until they could be financed from domestic resources. (Revenues excluding those from oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea are expected to be $19m for 2000-01.)
UNDP fielded an Emergency Response Division (ERD) mission in September 1999. An Officer-in-Charge of UNDP in East Timor was appointed in early October 1999. A UNDP country office was established officially in November 1999. The Officer-in-Charge was appointed UNDP Resident Representative (and UN Development Coordinator) in March 2000. In early 2001, UNTAET appointed UNDP as its focal point for capacity building.

2. THE GOJ/UNDP ASSISTANCE

The GOJ contributions for the nine projects that were evaluated totalled $64,453,637. The funding came from two sources, GOJ Emergency Grant Aid and the UN Human Security Trust Fund, administered by the UN Controller and funded by the GOJ. The Emergency Grant Aid funded seven projects (one in Kosovo and six in East Timor) for a total of $41,980,000. The UNHSTF funded two projects in Kosovo for a total of $22,473,637.

By agreement between the GOJ and UNDP, all seven projects that were funded from Emergency Grant Aid were implemented under a Management Services Agreement with UNOPS, and the two projects funded from the UNHSTF were implemented under “cost-sharing” agreements – one executed by UNOPS and the other by an NGO (ADRA-Japan).

**Kosovo**

A GOJ mission including officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, from the Embassy in Belgrade, and from JICA visited Kosovo in August 2000. An agreement in principle to provide funding through UNDP was reached after this visit – subsequently resulting in the following projects:

- Rehabilitation of Brick Factory $3.7m. UNMIK project executed by UNOPS/RESS
- Support to Kosovo Independent Media Project $14.5m from Emergency Grant Aid (MSA) UNOPS execution
- Action for Beautiful and Clean Drenica $3m. UNMIK project executed by UNOPS/RESS
- Housing and Electrification in Kosovo $19.8m from UNHSTF UNOPS execution
- School Rehabilitation in Kosovo $2.7m from UNHSTF ADRA Japan execution
- Housing and Electrification in Kosovo $19.8m from UNHSTF UNOPS execution
- Action for Beautiful and Clean Drenica $3m. UNMIK project executed by UNOPS/RESS

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27 The Government of Japan has funded through UNDP, three projects in Kosovo and six projects in East Timor. These nine projects were within the scope of the evaluation. In Kosovo, the Government of Japan also funded six projects executed by UNOPS under UNMIK responsibility, and in East Timor one through UNICEF. Since these seven projects were not funded through UNDP they fell outside the scope of the evaluation; the evaluation mission did nonetheless benefit from briefings on the projects and from some site visits. (A scholarship programme for East Timorese students attending Indonesian Universities was funded through UNDP Jakarta. As this programme was not in East Timor, it was not included in the scope of the evaluation, but it was discussed with the members of the Evaluation Mission in both Jakarta and Dili.) The six projects executed by UNOPS under UNMIK responsibility were: UNMIK Emergency Assistance in Rehabilitation of Damaged Houses in Kosovo ($4.8m); Rehabilitation of Brick Factory ($3.7m); Broadcasting Media Resource Centre ($4m); School Buses for Minority Students ($1m); Action for Beautiful and Clean Drenica ($3m). The project through UNICEF was: ? (US$?). The project through UNDP Jakarta was: ? (US$?).
Support to Kosovo Independent Media Project
($14,500,000 – 15 months)

After the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1990, the media and public information system were put under state control and staffed essentially by ethnic Serbs. The system was politicized and did not meet democratic standards either professionally or ethically. Television and radio facilities – both studio and transmission equipment – were already old and in poor condition and then partly damaged or destroyed during the 1999 conflict.

The OSCE\textsuperscript{28} approached the GOJ through UNDP/UNOPS in late 1999 for support in developing Radio Television Kosovo (RTK) as independent public media. Further discussions between GOJ, the OSCE, UNDP and UNOPS, and the work of two GOJ technical missions (in January and March 2000) led to agreement in May 2000 on a project with three components: a terrestrial transmission system; radio and television studio equipment; and provision of training for radio and television production and equipment maintenance.

GOJ Emergency Grant Aid provided $14,500,000 through UNDP for the project, to be implemented under an MSA with UNOPS, with overall execution the responsibility of UNMIK/OSCE. UNDP and the GOJ signed the MSA on 10 May 2000.

Housing and Electrification in Kosovo
($19,998,000 – 18 months)

This project comprised two components, one for the reconstruction of housing and the other for the rehabilitation of electrification facilities.

Housing Component. The overall housing needs were first presented at a donor conference in Brussels in July 1999. The Japanese mission that visited Kosovo in August 1999 reviewed them further and discussed possible funding for reconstruction with the EU,\textsuperscript{29} UNDP and UNOPS. An electrification component was added subsequently (see below), under an overall project title of “Housing and Electrification in Kosovo” (HEIK). UNDP and UNOPS fielded an initial project formulation mission in October 1999.

The project was revised during the following year to reflect changes in funding and implementation modalities. Once finalized, the objective of the project was to reconstruct 700-1,000 rural dwellings in Peje, Skenderaj and Rehovec Municipalities. Another objective, shared by both components, was to provide technical and managerial training to the communities involved in the project.

Electrification Component. The electricity system of Kosovo has consisted of three generating stations, connections to Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia for the import of some power, transmission lines and seven electricity distribution centres. The system has an average age of nearly 40 years and is inefficient and generally unreliable. Technicians and managers are too few and poorly equipped and trained. The transmission and distribution systems were severely damaged during the conflict, leaving thousands of homes without electricity.

As mentioned above, the electrification component was added to the housing component during the formulation mission in October 1999 to form the HEIK Project. One objective of

\textsuperscript{28} Within UNMIK, in charge of institution building and media development in Kosovo.
\textsuperscript{29} Within UNMIK, responsible for reconstruction.
the electrification component was to rehabilitate part of the electrification sector in the areas of Mitrovice and Skenderaj, benefiting some 4,000 customers. As with the housing component, the second objective was to provide training in technical as well as managerial areas to the communities involved.

HEIK Start-up. The GOJ-funded UNHSTF provided $19,800,000 for the HEIK Project. Agreement on a UNDP “cost sharing” project was signed by UNMIK, UNDP and UNOPS by mid-September 2000, with UNOPS as the implementing agency. The funds were made available in October 2000 and a UNOPS Project Management Unit to manage the project was set up that same month. HEIK started operations in November.

School Rehabilitation in Kosovo ($2,700,373 – 15 months)

Education is a highly solicited sector, as half of the population of Kosovo is under the age of 20. Since the summer of 1999 some 28,000 educational staff and 400,000 students have re-entered the education system at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The conflict has severely affected the sector, partly because of the considerable damage to and looting of school facilities, teaching aids and furnishings. In 1998 there were 1,200 school buildings in Kosovo; some 800 of these were destroyed or severely damaged.

UNDP undertook project formulation in mid-2000 in consultation with the GOJ, UNMIK and international organizations active in the education sector. A first draft was submitted for funding to UNHSF in September 2000. The final document, which UNHSF approved in February 2001, set a project objective of improving school conditions and creating safer learning environments for students at three primary schools and two high schools in the Prizren Region, thus benefitting some 2,500 students. Shortly thereafter, UNDP, UNMIK and ADRA-Japan signed the UNDP “cost-sharing” project, with ADRA-Japan responsible for execution.

East Timor

The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), which had assessed recovery needs in East Timor in November-December 1999, presented its findings at the Donor Conference held in Tokyo in
December 1999. These needs included the rehabilitation of infrastructure that had been severely degraded by a combination of poor maintenance, damage, vandalism and heavy use linked to the conflict or post-conflict periods. Proposals to address certain of these needs were put forward to the GOJ by UNTAET and UNDP and developed into the following six projects formulated through a JICA-sponsored mission (March-June 2000).

The six projects, funded from GOJ Emergency Grant Aid, were to be carried out by UNOPS under six separate MSAs, with UNDP providing monitoring and backstopping and UNTAET retaining responsibility for overall execution. The agreements were signed in July 2000. A UNOPS East Timor Implementation Facility (ETIF) started work in October upon transfer of the funds.

**Six Infrastructure Rehabilitation Projects**
(Totalling $27,480,000)

- **Dili Water Supply System and Improvement** ($11,280,000 – 24 months). The capital city’s water and sanitation system was heavily damaged during the crisis. Water storage tanks, treatment plants, pumps and vehicles were damaged or destroyed. Despite emergency work undertaken after the crisis, the availability and quality of water remained unreliable. The project’s objective was to increase access to safe drinking water in Dili and the surrounding areas and thus benefit some 160,000 persons.

- **Urgent Rehabilitation of the Dili-Ainaro-Cassa Road** ($4,700,000 – 17 months). East Timor’s road network has been in a fragile state, largely due to poor maintenance and little upgrading over the years. In the rainy season many roads become impassable, making it impossible for some communities to access markets, schools or health services. The road network was not designed for heavy traffic. After the crisis the increase of humanitarian and military traffic placed further pressure on the roads. Nearly one third of East Timor’s population lives in the districts connected by the road that crosses East Timor from south to north, running from Dili to Ainar to Cassa. The project’s objective is to improve this road and benefit some 240,000 people living in the districts concerned.

- **Irrigation Rehabilitation Project** ($3,360,000 – 10 months). East Timor’s irrigation systems have been poorly maintained for lack of funds. In 1999, though little damaged in the crisis, their condition deteriorated further as some repairs normally carried out in dry seasons were neglected. Functioning irrigation systems are needed to avoid a food crisis and to boost production in agriculture, East Timor’s most important sector. The project’s objective is to rehabilitate the irrigation system in Manatuto District and directly or indirectly benefit some 20,000 persons living there.

- **Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas** ($2,390,000 – 13 months). Of the 58 rural power stations in East Timor, 37 were damaged during the crisis and ceased operation. The project’s objective is to restore 13 of these and help revive the local economy and improve social sector facilities.

Reconstruction of irrigation facility will help restore double rice cropping cycle to bring extra income to impoverished local farmers. Rebuilding the generators at Comoro Power Station in Dili. This UNDP-Japan project will help keep the lights on in the East Timorese capital.
Maintaining the Output Capacity of Comoro Power Station ($3,100,000 - 13 months).
The Comoro Power Station, which is Dili's main source of electricity, was not damaged during the crisis. Power production is, however, insufficient and unreliable because of run-down equipment, lack of spare parts and tools and a shortage of skilled people to manage and maintain the station. The project's objective is to overhaul the generators and provide spare parts to ensure satisfactory production of power for use in and around the capital.

Urgent Rehabilitation Project of Restoration of Navigational Aids and Fender System at the Port of Dili ($2,650,000 - 10 months). Dili's port – one of three in East Timor – sustained little structural damage during the crisis. However the docking fenders and the navigation aids used to enter and leave the port were in poor condition. The port's low capacity hinders East Timor’s economic development. The project’s objective is to replace navigational aids and the fender system to enable greater and safer use of the port.
1. CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS

The period of violent conflict ended in June 1999 in Kosovo, and in September 1999 in East Timor. In each place a short period during which emergency surveys and actions were taken was followed by more detailed assessments, the definition and costing of needs, and formulation, funding and implementation of international assistance. The international presence and authority established itself in its various dimensions. Kosovars and East Timorese faced an existence that had changed considerably from that which they had known a short while before, and was still changing.

It is self-evident that situations of this kind differ from those of relative stability, structure and continuity that prevail where there has not been conflict such as that which took place in Kosovo and East Timor. It is also evident that the characteristics of the post-conflict context are likely to affect not only what assistance is provided but also how effectively it is provided and with what results. The Evaluation Team sought to determine what characteristics the post-conflict context in Kosovo and East Timor had, and what the implications were for GOJ/UNDP assistance.
Findings

Based on experience in Kosovo and East Timor, the post-conflict context has characteristics that need to be taken into account in deciding on, formulating and providing assistance, both in the form under review and with regard to most other forms of assistance.

Salient characteristics include: weak baseline information; shifting populations; quickly and sometimes radically changing perceptions and circumstances of the assistance needed and provided; initially high expectations and accommodating attitudes among assisted populations, increasingly tempered over time by varying degrees of scepticism and frustration; competition and discontinuity over time between and within international entities; escalating prices in an economy rendered artificial by international presence; recurrent uncertainties in delivery of goods and services due to security, logistical and availability problems; open or latent tensions between former antagonists; absent or nascent government and public administrations; and legal issues over property ownership.

To help keep the pendulum of high initial expectations from swinging to disillusion and disappointment in such contexts, three safeguards for relevant, effective and sustainable programmes and projects are most needed: 1) comprehensive, coordinated and sound pre-feasibility studies for project formulation; 2) flexibility in design, funding, implementation, and scheduling; and 3) structured partnerships at all levels, from technical working groups to strategic frameworks for sectoral or multi-sectoral assistance.

Implicit, too, in successful post-conflict assistance is the need for well-grounded research into conditions preceding, related to and following the conflict, and for speed and equity.

Well-grounded pre-conflict and conflict-related research and post-conflict pre-feasibility studies are essential, but often difficult to come by.

The means should be put in place early on to enable professional data collection and high-quality analysis of accurate and comprehensive economic, social, political and community information on the conflict areas. Drawing on these studies, post-conflict project and programme formulation missions can have the data, information and analysis needed to develop, more quickly and easily, realistic project and programme profiles, along with doable options for donors and recipients. This is fundamental if the parties concerned are to avoid raising false expectations in post-conflict populations, with subsequent disillusion, disappointment and possibly resentment.

Speed is important for the obvious reason that thousands of people have pressing needs for shelter from winter, electricity for power, irrigation for farming, television and radio for information, and roadways and ports for transport and logistics. While quick response greatly contributes to overall recovery, speed is also important for more subtle and practical reasons. An initial window of opportunity enables international intervention to benefit from the welcoming disposition and high expectations of the affected populations. Misunderstandings and mistakes on both sides, but delays especially, gradually close that window and complicate relationships between beneficiaries and benefactors. Prices rise too as time passes, causing cost overruns in initially sound budgets, and competition among international aid organizations makes commodities and services more difficult to come by.

Equity is an important factor that needs to be taken into account in the planning and delivery of post-conflict assistance – one that must necessarily contribute to efforts at reconciliation between contending parties and to measures that can avoid recurrence of conflict.\(^\text{30}\) Equity is important too in avoiding the fuelling of pre-existing tensions or the creation of new tensions among families, communities, busi-

\(^{30}\) Other important measures, though not directly relevant to the projects under review, include security-enhancing steps under UN auspices, such as taking advantage of relatively stable post-conflict situations to reduce the prevalence of firearms in the civilian population.
nesses or other social groups not necessarily in political or ethnic opposition. This is a factor that has had to be addressed in virtually all of the projects under review, whether over choices of who is to benefit from a rebuilt house, how multi-ethnicity and politics are to be reflected in the national media, which communities are to receive electricity and water first, or ever, whose roads are to be repaired, etc.

Lesson Learned
(See Part IV – Post-Conflict Implications for Assistance.)

2. RELEVANCE OF THE ASSISTANCE

Relevance to Needs
The needs that GOJ/UNDP assistance was to address in Kosovo and East Timor were defined through a series of assessments. These were progressively refined and presented at various international gatherings, further reviewed by Japanese officials and specialists, and discussed in Kosovo and East Timor with staff of international organizations including UNDP, with UN Mission staff representing the national authority, and with national stakeholders where present.

In Kosovo there was no single overall assessment for the entire area; each of the four “pillars” assessed areas of respective concern, and officials from Tokyo and Belgrade determined all the details of assistance, including types, amounts, locations, beneficiaries and modalities. In East Timor, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) assessed the entire area, and a JICA technical team spent January through March 2000 formulating the six projects.

Findings
The modalities of the assessment process as concerned rehabilitation for Kosovo and East Timor had certain differences, but these do not seem to have affected the relevance of the assistance. The Evaluation Team confirmed the relevance of the assistance through on-site visits and discussions.

In Kosovo, the KIM Project addresses the clear need for balanced, informative radio and television broadcasts that are culturally relevant to the entire population. On-site visits quickly confirmed the statistics on destruction of housing, as well as the rudimentary living conditions of impoverished families. Also evident are the need for electricity and the insufficient means of producing and distributing it. The Evaluation Team saw firsthand the inadequate learning environments of several hundred pupils crowded into what remained of two schools and can attest to the pertinence of reconstructing those facilities.

In East Timor, the Evaluation Team found the only road linking the capital, Dili, on the southern shore to Cassa, on the northern shore in poor shape, with sections barely passable. Its rehabilitation is highly pertinent to the thousands who live along the road and need it for their livelihoods. Similarly, blocked and collapsed irrigation systems jeopardized dozens of communities in what has traditionally been East Timor’s most productive agricultural area. Only 27 rural areas in East Timor have had electrical power, from 27 low-output generators. None of these generators has worked since September 1999, depriving these areas of electricity for lighting, refrigeration of medicines and foodstuffs, and operation of tools and light equipment. Electricity for Dili comes mainly from five old, unreliable generators. The Port of Dili’s dilapidated docking and...
navigation aids hinder current and future sea-borne commerce and services. The stakeholders assigned high levels of pertinence to all of these conditions; the Evaluation Team confirmed all of them firsthand and all are being addressed by GOJ/UNDP projects.

The Kosovo projects will provide homes for a thousand families, reliable electric power for dozens of communities and better learning environments for several thousand students. Thanks to the projects in East Timor, hundreds of families will be able to grow food to eat and sell; a major road will enable people and goods to move easily from coast to coast; and 13 of the largest rural communities, mostly in remote mountainous areas, will have electric power for the first time in two years. Dili, East Timor’s capital and main seaport, will receive clean water, promoting health and cleanliness for tens of thousands; functional port facilities, supporting maritime trade and travel; and the electricity it needs as the country’s main metropolis.

Conclusion

All of these projects in Kosovo and East Timor are consistent with the priority post-conflict needs identified through assessments performed on behalf of the international community. The Evaluation Team confirms the projects’ relevance to priority needs of the affected populations in both places.

Relevance to UNDP and GOJ Missions and Expertise

In the context of intra- and inter-organizational debates that have accompanied the increased involvement of the international community in an increasing number of crises and complex emergencies, attention has focused on how international actors can best intervene in post-conflict situations to favour peace building and recovery, given respective mandates, policies, resources and abilities. Within this context, the Evaluation Team examined the consistency of Japan and UNDP’s respective post-conflict missions, roles and comparative advantages and their financial and institutional commitments to infrastructure rehabilitation in the present instance.\(^\text{31}\)

Basic to the philosophy of the Charter for Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) is “the concept that Japan’s ODA helps ensure the efficient and fair distribution of resources and good governance in developing countries through developing a wide range of human resources and socio-economic infrastructure, including domestic systems, and through meeting basic human needs, thereby promoting the sound economic development of recipient countries.”

The Charter identifies infrastructure improvement as a priority form of assistance and a prerequisite to socio-economic development. The Medium-Term (1999-2004) Policy on Overseas Development Assistance emphasizes “human-centred development,” cited as “indispensable to the realization of sustainable development,” and underscores the concept of “Human Security,” which since 1998 has been an important element of Japanese foreign policy. A key premise of the concept is that “armed conflicts result in humanitarian crisis, which destroys the very foundations for human livelihood and, furthermore, devastates the fruit of years of development” and that “subsequent efforts in recovery and reconstruction demand tremendous investments of money and time.” Thus, “considering such a situation as a major threat to human security, Japan has placed priority on providing assistance to the victims of these violent events.”\(^\text{32}\)

UNDP has summarized its role in crisis and post-conflict (CPC) situations as “addressing the development dimensions of these situations,” observing, “this development focus draws upon

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\(^{31}\) It is noted that the Evaluation Team did not extend its scope to review in detail, programmatic relationships between the GOJ/UNDP assistance and the aid that each party was providing outside GOJ/UNDP collaboration. This is an area that warrants attention, given the benefits of synergy that can be had when parts of one overall programme complement other parts of the same programme. Implicitly, this relates to the question of initial selection of sectors to address, which in the case of the GOJ/UNDP assistance was predicated on the GOJ’s choice. A further area of useful inquiry – but outside of the scope of the evaluation – concerns the relationship and place of MSAs, such as those under review, with respect to UNDP’s programming concerns in a given country or situation.

\(^{32}\) The references in this paragraph are to Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (Cabinet Decisions, June 30, 1992) and to “Japans ODA Annual Report 1999,” both to be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (http://www.mofa.go.jp).
and supports the broader mission of UNDP to enable sustainable social and economic development.” The point has also been made that “in its work in CPC situations, UNDP must remain responsive to country demands and build on its clear comparative advantages and experience” and that UNDP’s value added in the CPC environment “stems from the same assumptions that apply to UNDP activities elsewhere: the trust that it enjoys from Governments, its multisectoral approach to promoting sustainable development, its emphasis on capacity building, its approach to coordination and, most importantly, its emphasis in all situations on promoting human development and poverty eradication.”

**Findings**

As stated in the preceding section, the Evaluation Team considered the projects in Kosovo and East Timor pertinent to the needs of the affected populations. If successful, the infrastructure projects under discussion will contribute significantly to human security, development and poverty eradication among populations that have long been, and still are, the poorest in their geographical regions.

While the Evaluation Team felt that short-term success is likely (i.e. the physical infrastructure successfully rehabilitated), the longer-term success necessary to meet GOJ and UNDP goals for human security, development and poverty reduction appears problematic given the paucity of financial, material and human resources to manage, maintain and operate the infrastructure. As discussed in the Sustainability section below, these factors appear not to be sufficiently recognized and addressed, either by the projects or through complementary ones.

All of these infrastructure projects are “entry points” for policy advice, institution building and governance initiatives at various levels and in various sectors. Both the GOJ and UNDP recognize the importance of acting in these broader dimensions to achieve durable results from targeted post-conflict interventions.

In addition, the policies, institutions and governance practices and mechanisms in both situations are largely inoperative, and where operative, for the most part irrelevant, given the changes in political, social, and economic regimes.

In terms of GOJ/UNDP assistance, this is not merely a theoretical matter. In Kosovo serious issues have arisen about cost recovery and public-sector management of national media (within the KIM Project), and power utilities (within the electric power component of the HEI K Project). While responsibility for these matters ultimately devolved upon the OSCE (for the media) and the EU (for electrical power), in both cases the GOJ funding levels, as well as the character and extent of the activities, justified UNDP in drawing upon its capacity- and institution-building expertise and contributing explicitly to policy formulation.

In East Timor, with a smaller, more homogeneous and more tightly organized UN Mission, and with more accessible sectoral administrations than Kosovo, the GOJ/UNDP projects provide clearer evidence of the value of such “entry points” for building capacity and institutions, as well as for providing policy advice, both strategic and practical. In the new political and economic contexts, critical questions remain concerning cost-recovery, for example, in electricity and water, and responsibility for maintenance of irrigation systems and roads.

**Conclusion**

- GOJ/UNDP responses to priority needs in Kosovo and East Timor conformed to the philosophies and roles of both parties for development assistance in post-conflict
contexts. However, more explicit recognition of – and attention to – the links between infrastructure rehabilitation on the one hand, and capacity- and institution-building needs and governance on the other, would have better served these philosophies and roles.

Recommendation
- To the GOJ and UNDP: Steps be taken – for example internal concepts and guidelines developed – that will encourage and enable both institutions to approach the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure in a more holistic manner at the outset and engage them in broader developmental issues related to the maintenance, operation and use of the infrastructure, consonant with their respective roles and objectives in CPC situations.

Lesson Learned
(See Part IV – Capitalizing on Infrastructure Rehabilitation).

Beneficiary Involvement
Among stakeholders, the beneficiaries have the most direct interest in the results of the GOJ/UNDP assistance. Involving beneficiaries in assistance that concerns them is both ethical and a means of seeing to it that the assistance does indeed meet their needs.

Findings
Typically, needs are first assessed and assistance projects formulated shortly after the end of the conflict. At that time, many prospective beneficiaries of a given assistance programme may not have returned from conflict-induced displacement, or for various practical reasons may not have known about, understood, or been associated with the international assessment or formulation processes. The project to rehabilitate an irrigation system in Manatuto District in East Timor is a case in point. In its initial formulation, this project very possibly could not take into account the high volume of water that would be needed urgently by rapidly returning farmers and on a year-round basis. Beneficiaries engaged in a political process to secure changes in project design and sequencing and these have met with some difficulties on the donor side. It is likely this situation could have been prevented had needs been more fully articulated at the outset.

In the case of the housing component of HEIK (in Kosovo), the project was necessarily implemented with the involvement of the population concerned as Municipality Housing Committees had been established throughout Kosovo. The Committees, each comprising representatives of communities, NGOs and UNMIK, were involved in the elaboration of the list of beneficiaries, identification of houses to be included, and various aspects affecting progress in reconstruction. As the Evaluation Team observed in its visit, this was complemented by consultations with traditional representatives (such as elders) in the communities concerned.

Conclusion
- It is probable that several of the projects could have benefited from greater beneficiary involvement in their identification and formulation phases. While all the projects showed commendably increasing levels of beneficiary involvement during implementation, in some cases the increase was in answer to difficulties that arose because of insufficient involvement initially.

Recommendation
- To UNDP and GOJ: Mechanisms and safeguards are needed in assessment, formulation and implementation of post-conflict assistance to ensure initial and repeated consultations with beneficiaries.
The GOJ could benefit from more extensive use of indigenous consultants. GOJ formulation missions – including those of JICA – should, as a matter of course where appropriate, take advantage of UNDP’s institutional relationships and interactions with communities and civil society at all levels in a given country. Contractors should be required to rely more on nationals.

Lesson Learned
(See Part IV – Ensuring Beneficiary Involvement.)

3. PERFORMANCE IN PROVIDING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Project Management

The progress and results of a project greatly depend on how it is managed. In post-conflict contexts, effective project management requires taking into account the inherent uncertainties, the number of actors, their differences and the complexity of relationships, and constraints in logistics and communications.

Four management approaches were used in the nine projects. In Kosovo, a UNOPS Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Pristina implemented the HEIK Project, separated into its two components, housing and electricity. The PMU was also to have implemented the KIM Project, but for reasons discussed below it was implemented by UNOPS staff in New York and Geneva periodically travelling to Kosovo and supported by UNDP staff in Pristina. The Education Project, not yet started when the Evaluation Team visited, was to be implemented by an NGO using its own project-management mechanism. In East Timor, UNOPS implemented the six projects as six distinct exercises through a UNOPS East Timor Implementation Facility (ETIF).

Findings

The Evaluation Team did not have the time nor did it see a need for a detailed review of project management in the case of HEIK or the six East Timor projects. Given the contexts, the Team concluded that the projects were being managed professionally and competently and with appropriate mixes of creativity, flexibility and adherence to implementation parameters and objectives. (No opinion could be formed with respect to the Education Project in Kosovo that had not yet begun.)

However, the Evaluation Team did review in some detail how management of the KIM Project in Kosovo, and of the six projects in East Timor performed in accommodating unexpected circumstances and situations. As described below, the Team found that while the difficulties that have hampered implementation of the KIM Project could hardly have been predicted, they would – in hindsight – certainly have been diminished by the type of two-committee project management mechanism used for each of the six East Timor projects.

The KIM Project shows well how problematic the management of a seemingly straightforward project can become in a post-conflict environment, despite the best intentions and hard work of those directly concerned. In summary, the circumstances were found to be the following:

As described in Part II, in late 1999 the OSCE approached the GOJ, through UNDP/UNOPS, requesting support for the development of independent public radio and television media through provision of studio equipment, transmission equipment, a Kosovo-wide terrestrial network, and some technical and management training. The financial contribution totalled...
$14,500,000 (including $350,000 budgeted for technical and management training drawn from GOJ Emergency Grant Aid funds). A Management Services Agreement specified the use of “tied” services and equipment, and project implementation by UNOPS. The OSCE committed to specific complementary inputs and, by virtue of its lead responsibility for media affairs within UNMIK, was expected to coordinate related aspects (e.g. regulatory matters) and initiatives (e.g. inputs of other donors).

As the project seemed to be a relatively straightforward procurement exercise, special mechanisms for implementation did not seem necessary. UNOPS and UNDP decided to implement it through UNOPS New York, UNOPS Geneva and the UNOPS Tokyo Liaison Office, with backstopping from UNDP Pristina and missions by UNOPS staff and Japanese technicians as necessary. The Project Management Unit (PMU) that was to be established for the HEIK Project was to provide additional backstopping and logistical support as well as act as a conduit between UNOPS at Headquarters and local institutions, in particular OSCE and RTK. However, unforeseen circumstances gradually changed a “turn-key” initiative into a protracted, labour-intensive and politically uncomfortable implementation process, at higher cost to all parties involved, which had yet to be concluded satisfactorily when the Evaluation Team visited.

Following inquiries from UNDP/UNOPS, the OSCE itself recognized that it could not meet its schedule to provide complementary inputs, and in some cases could not provide the inputs at all. The OSCE coordination process was not sufficiently transparent or participative for UNDP/UNOPS to be aware that another donor, USAID, was undertaking development of a Kosovo-wide terrestrial transmission network for private (commercial) media. It is not clear why USAID was unwilling to make this intention known to UNDP/UNOPS, nor why the OSCE was not more proactive in seeing that relevant parties were aware of respective intentions and concerns. Unexpectedly, in May 2000, military authorities objected to one of the locations for the UNDP/UNOPS transmission equipment. Meanwhile, USAID prevailed on military authorities to raise an output level that UNOPS/UNDP had been asked not to exceed in February 2000. This accommodated the more powerful USAID equipment, but made some of the UNDP/UNOPS equipment redundant unless reconfigured to the new levels. Reconfiguring equipment for a different location and higher output levels entailed significant additional costs.

Finally, delays in finalizing the formulation, negotiation and signature process for the HEIK Project, and in obtaining funds, delayed operations of the PMU, which was to have supported both the HEIK and the KIM projects, until October 2000. Even then it was still unable to intervene usefully in what had become a thorny matter.

UNDP and UNOPS efforts to correct these issues were further complicated by problems of continuity associated with frequent staff changes. By the time of the Evaluation Team’s visit, UNOPS and Japanese technical teams had each made several such missions.
changes at OSCE, and by the unexpected involvement of new actors, both local and international, in the media sector.

These events led to additional problems. The OSCE’s inability to fulfill its counterpart commitments delayed implementation. UNDP and UNOPS did not learn enough from the OSCE and from USAID of the character, initiatives and progress of the USAID project. The GOJ felt that it was not sufficiently aware of a situation that had become significantly different from what it had expected and for which it had provided. The changing technical parameters, the USAID initiative, and certain regulatory matters led to protracted discussions in Pristina (which often should have involved a technical interlocutor from UNDP/UNOPS), and to laborious negotiations among USAID, the GOJ, UNDP, UNOPS, and OSCE in Pristina, Washington, Tokyo, Geneva and New York. UNDP Pristina staff became overly involved in work that should properly have been assumed by a PMU, had one been in place on schedule. Cost increases associated with the technical changes led to training funds being blocked temporarily, which in turn delayed sorely needed capacity building.

In East Timor, the Evaluation Team found that a two-committee mechanism had been built into the implementation of each of the six projects. The two committees are a Project Coordination Committee (PCC) and a Project Working Committee. The PCC membership includes the (ETTA) head of the sector concerned and executing agency, the MOFA representative, the heads of UNOPS and UNDP as well as technical staff including the JICA representative, the project’s Chief Engineer and the Project Manager of the consulting firm. The PCC meets every three months, invites representatives of other interest groups and holds special meetings to discuss stakeholder/interest group issues. The PWC membership includes the ETTA/ executing agency, the Chief Engineer as Chair, UNOPS and UNDP project staff, and representatives from GOJ/MOFA, JICA, UNOPS procurement, the consulting firm and the contractor. The PWC meets every two weeks, invites representatives of interest groups to attend meetings and give input, and conducts special meetings to discuss stakeholder/interest group issues. The meetings of both committees are structured, and are scheduled a year in advance.

In varying degrees, all of the projects in East Timor have been problematic to implement, with issues requiring responsiveness, the understanding of all stakeholders and significant funding decisions from the GOJ. The Manatuto Irrigation Project, the Comoro (Dili) Power Station Project and the Rural Power Station Project are good examples. The two-phase Manatuto Irrigation Project, planned and budgeted in considerable detail, met with politically charged objection from beneficiaries who sought immediate changes to the project, plus irrigation benefits in the first (funded) phase that were planned for the second (unfunded) phase. At the Comoro Power Station, the condition of the generators providing power to Dili was so much worse than originally estimated that, without new funding, the generators could only be overhauled and kept running with funds intended for spare parts.

In handling these complications, the two Committees were instrumental in obtaining, reviewing and deciding on the pertinent facts; proposing courses of action; and facilitating GOJ/MOFA decision-making in Tokyo to achieve favourable outcomes. The requested seasonal changes to the irrigation project were

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34 USAID’s assistance in this area had been initiated by a USAID Transition Team. In discussions with the Evaluation Team, staff of the “regular”USAID programme observed that they had themselves not been fully aware of the Transition Team’s activities, and of the implications for the UNDP/UNOPS project, until the Transition Team had made its turnover.
made in time, before the wet season. Funding for the second phase of the project was approved earlier than expected, such that the full benefits could be counted on. Furthermore, the GOJ/ MOFA showed appropriate flexibility in transferring savings from the irrigation project’s first phase to the Comoro Power Station budget.

While circumspection is in order when considering whether a project-management mechanism that proved effective in one situation will be successful in another, the Team finds that if, in Kosovo, UNDP, UNOPS and the GOJ had established a PWC and PCC mechanism by May 2000, the KIM Project’s problems would have surfaced earlier, been better understood by all concerned and been solved more easily. By drawing in stakeholders (especially the OSCE) and other interested parties (USAID and its contractors especially, but also the EBU), the systematic approach used in East Timor would have offset the difficulties with OSCE’s commitments and coordinating role, pressed USAID to reveal more of its plans and kept the GOJ/MOFA better informed as the situation evolved.

**Conclusion**

- The two-committee (PWC/PCC) mechanism used with all six projects in East Timor is an effective means to engage stakeholders; plan, coordinate and monitor project implementation; anticipate and address problems; and keep concerned parties abreast of changes. In retrospect, using this mechanism for the KIM Project in Kosovo would probably have alleviated the difficulties that it confronted. The mechanism could still be used to good effect there, as well as in similar post-conflict assistance programmes.

**Recommendations**

- To UNDP/GOJ: The two-committee (PCC/ PWC) project implementation mechanism, developed and used to the advantage of all concerned stakeholders in East Timor, should be adopted as a standard part of UNDP/GOJ post-conflict assistance, with adaptations as needed.
- To UNDP/GOJ: The two-committee (PCC/ PWC) mechanism should be developed and used in implementing the balance of the KIM Project in Kosovo.

**Lesson Learned**

*(See Part IV – Benefits of Structured, Collaborative Project Management.)*

**Roles in Project Management**

The three different implementation modalities used for the nine projects each involved three parties in three main roles: a UN entity acting on behalf of the national government to be responsible for overall execution; UNDP to monitor/support; UNOPS to implement or provide management services, or in one case ADRA (an NGO) to execute. The Evaluation Team reviewed how these roles were understood and played.

**Findings**

Management of the six projects in East Timor reflects roles that were clearly defined and fully assumed by the parties to the Management Services Agreements: UNTAET with overall responsibility for execution of the projects; UNOPS for implementation; and UNDP for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the MSA. UNOPS put into place an effective management structure and, together with UNDP and the donor representative, established the two above-mentioned committees that formally involved all the parties to the agreement. UNDP assumed its role fully by participating constructively through the project-management mechanisms that it had helped establish, and by ensuring that it had the technical expertise to backstop and monitor the six projects competently. For this purpose, UNDP engaged an interna-

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35 The MSA was explicit on UNDP’s role, notably para.1 (c), “UNDP will have responsibility for ensuring that UNOPS will undertake all its obligations under this agreement and for monitoring the Project in terms of the stated objectives for sustainable human development. This shall include necessary review of any services, work-in-progress or contractor performance for purposes of determining consistency with project objectives and whether adjustment to activities or priorities should be implemented for that purpose. In particular, UNDP will cooperate with UNTAET to oversee project execution generally and as specifically provided for in Appendix II of this agreement.”

36 The Evaluation Team recognized that a particularly strong working relationship between the UNDP Country Office and the UNOPS ETIF had underpinned many of the project-related accomplishments.
ional expert as Infrastructure Coordinator and an East Timorese expert as Infrastructure Engineer. The initiative had the additional benefit of not diverting UNDP’s limited core staff, whose technical skills in any case would not have corresponded to the need.

In the KIM Project in Kosovo, also implemented under an MSA, the signed letter of agreement confined UNDP’s role to “keep(ing) at the Donor Government’s disposal any interest accrued on the undisbursed balance of funds received according to (…), for use for project related purposes” (Para. 4 (c), and “UNMIK, UNOPS and the UNDP Resident Representative shall keep each other fully informed of all actions undertaken in carrying out this Agreement or that may affect it” (Para. 14).

While UNDP’s obligation to monitor project implementation and ensure compliance was spelled out and clearly stated in all six East Timor projects, it was neither spelled out nor clear in the KIM Project MSA. Notwithstanding UNDP’s minimal role as described in that MSA, UNDP staff in Pristina became increasingly heavily involved in implementing and monitoring the project, especially as unexpected circumstances considerably complicated the project’s implementation. This involvement drew heavily on UNDP’s core professional staff for tasks that in some cases should have been assumed by technical or logistics personnel.

Under both the East Timor and the Kosovo MSAs, the UN authorities (UNTAET and UNMIK, respectively) had “overall responsibility for the execution of the Project(s).” The MSAs for all six East Timor projects were signed by representatives of the three principals (the GOJ, UNTAET and UNDP) in the presence of a National Consultative Council representative who also signed.

The KIM Project’s MSA was signed by representatives of the Government of Japan and UNDP. An attachment to the MSA shows that UNMIK/OSCE welcomed the project and listed UNMIK/OSCE commitments, but UNMIK’s responsibility for overall execution of the project is nowhere explicitly acknowledged in the way that, by its signature, UNTAET acknowledged its overall execution responsibility in the MSAs with which it was concerned.

A formal written agreement, irrespective of how many parties sign, will not ensure the intended results. Nonetheless, in situations such as that of Kosovo where the post-conflict context poses unexpected challenges, turnover in international organizations is high, and the organizations may be unfamiliar with UNDP modalities and procedures, all parties must clearly understand and formally commit to their respective roles. Written agreements help accomplish this.

The Evaluation Team recognized the sizeable demands placed on UNDP staff by effective backstopping and monitoring of multi-million-dollar rehabilitation projects like the ones in Kosovo and East Timor. Even if Project Management Units or Facilities are established to implement projects, as was the case for eight of the nine projects, knowledgeable staff must be sufficiently available. The demands increase when management units or facilities are not available, as was unexpectedly the case for the KIM Project, and with unexpected complications, as also occurred with this project. The Evaluation Team found UNDP’s measure in East Timor of recruiting specialized staff specifically for monitoring and backstopping to be useful. Unfortunately, existing procedures and financial practices do not seem to favour such measures. In most cases, UNDP offices receive management fees sufficient to cover most or all of the related costs for such project-related

Resources and qualified staff are needed at the start of a project or before, not a year into the project.

37 The international expert was funded by UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD).

38 It is noted that in an attachment to the MSA entitled “Outline of the Project” it was said that “UNDP/UNOPS will be responsible for monitoring both the substantive implementation of project activities as well as its budgetary reports in close collaboration with UNMIK” without explicitly delineating the respective share of responsibility discussed between UNDP and UNOPS in negotiations of the management fee.
services. Under present UNDP and UNOPS arrangements, the fees are only payable annually and on a reimbursable basis. From a management point of view, this is neither logical nor in everyone's best interest. Resources and qualified staff are needed at the start of a project or before, not a year into the project. 39

In post-conflict situations, early availability of qualified personnel, funds and equipment is a critical requirement if UNDP is to meet its responsibilities in large post-conflict projects, and this must not require diverting staff from core functions of the country office.

Conclusion
- As a matter of routine, the roles of all parties in a project must be clearly understood and agreed to. UNDP has special responsibility for ensuring this, inasmuch as it is accountable for the use of funds. This appears to have been the case for all projects except the KIM Project in Kosovo, which has been affected by unexpected circumstances. Difficulties there would probably have been fewer if the respective roles in this project were clearer to all concerned, and if each organization had played its role more fully.

Recommendations
- To UNDP and GOJ: In all cases the signatories to MSAs should include the national authority or acting national authority having overall responsibility for execution of the project (in addition, of course, to the Government of Japan and UNDP).
- To UNDP and GOJ: The signatories to MSAs should include all parties concerned, including the national authority or acting national authority having overall responsibility for execution of the project. The provisions in the East Timor MSAs on UNDP's role and responsibilities in project monitoring, implementation and execution should be standard in future MSAs.
- To UNDP: Country offices should ensure that they have the necessary personnel to provide the monitoring and backstopping needed. Offices need a means to fund increased capacity, if need be, and other project-related costs from the outset – for example by advance payment of a prospective project management fee, or by easily accessing an existing fund or a revolving fund that could be reimbursed later.

Lesson Learned
(See Part IV – Clear, Fully Played Roles in Project Management.)

GOJ Presence and Involvement
The Japanese Government contributed a large amount of money for the nine projects so as to bring specified benefits to many of the affected populations and their communities in Kosovo and East Timor. Japan, like other donor countries, made this contribution partly to win recognition for living up to its responsibilities as a leader in world affairs, particularly in post-conflict and developmental assistance. Thus, the GOJ would naturally want to be able to monitor use of the funds and make adjustments quickly if necessary.

Findings
It might be argued that in choosing and compensating UNDP for its administrative, supervisory, advisory and intermediary roles in the implementation of the projects, the GOJ should consider itself relieved of any need to be associated closely with them. However, irrespective of the performance of UNDP and other implementing partners, the Evaluation Team found that close association of GOJ representatives both facilitates the projects and serves GOJ interests. Justifications for this involvement include the practical and symbolic importance of GOJ aid, the unpredictability of post-conflict contexts, and the GOJ’s standing policies and practices with respect to Emergency Grant Aid and the use of the UNHSTF.

The relationships between the GOJ and the projects in Kosovo and East Timor show instructive contrasts. Within the GOJ, responsibility for the projects fell to the Japanese embassies in Belgrade and Jakarta, with both embassies initially rotating staff for 2-4 week periods in Pristina and Dili. This was

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39 This problem is particularly acute in a new country office, which does not start up with abundant financial resources.
still the practice for Kosovo during the Evaluation Mission’s visit. The rotating staff kept themselves informed on the projects’ progress but were not directly associated with the projects or the other stakeholders.

By that time, rotations in East Timor had been replaced by two officials outposted to Dili, a Jakarta embassy official at the First Secretary level and a JICA official. Largely by means of the PCC/PWC mechanism, which did not exist in Kosovo, these officials became knowledgeable and closely associated with the projects and other stakeholders.

In particular, the presence in Dili of the Japanese MOFA official, well versed in the six projects and participating in the PWC/PCC mechanism, greatly facilitated understanding among stakeholders and eased the potentially laborious processes for project changes requiring review and approval in Tokyo. For example, when thorny, politically charged issues unexpectedly arose in the Manatuto Irrigation Project, decisions had to be referred to Tokyo. The representative’s explanations and endorsement of the needed changes, made credible by his participation in the project, seemed to have greatly facilitated the decision-making process, which produced a timely and favourable outcome.

The Evaluation Team took note, however, that given the East Timor-wide representational responsibilities of the staff in question, additional personnel, notably local national staff, would benefit GOJ interests and capacities still more.

In terms of serving GOJ interests, there are parallel benefits in the increased GOJ presence in broad UN post-conflict roles and the greater use of Japanese staff in UN missions such as UNMIK and UNTAET. In addition to facilitating interaction with Japanese-funded assistance, this presence adds to the visibility of Japanese concern and involvement. One example is the municipality of Skenderaj/Srebica, where Japan funded several projects through UNDP and UNMIK and a Japanese national served as UNMIK administrator.

Conclusion

All those concerned benefit from close and sustained associations among knowledgeable GOJ staff, GOJ/UNDP project personnel and other stakeholders. In East Timor, long-term outposting of GOJ staff to Dili, and their membership in the PCC/PWC mechanism, clearly facilitated GOJ/UNDP projects.

Recommendation

To the GOJ:
1) To interact more consistently and fully with GOJ-funded projects in Kosovo, the “East Timor model” of a resident MOFA official participating as a stakeholder in project implementation should be adopted and/or reinforced through increased involvement of local staff.
2) In East Timor, GOJ staff, especially national staff, should be increased to enable fuller interaction with GOJ-funded projects.
3) Suitably qualified, junior professional officers should assist mission representatives in monitoring and managing aid projects.
4) Suitably qualified professional officers should be seconded and/or encouraged to apply to UN Missions.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV – Benefits of Structured, Collaborative Project Management.)

Coordination, Frameworks and Partnerships

In the case of Kosovo, the coordination of international assistance needs and responses, and the frameworks and partnerships that were put in place or evolved with respect to delivery, reflected the division of responsibilities among the four UNMIK pillars – the UN, the EU, UNHCR and the OSCE – and of the 20 interim departments under the Joint Interim.
Administrative Council (JIAC) established by UNMIK to administer Kosovo. There were a series of international conferences, beginning with one in Brussels in June 1999, at which needs were tabled across all sectors and for different levels of urgency and time periods. But there was no overarching assessment coordination mechanism or framework.

In the case of East Timor, the United Nations launched a humanitarian relief operation that started along with INTERFET’s intervention (20 September 1999). A Consolidated Interagency Appeal (CAP) was issued on 27 October 1999 for nearly $200 million to fund 48 projects in emergency and transitional programmes through June 2000. With respect to longer-term recovery, a meeting was held in Washington D.C. on 29 September among donors, the World Bank and UN Agencies and East Timorese representatives. The meeting agreed on a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to East Timor so as to identify priority reconstruction objectives and estimate external financing needs. The JAM visited East Timor in October/November 1999, adopting a framework of priority interventions in eight sectors. The findings of the JAM on medium- and long-term needs were presented at an International Donors’ Conference for East Timor held in Tokyo on 17 December 1999, along with the requirements of humanitarian and emergency rehabilitation as identified through the CAP, and budgetary support requirements.

OCHA was the focal point for the coordination of humanitarian operations and assistance until UNTAET was in a position to assume this function along with other overall coordination functions for which it was mandated, including development aid. An UNTAET Donor Coordination Unit was established for this purpose. This Unit has also been helping to establish and operate an external assistance coordination unit within ETTA to allow national authorities to assume this responsibility in due course. The World Bank used its Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) as a coordination mechanism for the activities thus funded – which in turn have been coordinated with the UNTAET Donor Coordination Unit. In March 2000, the UN Secretary-General designated the UNDP Resident Representative in East Timor as UN Development Coordinator, with UN inter-agency coordination functions in the East Timor post-conflict context similar to those of the UN Resident Coordinator elsewhere. Throughout all phases and for all sectors of activity, programme, project or operational coordination was carried out by the international entity or ETTA Department directly concerned.

Findings

All of the projects in both Kosovo and East Timor covered assistance of a type or in a sector also being covered by one or more other donors. With one exception, the various arrangements for the coordination of international assistance had been sufficient to ensure that there was not overlap between the GOJ/UNDP assistance and that of another donor. (This one exception is covered further below in the discussion of the project “Support to Kosovo Media.”)

The housing component of the HEIK Project faced particularly complicated issues of coordination and compliance in several areas. Following the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo, three province-wide assessments were undertaken by the EU-funded International Management Group (IMG), the U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the UNHCR, assisted by KFOR. These provided an information base for the reconstruction of private dwellings – and public buildings – though the scales used to describe levels of damage differed. In many cases, the reconstruction

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40 These sectors were: community development, education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, private sector support/economic management, public administration, judiciary and law enforcement. For each sector East Timorese technical experts were paired with international experts provided by five donor countries (including Japan), the European Commission, UN agencies (including UNDP), the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.

41 As a result, about $520 million was pledged in assistance to East Timor over three years. (This was in addition to the $700 million annually reserved from UNTAET from the UN assessed contribution budget.)

42 Two different scales were used to describe levels of damage to housing – scales of 1 to 4 by the EU and 1 to 5 by UNHCR. There were several donors committed to repairing some 100,000 houses.
initiatives undertaken by the many and varied external organizations increased competition among donor groups and tensions among beneficiaries as norms differed – for example over entitlement to reconstruction assistance, or over the construction standards. The complexity of property ownership and cadastral issues added further complications.

An UNMIK “Strategy Paper on the Housing Sector” of 25 October 1999 provided initial guidelines for reconstruction. UNMIK civil administration progressively developed construction standards and regulations. The Evaluation Team visited civil administration officers in the three municipalities where the HEIK housing component was active and found the project to be interacting effectively with the UNMIK and local authorities concerned – notably in the Cadastral and Planning Services. Visits to several construction sites suggested that interaction with Village Housing Committees was also effective.

The Evaluation Team also noted the fruitful partnership established with the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief43 in the construction of a limited number of houses. The savings in unit costs that the THW was able to achieve enabled the construction of a greater number of dwellings than provided for by the project budget.

The Evaluation Team was not able to assess the HEIK electricity component, or the School Rehabilitation Project with respect to coordination with comparable assistance, implementation frameworks or partnerships with other organizations. But in what the Team saw and learned of these projects it found no reason to question the assertions made on these aspects in the respective project documents. The project document for the HEIK electricity component describes the project as a discrete but complementary component within a Kosovo-wide, multi-donor rehabilitation programme with each donor/aid agency (including the GOJ/UNDP) having a clearly defined role and activities, in concert with Electrokosova, Kosovo’s electrical power utility.

The project document for the School Rehabilitation Project sets the project within the strategic plan (Designing an Education System for Kosovo – DESK) developed by the UNMIK Department of Education and Science and anticipates collaboration with that department, UNICEF, and local education administrators.

In the project “Support to Kosovo Media” however, the Evaluation Team did find that the component that concerns the establishment of the Terrestrial Broadcasting System has suffered the adverse consequences of insufficient and delayed frameworking and coordination. In this case, the GOJ/UNDP Project and comparable USAID assistance progressed on similar tracks, ostensibly unbeknownst to the parties involved – despite the overall executing responsibility for the project of the OSCE, which also had the lead role for media affairs within UNMIK. A collaborative framework was eventually developed after a series of painful negotiations emanating from the conflict of plans and interests, rather than as means of preventing the conflict in the first place.

In East Timor, the assistance provided through the six UNDP/GOJ projects fell within the assistance framework drawn up by the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and put forward at the Tokyo conference in January 2000. The UNTAET Donor Coordination Unit supported coordination of external assistance within the UNTAET framework, and within ETTA as the sectoral departments developed. The Evaluation Team found that the four projects that had then started were coordinated satisfactorily with other comparable assistance, were part of appropriate assistance frameworks, and were interacting effectively with appropriate partners – notably the concerned ETTA departments and officials at national, district and local levels. The

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43 Bundesanstalt Technisches Höfswerk (THW)
two-committee (PCC/PWC) management mechanisms established for each of the projects provided additional guarantees in these respects by making it possible to closely associate all concerned parties with project implementation.

The Evaluation Team took particular note of the project “Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas,” which covered 23 of the 37 rural power stations that were destroyed during the crisis – out a total of 58. Portuguese assistance provided through an MSA agreement with UNDP covered four power stations and the balance was covered by Trust Fund for East Timor (TEFT) assistance implemented by the Asian Development Bank. The coordination mechanisms in place made it possible to sort out an initial duplication of assistance with the ADB over a small number of the power stations, though it was somewhat later that the framework was established for common solutions to a host of common problems. By way of illustration, this includes standardization on the power levels of the generators, a joint approach to the question of missing distribution lines for the electricity generated, and together addressing the thorny issues of cost-recovery and maintenance within the communities concerned. The PCC/PWC mechanism facilitated the process of developing the framework.

Conclusion
The GOJ/UNPD projects in both Kosovo and East Timor were – with one exception – effectively coordinated with other comparable international assistance, adequately integrated in assistance frameworks and interacting with appropriate partners. In the one case where coordination and partnership was weak – the establishment of the Terrestrial Broadcasting System for the KIM Project in Kosovo – intractable difficulties arose. This does not seem to have been a simple case of cause and effect as there were other contributing factors, but these would have been offset significantly had coordination and partnership among the stakeholders in the media sector been more effective from the start.

Timeliness

PROJECT APPROVAL AND FUNDING

Findings
The launches of the HEIK Project in Kosovo and all six projects in East Timor were slowed significantly by difficulties in obtaining project
approvals and/or releases of funds. The KIM Project in Kosovo was also hindered by the late start of the HEIK Project, as the PMU planned for the HEIK Project was also to have covered the KIM Project, and was not operational until six months after the KIM Project began.

GOJ funding came from two different sources and through two different channels. The HEIK and Education Projects in Kosovo were funded from Japanese contributions made to the UN Human Security Trust Fund (UNHSTF), under the UN Controller's authority. On receipt of the UN Controller's approval the money was transferred to UNDP. The KIM Project in Kosovo and the six projects in East Timor were funded from Emergency Grant Aid funds, under the authority of the Grant Aid Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The KIM Project and the six East Timor projects were to be implemented under MSAs; the Grant Aid Division transferred the funds to UNDP accounts once the MSAs were signed and the UNDP accounts and responsible parties specified.

For the HEIK Project, project approval and funding took almost a year, measured from formulation of the first project document in November 1999 to the signing of the final project document in September 2000 and the receipt of funds in October 2000. This process included protracted discussions and modifications related to successive changes in the envisaged execution modality from national execution (November 1999), to UNOPS execution under an MSA (March 1999), to cost-sharing between UNHSTF/UNMIK and UNDP with implementation by UNOPS (July 2000), when approval from UNDP, UNMIK, GOJ, UNHSTF and UNOPS had to be secured again before signature.

Through document review and discussions on this matter, the Evaluation Team found that the process was prolonged partly by the successive decisions on execution and funding, partly by a lack of familiarity and understanding between UNDP and the UN Controller's Office on respective concerns and procedures with respect to UNHSTF, and partly by a multi-point, sequential approval process for using UNHSTF funding, which sometimes involved repeated reviews by different parties at UNDP Headquarters, UN Headquarters, UNOPS Headquarters, the Japanese Mission in New York, UNMIK, UNDP Pristina and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

With respect to the interaction between UNDP and the UN Controller's Office, the Evaluation Team understood that the Controller's Office receives requests from both UNDP field and headquarters staff, and that within UNDP, staff seeking UNHSTF funding do so directly on the basis of personal knowledge and experience with the Fund. With respect to the approval process for UNHSTF funding, the Evaluation Team received recently formulated guidelines that detail the activities to be supported by the Fund (including post-conflict rehabilitation) and the procedures for obtaining funds.

The delays in project approval and funding meant that the reconstruction of houses and restoration of electricity, due to start before winter 1999/2000 and finish before winter 2000/2001, had just started as the winter of 2000/2001 set in. The delay also led to cost increases of over 10 per cent, especially in building materials and transport, between the average prices in 1999 and those in effect nearly two years later. And, as has been indicated, the delay also deprived the KIM Project in May 2000 of the PMU envisaged to support both the HEIK and KIM projects.

For the six East Timor projects, the identification, formulation and approval processes moved systematically from the time when the needs were first assessed by the JAM (November-December 1999), through the Japanese Government's financial commitment at the donor conference (December 2000), the JICA technical missions (March-June 2000) and

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44 Given its nature and circumstances, the KIM Project was started within a reasonable time frame, not having been affected by the problems that delayed the start-up of the HEIK Project and of the six East Timor projects. Indeed, UNOPS appears to have offset the risk of possible delays here by financing technical missions for formulation with the proviso that, once the project document was signed, the charges would be reversed – which was done. The KIM Project was able to achieve major objectives of full rehabilitation and provision of equipment for both TV and radio studios (representing 70 per cent of the total budget) within tight deadlines and according to the work plan. The conclusion of the project as a whole was delayed by the problems and costs surrounding the transmission component, as described in Section 3, “Performance in Providing Assistance.”
the project finalization and approval stages to signature of the six MSAs on 14 July 2000.\(^{45}\) Soon after, the GOJ confirmed the availability of the funds. Various factors, including internal procedural uncertainties within UNDP, delayed the request from UNDP for deposit of the contribution until the last week of September. The deposit was made in early October.

As the MSAs were signed in Dili in July, the delay in receiving the funds was all the more apparent and negatively perceived at the country level. It meant that cost-incurring project activities could not begin, and that activities without significant costs but with implied commitments, such as tendering and planning, began with no assurance of when those commitments could be met. Because these activities could be and were undertaken without incurring significant costs, the Evaluation Team understood that the start-up delay for each project was about one month. Even this delay raised serious concern among stakeholders, especially the beneficiaries of the Manatuto Irrigation project, as it would jeopardize planting if the projected irrigation works were not finished before the flood season.

**Conclusion**

- The approval and funding process for the HEIK Project and the funding process for the six projects in East Timor were unreasonably slow given the predicaments of the intended beneficiaries and expected standards of international responsiveness. The delays were essentially bureaucratic and caused unnecessary difficulties for all concerned at the country level – project managers, counterparts and beneficiaries. Procedures and safeguards can and should be put in place to prevent their reoccurrence.

**Recommendations**

- To UNDP: Internal safeguards are needed for delivering post-conflict assistance on schedule and within time frames consistent with the purpose of the assistance. In particular, project funds made available to UNDP should be secured and engaged promptly.
- To UNDP: At UNDP Headquarters a central in-house function or facility should be established to develop a productive working relationship with the UN Controller’s Office. UNDP requests for UNHSTF funding should be channelled through this function/facility.
- To the GOJ: Recognizing that the UNHSTF is intended to finance activities that include emergency and post-conflict assistance for which speed of response is important, a “fast-track” approval procedure needs to be developed with the UN Controller’s Office for approval of qualifying applications and disbursements, while still respecting UN and GOJ regulations and conditions.

**Lesson Learned**

(See Part IV – Starting Projects Expeditiously.)

**Efficiency**

**FLEXIBILITY OF EMERGENCY GRANT AID AND OF UNHSTF FUNDING**

**Findings**

Because of factors essentially related to post-conflict contexts, the Evaluation Team found that virtually all of the projects in both Kosovo and East Timor have faced or are likely to face increases in costs beyond the budgeted amounts, or other changes affecting budgets, as the following examples show:

- Costs of materials and transport in Kosovo have risen some 10 per cent beyond those used to calculate the budget approved for the HEIK Project.
- Costs to the KIM Project (Kosovo) are likely to increase significantly due to the equipment changes needed because of retransmission locations and output levels different from those originally agreed to.
- Costs of the Comoro Power Station Project have been affected because generating equipment will need more repairs than had been estimated initially.

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\(^{45}\) The Evaluation Team noted the significance of the groundwork carried out by both JICA and UNOPS at this early stage – in technical studies, project planning and documentation, and in consultation with the parties concerned.
Costs of rehabilitating rural power stations have been affected because related facilities are in poorer condition than it had been possible to estimate initially, or were degraded during the intervening period.

Costs of the first phase of the Manatuto Irrigation Project were affected by pressure from beneficiaries to change the sequence of repairs between the first (funded) phase and the second one (as yet unfunded).

While solutions were or are being found to these changed costs, they are being made through budgetary reallocations that have sometimes involved reducing quality (e.g. in HEIK substituting wooden for concrete electricity poles), or scaling down an activity (e.g. training in the KIM Project), or reducing a benefit (e.g. less powerful generators in the rural power project). The Evaluation Team understood that neither in MSAs nor in UNHSTF funding were such contingencies provided for in the individual or overall funding envelopes.46

Conclusion

It is expected of project managers that they will stay within budget, and if this is not possible, then cut expenses or find other ways to cover cost increases. This has been done commendably in several of the projects, with the approval and accommodation of the GOJ, but at the price of affecting other aspects of the assistance provided, and of incurring delays while solutions are found and endorsed.

Recommendations

To the GOJ: In the case of Emergency Grant Aid funding, a set percentage (e.g. 10 per cent) over and above the budget of each project should be pooled into a combined contingency fund for all the projects funded from the same allocation. The contingency fund should be retained in Tokyo, and procedures established to enable quick and flexible decisions to draw on the fund in case of justifiable, unexpected costs linked to post-conflict contexts.

To the GOJ: In the case of funding from the UNHSTF, arrangements similar to those recommended for Emergency Grant Aid should be made with the UN Controller’s Office.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV – Anticipating Increases in Project Costs.)

4. ACHIEVING SUCCESS

Sustainability

NATIONAL TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Findings

Most of the projects in Kosovo and East Timor will likely face severe to moderate sustainability problems. In some cases, project benefits could greatly diminish unless sustainability is assured.

One major risk to sustainability in both Kosovo and East Timor is the shortage of requisite technical and management skills, in terms of both the number of persons and the level of skills. The reasons are similar in both places. In Kosovo’s final decade of Serbian administration, the Albanian population was excluded from positions in which people could acquire or

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46 As concerned the HEIK Project budget, though there was no separate “contingency” budget line, in accordance with standard practice, the possibility of a five per cent increase was foreseen in the budget line apportionments of costs likely to be affected, such as personnel and recruitment. Provision for potential increases in construction and material costs was also made in the project document by specifying flexibility as to the number of houses per category e.g. 350-500 houses in category IV, 350-500 in category V.
The six projects in East Timor, and to a lesser extent, the HEIK/electrification and the media support projects in Kosovo face problems of sustainability.

exercise these skills. Indonesian domination since 1975 similarly excluded the East Timorese from skilled positions.

Another factor limiting development of skills in the target population is that training in the infrastructure projects essentially consists of on-the-job experience that is mainly technical and directly associated with project implementation. This is largely because GOJ Emergency Grant Aid typically provides only for training strictly necessary to furnish the specified assistance. This contrasts with other types of grant aid such as “project-type technical cooperation” that combines grant aid with technical assistance.

Conclusions

- All the post-conflict infrastructure projects in Kosovo and East Timor directly affect the human security and development of the beneficiaries. Important dimensions of capacity- and institution-building, governance and sustainability that were not fully anticipated should be exploited by UNDP and GOJ, jointly or separately, both currently and in similar situations in the future.

- Accompanying the infrastructure projects are critical needs and opportunities for a range of capacity-building initiatives that could increase the projects’ sustainability while providing developmental benefits towards good governance and sustainable livelihoods, both at the community level and over broader areas.

Recommendations

- To UNDP and GOJ: Where insufficient technical or management capacity is likely to undermine indigenous management, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure, policies and measures supporting broad technical and management training are needed to complement infrastructure rehabilitation. UNDP and the GOJ should jointly develop guidelines and models for parallel capacity-building projects and mechanisms to accompany UNDP/GOJ infrastructure rehabilitation assistance. GOJ funding for such parallel projects might be favoured so as to reinforce complementarity in design, synchronisation in implementation and donor visibility.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV - Ensuring the Sustainability of Infrastructure Projects.)

POST-PROJECT MEANS TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN OUTPUTS

The second main reason for potential sustainability problems has to do with the lack of material and financial means with which to operate and maintain infrastructure facilities and services. This is true in both Kosovo and East Timor. In both places physical infrastructure has been poorly maintained and, in some cases, destroyed in the recent conflicts, and associated materials, machinery and parts looted. In both countries too, operating and maintenance costs were borne by the state, or if paid by the beneficiaries, then heavily subsidized. In both countries, the size of the pre-conflict government bureaucracies, and also of the newly installed post-conflict bureaucracies (in particular in East Timor), are disproportionately large for the size of the respective populations and economies. If the bureaucracies are not reduced in size at the appropriate times, those associated with the projects will be an additional financial burden to post-project maintenance.

The six projects in East Timor, and to a lesser extent, the HEIK/electrification and the media support projects in Kosovo face problems of sustainability, partly due to the lack of material and financial resources with which to operate and maintain the rehabilitated infrastructure once the projects are over.

Conclusion

- To UNDP and GOJ: Viable means by which to recover maintenance and operating
costs, or to ensure community/beneficiary burden sharing in operation and maintenance, should be developed if infrastructure rehabilitation projects are to be sustained under such conditions. Here again there is a need and an opportunity for projects parallel to the rehabilitation projects to develop institutional and community capacities, understanding and agreement for cost-recovery and burden sharing, as the case may be.

Recommendations

To UNDP and GOJ: Where the infrastructure concerned cannot be managed, operated or maintained for lack of financial and material resources, policies and means are needed to develop institutional and community capacities, understanding and agreement for cost-recovery, and burden-sharing. UNDP and the GOJ should jointly develop guidelines and models by which GOJ/UNDP assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation can be accompanied by parallel cost-recovery or burden-sharing projects. A phased, “conditional” approach might be taken whereby costs are covered through the infrastructure project for a specific period, conditional to the subsequent engagement of the cost-recovery or burden-sharing procedures developed through the parallel project. GOJ funding for such parallel projects might be favoured so as to reinforce complementarity in design, synchronisation in implementation and donor visibility.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV – Ensuring the Sustainability of Infrastructure Projects.)

Impact

INTERIM “GOOD FAITH”ASSISTANCE
Finding

From the viewpoint of affected populations, there can be a long wait between the first contact with international staff assessing requirements for rehabilitation assistance and the actual delivery of that assistance. This was true for some of the projects under review. In Kosovo, over a year passed, including two winters for most beneficiaries, between the time consultations were held and work actually started on housing reconstruction. In East Timor, villages without electrical power since September 1999 were first “assessed” with respect to their need for electricity in late 1999/early 2000 and are still without electrical power; the prospects of more widely available and cleaner water in Dili, and of a good road between Dili and Cassa were also made known at that time, but work has yet to start.

The Evaluation Team had no direct evidence of the consequences of these long waiting periods, aside from the obvious fact that the initially identified needs remained. But the Team did learn that the seemingly long waiting periods in delivery of aid in general, however justified they might be, had in some cases led to negative perceptions of international assistance.

Conclusion

There is a need to provide early evidence of good intention to offset the possible disillusionment of prospective beneficiaries and encourage their understanding and collaboration. Some form of immediate assistance linked to the sector to be addressed could help to do this. In fact, one modality of Japanese aid – termed “grassroots aid” – is suited to such quick-impact, initial assistance to ultimate beneficiaries at the most disadvantaged socio-economic levels. For example, if grassroots aid had been engaged in late 1999 or early 2000 with which to make small portable generators available to villages stripped of them during the last weeks of Indonesian occupation, it might have been a practical and “confidence-building” step in nurturing benefactor-beneficiary relations.

Recommendations

To the GOJ: When possible and appropriate, “grassroots aid” to potential beneficiaries should be associated with initial project design/formulation exercises as means of both providing interim help in the sector
The “visibility” of an assistance project, that is, the recognition and appreciation of the providers and quality of the assistance, has little if any bearing on the project’s success from the beneficiaries’ viewpoint. For donors and providers, however, visibility is a measure of success.

Concerned and of helping to develop a constructive relationship and attitude vis-à-vis Japanese rehabilitation assistance to be delivered in due course, but over a time period that the beneficiaries are likely to perceive as unexpectedly long.

Lesson Learned
(See Part IV – Maintaining Positive Rapport with Prospective Beneficiaries.)

Keeping People Informed about Post-Conflict Assistance

Post-conflict situations teem with all types of information: rumours, conjectures, half-truths, first-hand, second-hand and third-hand information, mis-information and sometimes, too, the right information, at the right time to the right people. This is understandable, given the dynamics at play within and between the national and international communities. Interests and agendas of all kinds, concerns over survival and recovery, daily pressures and hopes for a better future affect the dissemination of information in many different ways. Adding to the confusion, few international staff of aid organizations are likely to speak the local language or languages and radio and television services may be patchy or non-existent.

Findings

The situations in Kosovo and East Timor fit this norm. The implications for post-conflict assistance in general, and for the projects under review in particular are for sustained and proactive efforts to keep stakeholders, beneficiaries and the general public informed, in appropriate detail, of intentions, commitments and progress with respect to the assistance planned or being provided. Conversely, it is important to remain aware of what is being said. An example is the GOJ/UNDP Project to Maintain the Output Capacity of the Comoro Power Station, which assures the electricity supply for the city of Dili (with considerable difficulty, given the poor condition of the generating equipment.) To combat misplaced rumours about prospective power outages, which can cause ill feeling and panic buying, the ETTA power authority seeks out the rumours and does its best to dispel them with radio bulletins.

Each of the GOJ/UNDP projects affects large numbers of people directly, and is of practical interest to a yet larger number of interested persons and organizations, in Kosovo and East Timor and beyond. This “concerned constituency” has practical interests in the needs addressed by a project, the related background and general information, the expected results and regular updates on progress and plans.

The Evaluation Team found that the information given on the management of the projects in Kosovo and East Timor was ample and well suited to that purpose. General information publicizing what the GOJ and UNDP were funding and undertaking was also available, but regularly updated information for the “concerned constituency” seemed to be lacking. The readable, informative one-page briefs on each of the six East Timor projects, available in paper form and on the UNDP-Dili website, would be all the more useful if expanded to include data on plans and progress in implementation, and if updated monthly.

Conclusion

More can and should be done to keep the “concerned constituency” of each project abreast of its status through provision of pertinent facts on the project as well as data on plans and progress in implementation, notably to offset the poor quality and limited availability of information that is common in post-conflict contexts.
Recommendation

- To UNDP: Monthly bulletins should be published, disseminated and posted on appropriate UNDP websites giving basic and practical information about each GOJ/UNDP Project in Kosovo and East Timor, as well as data on plans and progress in implementation. This will benefit stakeholders and other members of the broader “concerned constituency,” such as donors and other international and national actors working in the same sector.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV – Keeping People Informed About Post-Conflict Assistance.)

VISIBILITY

The “visibility” of an assistance project, that is, the recognition and appreciation of the providers and quality of the assistance, has little if any bearing on the project’s success from the beneficiaries’ viewpoint. For donors and providers, however, visibility is a measure of success. Indeed, one justification for Japan’s ODA is that “providing aid to the developing world and working on global issues can be expected to earn Japan better ties with other countries, particularly in the developing world, bolster its stature in the eyes of the international community, and contribute to broader global understanding of and support for Japan and its people.” Similarly, UNDP can benefit politically, financially and in institutional self-esteem from visible UNDP expertise, roles and aid.

Visibility goes well beyond the flags, stickers and signs publicizing the sources of aid, and is measured by potentially subjective standards of understanding, appreciation and recognition. The relevance of the assistance to the needs and satisfaction of beneficiaries, the awareness of beneficiaries, donors and the media of GOJ and UNDP assistance, and in the case of Japanese aid, evidence of Japanese goods, services and organisations, all contribute to visibility.

Visibility can be “positive” or “negative” or both, depending on perceptions of a range of matters including the usefulness, success, fairness and promptness of assistance.

Findings

Maintaining positive visibility in the post-conflict contexts of Kosovo and East Timor requires attention to such considerations as flexibility in planning and funding, sustainability, regular consultation with beneficiaries and good information flow. Potential sources of negative visibility include perceived unfairness in allocations of housing, electrical power, or water; delays in implementation; real or feared power outages; and/or simply expectations of having to pay for services previously available free-of-charge, such as electricity.

All of the projects under review are to provide very visible assistance: houses, electricity, roads, irrigation, port facilities, clean water, radio and television are all physically evident, desired by many people, and politically and economically significant. All of these projects have potential for both positive and negative visibility, based more on how quickly, how well, and how fairly the assistance is provided than on their usefulness, which is well recognized.

The Evaluation Team found that on the whole, the projects have indeed generated “positive” visibility so far. In both Kosovo and East Timor, Japan’s aid was made clear in official documentation and public information on the international response in both places. In Kosovo, where international donors and organizations readily publicize their work, numerous signs and stickers attested to the GOJ/UNDP partnership in the HEIK and KIM projects, and scores of student beneficiaries-to-be of the Education Project lined up at their makeshift schools to greet the GOJ, UNDP and ADRA representatives along with the Evaluation Mission. In East Timor, where international publicity is lower key, there was less physical testimony, but comparable recognition at large.

Conclusion

Overall, Japan’s assistance and the related activities of UNDP and UNOPS have generated considerable positive visibility and special efforts have helped minimize negative visibility when problems and delays occurred. Given the near inevitability of occasional setbacks in such projects and contexts, these special efforts will remain necessary.

Lesson Learned

(See Part IV – Keeping Visibility Positive.)
The Evaluation Team derived 11 generic “lessons learned” from the experience of the nine projects in Kosovo and East Timor. These are given below, in order of priority, based on a rough estimate of lessons that might be overlooked, but if applied to similar future assistance would have the most positive effect.

1. Post-Conflict Implications for Assistance
Post-conflict situations have special characteristics. For assistance in rehabilitation, recovery and peace building to be relevant, effective and sustainable, the following characteristics must be taken into account at each stage of planning and implementation.

- Flexibility is the single most important attribute for providing relevant, effective and sustainable rehabilitation assistance in post-conflict situations, in all dimensions of the planning, preparation and furnishing of the assistance: in design, budgeting, sequencing of events, scheduling, etc. Close behind in importance are well-structured frameworks for coordinating assistance, quick responses to critical needs, and the equitable allocation of benefits. Coordinated, quick and equitable action sustains credibility and receptivity of the beneficiaries and reduces the risk of contention between them over the allocation of assistance.

- The quality of post-conflict assistance greatly depends on the quality of information available to planners. Comprehensive, accurate, specific and up-to-date information on economic, social, political and community
conditions is needed for realistic, appropriate planning that will also help prevent unrealistic expectations among beneficiaries and eventually lead to disappointment and resentment. As such information may not be readily available, the measures needed to develop and disseminate it should be taken as early as possible.

2. Starting Projects Expeditiously
The well-being of affected populations, the credibility and possibly the viability of international assistance depend significantly on needs being met expeditiously. Institutionalized processes that reflect this urgency should be applied to the formulation and approval of rehabilitation projects, and to the transfer of funds that allows them to start.

Although post-conflict rehabilitation of infrastructure is not as urgent a matter as the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance, it does need to be undertaken quickly; the well-being of affected populations, socio-economic recovery, and the credibility and possibly the viability of international assistance depend significantly on internationally recognized priority needs being met expeditiously. Institutionalized, fast-track processes that reflect the urgency of the needs should be applied to the formulation and approval of rehabilitation projects, and to the transfer of funds that allows them to start. In the absence of such measures, there is risk that the process and time needed will result in delays. While these delays might be considered acceptable in cases of “normal” developmental assistance, in cases of post-conflict assistance they undermine the results sought by all stakeholders.

3. Ensuring the Sustainability of Infrastructure Projects
Infrastructure projects are likely to need capacity-building and cost-recovery components or complementary parallel projects.

Infrastructure projects in post-conflict situations are likely to face significant sustainability problems, in places where ethnic or political groups had previously kept positions requiring management and technical ability for themselves, and where previous political/economic regimes had allowed for little experience with cost-recovery schemes suited to less controlled societies and economies. Thus infrastructure projects should include the needed (and probably consequent) capacity-building components, or be complemented with parallel assistance to build capacities. Where applicable, infrastructure projects should also include the means by which to transition to and maintain the related cost-recovery schemes – again, either within the projects themselves or by means of parallel, complementary assistance.

4. Capitalizing on Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Post-conflict needs are likely to include rehabilitation of various types of physical infrastructure. This can bring large-scale benefits for human security and overall recovery. There is opportunity and need for donors to also address policies, institutions, cost-recovery schemes and governance issues related to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, and to capitalize on the “entry points” available to address yet broader developmental concerns.

Post-conflict needs are likely to include rehabilitation of various types of physical infrastructure. The human security and development of the beneficiaries – typically numbering tens of thousands, the socio-economic health of many communities, and the speed and quality of overall recovery will be affected by how effectively this rehabilitation is carried out and the positive results sustained. Invariably this will require more than physical works. The policies, institutions, governance and cost-recovery schemes related to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure that existed prior to the conflict may, in the post-conflict situation, be ineffective, ill adapted or non-existent. There is opportunity and need for donors and international
organizations that have concerns regarding the long-term benefits of infrastructure rehabilitation to respond to these critical dimensions. At the same time, there is also scope for capitalizing on the “entry points” thus available to address yet broader developmental issues related to the rehabilitated infrastructure, for example, policy formulation, institution building or poverty reduction.

5. Benefits of Structured, Collaborative Project Management

Structured project management mechanisms involving all stakeholders around a given project can help offset complications surrounding project implementation in post-conflict situations; in cases of external funding, the donor representative is likely to facilitate donor review and approval of needed changes.

- Project implementation in post-conflict situations will probably be accompanied by uncertainty, the unexpected, weaknesses in coordination and information-sharing, and relational difficulties among organizations operating in the same fields. Changes in plans and budgets will typically be required. Structured, participative and substantive project management mechanisms, established and operated around a given project and involving all stakeholders at working and senior management levels, can help offset these detrimental aspects. In projects involving external funding and a need to obtain donor approval of changes, a donor representative who is closely associated with the project and the other stakeholders is likely to facilitate and speed the donor’s review and approval processes.

6. Clear, Fully Played Roles in Project Management

Roles in project management should be clearly specified and committed to; capacities to play these roles fully should be assured.

- Typically the formulation and provision of international assistance in post-conflict contexts places high time and performance demands on international organizations, many of which are likely to be understaffed, under-resourced and over-extended, at least in the initial stages of their presence. National organizations are likely to be in a still more unfavourable condition. In such contexts, the responsibilities of all parties to a given assistance project need to be all the more clearly understood and committed to. These responsibilities and commitments should be detailed and agreed to in the relevant project document or agreements. The ability of each party to play its role fully should be ensured, if necessary by increasing its capacity.

7. Ensuring Beneficiary Involvement

Displacement and survival concerns linked to the past conflict can result in insufficient involvement of beneficiaries; proactive efforts are thus needed for consultations through all assistance phases.

- Typically, needs are first assessed and assistance projects formulated shortly after the end of the conflict. At that time, many prospective beneficiaries of a given assistance programme may not have returned from conflict-induced displacement; or, for various practical reasons they may not have known about, understood, or been associated with the international assessment or formulation processes. In “demand type” post-conflict assistance, consultation with beneficiaries should be a continuing process at all stages: selection, design and implementation.
8. Anticipating Increases in Project Costs
In post-conflict contexts, project costs are almost certain to rise for unpredictable reasons. There should be budgetary provision to cover them quickly by means of a contingency fund or budget line.

In post-conflict contexts, project costs are almost certain to rise for unpredictable reasons. There should be budgetary provision to cover them quickly without affecting the quality of outputs or the initially envisaged benefits of projects. A contingency fund or budget line of a certain percentage over and above project budgets should be reserved for this purpose, and procedures set to enable expeditious review and as decided, release of funds.

9. Maintaining Positive Rapport with Prospective Beneficiaries
Small amounts of interim aid to prospective beneficiaries of international assistance can help maintain a positive relationship between the time of initial international assessment and delivery.

Even when international rehabilitation assistance is delivered expeditiously, there can be a long wait from the viewpoint of prospective beneficiaries between the first contact with international staff assessing requirements and actual delivery of assistance. Efforts are needed to maintain contact with and avoid the disillusionment of the prospective beneficiaries in the interim; for this purpose, providing small amounts of aid early on, preferably related to the assistance planned, is desirable.

10. Keeping Visibility Positive
The visibility of an assistance project goes well beyond flags, stickers and signs publicizing the sources of aid. Visibility can be “positive” or “negative” or both, depending on perceptions of a range of matters including the usefulness, success, fairness and promptness of assistance.

The “visibility” of an assistance project, that is, the recognition and appreciation of the providers and of the quality of the assistance, has little if any bearing on the project’s success from the beneficiaries’ viewpoint. For donors and providers, however, visibility is a measure of success. But visibility should be understood as going well beyond the flags, stickers and signs publicizing the sources of aid. Visibility can be “positive” or “negative” or both, depending on perceptions of a range of matters including the usefulness, success, fairness and promptness of assistance. Maintaining positive visibility in the post-conflict contexts of Kosovo and East Timor requires attention to such matters as sustainability, regular consultation with beneficiaries, good information flow and adapting quickly to changed circumstances through flexibility in planning and funding.

11. Keeping People Informed About Post-Conflict Assistance
Timely, accurate progress updates on assistance are needed to reduce misunderstanding among prospective beneficiaries.

Uncertainty, confusion, sense of insecurity and rivalries are inherent to post-conflict situations and can have negative effects on the prospective beneficiaries’ perception of the assistance intended for them. This risk can be reduced through timely, accurate progress updates.
1. OVERALL CONCLUSION

Conditions fully warranted the financial and institutional commitments which the GOJ and UNDP made to rehabilitate infrastructure facilities destroyed, damaged or in disrepair in Kosovo and East Timor, affecting the human security of thousands and socio-economic development in dozens of communities.

Overall, the assistance under review in Kosovo and East Timor is relevant and effective, and is coordinated and integrated satisfactorily into the wider international post-conflict aid programmes. However, all of the rehabilitated infrastructure and related services (except housing in Kosovo’s HEIK Project) face difficulties with long-term sustainability of operations and maintenance due to weaknesses in technical and management capacity, material and financial resources, and cost-recovery and burden-sharing strategies.

Despite the urgency of the situations, the start of each project was delayed by unreasonably slow document clearance and/or funding procedures, and each has faced additional delays and/or complications due to the unforeseen circumstances characteristic of post-conflict situations. All projects underscore the need to build flexibility into the funding modalities and project cycles. Several projects showed sound project management and well-designed mechanisms involving all stakeholders and sustained consultation with the beneficiaries will help expedite projects despite circumstances.

Though unfinished, experience to date with this GOJ/UNDP collaboration has been sufficiently broad and instructive to furnish a good
basis for similar cooperation in the future. Clearly, there has been a convergence of comparative advantage and interest. The GOJ has a strong record of proficient and sound assistance in infrastructure rehabilitation, while UNDP has a strong record of interacting productively with national and international entities at all levels and across the development spectrum. Both have the commitment to, and interest in, socio-economic recovery and peace-building in post-conflict environments and lessons drawn from the experiences in Kosovo and East Timor should benefit future collaborations. The experience should also encourage both organizations to associate post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation with expertise and assistance in institution-building, governance, human security and sustainability.

In closing, a word about the timing and utility of evaluations such as this. At first sight, this evaluation may seem oddly timed, since none of the projects under discussion were finished and several had not even started when it took place. In addition to the likelihood that a more thorough evaluation will be possible when the projects are done, this timing naturally raises concerns about distracting personnel from operational matters.

The Evaluation Mission believes that these concerns are outweighed by the prospect that the results of its work will help to improve the ongoing efforts. It also hopes that the benefits will prove sufficient to encourage midstream evaluations of future post-conflict rehabilitation projects and programmes.

2. BEST PRACTICE

The following is an illustration of how GOJ/UNDP post-conflict assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation might best be provided on the basis of the findings, conclusions and lessons learned from the Evaluation Team’s work. This “best practice” scenario is based on the post-conflict contexts found overall in Kosovo and East Timor, and on the funding (Emergency Grant Aid and UNHSTF) and implementation modalities (MSA and cost sharing) and execution organizations (UNOPS and ADRA) used in the present instance. The scenario is to be understood as idealized and over-simplified for the sake of illustration.

**Assessment and Conceptualization**

Post-conflict needs are identified through an internationally mandated, multi-organizational assessment team, such as the JAM used in East Timor. The needs and possible assistance are discussed and confirmed by MOFA officials in accordance with the relevant objectives, policies and procedures. The UNDP country office is associated with these discussions as appropriate. The GOJ confirms its intention to contribute in the sectors and manner previously discussed.

**Feasibility and Technical Studies**

Pre-feasibility studies and relevant information and data are brought together. Japanese technical teams undertake the requisite assessment and formulation missions, making full use of the assembled background information. Beneficiaries and local experts recruited for the purpose are associated closely with the technical studies, along with UNDP and other international and donor organizations present. If at this stage it is thought that UNOPS or another entity is

<table>
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<th>SIX LESSONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Infrastructure projects are likely to need special sustainability measures.</td>
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<td>2) Infrastructure projects can bring critical and large scale benefits and are “entry points” to other important areas.</td>
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<td>3) Clear roles and structured, collaborative project management offsets implementation challenges.</td>
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<td>4) Post-conflict projects need to start expeditiously, and remain flexible.</td>
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<td>5) Proactive efforts are needed to initiate and maintain involvement of the beneficiaries, and develop a positive rapport with them.</td>
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<td>6) In a given sector, a common framework of assistance from different sources brings benefits to all stakeholders.</td>
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49 Without presuming to predict the eventual results of the collaboration once the projects have been completed, it is probable that the GOJ, UNDP, JICA and UNOPS can draw on their collective experience in Kosovo and East Timor to make a useful contribution to the growing body of literature, guidelines and models for post-conflict assistance in infrastructure rehabilitation and the associated issues of human security, governance and institution-building.
likely to execute the project, it is also associated with the study and ensuing project formulation.

**Anticipating Sustainability Needs**
Specific attention is given to the technical and management capacities to maintain and operate the infrastructure once rehabilitated, including the question of institution building (e.g. public utilities), cost-recovery schemes and possible governance issues. Appropriate parallel projects addressing these matters and complementing the physical rehabilitation project are prepared and submitted for funding, either to the GOJ or another donor.

**Project Impact and Rapport with Prospective Beneficiaries**
For greater impact and added value, logical linkages are made with other ongoing or planned GOJ and UNDP projects in the same geographical areas (e.g. the linkage between the HEIK Project and the brick factory reconstruction project in Skenderaj District in Kosovo). In connection with each project proposal, dialogue is established with representative(s) of the beneficiaries and GOJ “grassroots” assistance is provided in the area to be addressed by the project proper.

**Fast-Tracking Project Formulation, Approval and Disbursement**
Following the decision and agreement to fund the project(s) through UNDP, and formulation of project document(s), the documents are approved on a pre-established “fast track” sequence, with pre-established time frames for each step and each party involved. Progress is closely monitored through the approval process for UNHSTF funding, which requires agreement from several geographically widespread parties. Within UNDP Headquarters, responsibility for this monitoring lies with a unit specifically established to interact with the UN Controller’s office and the GOJ/MOFA/UN Mission on UNHSTF matters, including the submission of UNDP funding requests.

**Anticipating Cost Increases**
For post-conflict assistance projects funded from Emergency Grant Aid, 10 per cent over and above the total to be financed from a given allocation is retained in Tokyo as a contingency fund for quickly covering unexpected, justifiable cost increases, following GOJ/MOFA approval. For projects funded from the UNHSTF, a similar 10 per cent contingency fund is retained in New York, with disbursements requiring approval from the UN Controller’s office and the GOJ/MOFA.

**Clarity and Understanding of Roles and Commitments**
With respect to project implementation, UNDP ensures that all parties to the project(s) are fully briefed on their roles, responsibilities and commitments, and that these are all clearly and fully spelled out and signed off on in the related agreements and project documents. UNDP’s responsibilities in particular are fully explained, notably as they relate to other parties in the agreement(s).

**Ensuring Capacity to Monitor and Backstop**
The UNDP country office obtains an advance from a central revolving fund at Headquarters against future payment of management fees. It promptly recruits the additional staff with the expertise that will be needed for the office to play its role fully in project implementation.

**Establishing Participatory Project Management**
UNDP ensures that a project management mechanism modelled on the PCC/PWC established by UNDP/UNOPS/GOJ in East Timor is set up for each project. The GOJ ensures that at least one MOFA representative, preferably residing in the affected area, is associated with the project(s) and participates in the PCC/PWC mechanisms and other project activities as appropriate.

**Regular Information Updates on Progress**
As of a project’s approval, UNDP initiates a monthly series of information bulletins for stakeholders and others concerned with the project, providing key facts about the project and updates on project implementation and plans.
## ATTACHMENTS

### A. EVALUATION TEAM AND OBSERVERS

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<tr>
<th><strong>Japan</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNDP</strong></th>
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B. LIST OF PEOPLE MET

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Financial Management Officer
Ms. Minako Tachibana,
Financial Management Officer

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Mr. Hiroyuki Moronaga, Programme Advisor

Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific
Mr. David Lockwood, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Regional Director
Ms. Hiroko Takagi, Programme Analyst, South East Asia and Pacific Division

Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (RBEC)
Mr. Jakob Simonsen, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director
Ms. Josyanne Chapelier, Chief, Division I
Ms. Soknan Han Jung, Deputy Chief, Division I
Mr. Paolo Galli, Programme Management Specialist, Former Yugoslavia States, Div. I

Emergency Response Division (ERD)
Mr. Omar Bakhet, Director

Evaluation Office (EO)
Mr. Khalid Malik, Director
Mr. M. Nurul Alam, Deputy Director
Mr. Douglas Keh, Evaluation Specialist (also an observer to the Evaluation Mission)

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
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Kosovo/Yugoslavia

United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Skendera/Srbica Municipality
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Mr. Vladimir Themaikov, Deputy Municipal Administrator (Energy and Utilities)

Peje-Pec Municipality
Mr. Robert Charmbury, Administrator
Ms. Gisela Kallenbach, Deputy Municipal Administrator

Maliqsheve District
Mr. Mujahid Alam, Administrator & Coordinator of KPC (Prizen Region)

Rahovec District
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C. LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

General


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General


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UNDP-GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN JOINT ASSESSMENT OF POST-CONFLICT ASSISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR AND KOSOVO

Justification and Background for Evaluation

The Government of Japan has requested the Evaluation Office (EO) to conduct an evaluation of UNDP projects funded by Japan in Kosovo and East Timor; the key objective is to distil lessons learned that could improve international programming and project implementation in post-conflict situations. As funding from Japan supports a sizeable share of UNDP programming in East Timor and Kosovo, the conclusions from this evaluation should help Member States as well as UNDP itself in developing and indeed expanding their post-conflict assistance.

In both Kosovo and East Timor, the United Nations has taken on an unprecedented role in maintaining peace and rebuilding the foundations of civil society. In myriad respects, United Nations involvement in these two geographic entities is distinct from those in the past where it has assisted in the peace-building process. Indeed, the extent of its role in a wide range of sectors that are essential for the transition from relief to development is the main justification for an early assessment of UNDP programmes in Kosovo and East Timor.

As the focus on the United Nations in post-conflict situations expands from peace-keeping to peace-building efforts, the coordinating role of UNDP in post-conflict situations has become an issue of paramount importance. More so than ever before, the question of how UNDP can best assist in planning and coordinating post-conflict support programmes deserves to be examined on a rigorous and empirical basis. Paragraph 17 of the report, “Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-conflict Situations,” submitted to the 2001 First Regular Session of the Executive Board (DP/2001/4) contains the following text:

“The convergence of actors working in the crisis and post-conflict environment and an increasing appreciation of the need to approach operations in an integrated fashion place a higher premium on UNDP support to the wider United Nations and to coordination processes generally.”

The Report of The Panel on United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report, includes the following text: “In the Panel’s view, UNDP has untapped potential in [the peace-building] area, and UNDP, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the

ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE

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lead in implementing peace-building activities. The Panel therefore recommends that ECPS propose to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.”

Clearly, a process of review and assessment is critical to any reorientation in United Nations peace-building strategies; it is in this context that this evaluation serves as a learning experience not only in terms of distilling lessons learned from and about the two entities visited, but in terms of how the UN can maximize the quality and cost-efficiency of the resources being channelled through it to post-conflict situations.

Purpose of the Evaluation
This exercise will review progress and lessons learned during the initial phase of Japan-funded programmes in East Timor and Kosovo. The assessment will:

- Assess progress of Japanese-funded projects in Kosovo and East Timor;
- Identify lessons learned that may prove useful to both UNDP and Member States in the context of planning and implementing international assistance in post-conflict situations;
- Make recommendations that could enhance the cost-effectiveness and programming quality of Japanese overseas development assistance.

Scope of the Evaluation
This exercise should distil useful lessons learned that improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of international assistance to post-conflict situations. The scope of the evaluation should cover the following issues:

- Evaluative Assessment. UNDP projects, funded by Japan, are the main focus of the evaluation; bilateral projects funded by Japan to Kosovo and East Timor should be included to the extent that their inclusion will provide a more comprehensive view of the sectoral coverage of Japanese assistance. The evaluation should review progress in project planning and implementation as well as funding modalities; conclusions should be articulated in such a way that they can be channelled back into the programming cycle for the UNDP and/or Japanese funded projects in East Timor and Kosovo.
- Beneficiary Inputs. The exercise should not only assess the extent to which projects are fulfilling intended objectives but also on development outcomes, i.e., changes in the lives of intended beneficiaries. In this regard, the exercise should contribute to the knowledge base for multilateral assistance in post-conflict situations by arriving at substantive recommendations in the sectors for which UNDP assistance in Kosovo and East Timor has been concentrated.
- Substantive Issues for Evaluation. A common element for the projects to be examined is an emphasis on infrastructural rehabilitation. The evaluation team should be prepared to carry out its work with a view to assessing on-ground developments in the main sectors which have received particular attention in UNDP-Japan assistance programmes:
  - In Kosovo, the focus should be on funding and carrying out rehabilitation in the media sector, housing and electrification, as well as initial developments in experience with schools/educational facility rehabilitation;
  - In East Timor, the focus should be on developments in water supply and irrigation, power supply/electrification, and port rehabilitation (Dili).
  - Optimizing procurement modalities should be a target of analysis in both cases; thus, recent evaluative work on UNDP-UNOPS cooperation should be referred to accordingly.
- Innovations in Project Design. The evaluation should focus on areas where there are indications that on-field developments may necessitate fine-tuning and/or reorientation during subsequent project implementation; the evaluation should in this light seek to identify noteworthy examples of flexibility in project design. The final report should identify specific project innovations – either evidenced in the projects evaluated or arrived at through careful assessment.
thereof – that could be replicated in other projects designed for implementation in post-conflict situations.

Methodology and Timeframe
The evaluation will be conducted on the basis of a literature/desk review, consultations with programming offices at UNDP, in-country missions, interviews with stakeholders, and the preparation of a report that includes recommendations for subsequent action. After it is finalized, the report will be presented at a seminar in Tokyo, as well as at a counterpart event at UNDP headquarters in New York.

- Literature Review (10 March-21 March). This phase entails preliminary data-gathering by the relevant actors in Tokyo, New York, Dili and Pristina. Details on the extent, nature, and intended outcome of assistance to the two areas should emerge during this phase.

- Consultations at NY Headquarters (22-23 March). The evaluation team should meet in New York to review relevant documentation and discuss objectives, modalities, and respective responsibilities.

- Field Observations: Kosovo (25-31 March). The evaluation team will visit Kosovo for first-hand observations and interviews with the relevant sources. The team will be assisted by field-based UNDP staff and local Japanese embassy staff.

- Field Observations: East Timor (2-11 April). The evaluation team will visit East Timor for first-hand observations and interviews with the relevant sources. The team will be assisted by field-based UNDP staff and local Japanese embassy staff.

- Meetings with Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12-13 April). The evaluation team will visit Tokyo for interviews with Government officials. This exchange will also serve as a debriefing, with which evaluation team members can also validate and further refine field-level observations.

- UNDP headquarters debriefing (16-17 April). During this phase, team member(s) will visit New York to meet with the relevant offices at UNDP headquarters.

These interviews will validate and/or further refine observations made during the field visits.

- Draft Report Preparation (18-26 April). Based on information gathered during the field visits and preceding documentation review, a draft report will be prepared by the evaluation team.

- Report Finalization (27 April-15 May). The report should be shared with all relevant stakeholders; comments will be reflected in the final draft to be ready by 15 May.

- Tokyo and New York Events. A seminar at which the report will be presented is to take place in Tokyo in early June (4 June). A counterpart event will be held in New York (11 June).

Team Composition
The Evaluation Team will consist of 3-4 international experts who have no current institutional affiliation with either of the sponsoring entities (UNDP & GOJ). A staff member from the UNDP Evaluation Office will accompany the expert team during parts of the field visits as a facilitator.

Implementation Modalities
The Evaluation Office will be responsible for organizing the evaluation and will assign one of its staff members to manage it. During the preparatory phase of this exercise, the Government of Japan will assist in the conceptualization and planning for the evaluation; the Government of Japan will also act as a key source of information during field observations and review of the draft report. Country offices to be visited will assist in organizing the field visits. Additional participants/observers may accompany the evaluation team during the field visits. The evaluation team will be responsible for delivery of the finalized report, with comments from stakeholders reflected, no later than 15 May 2001.